J, Y and others (Children;Care & Placement), Re [2015] EWFC B205 (04 December 2015)

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ____________________ Crown Copyright © JUDGE GREENE: These proceedings concern five children: J born 2003; Y, born 2006; K, born 2008; H, born 2013; and P born 2014. Currently the children are in foster care under an interim order. They are in three different placements. The mother is D. The father of J, Y and K is E. The father of H and P is G. The children's guardian for these proceedings is Ann Butler. The application brought by C County Council is for care orders in respect of all five of the children, with a care plan of long term foster care for the older three children and a care plan of placement for adoption for H and P. The applications are supported by the guardian. They are opposed by the parents. Each father seeks the care of his own children. The hearing has lasted four days, with three days of evidence from the social worker, Vanessa Canning, an independent social worker, Andrew Slade, and the fathers respectively, E and G. The mother did not attend throughout the proceedings, although she has spoken on a number of occasions to her counsel, Ms. Pilkington. The children were subject to previous care proceedings, which concluded in April of this year before HHJ O'Brien, when child arrangements orders and supervision orders were made. The child arrangements orders provided for the children to live with their mother and spend time with their respective fathers. G was to see P and H under professional supervision only. He was found in those proceedings to pose a risk to the children. Provision was made for J, K and Y to spend time with E, to include some alternate weekend staying. However, only K attended planned visits on a regular basis. J has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Oppositional Defiance Disorder. He has prescribed medication. He is assessed as being a very anxious child who, in some respects, has been put in the position of parenting the younger children. Y has hearing difficulties. She was described in the previous proceedings as being withdrawn and reserved. K suffers from asthma. He is described as being reserved and withdrawn at school. All of the children, except for Y, are overweight. The local authority undertook a sibling attachment assessment in respect of the three older children and the dynamics between the three of them, particularly in view of the difficulties posed by J's behaviour. J has extensive needs. He has been overinvolved in parenting his younger siblings. They have occasionally expressed a fear of him and the assessment recommended that J should be separately placed from Y and K. I turn now to the background. The mother, D, is aged 27. She had an abusive childhood and began her association with E when she was only 14 or 15 and he was then about 43. That became a sexual relationship, he says, when D was just 16. J must have been conceived not long after that, because she was still 16 when he was born. D has said on a number of occasions that she felt abused and controlled by E, but I have not heard any evidence from her in this hearing. The mother formed a relationship with G after she had separated from E. That relationship was reported as being violent and abusive. At the conclusion of the previous proceedings before HHJ O'Brien, the judge was told that D had separated from G and that he had not visited the family home since July 2014. Although the local authority was sceptical about that position it did not have sufficient evidence to demonstrate anything to the contrary. Therefore, a supervision order was agreed, with the children remaining with the mother on the basis that G would be kept away, with an injunction being made to that effect. Within a few days of those proceedings ending on that basis, G informed the social worker that he had in fact been living with the mother until the final hearing. The mother, D, has not actively taken part in this hearing and put herself forward, although she does want the children returned to her care. However, she has surrendered her tenancy on the family home. She has moved to stay with her sister. She clearly has encountered some difficulties. It is reported that she took an overdose in October and the ambulance service was called. An updating parenting assessment of D concluded that she was not able to keep the children safe or protect them. The father of J, Y and K is E, who is now aged 56. D had moved to live with him in the summer of 2003. They separated in 2011. J lived with E for about a year, with the younger children remaining with their mother. He then moved back to live with his mother and siblings, alleging that E had been physically abusive to him. Subsequently, J has refused to spend time with his father on a regular basis, although he does sometimes go to contact with his siblings. There were private law proceedings prior to the first set of care proceedings. They took place in 2012-13. The court made an order, which is referred to in the bundle, during which the parties' separation was described as having been very messy and that the children had been exposed to conflict between the parents. In addition to the threshold criteria filed earlier in the proceedings the local authority has sought some additional findings in the light of a report filed by Mr. Slade, an independent social worker. However, findings in relation to those matters have been hampered by the failure of the mother to attend and give evidence. I will deal with those matters more fully in a moment. I have reminded myself that the burden of proof is on the local authority throughout and that the standard of proof is the ordinary standard of the balance of probabilities. The father of H and P is G, who is aged 26. He too had an abusive childhood and spent some time in care. He was assessed by a psychologist, Peter Branston, in the previous proceedings in a report dated 10 th December 2014, a year ago. At the final hearing earlier this year, the court heard a recording of G shouting at the mother and children, something which Mr. Branston had also listened to and taken into account. He assessed G as having a strict and punitive approach to parenting, described his views as immature, with rigid beliefs resistant to change, and that he found it difficult to co-operate with professionals. Both Y and K have said that they are scared of G. G has attended some courses. On one of them, he was reported as saying that he would slap a child. He has since said that that was a joke. At the conclusion of the previous proceedings, D applied for an injunction against G. That was supported by the local authority and the guardian. G opposed that and sought unsupervised contact with the children. However, HHJ O'Brien granted the injunction and refused G's application for unsupervised contact. It is clear that in doing so the judge found G to be a risk to the children. The orders were made on the very clear basis of an understanding that the mother and G had separated. In these proceedings, G applied for leave to instruct an independent social worker. I refused that application. G has not been further assessed by the local authority; it is a matter on which his advocate made submissions which I will consider later in this judgment. The proceedings before me now were precipitated by concerns about violent and aggressive behaviour from G, the historical concerns of the controlling behaviour of E and the alleged physical abuse of J, the lack of emotional warmth towards the children, the lack of routine supervision and boundaries, arguments and conflict in the home and generally the children being caught up in parental disharmony. The mother had been assessed in the previous proceedings as having made some progress. It was felt at that stage that the major concern was G and the effect that he had. It became apparent, prior to the previous proceedings, that there had been a number of complaints to the housing authority about G's behaviour, with neighbours complaining about hearing him shouting at the children and the mother. There were reports of violent incidents; one report was by the grandmother. It was prior to the last proceedings that the mother first applied for an injunction against G. She described him as being aggressive and paranoid, that he was constantly making threats to her and that he had often damaged the property. Those matters all led up to the commencement of the previous proceedings. It transpired that in July 2014, despite an injunction having earlier been made, G went to the maternal grandmother's property and assaulted her partner whilst the children were present in the home. It appears that the mother said that she had been persuaded by G to allow him to visit. All of these matters were of great concern to the local authority and the care proceedings were issued. An assessment of E concluded that he could meet some of the children's needs but that there was a high level of concern about his physical chastisement and capacity to protect the children from acrimonious relationships. Those proceedings ended with the making of a supervision order, on the assurance that G and the mother had separated and on the basis of the local authority's lack of any evidence to the contrary. The position of E had been that he wanted his children to come and live with him, but he did not pursue that once that outcome had been put forward and agreed between the parties. It is clear, however, from the two judgments of HHJ O'Brien, that the judge came to the conclusion not only that the Section 31 threshold was met, but also that an injunction was merited, making an order preventing G from going to the mother's home and from contacting her, on the basis that this was required in order to keep the children safe. It was almost immediately after that hearing that G told the newly allocated social worker that he had in fact been living with the mother right up until the last day of that hearing. He reportedly said the same thing to a contact supervisor a week or so later. He has subsequently said that he was lying when he made those statements. Clearly he was lying either then or now. I have reminded myself of the fact that, even though someone may lie, that does not necessarily mean that they are guilty of all the things that they are accused of. However, in this instance, the lies are directly about the matters under consideration. In considering whether I accept his evidence that he had not been living with the mother and that his assertions to the social worker and the contact supervisor were untrue, I have asked myself why he would say so. His explanation was that he wanted to see whether the local authority would respond appropriately and, as he put it, "work with him". I found G's explanations utterly implausible. The consequences of what he said were obvious, in circumstances where it was so soon after a hearing which had revolved around whether he was living there and where the outcome had been dependent upon that fact. The local authority would conclude that he and the mother had been lying during the court proceedings and that the basis upon which the order had been made was a sham. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that G was lying when he first made that statement. The explanation that he has given is utterly implausible. I have been left in no doubt that G was telling the truth when he spoke to the social worker in April, saying that they had been living together and subsequently indicating that they have continued to see each other on numerous occasions. On 2 nd June this year, the police received a call from the mother's neighbour saying that J had run out into the street shouting for help because, he was reported as saying, the mother's boyfriend was there beating her up. The mother later denied this, however J was visibly upset. On the following day, G said to the social worker that he had gone to the house the previous evening and that the mother had threatened him with a knife. G now says that what he said to the social worker was a lie. It was submitted to me on his behalf that there was only hearsay evidence in relation to that incident and that, therefore, it would be unsafe to make any finding. However, I reject that submission. I accept the evidence of the social worker as to what G said to her, that he had been to the house. He gave detail about the incident, which he was unlikely to have otherwise known. He also mentioned it to a contact supervisor and to the police. I am satisfied that G was at the house and that there was a violent incident of some nature, although I cannot make a finding as to the detail of that incident in the absence of evidence from the mother. I am satisfied that there was an incident which was violent, that led to J running terrified into the street. A week later, on 9 th June, the police attended the mother's address. They arrested G within the 100m exclusion zone of the injunction. Both he and the mother initially denied that he had been at her property, but it then transpired that one of his shoes was still there, as was his mobile phone and some other property. The mother appears to have conspired with G in relation to that incident and attempted to deny that it had taken place. It appears that at one stage she had hidden the shoe and mobile phone from the police. A few days later, on 13 th June, the mother called to say that she had heard a bang outside her door and thought that G was there. When the police attended some two hours later, they found G in the vicinity and arrested him. I do not find his explanation as to why he was there a credible one. On 6 th November this year, on G's own evidence, the mother visited him. The mother herself has reported that, during that visit, he assaulted her and fractured her eye socket, which G denies. He has since alleged that she assaulted him. He said that she was uninjured when she left and that any injury she had was nothing to do with him. In his oral evidence before me, G expanded upon this incident. Under cross-examination, it became apparent from his own evidence that the mother had not only visited but had stayed overnight, they had gone out together the following day, gone back to his address again and that she had taken a shower whilst she was there. Then there was an argument, during the course of which clearly there was, at the least, a tussle. G said that he had to spend some time clearing up his room afterwards. In the course of the argument, the mother rang the police. G said in his evidence, which I found implausible, that she had been assaulting him whilst she was on the phone to the police complaining that he was assaulting her. He said that he put her on the bed. It is clear that he is minimising his actions when he says how he did that. It is clear that that was an episode in the middle of what was a physical fight. There was then some sort of incident with the door, which G was careful to minimise by saying that he had opened the door carefully. When the police arrived it is clear that there was another tussle. I was left with no doubt, from G's own evidence before me, that the serious injury that the mother was seen with occurred that day, during this physical altercation. It is not possible for me to conclude precisely how it occurred, as the mother is not here to give evidence, but I am satisfied on G's own evidence and admissions that there was no third party involved and that D had no opportunity to inflict such serious injury on herself before the police arrived. On the balance of probabilities, the injury occurred during the incident that took place between them. It was very plain to me, on G's own evidence, that there had continued to be a relationship of some nature between the mother and G throughout the previous proceedings, which continued on some basis after those proceedings right up until last month at least. I have to consider whether the threshold criteria is met for the making of the orders that the local authority seeks. Care or supervision orders can only be made if the test in s.31 of the Children Act 1989 is met, namely that: "A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied– (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to - (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him;" In considering the evidence I have heard, I make the following findings. In relation to the threshold as set out in the document at A3, the third paragraph consists of findings already made in the previous proceedings. Therefore, I find those to be made out. Paragraph 4 deals with G continuing to attend the family home, the mother failing to prevent him and failing to take reasonable steps to enable the police to provide protection for herself and the children. I make that finding as set out in that document. I also find the allegations met in subparagraphs (2) and (3) relating to the incidents on the 2 nd and 9 th June. I also find subparagraph (4) met in relation to the incident on 12 th to 13 th June. Additionally, I make a finding which perhaps would become subparagraph (5), that on 6 th and 7 th November the mother and G spent the day and night together and that a violent argument ensued, which became a physical fight during which the mother sustained serious facial injuries. I find that both remain incapable of controlling their anger and emotions and that the children will be at serious risk of significant harm in the care of either of them. I also make the findings set out in paras.5 and 6 at A5 of the bundle, which can be taken as read into this judgment. So far as the additional findings sought by the local authority are concerned, some of those are matters are not pursued in view of the failure of the mother to attend and give evidence. However, it is clear to me, as is set out in para.5, that following the separation of the mother and E, and upon the commencement of the mother's relationship with G, E moved into the property next door and the children were exposed to ongoing conflict, arguments and acrimony between the adults. I also find that following their separation, the mother and E failed to encourage the children to maintain a good relationship with the other parent. I make those findings as set out in that document. I also find that para.9 is made out, namely that J perceived the parenting he received from his father, E, as harsh and abusive and complained that he was hit and kicked by his father. I find the threshold criteria met on that basis. However, the finding that the Threshold is met does not necessarily mean that orders should be made. I have to go on to consider the children's welfare and whether any order should be made. In doing so, I remind myself that the children's welfare is the paramount consideration. In relation to all of the children, I have applied the welfare checklist in s.1 of the Children Act. There are other matters that I have taken into account in relation to H and P, which I will come to in a moment. I am going to deal firstly with J, Y and K. In considering the welfare aspect, I heard evidence from the social worker, Vanessa Canning. I found her evidence to be fair and balanced. Where it differs from that of E or G, I prefer her evidence, as I found each of the fathers to be unreliable and unconvincing witnesses. I am satisfied that Ms. Canning approached matters with a fresh and open mind, intending to implement the orders that had been made in the previous proceedings. In respect of that, I am referring specifically to the orders for contact in relation to the three older children and E. I find Ms. Canning's evidence as to the chaotic nature of the contact to be persuasive. I accept it as accurate and as a proper basis for the reduction of and restrictions on contact that were made as a result. In all material respects in relation to contact, the children's Guardian forms the same view as the social worker. The contact that the Guardian observed, which I shall come to in a moment, was perhaps even more extreme. It is concerning that Y continues to say that she will not go to contact with E unless another of her siblings goes too. That is highly relevant to E's application that she should go to live with him. Y's wishes and feelings are a very relevant matter and she has very clearly said that she does not wish to live with E. I accept the evidence of the guardian and social worker on those matters. In relation to the guardian's evidence as to contact, I accept that the guardian had gone to observe the contact with an open mind, with the starting point having been the orders made in the previous proceedings. She said that she had not previously observed contact. She described the contact as horrifying. She said that it was appalling and some of the worst contact she has ever seen. That is a very extreme thing for a guardian to say and Mrs. Butler is a very experienced guardian. The guardian reported that not only was J behaving badly (not, in itself, a particularly unusual thing in contact) but that what particularly concerned her, which is highly relevant for me, was that E was simply sitting back, watching and refusing to intervene in any way at all. She describes the situation as being so extreme that Y was upset by it. When E gave his evidence, he demonstrated what I perceived to be a dismissive approach to all of the concerns and arrogance towards the social worker. He did not retract at all his view expressed on previous occasions that social workers are useless. He exhibited a distain for the mother, who he has referred to as "the bitch". Again, there was no retraction in relation to that. E showed no insight into the harm that any of the children have suffered and equally no insight into their needs. It was very clear that he listens to no counsel other than his own. I did not find his evidence to be helpful and where it differed from that of the social worker or the guardian I preferred their evidence. These are children who, it is clear, have already suffered harm. It has had an adverse effect upon them. They need a good level of nurturing and parenting to help repair that damage. Following the commencement of the current proceedings, it had been agreed that the children should continue to stay overnight with their father; those of them who would agree to go. However, difficulties arose to such an extent that the local authority applied for, and the court approved, proposals for that contact to change to visiting only. Those visits were initially in the community, but were then moved to the family centre because of continuing difficulties and it being observed that E was failing to manage the children's behaviour. The evidence of the guardian based upon her observations, which I accept, was that, E chose not to manage the children's behaviour, rather than that he was incapable of doing so. Because of E's position in the previous proceedings, authority was given for an independent social worker to be instructed to carry out an assessment of him. That independent social worker was Andrew Slade, a man who has also had a number of years' experience as a children's guardian. He concluded that E was able to meet the needs of all the three children. He based that on a contact which he observed and his discussions with E. Both the local authority and the guardian challenged that report and Mr. Slade's evidence. Their position is that he failed to take into account the history, the nature of the relationship between the mother and E (in particular that it was viewed as controlling and abusive by the mother) and the years of exposure to conflict that the children have suffered. Mr. Slade gave oral evidence. It was very clearly in conflict with the contact reports of the guardian and the social worker. He said that the contact he observed was very positive and enjoyable. I take that very seriously into account. There was a very stark difference between that description and the description by the guardian. It goes without saying that children do not behave in exactly the same way on every occasion when they see their parents, whether it is in supervised contact or otherwise. Some allowance has to be made for good days, bad days and so on. It may be, as was suggested, that E made a special effort on the day that the independent social worker he had asked for attended. However, the evidence of the social worker and the guardian was that the majority of the contacts were not like that, that when J's behaviour was difficult (which is more the norm) E chose to sit back and do nothing. I found that position to be confirmed by E's own evidence before me. In considering Mr. Slade's answers to questions in cross-examination, it became clear that his report had been based very much upon E's own self-reporting. There seemed to be no attempt to go behind that. What E said to him seemed to be taken at face value and the observations were not analysed or put into the context of the history of the very concerning background. For reasons which were not ascertained from the questions that Mr. Slade was asked, he seemed to feel himself unable to go beyond the face value of the denials by E of the various problems that were reported by others. I sadly conclude that the report and evidence from Mr. Slade did not properly fulfil the role of an expert witness. It was concerning that Mr. Slade was not even sure which of the documents he had read. I was satisfied, on the evidence of the social worker and the guardian, that I should prefer their evidence and conclude that E is not capable of, or if capable is not prepared to give, the type of parenting that the children need in view of the harmful parenting experiences that they have suffered. By all accounts, including his own, E is bull-headed and finds it difficult to listen to advice. It was clear from his answers in cross-examination that he takes some pride in being self-opinionated and making up his own mind about everything. It appeared to me that the only advice he is prepared to listen to is advice which happens to coincide with the views that he already has. J requires skilled parenting. Sadly, I conclude that E is not able to offer that. I am also satisfied, in any event, based on the sibling assessment, that J should not be in the same placement as Y and K. It is also apparent to me, although she was not here to put forward her case actively, that the mother equally, at the moment, is not able to meet J's needs. So far as Y and K are concerned, they also require a high level of skilled parenting. They have been assessed as having a close relationship and that they should be placed together in a placement separate to J. Sadly, I conclude, on the evidence I have heard, that E could not meet the needs of any of the children at the moment. He would need to have a change of heart and attitude for there to be any prospect of that changing in the future. Mr. Slade, in his evidence, accepted that Y and K should not be with J. He also accepted that E was not yet ready to have their care without further work having been undertaken. Therefore, I had to consider whether there is any work which could be undertaken within a reasonable timescale. It was clear to me, from E's evidence, that he has a dismissive attitude towards the long term concerns and that he fails to take advice from the professionals involved. I heard no inkling at all in his evidence of any change in that. He continues to regard the advice of social workers as valueless and to treat them with scorn. On his own evidence, it was clear that his approach is intransigent and that he is not likely to co-operate with any work that would be needed before he could be considered as an adequate parent for any of the children; in relation to having their full time care, as opposed to being able to have occasional contact, as previously assessed. If and when E is able to change his attitude, the work required would be of a timescale that would go beyond any acceptable extension or adjournment of these proceedings, particularly as the starting point for that work is nowhere yet in sight. Such work would also need to address E's attitude towards the mother, because the children have a close and loving relationship with her. It would be harmful to them to be exposed to the views which E currently has and expresses about their mother, still referring to her as "a bitch". It was submitted, in view of the inadequacies which I have found in relation to Mr. Slade's report, that I should consider directing a further assessment. However, in considering that submission I have taken into account all of the evidence that I have heard during the course of these proceedings. I form the view that the inadequacies in that report have been filled by the assessment that I have been able to make during the course of this hearing, over the past three days of evidence. On the basis of what I have heard, I do not consider that there remain any issues for assessment that are necessary for these proceedings or the decisions I have to make. I am satisfied that neither J, Y nor K, individually or together, could be safely or appropriately in the care of E. In coming to that conclusion, I have reminded myself that the standard must not be set too high. I have also reminded myself of the words of Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 , repeating the words said in a number of cases to the effect that children are best brought up by their natural family, where that can possibly be achieved, as long as that does not endanger their health or welfare. Sadly, I am satisfied that the standard falls well below that in this case and that the children could not be safely or appropriately cared for in E's care. The care plan is one of long term foster care. I am satisfied that there is no other appropriate outcome for them. Their needs will be reviewed on a regular basis, both as to whether they should continue to be in care and also as to the appropriate level of their contact. An independent reviewing officer will be involved in ensuring that the arrangements continue to be the best for them and to meet their needs. Both the mother and E will have the opportunity to reflect on the judgment, on the evidence and on the incidents that have led to the judgment, and to decide whether they are able to make changes. In due course, if there have been sufficient positive changes, the mother and E could consider bringing the matter back if, at the regular Looked After Children reviews, they feel that the local authority and the independent reviewing officer are not acting appropriately in relation to the children's continued placement or contact needs. Therefore, in relation to J, Y and K, I approve the care plan put forward by the local authority. I make care orders in respect of each of them. I turn now to H and P, in relation to G. To some extent, I have already referred to the evidence which he gave. I found his evidence not at all credible. Much of it I have found to be lies and implausible. He has put himself forward to have the care of his two children. I should say that, to his credit, he shows commitment to them in contact and the children enjoyed their time with him. Sadly, however, the contact had to be suspended. I find that it was properly suspended as a result of G's unacceptable behaviour during contact, in carrying out an intimate inspection of H's genital area. It was unjustified and inappropriate. She had already been examined by a doctor on the basis of concerns that the mother had expressed, that H's vagina was red and sore. G then carried out another inspection himself, having been asked not to do so, saying that he did not trust the local authority. Unsurprisingly, therefore, contact was suspended and remains suspended at the moment. In view of the local authority's care plan, their position now is that if I make the orders sought, then contact should not resume, but there should be simply a goodbye contact for G. On G's behalf, it was submitted that there is a gap in the evidence and that if I do not consider that the children can be placed in his care now, I should consider adjourning for an independent social worker report into his parenting. G complains that he has not been properly assessed and that he has applied for such assessments and been refused. G has given evidence that he voluntarily enrolled himself on a number of courses. He provided no evidence of that prior to the commencement of this final hearing. His evidence about the courses was partly say-so and partly a report which was simply as to the number of attendances. There is no report, however, analysing the benefit to or any change in G arising from those courses. I have had the benefit of three days of evidence and paid particular attention to G and his own evidence. On the basis of the evidence which he gave, including the admissions of numerous breaches of the injunctions and the various incidents, I am satisfied that he has demonstrated a total lack of insight into the children's needs and that he has lied on numerous occasions. The evidence he gave satisfied me that the courses which he has attended have had little or no perceivable effect or positive effect on him. On the evidence I have heard I consider that he remains a dangerous man. There remains a real risk of his behaving in an unrestrained and harmful way during anything other than supervised contact. The findings which I have already made as to the threshold are directly relevant here. It was abundantly clear to me, from G's evidence, that those incidents upon which I have made findings were matters which are directly relevant to the question of whether he has benefitted from any of the courses which he has been on. I find that he has not. It also satisfied me that the psychological assessment completed in December 2014 remains as valid and relevant now as it was then. The psychologist, Mr. Branston, gave oral evidence before HHJ O'Brien and was cross-examined prior to the point in the proceedings at which matters proceeded to an agreement. HHJ O'Brien was satisfied that G posed such a risk to the mother and children that the children could only be safely in her care if injunction orders were made to keep G away. The evidence that I have heard satisfies me that there has been no change in that position. Whatever the status of the relationship between G and the mother, they remain volatile. Certainly up