Skanska Rashleigh Weatherfoil Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1732 (22 November 2006)

Skanska Rashleigh Weatherfoil Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1732 (22 November 2006)

The natural and primary meaning of the August letter, particularly paragraph 5, is that the temporary arrangement was to be governed by the terms of the June FMA, except for those terms inconsistent with the temporary nature or the express provisions of the August letter. The reference to the June FMA was not limited to identifying the services but extended to the terms under which the services were to be provided.

Citation
[2006] EWCA Civ 1732
Parties
Claimant/respondent: Skanska Rashleigh Weatherfoil Ltd; Defendant/appellant: Somerfield Stores Ltd
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
22 November 2006
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court (queen's Bench Division) to Court of Appeal
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Interpretation of Contracts, Incorporation of Terms, Facilities Management Agreements, Preliminary Issues
Contract Law Commercial Law Interpretation of Contracts Incorporation of Terms Facilities Management Agreements Preliminary Issues

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Parties

Skanska Rashleigh Weatherfoil Ltd

Claimant/respondent

Somerfield Stores Ltd

Defendant/appellant

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court (queen's Bench Division) to Court of Appeal

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the temporary agreement incorporated all, some, or few of the terms of the draft Facilities Management Agreement (June FMA) referenced in the August letter.

Ratio Decidendi

The natural and primary meaning of the August letter, particularly paragraph 5, is that the temporary arrangement was to be governed by the terms of the June FMA, except for those terms inconsistent with the temporary nature or the express provisions of the August letter. The reference to the June FMA was not limited to identifying the services but extended to the terms under which the services were to be provided.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • Matter remitted to the judge to determine which terms of the June FMA apply to the temporary arrangement if parties cannot agree.