John Parker v Information Commissioner

NCN: [2025] UKFTT 01280 (GRC) First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber Information Rights Case Reference: FT/EA/2025/0048 Hearing date: 18 August 2025 Decision given on 31 October 2025 Before JUDGE SCHERBEL-BALL TRIBUNAL MEMBER SAUNDERS TRIBUNAL MEMBER PALMER-DUNK Between JOHN PARKER and (1) INFORMATION COMMISSIONER Appellant Respondents Decisions: (1) The Appellant’s application dated 31 July 2025 is refused. (2) The appeal is dismissed. A. Introduction and Summary REASONS 1. This appeal concerns seven requests (the “Requests”) for information which the Appellant made of Tendring District Council (the “Council”) between 2 June 2024 and 1 July 2024. In broad substance, those requests concerned various planning matters and disputes within the Council’s local area, largely in relation to Henderson Park which has been the subject of property development and where the Appellant had purchased a property. The precise scope of each of the Requests is set out in full at paragraph 9 below. © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2024 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. B. 9. The Council responded to all of the Requests on 3 July 2024. It addressed them under the scope of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (the “EIRs”). The Council refused to respond to the Requests relying on s.12(4)(b) of the EIRs on the basis that the requests were manifestly unreasonable. The Appellant complained to the Commissioner about the Council’s response to the Requests. In a decision notice dated 19 December 2024 (Ref IC-327063-B5R3) (the “Decision Notice”) the Commissioner substantively dismissed the Appellant’s complaint and held the Council was entitled to rely on s.12(4)(b) of the EIRs to refuse to respond to the Requests. The Commissioner did find that the Council had breached r.5(2) of the EIRs by failing to respond to multiple requests within 20 working days. On 9 January 2025, the Appellant appealed the Decision Notice to the Tribunal. He contends, amongst other things, that the Council is not entitled to rely on s.12(4) of the EIRs in respect of the Requests. The Appellant seeks a variety of outcomes, which include not only asking the Tribunal to set aside the Decision Notice, but also include asking the Tribunal to make various declarations or orders in respect of a number of planning applications and property matters (the “Additional Outcomes”). On 20 May 2025, Judge Armstrong-Holmes decided that the case will be decided without a hearing. It was determined on the papers by the Panel and we decided that this was a fair and appropriate way for the issues to be determined. By application dated 31 July 2025, the Appellant has also sought case management directions asking the Tribunal to direct the Information Commissioner’s Office to instruct its Criminal Investigation Team to recover the audit log file from the Council or alternatively to order the Council to provide an unredacted copy of the audit log to “verify allegations of document manipulation”. Sitting as a Judge alone, I have dismissed the application made by the Appellant for the reasons set out specifically at paragraphs 30 to 33 below. Sitting as a Panel, we have collectively (and unanimously) decided to dismiss the appeal. This is because we have decided that the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and we agree that the Council is entitled to rely on s.12(4)(b) of the EIRs to refuse the Requests. Our reasons are set out in further detail for this conclusion below. Summary of the Procedural Background The Requests which the Appellant made of the Council and which are the subject of the Decision Notice are as follows: 9.1. On 2 June 2024, the Appellant made a request in the following terms (the “First Request”): “Please provide details of any TCPA section 106 agreements between the dates of 1 March 2017 and the 31 May 2024 that was agreed with a planning obligation that restricted; 1. development of land 2. use of land 3. transfer of ownership of public open space land For each please identify if there were requirements to complete the obligation before a specific event and if that event was exceeded the date the enforcement action taken. Please provide details of any injunctions that were sort in pursuit of holding the developer to its original agreement. Please also confirm if these specific obligations were registered on the TDC Local Land Charges Register so as to alert purchasers to their existence.” 9.2. On 2 June 2024, the Appellant made a request in the following terms (the “the Second Request”): “Please provide detailed discussion, emails [consultations] with land owners, agents in house legal advice regarding the laws approving planning 1. Please provide details of any decisions or consultations taken to include the land bounded by EX828567 inside the settlement boundary for Thorpe le Soken following the approval of 16/01169/OUT. Please provide details of any pre planning consultation correspondence for 2. 21/01397/FUL. 3. Following TDC receiving the application 21/011397/FUL Please provide details of the decision / assessment that led to the site notice 16 Sep 2021. This should include the person who issued that notice and their reasons. 4. Following TDC receiving the application 21/011397/FUL please provide details of any checks TDC made as to the accuracy of the ownership certificate. This should include if the planning officers made enquiry as to the occupancy limit being exceeded and if the transfer had taken place.” 9.3. On 3 June 2024, the Appellant made a request in the following terms (the “the Third Request”): “This request is being made under the EIR as it concerned the development and use of land under a s106 agreement likely to affect the state of the land as an element of the environment. Please provide full details of the training records for those members of the planning committee who sat and determined applications on the 12 March 2024. For each member please provide their training record and any testing result to ensure they understood what they were being taught. Please provide the training details for the following issues and any supporting case law; 1. the difference between planning obligations and planning conditions 2. Ownership certificates and TCPA section 65 3. When TCPA section 73 can and cannot be used 4. The enforcement of TCPA s106 obligations” 9.4. On 9 June 2024, the Appellant made a request in the following terms (the “the Fourth Request”): “Please provide any recorded information regarding any meeting the council had with Essex police regarding any planning applications such as 21/01497/FUL and the access from Henderson Park estate. The information requested is being made under the Environmental Information Regulations as it concerns development of land and should include copies of; 1. any correspondence received in connection to the meeting its purpose the agenda and any recorded minutes of the meeting 1. Any follow-up information 2. any recorded information from the councils in-house solicitor.” 9.5. On 23 June 2024, the Appellant made a request in the following terms (the “the Fifth Request”): “…The planning application 21/01397/FUL submitted a Planning, Design and Access Statement (PDAS) in which it proposed to make the development acceptable by including Occupancy Restrictions to those over 55 or those with medical conditions who would benefit from single story occupation. It set out a schedule of the proposed wording to be used. In the event this planning obligation was not made as the s106 agreement and was not submitted to the planning committee. Please provide any information regarding consultations that took place and should include; 1. Any assessment consultations made regarding the decision not to submit the planning obligations and application to the planning committee and follow due process 2. Any information regarding consultations with the chair of the planning committee and legal officers 3. Any information between the council Strutt and Parker (Farms) Limited and their agents Scott Properties regarding their Planning application 4. Any information including legal advice in the drafting and approval of the s106. 5. Any information regarding checks the legal officer made that the s106 was procedurally fair and in line with due process.” 9.6. On 24 June 2024, the Appellant made a request in the following terms (the “the Sixth Request”): “This EIR request concerns information regarding the Delegated Decision Report available on the planning portal 21/01397/FUL 13 Feb 2023. The delegated Decision report lists 3 persons with initials. In particular who is JJ? Please provide the names of those persons and the position held. Please provide a copy of any information including drafts and the names of those person who were directly involved in the preparation of the report I would like to receive copies of recorded information by email as attachments of original documents.” 9.7. On 1 July 2024, the Appellant made a request in the following terms (the “the Seventh Request”): “Please provide any information regarding changes to the Tendring District Council’s Constitution document regarding Delegated Functions for approving Planning applications. The cabinet are responsible for making changes to the constitution document and recording the proposed text change. Unfortunately there is a mismatch of whose role it is delegated to approve planning matters in various documents. I. Part 3 - Responsibility of Functions.pdf II. Part 3 - Delegated Powers - Sept 2023.pdf III. Complete Version of the Constitution April 2023.pdf The Cabinet meeting of the 9/11/2018 has recorded that it is the Head of Planning. Any delegation of roles should also be recorded at the cabinet meeting as it relates to the Constitution. In a previous EIR request you reported that the Head of Planning resigned in April 2020 and the Assistant Director (Planning) resigned in Oct 2022 and neither of these roles were replaced. I have spent some considerable time going through the Cabinet meetings since 9/11/2018 and cannot find any record of the constitution changing from Head of Planning to Assistant Director (Planning) or of the change in the 4.4 clauses. Please provide any original recorded information; 1. Details and record of the Cabinet meeting or otherwise that made changes to the constitution from Head of Planning to Assistant Director (Planning) 2. Details and record of the cabinet meeting or otherwise that made changes to the Part 3 Schedule 3 clause 4.4 from 10 to 12 clauses. 3. Details and record of the Cabinet meeting or otherwise agreeing to change delegation from Head of Planning to Assistant Director (Planning) or otherwise.” 10. The Council responded collectively to the Requests on 3 July 2024 and relied on s.12(4) (b) of the EIRs to refuse to respond to each of the Requests. It explained that it considered the Requests to fall within the scope of this section because they were “becoming excessive, harassing the authority [and] imposing a significant burden”. The response attached a table setting out the Requests which the Council stated “evidences the high volume and frequency of [the Appellant’s] correspondence to the Council under EIR along with the persistent nature of the subject matter. The public interest in maintaining this exception lies in protecting the Council from disproportionate burden and an unjustified level of distress and disruption in handling such information requests. Dealing with manifestly unreasonable requests strains resources and obstructs the Council from delivering mainstream services and answering other information requests. The Council does not believe that your requests are an attempt to obtain information of value that would benefit the wider public, but instead views your requests as an attempt to seek information serve private interests only. Your requests are demonstrating unreasonable persistence, and this has been determined as an inappropriate use of the public authority’s resources and a misuse of the EIR legislation.” 11. The Appellant requested an internal review on 9 July 2024 and contended that each of the Requests was not manifestly unreasonable. The Council maintained its position on internal review. The Appellant complained to the Commissioner on 19 August 2024. 12. The Decision Notice substantively rejected the Appellant’s complaint. For the purposes of this appeal, the main points set out in the Decision Notice are as follows: 12.1. The Commissioner considered that the Requests related to environmental information as defined in r.2(1) of the EIRs and should therefore fall under the scope of the EIRs. 12.2. The Council considered that when considering if the Requests were vexatious this required an assessment of the burden on the public authority, the motive of the requester, the value or serious purpose of the request and/or any harassment or distress of and to staff. 