A & Z, Re (Service Out; MPS; LSPO) [2026] EWFC 64 (18 March 2026)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWFC 64 Case No: 1759-4307-2483-7653 IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL 18/03/2026 B e f o r e : THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MCKENDRICK ____________________ Between: A Applicant - and - Z Respondent (Re A and Z: Service Out; MPS; LSPO) ____________________ Mr Richard Todd KC (instructed by Vardags) for the Applicant Ms Alexis Campbell KC (instructed by Winkworth Sherwood) for the Respondent Hearing dates: 16 February 2026 ____________________ HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________ Crown Copyright © This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 18 March 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ............................. McKendrick J : Introduction These divorce and financial remedy proceedings involve two spouses, anonymised as A and Z to protect their private and confidential information. There is currently no public interest in naming them. A is the national of a European country who lives in England and Wales. Z is a citizen of the United States of America (hereafter "the USA") and lives there. I heard submissions at a contested hybrid hearing on 16 February 2026. The issues between the parties at the outset were as follows: a. Permission for Z to apply out of time to set aside the order of Deputy District Judge Stuart permitting service out the jurisdiction of the divorce application by alternative means (email); and the application to set aside the order for service, if permission were granted; b. An application to stay both the divorce and financial remedy proceedings in England and Wales; c. A's application for maintenance pending suit; d. A's application for a legal services payment order; e. An application by Z for the instruction of two FPR Part 25 experts in the law of the USA (two different states); f. Further directions leading to a hearing to determine the dispute in respect of forum conveniens between England and Wales and the USA. At the conclusion of argument I reserved my decision. Background Z was born in 1972. A was born in 1992. They met in 2019 and shortly thereafter began a romantic relationship. Z proposed marriage to A in July 2019. A pre-nuptial agreement was executed on 29 July 2020 and very shortly thereafter A and Z married in the USA. In September 2025 the parties separated. On 6 October 2025 A issued an application for divorce before the courts in England and Wales. On 10 October 2025 A issued an application for alternative service of the divorce application on Z out of the jurisdiction by email in the USA. On 14 October 2025 DDJ Stuart acceded to this application after consideration of the matter on the papers and without a hearing. No opportunity was provided for Z to respond to this application before the order was made. The order provided Z with seven days to apply back to vary or revoke the order. On 14 October 2025 A's solicitors served this order by email on Z. Also on 14 October 2025, Z filed for divorce before the courts in X State in the USA. A was personally served in respect of this application on 6 November 2025. On 7 November 2025, Z filed their Answer to the divorce petition and applied to stay the English proceedings and/or to set aside the service order. On 17 November 2025 A filed applications for: (i) maintenance pending suit (hereafter "MPS"); and (ii) a legal service payment order (hereafter "LSPO"). On 15 December 2025 a Notice of Hearing was issued, listing the maters on 16 February 2026. On 14 January 2026, by email through my clerk to the parties, I confirmed that all outstanding contested matters would be dealt with at the forthcoming hearing. Application to Extend Time to Set Aside Order of 14 October 2025 Deputy District Judge Stuart's order of 14 October 2025 granted A permission to serve Z by alternative service, namely by email. Paragraph 4 of the order stated: Any party may apply to vary or revoke this Order. Any such application must be made pursuant to Rule 4.3 / 18.11 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and must be made within 7 days of receipt of this Order upon them. A's application for permission to serve by email was accompanied by a witness statement from A. A set out in their statement why they believed service by email was required, this was essentially for two reasons. The first was Z's peripatetic lifestyle and it was said it would be difficult to locate and serve them. Secondly, A's written evidence stated that they were concerned Z would try to evade service "and use that evasion to obtain an unfair advantage by progressing rival litigation elsewhere." They explained the couple had signed a pre-nuptial agreement before marriage and the pre-nuptial agreement was "palpably unfair" and Z would seek to pursue divorce in X State, USA where the courts would be less critical of the purportedly unfair pre-nuptial agreement and as a result they would face financial prejudice. In addition Z exhibited to their witness statement a report from a qualified attorney in X State who opined it was permissible to serve by email in X State in certain circumstances. 7. On 7 November 2025 Z signed a witness statement in support of their application to extend time to set aside the 14 October 2025 order of DDJ Stuart. They state that A knew that Z was attending a "silent retreat" when served with the divorce petition. Evidence was provided to dispute the suggestion that they might evade service and were open about wishing to file for divorce. There were no covert actions. The evidence filed was that service by email was not permitted in X State until such time as personal service had been attempted and failed. The evidence from the X State attorney relied on by A was strongly challenged and it was said that his opinion did not provide "a firm legal foundation for the English court to accept that service by email is Hague compliant or permitted under [the law of X State]…." Z exhibited a letter from their attorney which agreed with the position summarised in Z's witness statement. Z gave evidence that the email with the divorce documents was not opened by them until 14 October. Z met with English lawyers on 22 October 2025. "Know Your Client" checks were begun but not finalised. Z's evidence was that they had acted expeditiously and delays were caused by the complexity of service rules, obtaining advice in England, work commitments and time zone challenges. Z went on to state they do not accede to the jurisdiction of England and Wales and that X State is the appropriate jurisdiction. Z states both signed the pre-nuptial agreement requiring them to divorce in X State. Z goes on to explain why X State is the most convenient forum for the divorce. Ms Campbell KC submits that Z should have applied to set aside DDJ Stuart's order by 23 October 2025 and therefore Z has applied only two weeks late, on 7 November 2025. Specialist legal advice was required. The delay was not significant and has caused no prejudice to A. Mr Todd KC submits Z was nearly three weeks late and no good reason has been provided. If permission were granted, it is said the application to set aside substituted service should be dismissed because: (i) Z knows about the application and so the purpose of service has been achieved; (ii) the evidence of A's X State lawyer is clear and is correct and is now supported by a further X State lawyer. I raised with counsel whether Z's application was an application for relief from sanctions. Both Mr Todd and Ms Campbell made submissions based on the well-known three stage test set out by the Court of Appeal in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 ; [2015] 1 All ER 880 . The White Book summarises the three stage test as: "The guidance given in Denton may be summarised as follows: a judge should address an application for relief from sanction in three stages. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the "failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order" which engages r.3.9(1). If the breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application including r.3.9(1)(a)(b). The court also gave guidance as to the importance of penalising parties who unreasonably oppose applications for relief from sanctions." The same approach applies to the Family Procedure Rules – see the decision of Lieven J in BF v LE [2023] EWHC 2009 (Fam) at paragraph 63. 12. FPR Rule 4.6 sets out the rules in respect of relief from sanctions which is defined in Rule 4.1 as "…an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order". In determining whether to grant relief the court will consider all the circumstances including those set out at FPR 4.1 (a). On reflection the application is not one for relief from sanctions. DDJ Stuart's order did not provide for a sanction if his order was not the subject of an application to be varied or discharged within 7 days. Rather, it seems to me the appropriate test is to apply FPR Rule 4.1 (3) (a) and consider the application by Z to extend the 7 day period from 23 October to 7 November 2025. I should seek to give effect to the overriding objective when applying Rule 4.1 (3) (a). Very similar issues are engaged under either procedural test and for the avoidance of doubt I would have reached the same conclusion under either test. I have come to the clear conclusion that Z must be permitted to extend time to 7 November 2025 to apply to discharge the order for alternative service. My reasons are: a. no notice was given of the application for alternative service – it was effectively a without notice application and was of questionable fairness; b. the extension of time to 7 November is not a long one and causes no prejudice to A (other than the consideration of the set aside) or to the progress of these proceedings and the administration of justice more generally; c. the order permitting service out engaged Z in discussion with both their US and English legal teams, time would have been needed for this; seven days provides insufficient time for a litigant to such an application to respond in circumstances where that person lives in the USA; was not involved in litigation in England and Wales and where there was no obvious expectation they would become involved in litigation in this jurisdiction; it was reasonable to take some time to instruct solicitors, receive advice, deal with KYC (whether completed or not) and approve the application; d. Z's legal team required time to put together their application and the application was one of substance, served with a witness statement running to thirty three paragraphs with three exhibits. The last exhibit is a detailed statement about the permissibility of service by email in X State. It would have been a tall order for Z's English and US legal teams to have produced these documents within 7 days; e. FPR Rule 6.42 and PD 6B set out extended periods of time for acknowledging service - more time is granted for service out to certain jurisdiction: up to thirty one days for non-European Hague country. This adds to my impression that seven days to respond to service out the jurisdiction was really rather short; f. Z had provided good enough reasons for the delay. g. It would be unjust not to extend time. Having granted permission to extend time to apply to discharge the order of DDJ Stuart permitting substituted service, should the court set aside that order? Both parties accept the divorce and financial remedy claim are validly issued. Both parties accept that the court can make an order for MPS and a LSPO from the date of issue not service. Both parties invite me to list the matter for a hearing for the determination of forum conveniens . Mr Todd appeared to accept his client could re-serve Z in a manner consistent with the legal advice set out by Z's US attorneys. He noted that would add expense. Mr Todd's overarching submission was that Z knows about the divorce and the financial remedy claim (they was present remotely at the hearing and represented by solicitors and counsel). Therefore, the purpose of service is met: they know about the claim and there is no unfairness. I accept on one level there is a rather arid debate about the service of the English divorce proceedings on Z. However, service is more than permitting the respondent to the proceedings being made aware of the claim or the application. It involves the exercise of sovereignty and respect for sovereignty. This was clearly set out by Stanley Burnton LJ (with the agreement of Rix and Wilson LJJ (as the later then was)) in Bayat v Telephone Systems [2011] EWCA Civ 135 ; [2011] 1 WLR 3086 at paragraphs 61 to 67: The judge's reasons for his decision on this issue are to be found in paragraph 199 of his judgment, which I have set out above. In it, he referred to service as a means of bringing proceedings to the attention of the Defendants. However, service is more than that. It is an exercise of the power of the Court. In a case involving service out of the jurisdiction, it is an exercise of sovereignty within a foreign state. It requires the defendant, if he is to dispute the