Castle v Crown Prosecution Service [2014] EWHC 587 (Admin) (24 January 2014)
The 2011 Order was validly made under Section 14 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, which authorises the imposition of variable speed limits as necessary. The Order was not ultra vires because the Secretary of State could lawfully act through authorised officials in the Highways Agency under the Carltona principle, and the act of signing by a Highways Agency employee was constitutionally the act of the Secretary of State. There was no unlawful delegation or deficiency in the making or enforcement of the Order.
- Citation
- [2014] EWHC 587 (Admin)
- Parties
- Appellant: Castle; Respondent: Crown Prosecution Service
- Jurisdiction
- England and Wales
- Judgment Date
- 24 January 2014
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Appeal by Way of Case Stated / Divisional Court Judgment on Appeal Against Conviction
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Variable Speed Limits, Delegation of Ministerial Powers, Statutory Interpretation, Ultra Vires, Carltona Principle, Subordinate Legislation, Traffic Regulation Orders
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Castle
Appellant
Crown Prosecution Service
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal by Way of Case Stated / Divisional Court Judgment on Appeal Against Conviction
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the 2011 Order permitted variable speed limits
- 2 Whether the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 authorised variable speed limits
- 3 Whether the 2011 Order was ultra vires due to being signed by a Highways Agency employee
Ratio Decidendi
The 2011 Order was validly made under Section 14 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, which authorises the imposition of variable speed limits as necessary. The Order was not ultra vires because the Secretary of State could lawfully act through authorised officials in the Highways Agency under the Carltona principle, and the act of signing by a Highways Agency employee was constitutionally the act of the Secretary of State. There was no unlawful delegation or deficiency in the making or enforcement of the Order.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed
Orders
- Detailed public funding assessment ordered
- Written submissions invited on certification and leave to appeal
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
Sign in to read
Sign in to read the full judgment text
Sign in to read the full judgment text. Downloads and additional research tools may depend on your plan.
Sign in to read the full judgment