UYR, R (on the application of) v Derby City Council

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 2081 (Admin IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE COURT Case No: AC-2025-MAN-000195 Civil Justice Centre 1 Bridge Street West, Manchester M60 9DJ Date: 25/07/2025 Before : KAREN RIDGE SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Between : THE KING (on the application of UYR) - and – Claimant Derby City Council Defendant -and- Bedford Borough Council -and- Manchester City Council - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 st Interested party 2 nd Interested Party Susana Ferrin (instructed by Luke and Bridger Law) for the Claimant Michael Paget (instructed by In-house Legal Services) for the Defendant Mr Harrop-Griffiths (instructed by Bedford Borough Council Legal Services) for the first Interested Party Hearing date: 14 May 2025 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - APPROVED JUDGMENT High Court Approved Judgment: UYR v Derby City Council & Ors Deputy High Court Judge Karen Ridge: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The judicial review claim is a challenge to a decision to assess the Claimant to be an adult and to decline to provide services pursuant to the Children Act 1989. That decision was made on 28 March 2025 by the Defendant, Derby City Council, (“DCC”). The Claimant currently resides in the administrative area of Manchester City Council (“MCC”) named as Second Interested Party. Bedford Borough Council (“BCC”) are named as the First Interested Party because of their earlier involvement with the Claimant when they conducted an age assessment by brief enquiry and concluded that the Claimant was an adult. That brief enquiry decision is not subject to challenge. I shall determine a number of interim applications which the Claimant has made. The Claimant has made an application for interim relief seeking an order that the Defendant should treat the Claimant as a putative child, aged 15, pending the final conclusion of these proceedings or until further order. Following a hospital admission the Claimant has been accommodated by MCC since around 9 May 2025 as a looked after child under the provisions of the Children Act 1989. There are further applications for anonymity and to dispense with a litigation friend. Those applications are not contentious. The claim arises from an age assessment and the Claimant has a live asylum claim. It is not appropriate for material which could identify the Claimant, who may be a child, to be in the public domain when his claim to international protection is yet to be considered and where his application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings may continue. I am satisfied that non-disclosure of the Claimant’s identity is currently necessary to secure the proper administration of justice and in order to protect his interests in accordance with CPR 39.2(4). On his own case the Claimant is now almost 16 years of age. There is no reason to doubt his capacity to conduct litigation and his instructing solicitor has confirmed this. In light of the guidance in R (ex p JS) v SSHD [2019] UKUT 000064 (IAC), it is not necessary for a litigation friend to be appointed and his claim can properly continue without this. I therefore make the requested orders in relation to those matters. Background The Claimant’s country of origin is Ethiopia. The Claimant’s witness statement documents his life in Ethiopia, the murder of his father and his imprisonment alongside his brother for one month before his escape from detention. The Claimant then travelled to Libya with his mother and other family members in February 2024, and thereafter the family stayed in a warehouse for 6 months. He then travelled by boat to Italy and then on to Calais before arriving, unaccompanied, in the UK on the back of a lorry on 17 March 2025. On his arrival into the UK the Claimant says that he approached the police for help and he informed the police that he was a child with a date of birth of 6 October 2009. He was screened as an adult and dispersed into adult accommodation. He spent 4 days in accommodation in Bedford, before being moved to Derby where he stayed for Draft 4 August 2025 15:31 Page 2 High Court Approved Judgment: UYR v Derby City Council & Ors 7. 8. 20 days. On 23 April 2025 he was moved to Manchester where he has remained since. On the 28 March 2025 DCC social workers conducted a brief age enquiry and concluded that the Claimant was not his claimed age and that he was clearly an adult. On the 31 March 2025 the Claimant’s legal representatives sent a pre-action protocol letter to the Defendant challenging the decision not to treat the Claimant as a child and not to provide him with support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. On 7 April 2025, in its response to the pre-action protocol letter, the Defendant notified the Claimant’s legal representatives that BBC had conducted an age assessment on the 18 March 2025; that the claim should be brought against BBC; and that the Defendant would not be providing children’s services. Evidence produced by the Claimant attests to his mental health deteriorating due to the trauma he has suffered and his sense of isolation and lack of support. On the 6 May 2025 the Claimant presented himself at a Manchester hospital after collapsing. The staff nurse on duty was of the view that the Claimant was very young and she made a safeguarding referral to MCC. The Claimant was then admitted to the children’s ward of the hospital. Emergency Duty Social Workers from MCC attended at the hospital and decided that the Claimant should be accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 after his discharge from hospital. Thereafter the Claimant has been accommodated in foster care arranged by MCC on an interim basis. The Legal Framework and Applicable Guidance 9. Section 17(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989 imposes a general duty on every local authority “to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need.” Section 20 of the Act, so far as material, provides:- “(1) Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need within their area who appears to them to require accommodation as a result of- (a) there being no person who has parental responsibility for him; (b) his being lost or having been abandoned; or (c) the person who has been caring for him being prevented (whether or not permanently, and for whatever reason) from providing him with suitable accommodation or care. (2) Where a local authority provide accommodation under subsection (1) for a child who is ordinarily resident in the area of another local authority, that other local authority may take over the provision of accommodation for the child within- (a) three months of being notified in writing that the child is being provided with accommodation; or (b) such other longer period as may be prescribed.” Draft 4 August 2025 15:31 Page 3 High Court Approved Judgment: UYR v Derby City Council & Ors 10. The Age Assessment Joint Working Guidance of 31 March 2023 (“Joint Working Guidance”) has been produced by the Home Office and it sets out the agreed arrangements between the Home Office and Local Authorities where there are disputes about the age of a person claiming to be a child. Section 6 deals with actions to be taken when there are conflicting age assessments/disputes or legal involvement. Section 6.2 deals with the situation where there are conflicting local authority age assessments and directs that local authorities: “must work together, and with other agencies, and be sure they prioritise safeguarding the individual and adhere to the Children Act 1989 and Children Act 2004.” The guidance specifically provides advice aimed at reducing unnecessary repetition of the assessment process. The Parties’ Positions at the Hearing 11. Ms Ferrin, on behalf of the Claimant, confirmed that the Claimant’s primary position is that the Defendant (DCC) formed its own decision on the Claimant’s age, that decision is subject to challenge, and therefore interim relief is claimed against DCC. In the alternative, Ms Ferrin submits that the geographical rule applies in terms of interpretation of the Children Act 1989, and she contends that MCC must provide services under the Act but that in any event, it is for local authority services to work together as recognised by the Joint Working Guidance. 12. Mr Harrop-Griffiths appeared on behalf of BBC at the commencement of the interim relief hearing but when it became apparent that no party is seeking to argue that interim relief should be ordered against BBC, he asked to be released from the hearing. The decision of BBC in relation to its brief enquiry decision is not under challenge and no relief is sought against it. Therefore I released Mr Harrop-Griffiths and BBC played no further part in the interim relief hearing. 13. MCC were not represented at the hearing but its solicitor sent an email dated 14 May 2025 timed at 9:45am to the Court. That email records recent events regarding the safeguarding referral to MCC and its decision to accommodate the Claimant under section 20. MCC social workers have been in communication with the Defendant to seek to agree matters but agreement had not been reached. The position of MCC is that the Claimant is being accommodated by it, but in these circumstances MCC says that the Joint Working Guidance and the ADCS Age Assessment Guidance 2015 provides that the Claimant should be referred to the local authority which conducted the previous age assessment, namely the Defendant authority. 14. Mr Paget, on behalf of the Defendant, points out that the Claimant is seeking a mandatory order and the Court requires a high degree of assurance that the claim has merit before making such an order. Mr Paget submits that there have been two brief enquiries as to the Claimant’s age, by BBC and the Defendant Council, and each has concluded that the Claimant is plainly an adult. Those enquiries followed the Home Office decision that the Claimant was an adult. The Claimant is now being treated as a child and Mr Paget contends that there would be no risk of prejudice or harm to the Claimant if interim injunctive relief is refused. 15. Mr Paget refers to the Joint Working Guidance and says that there MCC have decided to treat the Claimant as a child in circumstances where there has been no full age assessment, he contends that MCC will struggle to persuade the Court that the Claimant should be transferred to DCC. Mr Paget further submits that the serious Draft 4 August 2025 15:31 Page 4 High Court Approved Judgment: UYR v Derby City Council & Ors 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. issue to be tried limb of the test has not been satisfied but that, in any event, the balance of convenience limb of the test has not been satisfied. In response, Ms Ferrin submits that the brief enquiry is still an age assessment, and that the Joint Working Guidance makes clear that where a local authority makes an assessment as to age and that person is dispersed to another local authority, the matter should be referred back to the deciding authority. Ms Ferrin contends that if the Court does not grant relief then MCC could disperse the Claimant into adult accommodation pending resolution of these proceedings. Interim Relief In considering the grant of interim relief, the Court’s starting point is the decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396. In summary that decision requires the court which is invited to grant interim injunctive relief to consider three issues:  Does the case of the party seeking injunctive relief show a serious issue to be tried? If not, the court goes no further in considering the application. If there is:  Would damages be an adequate remedy to a party who is injured by the wrongful grant or refusal (as the case may be) of an interim injunction?  Where does the balance of convenience lie? The Court of Appeal in R (GE (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1490 [2015] 1 WLR 4123 made clear that, when looking at the correctness of age assessments, the decision is retaken afresh and is not confined to material available to the decision maker. The claim proceeds on two bases; the Claimant’s age as a question of precedent fact and procedural unfairness and/or failure to comply with guidance and relevant caselaw. In this case, Mr Paget submits that the Claimant cannot demonstrate there is a serious issue to be tried in relation to the age assessment because the Home Office and two local authority assessments have all come to the same conclusion. At the hearing he sought to persuade me that the opinion of the Staff Nurse and the two Emergency Social Workers are not relevant to my consideration of this matter. I disagree. The safeguarding referral made by the Accident and Emergency Staff Nurse was an indication that a medical professional had formed such a view of the Claimant’s age and vulnerabilities that it warranted such a referral. Similarly, the two Emergency Social Workers from MCC also formed a view that the Claimant was a child and his situation was such that powers should be exercised under the Children Act 1989 to accommodate him. There is also the Claimant’s evidence from the Advocacy and Caseworker Manger at the Humans for Rights Network and more pertinently that of Coral McDonnell, Safeguarding Lead at Derbyshire Refugee Solidarity, previously a senior social worker of some 32 years standing. That evidence attests to the views of individuals experienced in working with children as to the Claimant’s age. Draft 4 August 2025 15:31 Page 5 High Court Approved Judgment: UYR v Derby City Council & Ors 22. 23. Given the differing views of various professionals and other individuals, the fact that the Claimant is currently being accommodated as a child and all other evidence, I am satisfied that there is a serious issue to be tried. In the sphere of public administrative law there is little doubt that either party would be harmed by the wrongful grant or refusal (as the case may be) of injunctive relief in a way that cannot be adequately compensated in damages. That is the position here. That deals with the second limb. 24. With regards to the third limb, the balance is between the harm that is done through the court refusing relief to someone who is in fact under the age of 18 on the one hand and granting relief to someone who is over the age of 18 on the other. A local authority such as the Defendant has a statutory duty to house those under the age of 18 years. The accommodation of someone such as the Claimant would entail resources being utilised for his accommodation. In addition, children looked after by a local authority are highly likely to have significant needs and will often be vulnerable. It would be wrong to house an adult with such children. 25. 26. On the particular facts of this case, there is evidence of the Claimant’s deteriorating mental health and his recent presentation at hospital which raises further concerns. On his own account it would be unsurprising if the Claimant’s mental health had not been adversely affected by his experiences in Ethiopia and Libya. The decision by hospital staff and MCC social workers to treat him as a child and to raise safeguarding concerns highlight the risks of treating a potentially vulnerable child as an adult. The Claimant is currently being accommodated as a child in local authority foster care. That is the present status quo. Recent events and the evidence of the Claimant’s mental health issues weigh on the side of granting interim relief to ensure that the Claimant is treated as a putative child pending the outcome of this claim. I have concluded that the risk to the well-being of the Claimant of not treating him as a child is a significant factor which weighs in the balance and that he should be treated as a child pending the outcome of the dispute about his age. That points to the grant of interim relief. 27. Mr Paget seeks to persuade me that, in these particular circumstances, it is not necessary to grant interim relief because the Claimant’s accommodation in foster care is already secured and there is no need for an order. That argument relies upon the provisions of the Children Act 1989 which places a duty upon local authorities to look after children in their administrative area. It is however apparent that MCC are looking to the Defendant to potentially assume the care of the Claimant or come to some agreement having regard to the advice within the Joint Working Advice. There is a tension between that argument and the need to have clear arrangements between local authorities regarding disputes on age assessments in circumstances where a person may decide to move between authorities to seek further age assessments. Here the Defendant has formed its own view as to the Claimant’s age and that view is subject to challenge. 28. The question as to which local authority should be directed to provide interim relief was considered in R(HA) v London Borough of Hillingdon and the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 291 (Admin) in circumstances where the Defendant authority had conducted an age assessment and concluded that the Draft 4 August 2025 15:31 Page 6 High Court Approved Judgment: UYR v Derby City Council & Ors Claimant was an adult and the Claimant was residing in adult accommodation in the administrative district of a different authority. Bean J observed that: “8. In R(A) v Croydon LBC [2009] 1 WLR 2557 the Supreme Court held that whether a person is a child is a question to which there is a right or a wrong answer. Lady Hale said at para [27]:- “It may be difficult to determine what that answer is. The decision makers may have to do their best on the basis of less than perfect or conclusive evidence. But that is true of many questions of fact which regularly come before the court. That does not prevent them from being questions for the courts rather than for other kinds of decision makers.” 9. It follows from this, as Beatson J observed in R(MWA) v Birmingham City Council [2011] EWHC 3488, that if the relevant local authority gets the decision as to whether the Claimant is a child wrong, “it cannot give itself a jurisdiction which it does not have, and cannot as a result of that decision decline a jurisdiction which it does have.” ” 29. 30. In this case, if the Defendant is wrong about the age of the Claimant, then the Defendant would have had responsibility for safeguarding the needs of the Claimant under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 from the date of the impugned decision. Whilst MCC has subsequently assumed responsibility for providing Children Act services pursuant to the section 20 duty, that has occurred after the date of the impugned decision and the date when, if the claim succeeds, the Defendant would have been liable to provide Children Act services. The Joint Working Guidance is aimed at reducing unnecessary and repeated age assessment by different local authorities. In this case there is a live dispute as to the Claimant’s age- that issue needs to be resolved between the Claimant and Defendant. I have concluded that, in the interim, the Claimant should be accommodated as a putative child pending resolution of the issue. If the Claimant is a child the duty to accommodate would have fallen on the Defendant at the date of the age assessment and prior to his current accommodation by MCC. There is no guarantee that MCC will continue to accommodate the Claimant as a child; they are now on notice as to the dispute regarding his age. On balance and following the rationale of the Joint Working Guidance regarding duplication of work by authorities, I am persuaded that it is appropriate to order interim relief against the Defendant as the maker of the impugned decision. 31. I would ask that Counsel agree an order to reflect the terms of this judgment and any consequential matters and forward it for my approval. Draft 4 August 2025 15:31 Page 7