claim, to file an acknowledgment of service and to participate in litigation in what for him is a foreign state. Thus, in Cookney v Anderson (1863) 1 De G J & S 365 (1863) 46 ER 146 Lord Westbury, the Lord Chancellor said, at 380-381: The right of administering justice is the attribute of sovereignty, and all persons within the dominions of a sovereign are within his allegiance and under his protection. If, therefore, one sovereign causes process to be served in the territory of another, and summons a foreign subject to his Court of Justice, it is in fact an invasion of sovereignty, and would be unjustifiable, unless done with consent … Similarly, in George Monro Limited v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation [1944] 1 KB 432, 437 Scott LJ said, in a judgment with which Goddard and du Parcq LJ agreed: Service out of the jurisdiction at the instance of our courts is necessarily prima facie an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereignty of the foreign country where service is to be effected. In Afro Continental Nigeria v Meridian Shipping Co SA (The Vrontados) [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 241, Lord Denning MR said, at 245: As I have always understood it, service of a writ out of the jurisdiction is an exercise of sovereignty within the country in which service is effected. More recently, in Molins Plc. v. G. D. S.p. A. [2000] 1 WLR 1741, Aldous LJ, giving the only substantive judgment of the Court of Appeal, said at paragraph 40: … under both English and Continental legal systems service out of the jurisdiction is regarded as an interference with sovereignty In modern times, outside the context of the EU, the most important source of the consent of States to service of foreign process within their territory is to be found in the Hague Convention (in relation to the State parties to it) and in bilateral conventions on this matter. Because service out of the jurisdiction without the consent of the State in which service is to be effected is an interference with the sovereignty of that state, service on a party to the Hague Convention by an alternative method under CPR 6.15 should be regarded as exceptional, to be permitted in special circumstances only. It follows, in my judgment, that while the fact that proceedings served by an alternative method will come to the attention of a defendant more speedily than proceedings served under the Hague Convention is a relevant consideration when deciding whether to make an order under CPR r 6.15, it is in general not a sufficient reason for an order for service by an alternative method. Quite apart from authority, I would consider that in general the desire of a claimant to avoid the delay inherent in service by the methods permitted by CPR r 6.40, or that delay, cannot of itself justify an order for service by alternative means. Nor can reliance on the Overriding Objective. If they could, particularly in commercial cases, service in accordance with CPR r 6.40 would be optional; indeed, service by alternative means would become normal. Although the FPR and the CPR contain different rules for service out of the jurisdiction, these obiter comments apply generally. Family law is not any different. Z took the trouble to ensure that A was properly served in respect of the X State application in England by way of personal service. A who is habitually resident in England and Wales has benefited from the protection of compliance with the proper rules of service. There is a good argument that this works both ways and similarly Z is entitled to be served in compliance with the rules. Service is an exercise of the power of the Family Court. Comity requires proper respect between the judicial authorities between England and Wales and the USA, including X State. I have considered whether there is a good reason for A to be permitted to serve Z by email because of the peripatetic lifestyle or because of attempts to evade service. Both A and Z have filed witness statements on these disputed factual matters. I heard no evidence and am not in a position to determine these issues easily. It is clear that Z travels with considerable frequency. They are often in different places and often not at their home in X State. They strongly deny evading service. They wish for the rules of service to be complied with, noting that A was personally served in England in accordance with the rules. FPR Rule 6.43 (3) (b) required me to be satisfied that service by email is permitted in X State. This is a matter of US law and is therefore a factual matter. A and Z's legal teams have provided detailed letters/opinions which take very different views on this point. They cannot even agree on the identification of the appropriate statute or rule in X State. It is not possible to resolve the factual dispute in the absence of a Part 25 expert who can impartially assist the court consistently with their expert duties. A and Z are (as their anonymised initial suggest) miles apart and are weaponising the litigation. I do not have confidence in the correctness of Mr Todd's submission at paragraph 24 of his helpful note. It is properly contested by Z's US attorney team. The burden of proof is on A. They have not discharged it. A Part 25 expert would be required to determine this issue. Furthermore, the parties appeared to agree that Z could be served but that such service by email may take place after exhausting attempts at personal service. Mr Todd (rightly) stated this would drive up costs. I suggested Z could provide a date and address for personal service following the hearing. Z was not prepared to give instructions to Ms Campbell to agree that. Z agreed to the making of a LSPO although they disputed the quantum. I will factor in the increased cost of service in my calculations below. Pulling the strands together, on the contested evidence it does not appear that Z seeks to evade service. Z wishes the rules to be complied with (as they did when serving the X State application) and is opposed to A having what is considered to be a tactical advantage by issuing first. A has not established as a matter of fact that the law of X State permitted Z be served by email in the circumstance this took place. Service as an exercise of the power of this court is an important act of sovereignty. Comity requires due respect to US citizens and their courts. Considering all the facts holistically, I am satisfied that the correct order is to set aside permission for alternative service. I will hear the forum conveniens dispute between X State and England and Wales in July 2026. My preliminary view is that whether A or Z issued first is not a factor of significant importance. Maintenance Pending Suit There was no dispute between the parties that spousal maintenance is required. Section 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (hereafter "the 1973 Act") gives the court power to make an order for maintenance during the course of the proceedings (with emphasis added): On a petition for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation, the court may make an order for maintenance pending suit, that is to say, an order requiring either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her maintenance and for such term, being a term beginning not earlier than the date of the presentation of the petition and ending with the date of the determination of the suit, as the court thinks reasonable . The procedural rules for such applications are set out in FPR rule 9.7 (emphasis added): (1) A party may apply at any stage of the proceedings for – (a) an order for maintenance pending suit; (b) an order for maintenance pending outcome of proceedings; (c) an order for interim periodical payments; (d) an interim variation order (da) an order for payment in respect of legal services; or (e) any other form of interim order. (2) An application for an order mentioned in paragraph (1) shall be made using the Part 18 procedure. (3) Where a party makes an application before filing a financial statement, the written evidence in support must – (a) explain why the order is necessary; and (b) give up to date information about that party's financial circumstances. (4) Unless the respondent has filed a financial statement, the respondent must, at least 7 days before the court is to deal with the application, file a statement of his means and serve a copy on the applicant . There is, of course, a dispute between the parties in respect of whether proceedings should be litigated here or in X State, USA. This dispute is no bar to the making of a MPS or LSPO order. The parties accept this. The court must be cautious about whether to make an order and as to the amount particularly in circumstances where the order may turn out to be made on a false premise, see: Re YM and BA [2020] EWFC 13 , MET v HAT [2013] EWHC 247 and BN v MA [2013] EWHC 4250 . Mostyn J set this out in MET v HAT at paragraphs 20 and 21: It is certainly true that the court has power to award maintenance pending suit, even where the jurisdiction of the court to pronounce a decree has been challenged; that has been recognised throughout the generations and stretches right back to the very dawn of the power of judicial divorce in 1857. It is referred to specifically in the case of Moses-Taiga [2005] EWCA Civ 1013 at paras 19 - 21. However, I take the view - and, in this regard, I am fortified by having heard the very same words fall from the mouth of Ewbank J when he awarded maintenance pending suit in the well-known case of Z v. Z [1992] 2 FLR 291 - that, where the jurisdiction to pronounce a decree is in dispute, the court should act very cautiously indeed. The court is entitled, in my view, to have regard to the strength or otherwise of the claim that the court has jurisdiction, and the more uncertain the court is on a provisional basis that the court does have jurisdiction, the more cautious it should be. In MG v GM [2022] EWFC 8 Peel J addressed at paragraph 39 the approach to interim provision in circumstances where there was a jurisdictional dispute: " In my view, the fact of a jurisdictional dispute is relevant, but does not weigh too heavily ." More recently in KV v KV [2024] EWFC 165 Peel J summarised these principles effectively noting there is a spectrum in MPS cases where jurisdiction is in dispute: from no award to the jurisdictional issues not weighing very heavily, in circumstances where the court will approach its task with caution both as to whether to make an award and in respect of the quantum. At paragraph 21 he said: " There is no doubt that the fact of a dispute about jurisdiction does not prevent the court from making an interim maintenance award, although if the jurisdictional basis of the applicant's claim is doubtful, the court will be appropriately cautious when considering (i) whether such an award should be made and (ii) the quantification thereof ." The principles to be applied are well known. In TL v ML [2006] 1 FLR 1263 Nicholas Mostyn QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (as he then was) set out a number of principles in MPS applications: "From these cases I derive the following principles: The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is "reasonableness" (s22 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973), which, to my mind, is synonymous with "fairness". A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living ( F v F ). This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard (M v M). In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long term expenditure more aptly to be considered on a final hearing ( F v F ). That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration ( F v F ). Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources ( G v G, M v M ). In such a situation the court should err in favour of the payee." I must look at the resources of both parties and the nature of the lifestyle they enjoyed during the marriage. The existence of the pre-nuptial agreement is a relevant factor. In BN v MA [2013] EWHC 4250 (Fam) , Mostyn J held at paragraph 33: "….when adjudicating the question of interim maintenance, where there has been a prenuptial agreement, the court should seek to apply the terms of the prenuptial agreement as closely and practically as it can, unless the evidence of the wife in support of her application demonstrates, to a convincing standard, that she has a prospect of satisfying a court that the agreement should not be upheld." Applying this learning to A's application, I must be cautious, although there is no dispute a MPS orders should be made. On quantum, caution is again required and I should consider what evidence I have of each parties' resource, their lifestyle and the PNA but the unvarnished words of the 1973 act are my guide: reasonableness. A seeks a monthly budget of £ 29, 000, which is £ 348, 000 per annum. In addition they seek for the rent to continue to be paid at their current rented flat (the rent was paid in advance by Z and the lease expires in June 2026). Their second witness statement sets out their evidence in support of the MPS order. They say the PNA was signed under duress the day before the wedding. The signing of the PNA was recorded. I record that I have not watched the recording. A's assets in July 2020 were around $ 442, 000. They state these were properties which have been subject to legal challenges from family members and they now have no assets. They state if the PNA were enforced they would be left without income or assets. It is strongly challenged. A's evidence is that their gross income in 2025 was £3000-£4000 as a wellness ambassador. A luxurious international lifestyle during the marriage is described with many expensive holidays and the use of private jets or business or first class travel. Upwards of $ 1000 would be spent on hotels per night. A spent freely and without limit on personal items. Z bought A a £ 220, 900 sports car in March 2022. A had access to Z's credit cards. In 2022 A spent $ 212, 890 on just one card. A estimates their expenditure funded by Z then was around $ 400, 000. The relationship became strained in May 2024 and Z restricted A's access to credit cards and rented a one bedroom flat for them in London. A complains they had previously rented an £ 11, 400 per month three bedroom terraced house in London. From June 2024 Z provided A access to £ 5, 500 a month for their expenditure. A says this is insufficient. A states that Z's assets have grown considerably since the signing of the PNA and Z is now worth many hundreds of millions. Z has been requested to set out evidence and/or information in respect of their wealth and resources by A's solicitors for some time. Z's third witness statement was filed and served on the morning of the hearing. This is a clear breach of FPR Rule 9.7 (4). It plainly limited A and their legal teams' ability to analyse the information provided. Z filed a second witness statement in response to the MPS and LSPO application but chose to disclose very little in respect of their wealth and capital. They referenced income as an annual salary of $ 400, 000 and annual bonuses/distributions which ranged from $ 0 to $ 500, 000 to $ 1 million per annum. The third witness statement disclosed a "total current asset base" of $ 60, 489, 919. It was said only $ 500, 000 was liquid. The PNA noted their assets in July 2020 were approximately $ 90 million. Z set out evidence in response to the MPS order application in their second witness statement. Z describes the sums claimed by A as "eye watering". Z claims the marriage began to break down in 2022. They tried to repair the marriage in 2024 but this did not work. Z encouraged A to obtain employment in 2024. Z states A freely entered into the PNA and received legal advice. Z stated the video recording of the signing of the PNA demonstrates that the PNA was signed without duress. Z describes their business and their modest lifestyle, living in modest rented apartments. Z accepts there was a whirlwind romance in 2019 and 2020 and high levels of spending to impress A. They currently live in a rented two bedroom apartment in X State. A budget of $ 7000 per month plus rent is proposed with the rent reducing to £ 4, 500 from July 2026. Z considers the sports car should be sold and a cheaper car bought for £ 20, 000. Z considers private health insurance is sufficient. Z notes that A accept the terms of the PNA in which A waived their right to spousal support at clause 14 (D) and agreed they were able to be gainfully employed and earn in a self-sufficient manner. It is said A could find employment give their age and qualifications. Z proposes MPS in the sum of $ 7000 per month. In addition Z has paid £ 100, 000 to rent a flat for A. This lease expires in June 2026. The lease was not in the evidence before me. Z proposes to pay 12 months rent in advance for another less expensive property in the sum of £ 4000 per month. Z has paid interim maintenance since mid-2024 in the region of this sum. Ms Campbell submits the evidence demonstrates that A can live well within this budget and did so. It was only when A's solicitors became involved that the interim maintenance claim was exorbitantly increased. Reference was made in submissions to a much lower budget before Vardags were instructed. Ms Campbell has provided a breakdown of the MPS budget with Z's counter proposal. The figures are per month. It is as follows, with my addition of the appropriate interim position until the July forum hearing: Expense A Z Court Property Outgoings 330 330 with building and contents insurance and council tax paid directly in addition Car 670 (to end when the sports car is returned) Food and housekeeping 1784 Holidays and travel 0 Pet expenditure 1322 Personal 700 Medical 0 (health insurance paid directly) 2000 plus BUPA premium Entertainment and Hobbies 0 Employment expenses 0 Total 28, 733 Of which 1333 is paid directly. 13, 849 Plus building and contents insurance, council tax and BUPA premium. Having taken a cautious approach, I am satisfied there should be an MPS order. Z accepts there must be spousal maintenance although appears to oppose an actual order. Unhelpfully the court was not provided with the lease on A's London home. I am satisfied until the July 2026 forum conveniens hearing it is reasonable for A to remain in the home they have lived in since July 2025. Z was satisfied then the rental was appropriate post breakdown of the marriage. I can consider in July 2026 whether there is any case for alternative accommodation, should the proceedings continue in England and Wales. I am not clear how the lease may be extended by one month, but neither party included the lease to permit consideration, so that is matter for them to resolve. I also consider it remains reasonable for A to have access to their current sports car and the ancillary costs of that are reasonable. This mirrors the lifestyle during the marriage, indeed it was considered by Z to be a suitable and appropriate car and standard. On health expenses, whilst I was not provided with the BUPA insurance policy, it appeared to be common ground there were additional expenses not covered. £ 3069 per month seems excessive but I am prepared to accept there will be some additional costs not covered whether by way of pre-existing conditions or because they are not covered by BUPA limited cover. The reasonable sum is £ 2000 per month. I have slightly reduced the pet expenses to Z' proposed £ 1322 as £ 1462 per month for a dog seems excessive. I have reduced A's budget on: (i) food/housekeeping; (ii) holidays and travel; (iii) personal; (iv) entertainment and hobbies; and (v) employment expenses as they are excessive. None of them are reasonable or justified on the evidence. I agree with Ms Campbell that an annual budget of £ 348, 000 is excessive. I remind myself of the need to be cautious on quantum and that this was a short marriage with no children. I cannot resolve the validity of the PNA at this interim hearing, but I note Z was not suggesting it be followed and accepted the need for spousal maintenance. I also view with scepticism Z's evidence that they have insufficient liquid assets. There is no good reason advanced for Z's failure to comply with the rules and file evidence of their assets 7 days before the hearing. In those circumstances at this interim hearing I do not accept they cannot pay the terms of a MPS order. I also accept A can make greater attempts to work. I also note the lavish early marriage lifestyle appears to have endured for a shortish period and a modest lifestyle was then enjoyed. An annual budget of £ 266, 188 (12 x £ 13, 849 plus £ 100, 000 rent) is reasonable and fair in this context. Legal Services Payment Order Section 22ZA of the 1973 Act states: (1) In proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation, the court may make an order or orders requiring one party to the marriage to pay to the other ("the applicant") an amount for the purpose of enabling the applicant to obtain legal services for the purposes of the proceedings. (2) The court may also make such an order or orders in proceedings under this Part for financial relief in connection with proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation. (3) The court must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, without the amount, the applicant would not reasonably be able to obtain appropriate legal services for the purposes of the proceedings or any part of the proceedings. (4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the court must be satisfied, in particular, that— (a) the applicant is not reasonably able to secure a loan to pay for the services, and (b) the applicant is unlikely to be able to obtain the services by granting a charge over any assets recovered in the proceedings. (5) An order under this section may be made for the purpose of enabling the applicant to obtain legal services of a specified description, including legal services provided in a specified period or for the purposes of a specified part of the proceedings. (6) An order under this section may— (a) provide for the payment of all or part of the amount by instalments of specified amounts, and (b) require the instalments to be secured to the satisfaction of the court. (7) An order under this section may direct that payment of all or part of the amount is to be deferred. (8) The court may at any time in the proceedings vary an order made under this section if it considers that there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made. (9) For the purposes of the assessment of costs in the proceedings, the applicant's costs are to be treated as reduced by any amount paid to the applicant pursuant to an order under this section for the purposes of those proceedings. (10) In this section "legal services", in relation to proceedings, means the following types of services— (a) providing advice as to how the law applies in the particular circumstances, (b) providing advice and assistance in relation to the proceedings, (c) providing other advice and assistance in relation to the settlement or other resolution of the dispute that is the subject of the proceedings, and (d) providing advice and assistance in relation to the enforcement of decisions in the proceedings or as part of the settlement or resolution of the dispute, and they include, in particular, advice and assistance in the form of representation and any form of dispute resolution, including mediation. Section 22ZB of the 1973 Act sets out the factors the court must have regard to: (1) When considering whether to make or vary an order under section 22ZA, the court must have regard to— (a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the applicant and the paying party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, (b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the applicant and the paying party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, (c) the subject matter of the proceedings, including the matters in issue in them, (d) whether the paying party is legally represented in the proceedings, (e ) any steps taken by the applicant to avoid all or part of the proceedings, whether by proposing or considering mediation or otherwise, (f) the applicant's conduct in relation to the proceedings, (g) any amount owed by the applicant to the paying party in respect of costs in the proceedings or other proceedings to which both the applicant and the paying party are or were party, and (h) the effect of the order or variation on the paying party. (2) In subsection (1)(a) "earning capacity", in relation to the applicant or the paying party, includes any increase in earning capacity which, in the opinion of the court, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant or the paying party to take steps to acquire. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(h), the court must have regard, in particular, to whether the making or variation of the order is likely to— (a) cause undue hardship to the paying party, or (b) prevent the paying party from obtaining legal services for the purposes of the proceedings. Both parties relied on Mostyn J in Rubin v Rubin 2014 EWHC 611 at paragraph 13. He gave guidance as to the approach to these applications: "13. I have recently had to deal with a flurry of such applications and there is no reason to suppose that courts up and down the country are not doing likewise. Therefore it may be helpful and convenient if I were to set out my attempt to summarise the applicable principles both substantive and procedural. i) When considering the overall merits of the application for a LSPO the court is required to have regard to all the matters mentioned in s22ZB(1) – (3). ii) Without derogating from that requirement, the ability of the respondent to pay should be judged by reference to the principles summarised in TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 (Fam) [2006] 1 FCR 465 [2006] 1 FLR 1263 at para 124 (iv) and (v), where it was stated: "iv) Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation the court should err in favour of the payee. v) Where the paying party has historically been supported through the bounty of an outsider, and where the payer is asserting that the bounty had been curtailed but where the position of the outsider is ambiguous