Leeson v Marsden & Anor
The court held that section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 provides an unfettered discretion to allow a claim to proceed out of time if equitable, and that all circumstances—including prior use of court resources, prejudice to parties, and evidential cogency—must be considered. The claimant was not personally responsible for the delay caused by her solicitors, and the defendants suffered no material evidential prejudice. A fair trial was still possible, and the balance of prejudice favored the claimant. Abuse of process arguments based solely on prior court resource use do not override section 33 discretion in clinical negligence claims. The claim was allowed to proceed, subject to costs...
- Parties
- Claimant: Susan Leeson; First Defendant: Rachael Marsden; Second Defendant: United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust
- Jurisdiction
- England and Wales
- Judgment Date
- 13 May 2008
- Procedural Posture
- Personal Injury/clinical Negligence / Trial of Preliminary Issues on Limitation and Abuse of Process
- Outcome
- Claim allowed to proceed; limitation period disapplied under section 33.
- Legal Topics
- Limitation of Actions, Abuse of Process, Section 33 Discretion, Professional Negligence, Clinical Negligence
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Susan Leeson
Claimant
Rachael Marsden
First Defendant
United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust
Second Defendant
Procedural Posture
Personal Injury/clinical Negligence / Trial of Preliminary Issues on Limitation and Abuse of Process
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the court should exercise discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period and permit the claim to proceed
- 2 Whether the action is an abuse of process and should be struck out
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 provides an unfettered discretion to allow a claim to proceed out of time if equitable, and that all circumstances—including prior use of court resources, prejudice to parties, and evidential cogency—must be considered. The claimant was not personally responsible for the delay caused by her solicitors, and the defendants suffered no material evidential prejudice. A fair trial was still possible, and the balance of prejudice favored the claimant. Abuse of process arguments based solely on prior court resource use do not override section 33 discretion in clinical negligence claims. The claim was allowed to proceed, subject to costs...
Court Disposition
Claim allowed to proceed; limitation period disapplied under section 33.
Orders
- Costs incurred in relation to the first claim to be paid before this action proceeds further, with liberty to apply if difficulties arise.
- Liberty to apply for directions constraining use of Mr. Hockley’s report if sought by the Trust.
Full Case Text
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