12.3. The Appellant’s position was that (a) making requests under the EIR could not be considered as harassing the Council, (b) the burden should not be significant as the requested information should already be held and some should already have been published, (c) the number of requests had occurred due to previous responses to requests which raised more questions than answers, resulting in further requests being required, (d) the Requests were distinctively different, and therefore not vexatious and (e) that responding to the Requests would ensure that public confidence in the Council is maintained. 12.4. The Council’s position was that (a) the Requests were becoming excessive, harassing the authority and imposing a significant burden, (b) the Requests were not an attempt to obtain information of value but to serve the Appellant’s private interests only, (c) the Appellant appeared to have a grievance with it over a dispute regarding their property’s view and development within the area, (d) between 23 May 2024 and 9 July 2024, the Council had received a total of 9 requests, all of which relate to the same residential development and particular aspects of that development, (e) the Appellant had made allegations of malpractice and wrongdoing in the correspondence and queried the authority of staff members. This had caused both distress and irritation and was demoralising when officers were trying to carry out their jobs and deliver services on behalf of the Council to all residents within the district, (f) the number of requests and reviews appeared to have a scattergun approach to identify previously unearthed information; the Requests had placed a strain on the Council’s resources and have resulted in a diversion of these resources, and (g) the Council was a relatively small public authority, with available resources now finite and already stretched without the additional burden of the Requests. 12.5. The Commissioner accepted that there would be a public interest in disclosing the information which was the subjects of the Requests, in that it would demonstrate that the Council is working in an open and transparent manner. The Requests could also demonstrate the Council is upholding standards of integrity. Set against this was the strain on the Council’s resources which lead to diverted resource and a consequential negative impact on other services being provided by the Council which was not in the public interests. The Commissioner also accepted that multiple requests for one individual could lead to distress or irritation. The Commissioner considered that it was not in the public interest to expose the Council’s staff to a disproportionate burden or unjustified distress or disruption. 12.6. While the Commissioner had been informed by the presumption in favour of disclosure under r.12(2) of the EIRs, he was satisfied that the Council had been correct to rely on s.12(4) of the EIRs. 13. The Appellant has appealed the Decision Notice. His grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows: 13.1. First, the Commissioner provided inadequate reasons and failed to apply the statutory tests. The decision does not adequately explain how it was reached or what evidence was submitted substantiating the Council’s claims. The Commissioner failed to consider the first issue, namely whether the Requests were manifestly unreasonable. 13.2. Second, the Commissioner does not have authority to consider the First, Second and Third Requests as manifestly unreasonable because the Council failed to give notice of refusal because the mandatory requirement of 20 working days pursuant to r.14(2) of the EIRs. 13.3. Third, the Annex makes no reference to EIR 355 or EIR 356 which were two further requests. The Decision Notice was premature because EIR 356 had not yet been determined by another Commissioner which was material to the Appellant’s motive and value. 13.4. Fourth, the Commissioner was wrong to assert in a covering email that the Council’s conduct is outside the remit of the ICO. The Appellant’s case is that the Council’s conduct is central to his requests and materially relevant. 13.5. Fifth, the Commissioner gave no regard to the requester that the reply to his internal review was sent to his private email and not through the WDTK portal and that it was in breach of the UK GDPR. 13.6. Sixth, the FTT has wide ranging powers to consider all the circumstances of the case and has jurisdiction to make declarations regarding the matter that is at the heart of the requests, namely that of breach of obligation of a s.106 agreement dated 26 April 2017. This includes jurisdiction under s.108(2)(b) of the Land Registration Act 2002 for the rectification or setting aside of a document. The Appellant contends that the FTT will need to consider the legal status of the s.106 agreement and various Planning Permissions and whether those decisions were made ultra vires. He contends he is not bypassing the judicial review of planning applications because the s.106 agreement sits outside of any planning approvals. 13.7. Seventh, the Council made a number of false representations to the LGSCO and ICO regarding s.106 enforcement choices, ownership certificates, private interests, size of the council and the law. The Appellant had a proper basis for suspicions of wrongdoing. 14. In Box 8.1 of the Appeal Form, in addition to asking for the Tribunal to issue a substituted decision notice stating that the Council cannot rely on r.12(4)(b) of the EIRs, the Appellant seeks the following Additional Outcomes: 14.1. Set aside LGSCO decision 23 004 570 dated 02/04/2024. 14.2. Declaration that the open space plan 2Rev E is a binding plan within the 2017 Agreement. 14.3. Declaration that the 2017 Agreement and the 2017 Permission did not permit the erection of more than 98 dwellings on EX828567. 14.4. Declaration that the Council’s decision to approve planning applications 21/01397/FUL & 23/009993/VOC were ultra vires. 14.5. An order that the Council enforces the breaches in planning obligations s.106(5). 14.6. An order to the registrar to amend the register and transfer for EX959158 to Henderson Park (Thorpe le Soken) Management Company Limited free of encumbrances and with all necessary easements and vacant possession with effect from 29 June 2021. 14.7. An order that the Council register the planning obligations relating to restrictions of development and use of land in the Council’s Local Land Charges Register. 15. In a letter dated 11 February 2025, the Council declined to be joined as a party to the appeal on the basis that there was “little or nothing it could contribute to the progression of this matter." 