Dalton v Gough Cooper & Company Ltd [2014] EWHC 1556 (QB) (16 May 2014)

Dalton v Gough Cooper & Company Ltd [2014] EWHC 1556 (QB) (16 May 2014)

The appeal was allowed because Master McCloud's decision that Gough Cooper had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim was unsustainable. The evidence did not positively support the claim as now pleaded, and the defendant had at least a real prospect of success. The delay in applying to set aside was not sufficient to justify maintaining the default judgment in light of the merits of the defence.

Citation
[2014] EWHC 1556 (QB)
Parties
Respondent/claimant: Pamela June Dalton (executrix of the estate of Frederick John Dalton deceased); Appellant/defendant: Gough Cooper & Company Limited
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
16 May 2014
Procedural Posture
Appeal (queen's Bench Division, High Court of Justice) / Appeal Against Refusal to Set Aside Default Judgment
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Setting Aside Default Judgment, CPR 13.3, Negligence, Asbestos Exposure, Breach of Statutory Duty

Case Brief

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Parties

Pamela June Dalton (executrix of the estate of Frederick John Dalton deceased)

Respondent/claimant

Gough Cooper & Company Limited

Appellant/defendant

Procedural Posture

Appeal (queen's Bench Division, High Court of Justice) / Appeal Against Refusal to Set Aside Default Judgment

  1. 1 Whether the defendant (Gough Cooper) has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim under CPR 13.3(1)(a)
  2. 2 Whether there is some other good reason to set aside the default judgment under CPR 13.3(1)(b)
  3. 3 Whether the application to set aside was made promptly under CPR 13.3(2)

Ratio Decidendi

The appeal was allowed because Master McCloud's decision that Gough Cooper had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim was unsustainable. The evidence did not positively support the claim as now pleaded, and the defendant had at least a real prospect of success. The delay in applying to set aside was not sufficient to justify maintaining the default judgment in light of the merits of the defence.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • Default judgment obtained on 3 December 2013 set aside
  • Submissions on costs to be heard if not agreed