Attorney General's Reference No 3 of 2004 [2005] EWCA Crim 1882 (13 July 2005)
A secondary party to a joint enterprise cannot be convicted of manslaughter if the act causing death by the principal is fundamentally different from the act contemplated by the secondary party, and the secondary party did not foresee the possibility of physical injury or death. Liability requires subjective foresight of the act causing death as a possible incident of the joint venture.
- Citation
- [2005] EWCA Crim 1882
- Parties
- Applicant: Attorney General; Respondent / Acquitted Person: H (name withheld)
- Jurisdiction
- England and Wales
- Judgment Date
- 13 July 2005
- Procedural Posture
- Attorney General's Reference Under Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 / Court of Appeal (criminal Division) Opinion on Referred Points of Law
- Outcome
- Opinion given; Attorney General's Reference answered in favour of the acquitted person on the first question; no jurisdiction to answer the second question.
- Legal Topics
- Joint Enterprise, Manslaughter, Murder, Secondary Liability, Scope of Joint Enterprise, Mens Rea
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Attorney General
Applicant
H (name withheld)
Respondent / Acquitted Person
Procedural Posture
Attorney General's Reference Under Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 / Court of Appeal (criminal Division) Opinion on Referred Points of Law
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a secondary party to a joint enterprise can be convicted of manslaughter when the principal's act causing death is outside the scope of the joint enterprise as foreseen by the secondary party
- 2 Whether variation in intent between participants precludes conviction for manslaughter
- 3 Jurisdiction to answer questions not arising in the case
Ratio Decidendi
A secondary party to a joint enterprise cannot be convicted of manslaughter if the act causing death by the principal is fundamentally different from the act contemplated by the secondary party, and the secondary party did not foresee the possibility of physical injury or death. Liability requires subjective foresight of the act causing death as a possible incident of the joint venture.
Court Disposition
Opinion given; Attorney General's Reference answered in favour of the acquitted person on the first question; no jurisdiction to answer the second question.
Orders
- The conclusion reached by Sir Stephen Mitchell was correct on the assumed facts; no jurisdiction to answer the second question.
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