Stevens, R v

Stevens, R v

The judge's admission of VIPER identification evidence was not unfair, procedural criticisms were not substantial, and the summing-up was adequate. The activation of the suspended sentence was correct, and the tariff for life imprisonment should be set at 5 years, deducting time served on remand.

Parties
Appellant: Danny Stevens; Respondent: The Crown
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
01 December 2003
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Judgment on Appeal Against Conviction and Sentence
Outcome
Appeal against conviction dismissed; appeal against sentence allowed in part
Legal Topics
Identification Evidence, Admissibility of Evidence, Sentencing, Life Imprisonment, Activation of Suspended Sentence
Criminal Law Identification Evidence Admissibility of Evidence Sentencing Life Imprisonment Activation of Suspended Sentence

Case Brief

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Parties

Danny Stevens

Appellant

The Crown

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal / Judgment on Appeal Against Conviction and Sentence

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the judge erred in admitting identification evidence obtained via the VIPER procedure
  2. 2 Whether the VIPER identification procedure was conducted fairly
  3. 3 Whether the judge's summing-up on identification evidence was adequate

Ratio Decidendi

The judge's admission of VIPER identification evidence was not unfair, procedural criticisms were not substantial, and the summing-up was adequate. The activation of the suspended sentence was correct, and the tariff for life imprisonment should be set at 5 years, deducting time served on remand.

Court Disposition

Appeal against conviction dismissed; appeal against sentence allowed in part

Orders

  • Minimum period to be served before parole is 4 years and 2 months, after deduction of time served on remand