Wood v North Durham Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 629 (26 April 2001)

Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 629 B3/2001/0309 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE DISTRICT REGISTRY (Mrs Justice Hallett) Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Thursday, 26th April 2001 B e f o r e : LADY JUSTICE HALE ____________________ LOUISE WOOD (A child suing by her mother and litigation friend GILLIAN WOOD) Claimant/Applicant -v- NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS NHS TRUST Defendant/Respondent ____________________ Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of Smith Bernal Reporting Limited 190 Fleet Street London EC4A 2AG Tel: 020 7421 4040 Fax: 020 7831 8838 (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court) ____________________ Miss E Gumbel QC (instructed by Messrs Deas Mallen, Newcastle upon Tyne) appeared on behalf of the Applicant Claimant. Miss S Goodrich (instructed by Messrs Crutes, Newcastle upon Tyne) appeared on behalf of the Respondent Defendant. ____________________ HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ____________________ Crown Copyright © LADY JUSTICE HALE:This is an application for permission to appeal against the order of Mrs Justice Hallett made in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court sitting in Newcastle upon Tyne on 24th January 2001. She entered judgment for the defendant in a medical negligence claim brought on behalf of Louise Wood, who is now aged 11. She was born on 8th August 1989 in the defendant's hospital. She suffers from severe cerebral palsy. Her case is that this was caused by the negligence of the doctors assisting at her birth. This was a vaginal delivery of a breech presentation. Louise was deprived of oxygen because of the separation of the placenta some time before an airway was established. The original case was founded mainly on the lack of adequate monitoring of the foetal heartbeat during the later stages of labour. As the evidence developed, however, the focus turned to the length of time allowed to elapse between the point when foetal monitoring became impracticable by the standard means and the point when the baby was delivered and an airway established. Brain damage can occur to some babies if they are deprived of oxygen for ten minutes. In this case monitoring by foetal scalp electrode stopped at 10.20am, when she was still in a good condition. Thereafter, the judge found that monitoring by doptone continued until the crowning of the breech at 10.30am and continued to be attempted until delivery of the umbilicus at 10.33am. There was no monitoring after that, and that was the likely time for the separation of the placenta, which in itself was later than usual. The baby was delivered at 10.43am in a very poor condition. So the question was whether the doctors assisting at the delivery should have taken steps to ensure that she was delivered in less than ten minutes from the delivery of the umbilicus. The argument for the applicant claimant is that by the end of the evidence the view of both of the experts, Professor Taylor for the claimant and Professor Tindall for the defendant, was that she should have been delivered in less than ten minutes. The different conclusion reached by the judge was based on textbooks rather than that expert evidence. The argument for the defendant is that the views of the experts which are quoted have to be interpreted in context and this was a case in which, although Professor Tindall's own practice was that he would be looking to deliver in less than ten minutes, nevertheless at no time did he say that it was not a respectable view that delivery could take as long as that. Reference has been made in the arguments very clearly addressed to me by both counsel to the case of Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd [1990] 1 Med LR 117 and, in particular, to the approach to the difference between textbook evidence and expert opinion given by expert witnesses. It seems to me in this case that, although it would be presumptuous of me to make any precise assessment of the prospects of success upon appeal, this very hearing has demonstrated that there is enough in this case for the parties to argue about to justify the grant of permission to appeal. It all depends on a careful analysis of the expert evidence given in this case, coupled with argument about the precise effect of various statements as to the treatment of such evidence and as to the application of the Bolam and Bolitho principles in such circumstances. It seems to me, therefore, that this is a case which is worthy of the attention of the full court. Order: application for permission to appeal granted; costs of the application to be costs in the case. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII