Harris, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 638 (04 March 2025)

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Crim 638 CASE NO 202400103/B5 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT STAFFORD HHJ FLETCHER (T19950812 and T19950720) Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL 4 March 2025 B e f o r e : LADY JUSTICE NICOLA DAVIES MRS JUSTICE McGOWAN MR JUSTICE NICKLIN ____________________ REX - v - ANDREW HARRIS ____________________ Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd, Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court) ____________________ NON-COUNSEL APPLICATION JUDGMENT (Approved) ____________________ HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT (APPROVED) ____________________ Crown Copyright © MR JUSTICE NICKLIN: The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. On 5 February 1996, in the Crown Court at Stafford, the Applicant (then aged 25) pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault on a female under the age of 14, contrary to s.14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. On 26 June 1996, the Applicant was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment. On 15 November 1996, the Applicant successfully appealed his sentence, which was reduced by the Court of Appeal to 5 years' imprisonment. The Applicant (now acting in person) has made an application for leave to appeal against his conviction. He also applies for an extension of time of 10,056 days. It is not necessary to set out the facts of the offences to which the Applicant pleaded guilty. They are set out in the earlier Court of Appeal decision. The Applicant seeks to advance the following grounds of appeal. First, as regards his sentence, the Applicant seeks to argue that false or misleading information has been recorded in relation to earlier allegations made against him. He argues, in summary, that there was a breach of process by the Staffordshire Police and the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to his previous convictions. His Police National Computer Record included a conviction for an offence in 1988 in the Cannock Magistrates' Court, which had actually been dismissed by the magistrates. The Applicant alleges that the police "deliberately fabricated" this entry and that the police and the CPS allowed this fraudulent information to be used when presenting the case to the judge in the trial below. This resulted, he says, in him concluding that the convictions were "worse than they were" and arriving at the sentence that he imposed. As regards conviction, the Applicant first seeks to contend that the substantive allegation in relation to the second complainant was untrue and malicious. Second, he seeks to argue that his solicitor and counsel were incompetent, in that they failed to challenge false or misleading information about his previous convictions. Third, he seeks to argue that his legal representatives were given insufficient details of the allegations against him. The Applicant alleges that his solicitor was incompetent and that he failed to challenge allegations which he says were clearly fabricated. The Applicant was only charged with one of the counts on the indictment due to his solicitor's incompetence, he claims, and, if his solicitor had represented him appropriately, then this allegation would not have gone beyond the investigation stage. Finally, the Applicant seeks to argue that his solicitor told him to plead guilty because he had "no standing". In view of the criticisms made of his trial counsel and solicitors the Applicant was invited to, and did, waive privilege. Comments were therefore sought from his trial solicitors and counsel. Given that the events took place over 28 years ago, and the legal representatives no longer having access to any of their papers, they were therefore unable to offer any comment on the complaints made against them by the Applicant. The Crown has filed a Respondent's Notice. In it, the prosecution accepts that a recording error was made in respect of the outcome of the proceedings on 5 December 1988 at Cannock Magistrates' Court. It appears from the Respondent's Notice that the record may still be inaccurate. If not already corrected, the Crown should take steps to ensure that the record of the Applicant's previous convictions is accurate. The Applicant might have other avenues of redress were his conviction data shown to be inaccurate. Nevertheless, the respondent submits that in substance the Applicant's complaint is a renewed challenge against his sentence, namely that the sentencing judge considered his offending to be more serious than it was because of the mis-recording of the 1988 matter. An appeal in relation to sentence has already been determined and the Crown submission therefore is the Court of Appeal is therefore functus officio and none of the grounds for reopening the determination of an appeal set out in Criminal Procedure Rules 50.27 apply in this case. Finally, the Crown contends that the grounds of appeal disclose no arguable basis for asserting that the Applicant's convictions, through his guilty pleas, were unsafe. Refusing leave to appeal conviction, the single judge gave the following reasons: "I have considered the papers in your case and your grounds of appeal. The form of appeal sought is leave to appeal against conviction. However [1] you pleaded guilty to both counts and there is no basis for considering the pleas equivocal and [2] you advance no basis on which there could be any doubt about the convictions. The complaints advanced relate to the wrong citation of previous convictions in the sentencing process. There is no basis for alleging corruption or malice by the police, rather than an error of bureaucracy. Even if it is accepted that such an error was made, this could not form the basis of a successful appeal. The first reason for that is technical: you have already had a successful appeal on sentence, and that court's function is finished and cannot be re-opened. The second reason is not technical. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal in reducing your sentence to 5 years, and the analysis of the sentencing judge in imposing the sentence he did, did not turn on the erroneous record of convictions, but on a detailed analysis of the offending and of your attitudes in your response to with the probation service and by the reporting clinical psychologist. The key was your distorted thinking. The judgment of the Court in 1996 makes that entirely clear." We agree with the single judge. There is no substance to the Applicant's renewed complaint about his sentence and a further appeal is barred because he successfully appealed the sentence in 1996 and it would appear that none of the grounds in Criminal Procedure Rules 50.27 apply to the Applicant's case. The single judge did not deal with the complaints made by the Applicant about his legal representatives which are advanced in his challenge against his conviction. The Applicant seeks to challenge events that took place over 28 years ago. He has provided no adequate explanation for the delay. In his grounds of appeal the Applicant claims that his delay is explained by what he alleges to be the deliberate withholding of information about mistakes on his criminal record. However, that does not explain the delay in bringing forward his complaints about his legal representatives. The delay is substantial and, as the fruitless inquiries with his legal representatives at his original trial demonstrate, it means it is now impossible to adjudicate fairly upon these complaints. The Applicant bears responsibility for this. Had he brought forward his complaints about his convictions and his claims that he had been badly served and advise by his legal representatives in 1996, when his appeal against sentence was being considered, it may have been possible to adjudicate upon those complaints. At this distance it is now impossible. For those reasons, we refuse the Applicant's application for an extension of time. The effect will be that his renewed application for leave to appeal is refused. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII