Wood, R v

Wood, R v

The trial judge's direction that giving in to a craving is not involuntary, even if very difficult to do otherwise, set the threshold for diminished responsibility too high and failed to reflect the current legal understanding post-Dietschmann. The law does not require total loss of control or observable brain damage for alcohol dependency syndrome to amount to an abnormality of mind. The jury should have been directed to consider whether the syndrome, even absent brain damage, constituted an abnormality of mind that substantially impaired the appellant's mental responsibility, focusing on the effect of alcohol consumed as a result of the illness and disregarding purely voluntary...

Parties
Respondent: R; Appellant: Clive Wood
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
20 June 2008
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Appeal Against Conviction for Murder
Outcome
Appeal allowed; conviction for murder quashed
Legal Topics
Diminished Responsibility, Alcohol Dependency Syndrome, Murder, Manslaughter, Voluntary Intoxication
Criminal Law Diminished Responsibility Alcohol Dependency Syndrome Murder Manslaughter Voluntary Intoxication

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

More case intelligence is available

Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.

Full judgment text Downloadable case file Legal principles 4 Authorities cited 9 Party arguments 2
Sign in to unlock

Parties

R

Respondent

Clive Wood

Appellant

Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal / Appeal Against Conviction for Murder

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the law of diminished responsibility in the context of alcohol dependency syndrome
  2. 2 Whether voluntary intoxication precludes a defence of diminished responsibility for murder
  3. 3 Whether the presence or absence of brain damage is determinative for diminished responsibility in alcoholics

Ratio Decidendi

The trial judge's direction that giving in to a craving is not involuntary, even if very difficult to do otherwise, set the threshold for diminished responsibility too high and failed to reflect the current legal understanding post-Dietschmann. The law does not require total loss of control or observable brain damage for alcohol dependency syndrome to amount to an abnormality of mind. The jury should have been directed to consider whether the syndrome, even absent brain damage, constituted an abnormality of mind that substantially impaired the appellant's mental responsibility, focusing on the effect of alcohol consumed as a result of the illness and disregarding purely voluntary...

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; conviction for murder quashed

Orders

  • Conviction for murder quashed
  • Submissions to be invited on whether to order a new trial or substitute a conviction for manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility