Bedford Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor [2008] EWHC 2304 (Admin) (20 August 2008)

Bedford Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor [2008] EWHC 2304 (Admin) (20 August 2008)

Conditions 3 and 4 did not expressly prohibit commencement of development until fulfilled and did not go to the heart of the planning permission. Their breach did not render the commencement of development unlawful; thus, the Whitley principle was not engaged. The inspector's decision was correct in law.

Citation
[2008] EWHC 2304 (Admin)
Parties
Claimant: Bedford Borough Council; First Defendant: The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; Second Defendant: Aleksander Stanislaw Murzyn
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
20 August 2008
Procedural Posture
Statutory Appeal Under Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 / High Court Appeal From Inspector's Decision
Outcome
Appeal dismissed
Legal Topics
Lawful Commencement of Development, Planning Conditions, Condition Precedent, Enforcement of Planning Control

Case Brief

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Parties

Bedford Borough Council

Claimant

The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

First Defendant

Aleksander Stanislaw Murzyn

Second Defendant

Procedural Posture

Statutory Appeal Under Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 / High Court Appeal From Inspector's Decision

  1. 1 Whether breach of planning conditions 3 and 4 rendered commencement of development unlawful under the Whitley principle
  2. 2 Whether the inspector erred in law in finding that the conditions were not true conditions precedent

Ratio Decidendi

Conditions 3 and 4 did not expressly prohibit commencement of development until fulfilled and did not go to the heart of the planning permission. Their breach did not render the commencement of development unlawful; thus, the Whitley principle was not engaged. The inspector's decision was correct in law.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed

Orders

  • Claimant to pay the first defendant's costs of the appeal, summarily assessed at £8,840, payable within 14 days
  • Permission to appeal refused by the High Court; application to be made to the Court of Appeal if pursued