Hatton v Messrs Chafes (a firm) [2003] EWCA Civ 341 (13 March 2003)
The respondent's cause of action in negligence against his former solicitors accrued before 13 October 1994, when his underlying claim against the accountants became worthless due to inordinate and inexcusable delay, making any further prosecution of the claim impossible. As the action was commenced more than six years after that date, it is time barred. Section 14A does not assist the respondent because he had the requisite knowledge of the material facts and his right to bring an action by October/November 1995, more than three years before the action was commenced.
- Citation
- [2003] EWCA Civ 341
- Parties
- Claimant/respondent: Anthony Arthur Hatton; Defendants/appellants: Messrs Chafes (A Firm)
- Jurisdiction
- England and Wales
- Judgment Date
- 13 March 2003
- Procedural Posture
- Appeal (civil) / Appeal From Manchester County Court Decision on Limitation/preliminary Issue
- Outcome
- Appeal allowed; cross-appeal dismissed; action declared time barred and dismissed.
- Legal Topics
- Limitation Periods, Solicitors' Negligence, Loss of Chance, Section 14 a Limitation Act 1980, Striking Out for Want of Prosecution
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Anthony Arthur Hatton
Claimant/respondent
Messrs Chafes (A Firm)
Defendants/appellants
Procedural Posture
Appeal (civil) / Appeal From Manchester County Court Decision on Limitation/preliminary Issue
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the respondent's claim against his former solicitors is time barred under the Limitation Act 1980
- 2 When the cause of action for solicitors' negligence accrued in the context of a lost litigation claim
- 3 Whether section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 saves the claim from being time barred
Ratio Decidendi
The respondent's cause of action in negligence against his former solicitors accrued before 13 October 1994, when his underlying claim against the accountants became worthless due to inordinate and inexcusable delay, making any further prosecution of the claim impossible. As the action was commenced more than six years after that date, it is time barred. Section 14A does not assist the respondent because he had the requisite knowledge of the material facts and his right to bring an action by October/November 1995, more than three years before the action was commenced.
Court Disposition
Appeal allowed; cross-appeal dismissed; action declared time barred and dismissed.
Orders
- The appeal is allowed.
- The cross-appeal is dismissed.
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