HM Attorney General v British Broadcasting Corporation

HM Attorney General v British Broadcasting Corporation

The Court of Appeal held that the judge below applied the wrong legal test and standard of proof to the continued restraint on publication. Once the principal injunction was discharged, the residual concerns about prejudice to the investigation were speculative and unsupported by evidence. The threshold for restraining publication should have remained the same as for the original injunction. There was no convincing evidence of a substantial risk of serious prejudice to the investigation or to any individual’s fair trial rights. The appeal was allowed and the restraint was lifted.

Parties
Respondent: Her Majesty’s Attorney General; Applicant/appellant: British Broadcasting Corporation
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
12 March 2007
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court (queen’s Bench Division) to Court of Appeal
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Interlocutory Injunctions, Contempt of Court, Open Justice, Freedom of Expression, Confidentiality, Police Investigations
Media Law Criminal Law Civil Procedure Human Rights Interlocutory Injunctions Contempt of Court Open Justice Freedom of Expression +2 more

Case Brief

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Parties

Her Majesty’s Attorney General

Respondent

British Broadcasting Corporation

Applicant/appellant

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court (queen’s Bench Division) to Court of Appeal

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the continued restraint on publication of certain information relating to a police investigation was justified
  2. 2 Whether the correct legal test and standard of proof were applied to orders restraining publication and holding hearings in private

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that the judge below applied the wrong legal test and standard of proof to the continued restraint on publication. Once the principal injunction was discharged, the residual concerns about prejudice to the investigation were speculative and unsupported by evidence. The threshold for restraining publication should have remained the same as for the original injunction. There was no convincing evidence of a substantial risk of serious prejudice to the investigation or to any individual’s fair trial rights. The appeal was allowed and the restraint was lifted.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • The restraint on publication is lifted; the arguments, judgments, and orders are to be in the public domain.