Attorney General's Reference No 3 of 2004 [2005] EWCA Crim 1882 (13 July 2005)

Attorney General's Reference No 3 of 2004 [2005] EWCA Crim 1882 (13 July 2005)

A secondary party to a joint enterprise cannot be convicted of manslaughter if the act causing death by the principal is fundamentally different from the act contemplated by the secondary party, and the secondary party did not foresee the possibility of physical injury or death. Liability requires subjective foresight of the act causing death as a possible incident of the joint venture.

Citation
[2005] EWCA Crim 1882
Parties
Applicant: Attorney General; Respondent / Acquitted Person: H (name withheld)
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
13 July 2005
Procedural Posture
Attorney General's Reference Under Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 / Court of Appeal (criminal Division) Opinion on Referred Points of Law
Outcome
Opinion given; Attorney General's Reference answered in favour of the acquitted person on the first question; no jurisdiction to answer the second question.
Legal Topics
Joint Enterprise, Manslaughter, Murder, Secondary Liability, Scope of Joint Enterprise, Mens Rea

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Parties

Attorney General

Applicant

H (name withheld)

Respondent / Acquitted Person

Procedural Posture

Attorney General's Reference Under Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 / Court of Appeal (criminal Division) Opinion on Referred Points of Law

  1. 1 Whether a secondary party to a joint enterprise can be convicted of manslaughter when the principal's act causing death is outside the scope of the joint enterprise as foreseen by the secondary party
  2. 2 Whether variation in intent between participants precludes conviction for manslaughter
  3. 3 Jurisdiction to answer questions not arising in the case

Ratio Decidendi

A secondary party to a joint enterprise cannot be convicted of manslaughter if the act causing death by the principal is fundamentally different from the act contemplated by the secondary party, and the secondary party did not foresee the possibility of physical injury or death. Liability requires subjective foresight of the act causing death as a possible incident of the joint venture.

Court Disposition

Opinion given; Attorney General's Reference answered in favour of the acquitted person on the first question; no jurisdiction to answer the second question.

Orders

  • The conclusion reached by Sir Stephen Mitchell was correct on the assumed facts; no jurisdiction to answer the second question.