Catherine Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank PLC

Catherine Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank PLC

The Respondent was not put on inquiry because, on the facts, only a minor part of the remortgage was for the sole benefit of Mr Bishop, the majority was for joint benefit, and the transaction was not, as a whole, to the manifest disadvantage of the Appellant. The solicitor's knowledge of the Divorce Payment was acquired in the capacity of acting for the borrowers, not the bank, so Section 199(1)(ii)(b) did not impute that knowledge to the Respondent. Thus, the Respondent was not fixed with constructive notice of undue influence.

Parties
Appellant/second Defendant: Catherine Waller-Edwards; Respondent/claimant: One Savings Bank PLC
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
11 October 2024
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal Judgment
Outcome
Appeal dismissed
Legal Topics
Undue Influence, Constructive Notice, Mortgages, Imputed Knowledge, Remortgage, Suretyship, Section 199 Law of Property Act 1925
Property Law Equity Banking Law Undue Influence Constructive Notice Mortgages Imputed Knowledge Remortgage +2 more

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Parties

Catherine Waller-Edwards

Appellant/second Defendant

One Savings Bank PLC

Respondent/claimant

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal Judgment

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the Respondent bank was put on inquiry as to undue influence exercised by Mr Bishop over the Appellant in the creation of the charge/mortgage.
  2. 2 Whether the Respondent was fixed with constructive notice of undue influence by operation of Section 199(1)(ii)(b) Law of Property Act 1925.

Ratio Decidendi

The Respondent was not put on inquiry because, on the facts, only a minor part of the remortgage was for the sole benefit of Mr Bishop, the majority was for joint benefit, and the transaction was not, as a whole, to the manifest disadvantage of the Appellant. The solicitor's knowledge of the Divorce Payment was acquired in the capacity of acting for the borrowers, not the bank, so Section 199(1)(ii)(b) did not impute that knowledge to the Respondent. Thus, the Respondent was not fixed with constructive notice of undue influence.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed

Orders

  • Possession order in favour of the Respondent stands
  • Judgment for the sum outstanding under the mortgage stands