or unclear, then the court is justified in assuming that the third party will continue to supply the bounty, at least until final trial." iii) Where the claim for substantive relief appears doubtful, whether by virtue of a challenge to the jurisdiction, or otherwise having regard to its subject matter, the court should judge the application with caution. The more doubtful it is, the more cautious it should be. iv) The court cannot make an order unless it is satisfied that without the payment the applicant would not reasonably be able to obtain appropriate legal services for the proceedings. Therefore, the exercise essentially looks to the future. It is important that the jurisdiction is not used to outflank or supplant the powers and principles governing an award of costs in CPR Part 44. It is not a surrogate inter partes costs jurisdiction. Thus a LSPO should only be awarded to cover historic unpaid costs where the court is satisfied that without such a payment the applicant will not reasonably be able to obtain in the future appropriate legal services for the proceedings. v) In determining whether the applicant can reasonably obtain funding from another source the court would be unlikely to expect her to sell or charge her home or to deplete a modest fund of savings. This aspect is however highly fact-specific. If the home is of such a value that it appears likely that it will be sold at the conclusion of the proceedings then it may well be reasonable to expect the applicant to charge her interest in it. vi) Evidence of refusals by two commercial lenders of repute will normally dispose of any issue under s22ZA(4)(a) whether a litigation loan is or is not available. vii) In determining under s22ZA(4)(b) whether a Sears Tooth arrangement can be entered into a statement of refusal by the applicant's solicitors should normally answer the question. viii) If a litigation loan is offered at a very high rate of interest it would be unlikely to be reasonable to expect the applicant to take it unless the respondent offered an undertaking to meet that interest, if the court later considered it just so to order. viii) The order should normally contain an undertaking by the applicant that she will repay to the respondent such part of the amount ordered if, and to the extent that, the court is of the opinion, when considering costs at the conclusion of the proceedings, that she ought to do so. If such an undertaking is refused the court will want to think twice before making the order. ix) The court should make clear in its ruling or judgment which of the legal services mentioned in s22ZA(10) the payment is for; it is not however necessary to spell this out in the order. A LSPO may be made for the purposes, in particular, of advice and assistance in the form of representation and any form of dispute resolution, including mediation. Thus the power may be exercised before any financial remedy proceedings have been commenced in order to finance any form of alternative dispute resolution, which plainly would include arbitration proceedings. x) Generally speaking, the court should not fund the applicant beyond the FDR, but the court should readily grant a hearing date for further funding to be fixed shortly after the FDR. This is a better course than ordering a sum for the whole proceedings of which part is deferred under s22ZA(7). The court will be better placed to assess accurately the true costs of taking the matter to trial after a failed FDR when the final hearing is relatively imminent, and the issues to be tried are more clearly defined. xi) When ordering costs funding for a specified period, monthly instalments are to be preferred to a single lump sum payment. It is true that a single payment avoids anxiety on the part of the applicant as to whether the monthly sums will actually be paid as well as the annoyance inflicted on the respondent in having to make monthly payments. However, monthly payments more accurately reflects what would happen if the applicant were paying her lawyers from her own resources, and very likely will mirror the position of the respondent. If both sets of lawyers are having their fees met monthly this puts them on an equal footing both in the conduct of the case and in any dialogue about settlement. Further, monthly payments are more readily susceptible to variation under s22ZA(8) should circumstances change. xii) If the application for a LSPO seeks an award including the costs of that very application the court should bear in mind s22ZA(9) whereby a party's bill of costs in assessment proceedings is treated as reduced by the amount of any LSPO made in his or her favour. Thus, if an LSPO is made in an amount which includes the anticipated costs of that very application for the LSPO, then an order for the costs of that application will not bite save to the extent that the actual costs of the application may exceed such part of the LSPO as is referable thereto. xiii) A LSPO is designated as an interim order and is to be made under the Part 18 procedure (see FPR rule 9.7(1)(da) and (2)). 14 days' notice must be given (see FPR rule 18.8(b)(i) and PD9A para 12.1). The application must be supported by written evidence (see FPR rule 18.8(2) and PD9A para 12.2). That evidence must not only address the matters in s22ZB(1)-(3) but must include a detailed estimate of the costs both incurred and to be incurred. If the application seeks a hearing sooner than 14 days from the date of issue of the application pursuant to FPR rule 18.8(4) then the written evidence in support must explain why it is fair and just that the time should be abridged. Caution is once again required. I have in mind what is set out above in respect of the background to the MPS award. A seeks the following: Historic costs: £226,204.11 Projected jurisdiction costs: £774,400.80 Projected financial remedy costs: £659,076.00 LSPO costs: £187,836.00 Total (per 17/11/25): £1,847,516.91 Additional funds spent £55,530.00 Additional funds spent £30,883.00 Additional funds (foreign proceedings) £180,105.00 Total additional funds: £266,518.00 GLOBAL SUM SOUGHT TO PFDR £2,114,034.91 Z submits the total costs for the same period should be £ 165, 269. The parties are miles apart which is very unhelpful for the court. Ms Campbell points out that A's legal team involves six lawyers. The senior lawyer is charging £ 1, 130 A per hour. The other solicitors rates range from £ 680 to £ 395 an hour. Ms Campbell submits there is simply no need for six lawyers and the hourly rates are very high. She makes reference to the Guidance on Solicitors' hourly rates