Priestley v Dunbar & Co (a firm) [2015] EWHC 987 (Ch) (30 April 2015)

Priestley v Dunbar & Co (a firm) [2015] EWHC 987 (Ch) (30 April 2015)

The district judge erred in the exercise of discretion by failing to evaluate all relevant circumstances, including the seriousness of the judgment, proportionality of sanction, and actual impact of delay. Although the application to set aside was not prompt, the delay was not so significant as to justify refusing relief in light of a realistic defence and the sums at stake. The default judgment should be set aside.

Citation
[2015] EWHC 987 (Ch)
Parties
Claimant: Dr Nicolas Max Priestley; Defendant: Dunbar & Co (a firm)
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
30 April 2015
Procedural Posture
Appeal / Appeal Against Refusal to Set Aside Default Judgment on Liability in Professional Negligence Action
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Setting Aside Default Judgment, Promptness Under CPR 13.3, Relief From Sanctions, Professional Negligence by Accountants
Civil Procedure Professional Negligence Setting Aside Default Judgment Promptness Under CPR 13.3 Relief From Sanctions Professional Negligence by Accountants

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Parties

Dr Nicolas Max Priestley

Claimant

Dunbar & Co (a firm)

Defendant

Procedural Posture

Appeal / Appeal Against Refusal to Set Aside Default Judgment on Liability in Professional Negligence Action

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the application to set aside default judgment was made promptly under CPR 13.3
  2. 2 Whether the district judge erred in exercising discretion to refuse to set aside the judgment
  3. 3 Whether the merits of the defence and proportionality of sanction were properly considered

Ratio Decidendi

The district judge erred in the exercise of discretion by failing to evaluate all relevant circumstances, including the seriousness of the judgment, proportionality of sanction, and actual impact of delay. Although the application to set aside was not prompt, the delay was not so significant as to justify refusing relief in light of a realistic defence and the sums at stake. The default judgment should be set aside.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • Default judgment on liability set aside
  • Costs of the application before DJ Giles to be paid by Dunbar