Wood v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government

Wood v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government

The inspector lawfully interpreted the planning permissions as authorizing only commercial mooring as part of a boatyard, not unrestricted private mooring; the current use constituted a material change of use requiring planning permission, and the restriction to 25 vessels was a lawful exercise of planning judgment.

Parties
Claimant: Roger Wood; First Defendant: Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; Second Defendant: The Broads Authority
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
06 August 2015
Procedural Posture
Judicial Review and Statutory Appeal / Final Judgment
Outcome
Application and appeal dismissed
Legal Topics
Interpretation of Planning Permissions, Material Change of Use, Abandonment of Use, Section 288 and 289 Appeals, Planning Enforcement, Section 75(3) Town and Country Planning Act 1990
Planning Law Administrative Law Interpretation of Planning Permissions Material Change of Use Abandonment of Use Section 288 and 289 Appeals Planning Enforcement Section 75(3) Town and Country Planning Act 1990

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Parties

Roger Wood

Claimant

Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

First Defendant

The Broads Authority

Second Defendant

Procedural Posture

Judicial Review and Statutory Appeal / Final Judgment

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Did the inspector err in law in his conclusions on the ground (c) appeal?
  2. 2 Was the restriction of the mooring use to 25 vessels lawful?
  3. 3 Was the inspector's decision irrational?

Ratio Decidendi

The inspector lawfully interpreted the planning permissions as authorizing only commercial mooring as part of a boatyard, not unrestricted private mooring; the current use constituted a material change of use requiring planning permission, and the restriction to 25 vessels was a lawful exercise of planning judgment.

Court Disposition

Application and appeal dismissed

Orders

  • Permission granted for section 289 appeal to be argued
  • Section 288 application dismissed