for City and Central London which range from £ 422 per hour for a category A lawyer to £ 157 for a category D lawyer. Mr Todd submits the number of solicitors and the quantum of the hourly rate are acceptable because this is, or effectively is, commercial litigation. He submits it is commercial in character because of the high value of the assets under consideration and because of the international nature of the proceedings. Mr Todd also submits that costs have been driven up by the approach taken by Z to the litigation in this jurisdiction and in the USA. Overall, I conclude, adopting a cautious approach, that six lawyers is excessive. Four is sufficient. The hourly rates are excessive. They will need to be reduced although not as far as Ms Campbell submits. The amount of work proposed in A's legal team's budget is excessive and unreasonable. It is fleshed out with an excessive number of unnecessary strategy meetings. I need only determine A's budget until the forum dispute and will permit brief evidence and a short period of time at the conclusion of that hearing to determine the future budget to the FDR, should Z's forum challenge fall away. I remind myself I am applying a budget to permit A to litigate fairly these issues. This is not commercial litigation and I am not aware of some similar form of LSPO order being made between two commercial entities engaged in commercial litigation. The LSPO is a statutory creation to deal with fairness between spouses in this situation. Mr McKirgan has filed a witness statement in support of his client's LSPO order. He says Vardags have not received payment for costs incurred. Applications for litigation funding were refused. Vardags will not enter into a Sears Tooth agreement. Without a LSPO Vardags will need to come off the record. Mr Todd submits this evidence meets Mostyn J's test in Rubin v Rubin for the payment of historic legal costs. Without this A would be unrepresented. Ms Campbell has made similar submissions in respect of the LSPO application as she did on the MPS, given the short childless marriage with, she submits, only non-matrimonial assets. Vardags were instructed on 3 October 2025. Ms Campbell notes that Vardags alone incurred £187, 355 over twenty-three working days. On balance I am satisfied that historic costs should be included in the LSPO. Within my broad discretion A will not reasonably be able to obtain appropriate legal services for the proceedings. I am applying the principles helpfully summarised by Peel J at paragraphs 28 and 29 of KV v KV [2024] EWFC 165 . A cannot provide any form of undertaking. This must also be factored in to the budget. I remind myself that my task is to identify a solicitor/client budget for A, to enable them to litigate in circumstances where they cannot reasonably be expected to access their own limited resources. I must determine a reasonable budget taking into account the necessary caution arising out of the forum dispute. I am not assisted by the proposals put forward by the parties which are so far apart. The appropriate approach to quantum, is whether the costs sought are "reasonable, in the context of the nature of the litigation, the issues, the resources, and how each party is approaching the proceedings" (see Peel J in HAT ). I have taken into account Z's more modest legal team. Their solicitors' hourly rates range from £ 525 for a partner to £ 295 for a solicitor. The largest hourly rate is less than half that of the partner at Vardags. No proper explanation is provided for this. Applying the overarching principles set out above, I award £175, 000 for historic costs. I am adopting a broad brush approach but the sum has been reduced having concluded that: (i) the amount of work billed is excessive; (ii) the hourly rates are excessive; (iii) the deployment of six solicitor is excessive. Applying the same approach the £187, 836 LSPO costs are excessive. I accept Ms Cambell's submission this figure involves double counting a CMH and the LSPO/MPS hearing, which is not permissible. They are reduced to £ 125, 000 again applying a cautious approach and reducing the costs in the three areas set out above. A seeks £774, 400 for the projected jurisdiction costs. This is also excessive. It is predicated on a five day hearing. There will likely be only three witness and brief submissions. There will be a forum hearing before me in July. Three days of court time will be provided, not five (although I will provide reading and judgment writing time but that will not drive up A's costs). I reduce the budget for jurisdiction to £400, 000. I have factored in the fact A has required further work to be undertaken on service of the divorce application on Z. This works out at a monthly budget of around £100, 000 (on the basis further work would have been undertaken since the February 2026 hearing). The LSPO order will therefore permit A to settle the majority of their historic costs, deal with the costs of the contested LSPO/MPS application and permit them a budget to fully litigate the jurisdiction/ forum issues. It is a much lower figure that A sought but I am clear that they do not reasonably need six lawyers charging high hourly rates. It is a much higher figure than Z sought. I have done my best noting there is something of a lack of reality in both sets of figures. A takes an excessive approach. Z takes a hardline approach. I have applied a broad brush approach in the exercise of my discretion and if one side feels the order is too high or too low then they may consider taking a more realistic approach from forum to FDR should matters progress before this court. The order will provide for £ 700, 000. Part 25/Directions The application for a stay in this jurisdiction was not pursued. I indicated at the hearing that I would grant Z's application for a Part 25 expert in the law of X State. This is necessary to permit resolution of the forum dispute. It may also be necessary to resolve any service issues. Z served this application for too late for it to be fairly dealt with by A's team. If there are dispute in respect of the identity of the expert or the scope of their instruction they will be resolved at a short, remote directions hearing. The parties are asked to agree directions to the forum conveniens hearing which will be on 7 July with a time estimate of 3 days, to include further consideration of the LSPO budget to the FDR should the claim continue. I am grateful to leading counsel for their assistance and ask they draft an order to give effect to this judgment. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII