Kaye v Robertson & Anor [1990] EWCA Civ 21 (16 March 1990)

Kaye v Robertson & Anor [1990] EWCA Civ 21 (16 March 1990)

The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was entitled to an interlocutory injunction based on malicious falsehood, as the intended publication falsely implied his voluntary consent, was malicious, and would cause pecuniary loss. There was no sufficient basis for injunction under libel, trespass to the person, or...

Source-derived case information.

Citation
[1990] EWCA Civ 21
Parties
Plaintiff (respondent): Gorden Kaye (by Peter Froggatt his next friend); Defendant (appellant): Drew Robertson; Defendant (appellant): Sport Newspapers Limited
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
16 March 1990
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court (queen's Bench Division) to Court of Appeal
Outcome
Appeal allowed in part; injunction limited to restraining implication of voluntary consent; other injunctions discharged.
Legal Topics
Malicious Falsehood, Libel, Trespass to the Person, Passing Off, Privacy, Interlocutory Injunctions
Tort Law Media Law Malicious Falsehood Libel Trespass to the Person Passing Off Privacy Interlocutory Injunctions

Source-derived case record

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

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Parties

Gorden Kaye (by Peter Froggatt his next friend)

Plaintiff (respondent)

Drew Robertson

Defendant (appellant)

Sport Newspapers Limited

Defendant (appellant)

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court (queen's Bench Division) to Court of Appeal

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the defendants can be restrained from publishing material obtained from the plaintiff in hospital without informed consent
  2. 2 Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action in libel, malicious falsehood, trespass to the person, or passing off
  3. 3 Whether interlocutory injunction is appropriate in the circumstances

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was entitled to an interlocutory injunction based on malicious falsehood, as the intended publication falsely implied his voluntary consent, was malicious, and would cause pecuniary loss. There was no sufficient basis for injunction under libel, trespass to the person, or passing off. The injunction was limited to restraining publication of material implying voluntary consent.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed in part; injunction limited to restraining implication of voluntary consent; other injunctions discharged.

Orders

  • Defendants restrained from publishing anything implying plaintiff voluntarily permitted interview or photographs while in hospital until trial or further order.
  • Defendants' solicitors to keep material (tapes, notes, photographs) in safe custody, with limited release to first defendant as per injunction terms.