16. The Commissioner filed its response to the Appeal on 20 February 2025. He opposes the appeal for the reasons substantively set out in the Decision Notice. The Relevant Legal Principles on the Appeal The Tribunal ’ s role on appeal 17. The powers of the Tribunal are set out in s.58 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). S.58 applies equally to the EIRs by virtue of r.18 EIR. Accordingly, under s.58, the role of the Tribunal is to consider whether the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law or to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently. 18. If the Tribunal considers that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law or, if it involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner. In any other case, the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. 19. The Tribunal must consider whether the provisions of the applicable information rights legislation (be that FOIA or the EIR) have been correctly applied and is not bound by the Commissioner’s views or findings but must arrive at its own view, giving such weight to the Commissioner’s views and findings as it deems fit in the particular circumstances - Guardian Newspapers & Brooke v Information Commissioner and BBC (EA/2006/0011 & 0013) at [14(3)]. The Environmental Information Regulations 20. The EIRs were made to implement EC Directive 2003/4/EC(2) on public access to environmental information. The directive gave effect to the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. This legislative history and context underlines the importance of access to environmental information and to hold authority to account on the important issues the environment raises for contemporary society – see Davies v Information Commissioner [2024] UKFTT 1017 (GRC) at [32] – [33] and Vesco v Information Commissioner [2019[ UKUT 247 (AAC) at [13] – [14]. 21. R.5(1) of the EIRs requires a public authority to make environmental information (as defined in r.2(1) of the EIRs) available on request, subject to various exceptions which may be applicable in a particular case. R.5(2) provides that following a request, the information should be made available as soon as possible and no later than 20 working days after the date of receipt of the request. 22. R.12 of the EIRs addresses exceptions to the duty referred to in the paragraph immediately above. These grounds must be interpreted restrictively and having regard to the public interest served by disclosure – Vesco at [16]. 23. One of the possible exceptions is the duty under r.12(4)(b), which allows a public authority to refuse a request for environmental information which is manifestly unreasonable. There is a three stage test for the application of this exception – see Vesco at [16]: 23.1. Is the request manifestly unreasonable? – r.12(1)(a); 23.2. If so, does the public interest in maintaining the exception outweigh the public interest in disclosing the information, in all the circumstances of the case? – r12(1) (b); 23.3. Does the presumption in favour of disclosure mean that the information should be disclosed? r.12(2). 24. In the conjoined cases of Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Council and Craven v Information Commissioner and DECC [2015] EWCA Civ 454 at [7] and [78], the Court of Appeal concluded that “to all intents and purposes” r.12(4)(b) of the EIRs had the same meaning as s.14 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”), which applies where a request is vexatious. 25. However, while the principles behind manifest unreasonableness in the EIRs and a vexatious request under FOIA may be substantively similar, the overall test is not the same. This is because, a public authority withholding information under r.12(4)(b) EIR must also apply a public interest test and the presumption in favour of disclosure – as the Upper Tribunal explained in Vesco at [16], this means that there are “more hurdles to jump before a public authority may legitimately refuse a request for environmental information”. 26. In Vesco at [17] the Upper Tribunal set out the approach to consider whether at the first stage, a request is manifestly unreasonable. The starting point is whether the request has no reasonable foundation, that is no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. The hurdle of satisfying the test is a high one. It may be helpful to consider the following factors (i) the burden on the public authority and staff, since one aim of the provision is to protect the resources of the public authority being squandered; (ii) the motive of the applicant – a malicious motive may point to vexatiousness, but the absence of a malicious motive does not point to a request not being vexatious; (iii) the value or serious purpose of the request; and (iv) the harassment or distress of staff. However, these are not an exhaustive checklist and other factors may also be relevant. These can include the nature, breadth and pattern of previous requests. In particular: “The Tribunal’s fact finding powers may be necessary when evaluating relevant factors; for example evidence might be led about why the information is sought, the amount of time likely to be required to comply with a request, the cost of doing so, and any prejudice on the public body’s other duties if complying with the request.” 27. A holistic approach is required when assessing whether a request is manifestly unreasonable, taking account all of the circumstances of the case – see Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 00711 (GRC) at [41] – [44]. 28. If it is established that a request is manifestly unreasonable, the public authority must then consider the balance of the public interests between disclosure and refusal. Application of this test may result in an obligation to disclose, even if a request is manifestly unreasonable. The public interest requirement is a fact sensitive test turning on the particular circumstances of a case. The following principles were summarised by the Upper Tribunal in Vesco at [18]: 28.1. The starting point is to consider the content of the information sought and whether any specific harm may result from disclosure. 28.2. The public interest or interests in disclosing and withholding the information should be identified. These are the “values, policies and so on that give the public interests their significance”. 28.3. The statutory context for the EIRs and the policy behind recovery information is important in this context. 28.4. Once identified, the public interests in disclosing and withholding the information must be balanced against each other. 28.5. If the public interest in disclosing the information stronger than the public interest in withholding the information, then the information should be disclosed. 29. The third stage only arises if the first two stages have notresulted in disclosure. This requires a public authority to consider the presumption in favour of disclosure. This presumption serves two purposes: (i) to provide the default position in the event that the interests are equally balanced and (ii) to inform any decision that may be taken under the EIRs – Vesco at [19]. The Application 30. Prior to determining the substantive appeal, I first address the Appellant’s application dated 31 July 2025. This is an application which makes the following points: 30.1. In box 3.1 of the application, the Appellant states that he is seeking to “appeal the ICO’s decision not to investigate the alleged s.77 FOIA breach by Tendring District Council”. 30.2. In box 3.2 the Appellant asks the Tribunal to issue a case management direction under its powers to “1. Direct the [ICO] to instruct its Criminal Investigation Team (CRIT) to recover the audit log file from the Xerox WorkCentre 7855 printer used by [the Council]. 2 Alternatively, order [the Council] to provide an unredacted copy of the audit log file to verify allegations of document manipulation.” 30.3. In box 5.2, the Appellant states “the audit log file may have already been overwritten or deleted due to the passage of time. Immediate action is necessary to prevent further loss of critical evidence. The allegation of document manipulation by [the Council] raise serious concerns about transparency and accountability in public authorities, making urgent consideration essential.” 31. 32. In support of his application, the Appellant has also attached an email exchange between the ICO and him relating to the issues in the application. It is apparent from this email exchange that the ICO’s Criminal Investigation Team had decided not to investigate a complaint made about the Council by the Appellant relating to data in a Xerox machine. The ICO explained that there were two factors for this decision. First, the length of time since the document was passed means it is less likely that the machine would still hold the data required for an investigation, and indeed the machine may also have overwritten the data since 2024. There is a possibility that “the document was signed and scanned onto the system in 2022 but retitled in 2024 for the purpose of the request.” Some further information about the background to this rather cryptic issue is set out in the Appellant’s email to the Commissioner on 21 July 2025. It is also addressed at paragraphs 26 to 33 of the Appellant’s witness statement. It is apparent that the issue of this log apparently relates to a request for information made on 10 May 2024. The Appellant was concerned about some of the data associated with a document and sought an audit log file. The Council provided an updated document, which led the Appellant to complain that the updated document had been altered in breach of s.77 FOIA and he requested that the ICO conduct a criminal investigation. The Appellant contends that this document is “critical” to the Appellant’s case that the Council was engaged in malpractice. 33. I have refused the application for the following reasons: 33.1. First, because the Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not include jurisdiction to entertain or consider an appeal against the ICO’s decision not to further investigate any alleged criminal offence under s.77 FOIA. 33.2. Second, it appears from the Appellant’s own case that this refers to EIR356 which was a request made on 10 May 2024. It is therefore not one of the requests which is the subject of the Decision Notice under appeal. While material in relation to EIR356 is in the hearing bundle, and the Appellant relies on this in support of his case in respect of challenging the Decision Notice and the Requests to which it relates, I do not consider that it would be necessary or proportionate to determine this present appeal to exercise the case management powers which the Appellant seeks for the reasons he seeks them. 33.3. Third, while the Tribunal has broad case management powers under r.5 of the GRC Rules 2009, I do not consider they extend to directing the ICO’s team to take steps to obtain information from a third party and even if they did, I would not exercise them for the reasons set out above. 33.4. Fourth, in any event, allegations of serious misconduct, including dishonesty or quasi criminal behaviour in civil proceedings must be more consistent with such conduct than its absence. Assertions or evidence which are merely neutral will not suffice – Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48. Indeed, the Appellant himself accepts (see p.325 of the bundle) that “at best, the filename has been changed and is very recent”. Taking account of the material before the Tribunal, there is no sufficient persuasive evidence which satisfies that threshold or which would justify the making of the order sought, even if the Tribunal had jurisdiction and it was directly relevant to the issues arising on the appeal. Evidence in respect of the Appeal 34. We have considered an open bundle of 569 pages as part of this appeal. The Appellant has provided a witness statement in support of his case dated 25 May 2025. We have taken into account all of the material in the bundle in reaching our decision, although it is not necessary or proportionate to refer to all or indeed much of the material in setting out reasons for refusing the appeal. Discussion and Conclusions 35. We begin by addressing two preliminary issues raised by the Appellant to challenge the Decision Notice in his first and second grounds of appeal. 35.1. In his first ground of appeal, the Appellant complains that the Commissioner failed to provide adequate reasons and also that he failed to apply the statutory tests. We reject the Appellant’s complaint in respect of the adequacy reasons. While we accept that the Decision Notice does not state this in the clearest of terms, it is apparent from paragraph 32 of the Decision Notice that the Commissioner was satisfied that the exception had been properly applied. Clearly this does not just apply to the public interest test within which that paragraph is situated within the Decision Notice. Rather, when read as a whole, it is apparent that the Commissioner accepted the Council’s position as to the reasons why it had relied on r.12(4)(b) EIRs. 35.2. In his second ground of appeal, the Appellant complains that the Commissioner did not have authority to consider the First, Second and Third Requests as manifestly unreasonable because the Council’s reliance on this exception was made later than the 20 working day time period required by r.14(2) of the EIRs. This ground of appeal is legally misconceived. It is well established that a public authority may rely on an exception at any time in the process, including for the first time before the Commissioner or the Tribunal – Birkett v Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2011] EWCA Civ 1606. It follows that it would have been open to the Council to rely on the exception for the first time before the Commissioner. The fact that the Council had failed to respond in time to a number of the Requests did not preclude the Commissioner from considering the application of the exception. 36. We consider that the substance of the other part of the first ground of appeal (that the Commissioner did not apply the statutory tests), the third, fourth and seventh grounds of appeal is that the Commissioner was wrong in law to uphold the Council’s reliance on r.12(4)(b) to refuse to comply with the Requests, including for the reasons given in those respective grounds of appeal. 37. We reject this central part of the appeal. We consider that the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and that the Commissioner was entitled to find that r.12(4)(b) EIR was correctly relied upon by the Council. 38. Having applied the legal principles set out at paragraphs 20 to 29 above, we have reached this conclusion because we find that (i) each of the Requests was objectively manifestly excessive within the meaning of r.12(4)(b) of the EIRs, (ii) the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information in all the circumstances of the case and (iii) the presumption in favour of disclosure does not mean that the requested information should be disclosed. 39. The starting point for our reasons for these conclusions is the value of the information sought in each of the Requests. We have concluded that the public interest in the Requested Information for each request (and also collectively) is limited and confined. This is for a number of reasons: 39.1. The background to the dispute concerns whether property developers have breached terms of planning approvals and a s.106 agreement. A “s.106 agreement” is a legal agreement linked to planning permissions between a planning authority and a developer to ensure that certain extra works related to a development are undertaken. The concerns which the Appellant has relate specifically to Henderson Park, a development within the Council’s authority where the Appellant had purchased a property. The Appellant’s case is that he was told that his plot would have an “open aspect” and that the view would be “forever”. Further development means this may not be the case. He has complained to the Council that amongst other things he was “lied” to, that he has been the victim of a “conspiracy to defraud” and that a developer made “false representations during the planning process”. While we accept that the Appellant’s concerns relate to those generally in the local area (his letters with the Council are signed on behalf of “John Parker and the Residents of Henderson Park” and his witness statement says he is representing other local residents) the evidence before us shows that the concerns are substantively of specific and direct interest to the Appellant. Indeed, it is noticeable that the first “key issue” identified in the Appellant’s witness statement specifically refers to the circumstances in which he purchased his home in Henderson Park. While we accept that there can be substantial and meaningful value for a request of particular interest to one individual rather than a broader community, the evidence is consistent with it being of particular specific focus to the Appellant rather than more broadly. 39.2. The underlying planning and property issues have been ventilated in meaningful detail in a number of different fora. They were first ventilated between Mr Pateman-Gee and the Appellant in correspondence in 2023. Mr Pateman-Gee was a senior Council planning official. In his correspondence, Mr Pateman-Gee explains in some detail the Council’s understanding of the relevant planning issues. This is not therefore a case where the Council has refused to engage with the Appellant on the issues he has raised, but in fact did so in detail. They were then further ventilated in a complaint the Appellant made to the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman. There has therefore been substantial opportunity for the Appellant to raise his concerns about the planning and property issues in question and the Council has engaged substantively in response. We accept that the Appellant remains dissatisfied with the Council’s position, but accept that this previous engagement from the Council contributed to the public interest in the underlying issues. This is not a case where the Appellant has no understanding of the Council’s position, but rather he seeks to use his information requests as a method of undermining the Council’s position. 39.3. The Appellant complains that he has a credible basis for asserting suspicions of serious wrongdoing on the part of the Council in relation to the property and planning issues under dispute. We do not consider there is sufficient persuasive evidence before us to justify such a conclusion. We agree with the Council that individually and collectively, these requests represent an attempt to procure very substantial amounts of information relating to the Council and the planning process in relation to Henderson Park in the hope that something may turn up. The Appellant has not adequately demonstrated any sufficient link between his allegations (which we do not find sufficiently established on the evidence before us) and each of the information he seeks in the Requests. This is consistent with a trawl or fishing expedition, not a focused request for specific information of demonstrative public benefit and interest. 39.4. The Appellant himself accepts that some of the information which he seeks through the Requests is already in the public domain, although he has not precisely specified this. Accordingly, to the extent that the information is already publicly available, other than adding to the burden on the Council to identify this, we consider that such information is of limited additional public interest since it is already available to the Appellant. 39.5. While we accept there are general principles of transparency and accountability which are of importance to public engagement in a local democracy and in particular with regards to matters affecting the environment, we do not accept that any of the specific requests will meaningfully contribute to a broader debate of general public concern, other than his series of complaints about the Council’s approach to planning issues concerning Henderson Park. 39.6. Finally, the Appellant himself accepts (at paragraph 24 of his document entitled “Claimant’s reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing”) that “the breaches of s.106 obligations are confirmed. They are serious breaches. The Council has a duty in the public interest to hold developers to their bargain and apply for an injunction…” On the Appellant’s own case therefore, he already has the information which he needs to advance his case. This reinforces our view that the documentation sought makes only a confined contribution to the public interest, judged in their overall context. 40. The second key issue is that of the burden on the public authority as this is a central plank of the Council’s position. We accept that the Council’s evidence that each of the Requests imposes a disproportionate burden on it. 41. In this regard, the Council is entitled to look at the pattern and burden of each of the Requests collectively. They clearly form a pattern of repeated, multifaceted requests often made on a daily or near daily basis. The seven requests which the Appellant made which are the subject of the Decision Notice are seven requests made in under a month between 2 June 2024 to 1 July 2024. These seven were part of nine requests made between 23 May 2024 and 9 July 2024, all of which in whole or in part relate to the same planning and property dispute. The Council’s evidence which we accept is that these repeated requests place an unacceptable burden on the limited resources of the Council and risk diverting resources from its other legal obligations and functions. 42. What will be a proportionate or disproportionate use of resources will depend on the nature, scope and pattern of the requests and the resources of the relevant public authority. A central government department is likely to be expected to have greater resources to address multiple requests from a single individual than a single parish council. This is a case where the public authority is a small one with confined and finite resources. In this case, we are satisfied that the intensity and repetition of the requests will place a very significant burden on the Council. A single well- focused request is far less likely to be manifestly excessive – see by analogy Parker v Information Commissioner [2016] UKUT 0427 (AAC). In contrast, in this case, these numerous requests in a very short period bear the hallmark of initial responses begetting further requests and a continuing cycle. 43. Moreover each of the Requests is significant in the scope of the information which it seeks. Many are multifaceted - see for example the First, Second, Fifth and Seventh Requests, so in reality that are substantially more than simply seven request for the Council to address. We therefore accept the Council’s case that on the evidence before us, it is unlikely that this will cease and indeed is likely to continue. As in Dransfield itself, we consider this a significant burden borne out through the breadth and pattern of requests as a powerful, but not determinative factor in the evaluation of whether a request is manifestly excessive. 44. A third issue which may arise in a case is the issue of motive. The Appellant himself raises this in his third ground of appeal, where he contends that the Decision Notice was premature because he had not yet determined the lawfulness of a response by the Council to an earlier request – EIR Request 356 which was relevant to his motive. It is ultimately a matter for the Commissioner to determine complaints to him in the appropriate manner and this does not give rise to an error of law in this Decision Notice. 45. More substantively and in any event we do not consider that, objectively judged, request 356 assists the Appellant. On the contrary, we consider that it undermines his case on appeal. Request 356 was a request made by the Appellant on 10 May 2024 for information about specific individuals involved on the part of the Council within the team responsible for planning. It was responded to substantively on 22 May 2024. In response, the Appellant engaged argumentatively with the Council, demanding the underlying information held and seeking further information. Amongst other things, in his email of 24 June 2025, he accused the Council of engaging in just “another delaying tactic”. It may well have been the case that the Council had not supplied the original underlying documentation which the Appellant had originally requested. However, in light of the substantive response which the Council undoubtedly provided to the Appellant within a fortnight of his original request, we see no reasonable objective foundation for the Appellant’s allegation of improper motivation. Mistake or oversight does not equate to bad faith. Nor does legitimate disagreement on issues of judgment or law. While the process of obtaining information under FOIA or the EIRs may be a slow and frustrating process, an undue readiness to make allegations of bad faith or improper motive is unlikely to assist a requester. We consider this to be a case in point. 46. As the authorities show, the absence of a malicious motive does not mean that a request is not vexatious or manifestly excessive. It is not the Council’s case that the Appellant had a malicious motive and we do not accept that he did have such an improper motive. It is clear from the documents filed by the Appellant such as that headed “Claimant’s reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing” that he genuinely believes in the issues he is exploring and their importance. However that same document shows a particular fixation on one particular issue in respect of which the Appellant himself states that “there is something not quite right with the responses the Claimant [sic] has been getting some considerable confusion over who was delegated to approve planning matters if anyone.” That document engages in detailed fashion with this narrow issue and then elevates the argument to a basis for a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. 47. While we do not have the ability to make detailed findings about the underlying issues (and this Tribunal is not the vehicle for a planning inquiry), we do not consider that the seventh ground of appeal advances the Appellant’s case. This is because he has not adequately demonstrated that any of the requests materially enhance the public’s understanding on these issues. Indeed, in light of the unequivocal assertions of wrongdoing made by the Appellant against the Council, we conclude that he considers he already has sufficient information to properly advance such allegations. 48. As certain parts of the document entitled “Claimant’s reasonable suspicions of wrongdoing” show, and as more broadly demonstrated by the Appellant’s approach to the issues in the hearing bundle, including not least in seeking the Additional Outcomes in this ground of appeal, we have concluded that the pursuit of the Requests was the Appellant’s chosen method to ventilate his concerns about the legality of the underlying actions by the Council or developer(s), when the Council has set out its position clearly and in respect of which he says he was not intending to bring a judicial review to challenge that legality. 49. This point is reinforced by the fourth ground of appeal which emphasises that he considers the Council’s conduct to be central to his belief in the public interest and to support rather than undermine his rationale for the requests. We accept that this is a key aspect of the Appellant’s rationale for the requests, but for the reasons given in this decision, we do not accept the Appellant’s arguments in respect of the public interest underlying the Requests. 50. Moreover we would reject the fourth ground of appeal for two reasons. First, because it does not concern the Decision Notice itself which is the document with which the specific focus of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction of s.58 FOIA is concerned. The covering email does not form part of the Decision Notice itself. Second and in any event, that covering email must be seen in the context of the Appellant’s complaint to the Commissioner dated 19 August 2024 in which he made a variety of complaints about the Council’s conduct not specifically linked to the requests which he was complaining about. The Commissioner’s covering email was simply indicating that its ability to adjudicate on such issues did not fall within its remit. There is accordingly no merit in this ground of appeal 51. More generally and taking a step back from the detail, we consider that pursuit of these requests is a good example of vexatiousness by drift – that is where an original legitimate concern has morphed into something which is pursued in such a way that it not only extinguishes or limits the underlying public interest, but also amounts to a disproportionate use of the relevant information law regime – see by analogy Oxford Phoenix Innovation Limited v Information Commissioner and MHPRA [2018] UKUT 192 (AAC) in the context of s.14 FOIA. Request 356 and the Appellant’s approach to that is a good illustration of the point and that also in our view extends to the related Requests which are the subject of this appeal. This issue is also supported by the approach of the Appellant generally in the documents contained in the bundle. 52. We also agree that the Appellant’s approach is likely to cause meaningful distress and concern to the Council’s staff, not least through the forceful manner and repeated allegations of wrongdoing against a variety of individuals at the Council. As set out in the Application this now includes allegations of criminal behaviour. In his complaint to the Commissioner, the Appellant included allegations that a solicitor had acted in breach of her professional obligations. We also repeat what we have said at paragraph 45 above about allegations of improper motivation which applies equally to this issue. While the issue of whether a request is manifestly excessive must be judged as at the time of the Council’s response to the Requests, we consider that this is consistent with the circumstances which existed at that time. 53. Judged objectively and holistically therefore, and taking account of all the factors in the case, including in particular the importance of access to environmental information by local individuals and campaigners, we consider that each of the Requests was manifestly excessive. 54. Having decided that, we next considered whether the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighed the public interest in disclosing the requested information. We have concluded that it does for the reasons set out above. In short, we consider that the public interest in the proportionate and focused use of the EIRs without placing an undue burden on the limited resources significantly outweighs the public interest in disclosure of the information requested for each of the requests. Finally, and for the same reasons, we have considered that this is a proper and justified occasion where the presumption in favour of disclosure does not mean that the requested information should be disclosed. The Commissioner’s Decision Notice therefore was in accordance with the law when it concluded that r.12(4)(b) of the EIRs was engaged. 55. Finally, we turn to two remaining aspects of the ground of appeal: 55.1. First, the Appellant’s complaint in his fifth ground of appeal that his reply to an internal review was sent to his private email and not through a public portal. He asserts that this was in breach of the UK GDPR. We do not consider this issue relevant to determination of whether the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law, including the application of r.12(4)(b) EIRs. It is not for this Tribunal to make findings about whether there has or has not been a breach of the UK GDPR. We would reject this ground of appeal. 55.2. Second, the FTT does not have jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the Appellant in respect of land and property as part of the Additional Outcomes which he seeks. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is set out in s.57 and s.58 FOIA. While r.12(4)(b) of the EIRs does require a holistic assessment when considering if a request is manifestly excessive, that does not give the Tribunal the powers to make the orders sought and to consider and make findings on the complex matters of property and planning law which the Appellant contends. Accordingly, we reject the sixth ground of appeal and the Appellant’s request that the Tribunal makes the various orders sought in relation to land and property in his appeal notice. 56. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and dismiss the appeal. Signed: Judge Scherbel-Ball Dated 28 October 2025 18