until the beginning of last month, when there was a violent incident, it is quite demonstrable that their relationship is volatile. A child in the care of either would be at real risk of physical harm because of the continuing likelihood of such incidents. For all of those reasons, I have concluded that a parenting assessment would be unnecessary and irrelevant in addressing the real issues in this case. I refused it earlier in the proceedings and I refuse it again now. In my view, G continues to present a clear risk of harm to the children. In view of the findings that I have made, that he poses a risk to their safety, it is neither necessary nor relevant for me to know whether he nevertheless can change nappies or prepare food. This is not a matter in which parenting abilities are relevant. This is a matter of fundamental safety. As the care plan for H and P is one of adoption, I have also considered s.1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, that the children's welfare throughout their lives is the paramount consideration, in addition to the other matters in the welfare checklist in that Act. The harm which the children have suffered and, in particular, are likely to continue to suffer, on my findings, is of fundamental importance. I find that they need a nurturing and safe family environment, which neither of their parents is able to offer now or in the foreseeable future. G, in particular, shows no insight and there is no real prospect, on my findings, of his making any relevant changes within an acceptable timescale. I have reminded myself of the words of the Supreme Court in Re B (a child) [2009] UKSC 5 and the Court of Appeal in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 . Placement for adoption is a draconian order. Every reasonable and realistic alternative option should be explored. In respect of H and P, I am satisfied that unfortunately they cannot safely live with their mother. The mother has not, in any event, actively put forward her case. There are no other viable family members or persons who have put themselves forward. As I have said, I find that they could not be safely placed in the care of G. Long term foster care is not a reasonable alternative for such young children, with all of the disadvantages of a life in care without a family to call their own. It is significant that even the mother recognises that and, on her behalf, Ms. Pilkington said that if the children could not live with the mother then she believes that their best interests would be met only by adoption, despite the fact that that outcome would be the one by which she would, herself, almost certainly lose all hope of direct contact continuing. That perhaps shows the awakening of some insight on the mother's part of the harm that the children have suffered and would suffer in the care of G. On that basis, I approve the care plans in respect of H and P and make care orders on the basis of those care plans. I turn now to the question of Placement orders. Placement orders can only be made either with the consent of the parents, which is not forthcoming in this case, or if I am able to dispense with their consent. Having already approved a care plan for adoption, it is obvious that that plan could not be implemented unless the local authority is able to place the children. The local authority is not able to place the children unless placement orders are made. Therefore, the children's welfare requires that I dispense with the consent of both parents in order that the care plan that I have approved can be implemented. Therefore, I dispense with their consent and make placement orders. One other matter that arose during the course of submissions was an application for there to be a transcript of the evidence of G produced and disclosed to the police. I heard argument as to that. I have balanced the need for parents in care proceedings to be able to give evidence in a way that can best assist the court and without concern of incrimination, against the public interest that, if criminal acts have taken place, such proceedings should proceed on the basis of the best evidence available. I have reminded myself of the provisions of the Children Act in relation to evidence and the extent to which it can be used. It is clear that the use of this would be restricted to further investigation and interview. However, in view of the nature of the evidence which G gave, and the fact that it is a matter already under investigation by the police, I am satisfied that the public interest does take priority in these circumstances and that I should order a transcript of the evidence at the joint expense of the parties. It should be disclosed to the police or Crown Prosecution Service. LATER I have considered the requests made in relation to contact. However, on the basis of the evidence I have heard, I am satisfied that the local authority's position is the appropriate one for the children and that the care plans are appropriate. In saying that I approve those care plans, I should perhaps have specifically referred to the question of contact. However, I did have that in mind and approve that as well. LATER I refuse leave to appeal in relation to contact. I have taken into account the welfare of the children as being paramount. I have to factor into that the decisions which I have made and what the future will hold for the children. I am satisfied that it would not have been right to restart contact which had already been suspended, only with a view to it then stopping again. In those circumstances, I consider the local authority position to be appropriate and my decision, therefore, to be right. Consequently, I refuse leave to appeal. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII