Mavin v Wyatt [2026] EWCA Civ 448 (17 April 2026)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 448 Case No: CA-2025-001864 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM MILTON KEYNES AND OXFORD COUNTY COURT HHJ Melissa Clarke K3PP6075 Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL 17 April 2026 B e f o r e : LORD JUSTICE BAKER and LORD JUSTICE SNOWDEN ____________________ Between: LEE MAVIN Appellant - and - KAREN WYATT Respondent ____________________ Christopher Jacobs (instructed by Scott-Moncrieff and Associates) for the Appellant Osaro Richards (of Crystal Solicitors) for the Respondent Hearing date: 19 February 2026 ____________________ HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________ Crown Copyright © This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17 April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ............................. LORD JUSTICE BAKER : This is an appeal against two orders of HHJ Melissa Clarke sitting in the Milton Keynes and Oxford County Court. Under the first order dated 16 April 2025 ("the contempt order"), the judge found the appellant, Mr Lee Mavin, in contempt of court on seven counts. Under the second order dated 25 June 2025 ("the sentencing order"), she sentenced him to 9 months' imprisonment, to take effect immediately. Both orders were made in Mr Mavin's absence. Although he has a right to appeal against the orders without first obtaining permission, the appeal notice was filed on 28 July 2025, some twelve weeks out of time in respect of the first order and twelve days out of time in respect of the second, and he therefore seeks an extension of time for filing the notice. On 30 July, Nugee LJ stayed the committal order pending determination of the appeal. Mr Mavin has not advanced any substantive grounds against the decision that he was in contempt of court, or against the sentence passed against him. The issues he raises in his five grounds are allegations of procedural irregularity. At the conclusion of the appeal hearing, we informed the parties that (1) the appeal against the first order would be allowed in respect of two of the seven findings (counts 6 and 7); (2) we were reserving our judgment in respect of the remainder of the appeal, but (3) in the event that we dismissed the appeal against the five other counts in the contempt order we would in any event reconsider the sentence passed by the judge in the light of the appeal being allowed in respect of counts 6 and 7. This judgment sets out my reasons for joining in the decision to allow the appeal in respect of counts 6 and 7 and my decision and reasons in respect of the rest of the appeal. Summary of facts and proceedings The findings of contempt arise out of what the judge found to be Mr Mavin's fraudulent misuse of the debt respite scheme known as "Breathing Space", established under the Debt Respite Scheme (Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020, made under section 7 of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018. Under the scheme, a debtor living in England or Wales can get temporary protection from their creditors for up to 60 days while obtaining advice and formulating a plan to pay off their debts. If the debtor is receiving mental health crisis treatment, the protection lasts for the length of their treatment, plus another thirty days. During that period, no enforcement action can be taken against the debtor, the creditors cannot contact the debtor about the debts included in the scheme, and no interest or charges can be added to the debt. The eligibility criteria for entering a breathing space moratorium include, under regulation 24(3)(g), that the debtor "is not subject to another breathing space moratorium and, if they have previously been subject to a breathing space moratorium, that moratorium ended more than 12 months before the date of the application." The respondent to this appeal (the claimant in the proceedings), is the proprietor and landlord of a property in Aylesbury. In September 2022, she let the property to Mr Mavin and a woman called Naomi Graham under an assured shorthold tenancy at a rent of £1,000 per calendar month. The tenants failed to keep up with the rent and substantial arrears accrued. In early 2023, the respondent started proceedings to recover possession of the premises, naming Ms Graham as the first defendant and Mr Mavin as the second defendant. In April 2023, however, Mr Mavin entered a breathing space moratorium initiated by a debt advice provider and the possession proceedings were suspended. On the expiry of the breathing space period, the proceedings resumed. On 25 September 2023, a possession order was granted, to take effect on 9 October 2023, together with an order for Mr Mavin and Ms Graham to pay rent arrears of £8,000 and the respondent's costs assessed at £355. On 19 October, however, Ms Graham entered a breathing space moratorium for two months. On 4 January 2024, after the expiry of that moratorium, a warrant of possession was issued and on 10 January 2024, the court issued a notice of appointment with the bailiff for execution of the warrant of possession, scheduled for 13 February 2024. Meanwhile, Mr Mavin filed an application to set aside the possession order. On 31 January 2024, that application was dismissed. On 13 February 2024, Mr Mavin sent an email to the court giving details of another breathing space moratorium which he claimed to have entered and as a result the enforcement proceedings were halted. The respondent subsequently alleged (count 1), and the judge ultimately found, that the details included a false breathing space reference number provided by Mr Mavin knowing it was false and in order to stop the eviction, and that by doing so he unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice. On 23 April 2024, Mr Mavin entered a further breathing space moratorium with a different debt advice provider and deployed it to prevent a lawful eviction. The moratorium was cancelled a few weeks later when the provider discovered that he was ineligible. The respondent subsequently alleged (counts 2 and 3), and the judge found, that Mr Mavin had entered the breathing space, and deployed it, fraudulently to avoid lawful eviction, and that by doing so he prevented the eviction and therefore interfered with the due administration of justice. On 26 April 2024, the respondent filed an application for contempt of court against Mr Mavin, supported by an affidavit, putting forward five allegations, namely putting forward false evidence to stop bailiffs from evicting him, interfering with the administration of justice by putting forward that evidence, and breach of the orders dated 25 September 2023, 31 January 2024 and the notice of appointment with the bailiff issued on 10 January 2024. In the event, in circumstances described below, the five allegations set out in the application filed on 26 April 2024 were not pursued. On 16 May 2024, Mr Mavin again misrepresented to bailiffs that he had entered a breathing space and provided a false reference number. The respondent later alleged (count 4), and the judge found, that he had again acted in this way to avoid eviction and thereby unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice. On 25 July 2024, Mr Mavin and Ms Graham filed an application to suspend the warrant of possession. That application was listed for hearing on 29 July 2024, but in the event neither applicant attended court. Instead, Mr Mavin sent an email stating that he had entered a breathing space, giving a false reference number and attaching a print-out falsely purporting to be a gov.uk document as evidence in support. As a result, the hearing was adjourned, and the eviction suspended, until 2 October 2024. The respondent alleged (count 5), and the judge found, that Mr Mavin had used forgery, deception and misrepresentation to induce the court to suspend the eviction, and that by this conduct he unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice. On 23 September 2024, Mr Mavin filed an application seeking a further adjournment. By that stage, the arrears of rent amounted to £25,255. At the hearing on 2 October 2024, which was attended by Mr Mavin, Deputy District Judge Warriner refused the application to adjourn the hearing and, under the heading "Contempt", made the following further orders: "2. The claimant is permitted to make an application for the committal of the 2nd defendant [i.e. Mr Mavin] for contempt of court. 3. By 4pm on 16 October 2024, the claimant shall file and serve an amended affidavit setting out the grounds upon which she seeks the 2nd defendant's committal for contempt of court and the evidence upon which she wishes to rely in support of the application. The requirement for personal service on the 2nd defendant of the affidavit is dispensed with. 4. If so advised the 2nd defendant has permission, by 4pm on 30 October 2024, file and serve a witness statement in response to the application and the claimant's affidavit. 5. The application shall be listed on 17 December 2024… 6. Costs reserved." On 15 October 2024, in compliance with those directions, the respondent filed an "amended affidavit" in support of the committal application, stating: "the basis upon which I seek the 2nd defendant's committal for contempt of court is that he keeps providing false Breathing Space numbers to the court and to bailiffs to avoid eviction. He also obtained Breathing Space by means including deception, misrepresentation and concealment of material facts." She set out five fresh grounds for seeking his committal, namely the five counts summarised in paragraphs 12 to 16 above. On 20 November 2024, Mr Mavin again emailed the court and asserted that a breathing space application was being processed and would be confirmed by the end of the day and asking for the eviction to be suspended. The respondent subsequently claimed that these assertions were false and amounted to an unlawful interference with the due administration of justice. On the following day, 21 November 2024, Mr Mavin sent documents purporting to show that he had been placed in breathing space. The respondent subsequently claimed that the documents supplied were forgeries to support Mr Mavin's false assertion that he had entered a breathing space moratorium with yet another provider. These further allegations formed counts 6 and 7 of the committal application ultimately considered by the judge in circumstances described below. In the event, the application for suspension of the eviction was refused by District Judge Nutley on 21 November and Mr Mavin and Ms Graham were duly evicted. On 16 December 2024, Mr Mavin applied by email to the court for an adjournment of the committal hearing listed the following day, stating that he was still seeking legal representation. District Judge Pittman ordered that the matter remain in the list "for directions only, so the Court can ensure that ensure that the Defendant is fully aware of his rights to legal advice and the actions required of him on this regard." At the hearing on 17 December, which Mr Mavin did not attend, District Judge Pittman ordered that all further applications be reserved to HHJ Clarke "to ensure judicial continuity" and that the committal application be listed before her on a date to be advised. The order also stated that if Mr Mavin did not attend the hearing "a warrant could be issued for his arrest." In addition, under the hearing "The 2nd Defendant's rights", the order stated: "4. The 2nd Defendant is reminded of his rights which are set out below and in the attached sheet. (a) The 2nd defendant has the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings. (b) The 2nd defendant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test. (c) HMCTS will provide the 2nd defendant with an interpreter to support him in the courtroom if he cannot speak or understand the language used in court. (d) The 2nd defendant is advised to notify court staff if this is necessary. (e) The 2nd defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing of the contempt application against him. (f) The 2nd defendant is entitled but not obliged to give written and oral evidence in his defence. (g) The 2nd defendant has the right to remain silent and may not be compelled to answer any question the answer to which may incriminate him. (h) If the 2nd defendant does not attend the hearing, the court may proceed in his absence. (i) Whether or not the 2nd defendant attends the hearing, the court will only find him in contempt if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the facts constituting contempt and that they do constitute contempt. (j) If the court is satisfied that the 2nd defendant has committed a contempt, the court may punish him by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment permitted under the law. (k) If the 2nd defendant admits the contempt and wish [sic] to apologise to the court, that is likely to reduce the seriousness of any punishment by the court." The committal hearing was listed before HHJ Clarke on 9 April 2025. On 2 April 2025, Mr Mavin applied to adjourn the hearing. That application has not been included in the papers before us but at the hearing on 9 April the judge stated that the basis for the adjournment application had been that Mr Mavin had just found a solicitor "but they need adequate time to apply for the individual case contract and then go through the claimant's bundle and put together my defence." By an order made on 4 April, without a hearing, the judge dismissed the application to adjourn, stating that Mr Mavin "has had almost four months since the last hearing to seek to obtain legal advice" and that, the order having been made without a hearing, he "may request that it be stayed, varied or set aside at the start of the hearing on 9 April." Also on 4 April, the respondent's solicitor, Mr Richards, filed a document, headed "Charges against Mr Lee Mavin", setting out seven "counts" of contempt of court, namely the five included in the amended affidavit filed on 15 October 2024 and the two additional counts arising out of Mr Mavin's conduct on 20 and 21 November 2024, summarised in paragraph 19 above. In respect of each count, the respondent asserted that "by engaging in the above conduct, [Mr Mavin] unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice." Mr Mavin did not attend the hearing on 9 April 2025. A transcript of the hearing has been prepared for the present appeal. At the start of the hearing, the judge referred to the application made on 2 April which she had refused. She then recited a number of further applications which Mr Mavin had made on the day before, and the morning of, the hearing. These included an application to attend the hearing via CVP, on the following grounds: "Previous hearings had been by CVP due to my disabilities. I have heart failure which affects my ability to attend a hearing in person. I am prone to blacking out and collapsing, I suffer with PTSD and trauma." The judge said that she had reviewed that application but, as no medical evidence had been provided in support, she dismissed it. She then referred to a further application made by Mr Mavin shortly before the hearing, in which he renewed his application for an adjournment on the grounds that (a) he had never been offered an intermediary, stating that he suffered from PTSD and trauma which would affect his ability to participate; (b) he had never received a copy of the order made on 17 December 2024, and (c) his solicitor had not had time to prepare a defence and that the solicitors' firm "do not have anyone free to attend a hearing today". The respondent's solicitor, Mr Richards, then made submissions in which he recited some of the background, observed that Mr Mavin had "a habit of making these applications" and asked the judge to refuse this application. The judge responded: "So what do you say I do today? Because my options are to go ahead with the hearing in his absence, which is difficult in a committal hearing, or to issue a warrant for his arrest which will bring him before the court." After further discussion with Mr Richards, the judge decided to issue a bench warrant and made an order in the following terms: "Upon the Defendant making a flurry of applications since 3pm yesterday 9 [sic] April 2025 to (i) adjourn the hearing on the grounds that (a) his (unnamed) solicitors have had insufficient time and do not have anyone free to attend a hearing and (b) because he did not receive the court order of 17 December 2024 or the notice of hearing for today; (ii) to appoint an intermediary as he has PTSD and cannot fully participate in court proceedings; and (iii) to attend the hearing by CVP; And upon the Defendant having previously told the Court that he instructed solicitors on 2 April 2025 but no solicitors having come on the record as so acting or corresponding with the Court and the Claimant's solicitors having had no contact from any such solicitors And upon the Court being satisfied that he was served with the court order of 17 December 2024 and has known of the final hearing since at least 2 April 2025 when he corresponded with the Court about it and made an application to adjourn it on medical grounds (unsupported by any medical evidence) which was refused by the order of HHJ Melissa Clarke on 4 April 2025 And upon the Court noting that although the Defendant was evicted from [the property] in November 2024 he has failed to update the Court with his current address and has continued to use this address on his applications to the court, most recently at 10am today. Any failure to receive post forwarded to him from this address results from his failure to update the Court and the Claimant with his current address And upon the Court having refused his application for remote attendance of 8 April 2025 by order of 9 April 2025 (emailed to his usual email address from which the application was filed) which stated that the Defendant must attend And upon the Court considering that the Defendant has in these proceedings indulged in a pattern of very late applications to adjourn, or to suspend warrants, without good reason for the lateness And upon the Court considering there is no good reason for the Defendant's failure to attend the hearing today And upon the Defendant being warned previously that if he failed to attend without good reason a warrant would be issued for his arrest IT IS ORDERED THAT 1. The late applications for adjournment and appointment of an intermediary which have not already been dealt with, are dismissed. 2. The Court will issue a warrant for the Defendant's arrest. 3. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant's wasted costs of attendance at the hearing today summarily assessed at £2298 plus VAT…." On 13 April 2025, Mr Mavin filed an application in form N244 stating that he did not attend the committal hearing on 9 April 2025 because of "a mental health crisis". On 14 April, Mr Mavin presented himself for arrest at a police station and was brought before HHJ Clarke. No transcript of that hearing has been prepared. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge made an order in the following terms: "Upon the Court having issued a warrant for the Defendant's arrest on 9 April 2025 And upon the Defendant having presented himself for arrest at Aylesbury Police Station on 14 April 2025 And upon the Defendant agreeing to attend at Oxford County Court at 11am on Wednesday 16 April 2025 for his adjourned committal hearing and being warned that the hearing would continue in his absence if he failed to attend, and that he could be found to be in contempt of court and even sentenced in his absence in those circumstances AND UPON the Defendant being advised to seek to obtain legal advice IT IS ORDERED THAT 1. The Defendant Mr Lee Mavin to be released from custody forthwith and given a travel warrant to return to Aylesbury. 2. The adjourned committal hearing is relisted for 11am on 9 April 2025 [sic] at Oxford County Court. 3. Costs in the committal application" On 15 April, Mr Mavin filed an application to adjourn the 16 April hearing in order to obtain evidence. On 16 April, Mr Mavin attended the County Court at Oxford at 11am. The hearing was, however, delayed, and by the time it was called on at 2pm, he had left the court building. Shortly before the start of the hearing, he sent an email to the court office which he asked to be passed to the judge and which she read out at the start of the hearing: "My hearing has been pushed back twice today. It was scheduled for 11 am, then pushed to 12.30, then to 2 o'clock. I took my mental health medication early this morning so I would be able to attend at 11 am. I was able to wait until 12.30 but the next push back time was too much for me, my mental health medication has worn off. I was starting to freak out I'm going to [go] directly to my mental health crisis team. I sincerely apologise I could not stay. The claimant's partner was also there, who seriously harassed me last year and that exacerbated my mental health. I did send in an N244 to request an adjournment as new evidence has come to light. This evidence will be ready by the end of the working day on 22.04.2025." After submissions from Mr Richards, the judge decided to proceed with the hearing and delivered a preliminary judgment setting out her reasons for taking that course. After summarising the case, she said: "16. The day before yesterday when he was brought in on arrest, I made it clear to him that if he did not attend today, I would be proceeding in his absence unless there was a good reason not to. He did attend today but he has now gone and the question is whether there is a good reason not to. He says he is in a mental health crisis. 17. It seems to me, from what he told me the day before yesterday, that he does find these proceedings extremely stressful and he does have vulnerabilities because of existing mental health issues which I have seen on the documentation which he has provided me. But it does not seem to me to provide a good reason for leaving the court five minutes before a hearing and emailing the court three minutes before a listed hearing when this is a matter which is of importance where he has been informed that I will continue in his absence if he does not attend and which he really appeared to understand. 18. We had a good conversation the day before yesterday about exactly how important this was. I told him if he did not attend, I would continue in his absence and he had put in no evidence to rebut the allegations made against him and so, given what I have seen of the bundle at that stage, that without any explanation from him to counter these allegations it would be likely he would be found to be in contempt of court and then sentence might include a sentence of imprisonment and he understood all of that. 19. He is not here. It seems to me that it would be wrong to adjourn this further. I feel as though the court has really bent over backwards to try and assist Mr Mavin in giving him every opportunity to obtain legal advice, in allowing previous adjournments on really very little except a statement that he would get legal representation which he has not done. And now, though I accept he is a vulnerable person with mental health difficulties, it seems to me that he should have been able to stay and see me at 2 pm, even if only to make his application to adjourn orally. 20. In terms of the evidence that he says he is going to be able to provide next week, as Mr Richards says, he could have obtained evidence at any point since he was first notified of these proceedings in July 2024. He was served with these proceedings on 31 August 2024 and so I am going to adjourn on that basis. So, I am going to proceed in his absence, certainly in relation to the decision about contempt of court." The hearing continued. Mr Richards went through the seven grounds. In respect of the first five grounds, the judge made the findings summarised at paragraphs 12 to 16 above. In respect of counts six and seven, relating to Mr Mavin's conduct on 20 and 21 November 2024 summarised at paragraph 17 above, she found that he had submitted a false statement that a breathing space application was being processed and submitted forged documents to induce the judge to suspend the eviction, and that in doing so he had sought unlawfully to interfere with the administration of justice. She therefore found him to be in contempt on all seven allegations and adjourned sentence to 2 May. On 1 May, the day before the adjourned hearing, Mr Mavin filed an application for a further adjournment to obtain legal advice. The judge allowed this application and adjourned the hearing to 29 May. On 28 May, the day before the hearing, Mr Mavin applied to the court again for an adjournment in order to obtain legal representation. He was informed by the court that the application would be considered at the hearing. On 29 May, Mr Mavin emailed the court to say he was in hospital having had breathing difficulties, and had fallen and hit his head. Sentencing was adjourned to 12 June 2025. Mr Mavin was ordered to provide a discharge summary from hospital relating to his attendance. On 8 June, Mr Mavin filed another application for an adjournment to seek legal advice. That application was initially refused by the judge on paper. At the hearing on 12 June, which Mr Mavin attended, he renewed the application for an adjournment and produced documentary evidence showing that he had contacted the Aylesbury Homeless Action Group ("AHAG") who had liaised with Hillingdon Law to act for him. On that basis, the judge ordered "a final adjournment of the sentencing hearing to 11.30 am on 25 June 2025". The order of 12 June contained the following recitals: "Upon hearing the Defendant who attended in person and the Claimant not attending nor being represented And upon the court being satisfied that the Defendant is now obtaining the assistance of [AHAG] who has liaised with Hillingdon Law to act for the Defendant in the sentencing hearing but cannot assist today as it is too short notice And upon the court seeing an email from Graham Taylor-Paddick of AHAG confirming the same and speaking to him to confirm the authenticity of the email And upon the court impressing on the Defendant the importance of engaging with AHAG and Hillingdon Law without delay and providing them with copies of all relevant court documents and orders so they can understand the position he is in And upon the Defendant declining to authorise the court to send a bundle of documents to AHAG and/or Hillingdon Law (who are not yet on the record) as he is confident he has all necessary documents to provide to them directly And upon the court advising the Defendant that if he does not attend the adjourned hearing he will be sentenced in his absence unless the court is satisfied there is good reason for his non-attendance." In the event, Mr Mavin was neither present nor represented at the hearing on 25 June. On the morning of the hearing, he sent an email to the court stating that he was in an ambulance on his way to Stoke Mandeville Hospital. The hearing proceeded in his absence and the judge then delivered a sentencing judgment. She summarised the earlier findings of contempt, the history of the proceedings and the various occasions when Mr Mavin had failed to attend. She continued: "9. Today … there is no attendance by the Defendant or any legal representative. He has sent an email at 9.15 this morning saying he is currently in an ambulance being taken to Stoke Mandeville Hospital with severe breathing difficulties. No medical evidence or other evidence has been provided of that. He has also enclosed some text messages which he says show that he has been in discussion with a solicitor who emailed him at 16.45 on Monday, the day before yesterday, to say that he could not attend the sentencing hearing as it was too short notice and he could not find counsel available in time, and Mr Mavin says he spoke to him first on Saturday 21 June. I do not understand why he was only in contact with a solicitor on 21 June when I adjourned this on 12 June 2025 and impressed upon him the importance of proper and speedy engagement with his solicitors and Aylesbury Homeless. I have been trying to sentence Mr Mavin since 2 May 2025 and he has been seeking adjournments of the proceedings to obtain legal representation since some time last year in these proceedings. 10. I note he went into hospital with alleged breathing difficulties on 29 May 2025 and was released with a prescription for a common antibiotic. The egg-shaped lump that he photographed on his forehead on that day is not referred to in the discharge report and I note that in his psychiatric report the Defendant has a history of self-harming by hitting his head against a wall. It is not at all clear to me from the discharge report that he was sufficiently unwell on that day to merit failing to attend court – in fact it sems to me that he was not – and I have no evidence save his own self-report that he is too unwell to attend court today. I have little confidence that if I adjourn again he will attend at the next sentencing hearing and be legally represented. I have warned him on very many occasions that if he does not attend I will sentence him in his absence and I now do so." The judge then set out some legal principles derived from case law and Sentencing Council guidelines. She continued: "16. …. In this case all of his acts were intentional and some included significant premeditation and sophistication in the production of forged documents purporting to be from government sources. Accordingly, I consider his culpability to be high and towards the top of the range. In relation to harm … I see several harms, first, to the claimants, his landlords [sic] who were delayed in enforcing their possession order by eviction for some period over nine months resulting in an increase in arrears of rent as well as the costs associated with their various visits to court and the costs of these committal proceedings. For these contempts caused a cancellation of an eviction. Secondly, to the general public and to the State in the attack on the administration of justice that each of his contempts represent, I consider that in relation to each contempt the harm caused is a serious harm falling short of the very highest level. If there were four possible levels I put those at category 2 where 1 is the highest. 17. The starting point is therefore, in my judgement, a sentence of around 12 to 14 months [for] those contempts which I consider altogether, being sentence as they are on a single occasion. I am only entitled to impose a maximum sentence of two years on a single occasion. I take into account and give credit for the following: firstly, the defendant has not offered any explanation for his actions. As was his right, he did not provide any written response to the committal application or file any witness statement and of course he was not present at the committal hearing. That means I do not know what he or his counsel would say in mitigation if he were here. I am able to say that I have seen him several times. He has never displayed any remorse for me. He has told me about his mental health issues and he has provided the court, being a report from [a treatment team] dated 8 March 2024, setting out that he has mental health issues …." After summarising some of those issues, the judge continued: "18. His … mental health issues do not to my mind explain his contempts and do not provide any significant mitigation for them although they do provide some and I will give him some credit for those vulnerabilities. He has previously been homeless and is also now living in a homeless hostel. I do not have any understanding of the background of the defendant in terms of whether he has breached court orders in the past, for example, and so I must assume that he has not. I am satisfied that it has passed the custody threshold because of the number of contempts and the attack on the administration of justice which it represents. Taking all of this into account, I find that the appropriate sentence is one of nine months' imprisonment. That is, I consider, the shortest sentence of imprisonment commensurate with the seriousness of the contempts and by sentencing them together I am taking into account totality. 19. Finally, I must consider whether it is appropriate to suspend the sentence and in this case I consider that the attack on the administration of justice that the contempts represent is such, having taken place as it did on multiple occasions over February to November 2024 when the effect that it has had on the claimant's legitimate attempts to evict him following a possession order, as to merit an immediate sentence of imprisonment and so I sentence him to 9 months in prison." Later that day, Mr Mavin applied by email for a stay of the sentencing order and suspension of the warrant of committal. On 27 June, that application was dismissed. Neither the application nor the order was included in the bundle before us. Recitals in a subsequent order summarised below (24 July 2025) recorded that in his application by email on 25 June Mr Mavin stated that he had a "legitimate medical emergency" which had prevented his attendance that morning. He stated that he had "collapsed … due to respiratory issues and blacked out whilst hitting my head" and that he had been taken to hospital by ambulance. He asserted that the discharge letter said that he was found to have a viral infection in his lungs. He also stated that he had been disabled since 2014, had a heart condition that affected his mobility and was also stress induced, and that he suffered from severe anxiety, PTSD and trauma. Recitals to the subsequent order also recorded that the order dated 27 June stated that "the discharge letter from Stoke Mandeville Hospital attached to the application … does not support [Mr Mavin's] assertion that he had a viral chest infection and was too unwell to attend court." On 9 July 2025, Mr Mavin filed an application to set aside the order, seeking to rely on what he asserted to be fresh evidence. On 24 July, that application was dismissed by Recorder Wood without a hearing. In addition to the recitals set out in the previous paragraph, the order made by the recorder recited that "none of the new evidence that was sent to the court with the application notice on 9 July is evidence that was not available to [Mr Mavin] or could not have been reasonably obtained by him by the time his application of 25 June 2025 was considered". The order further recorded that Mr Mavin had not provided any grounds as to why the court was wrong (1) to make findings of contempt, or (2) to sentence him to 9 months' imprisonment. On 28 July 2025, Mr Mavin, then still acting in person, filed a notice of appeal against the orders of 16 April and 25 June, including an application for an extension of time for filing the notice. On 30 July, Nugee LJ stayed the committal order pending determination of the appeal. On 12 August, Andrews LJ adjourned the application for an extension of time to a "rolled up" hearing with the committal appeal to follow if the extension were granted. She made a series of further case management directions, including listing the appeal in October 2025. She also ordered that, if Mr Mavin wished to seek the court's permission to adduce fresh evidence, including medical evidence, he must make a formal application to do so by no later than 8 September 2025, together with a witness statement in support exhibiting the fresh evidence, identifying the issues to which it related, and explaining why it was not adduced before the judge. On 8 September 2025, the respondent filed a witness statement in response to the appeal. On 23 September, Mr Mavin filed a witness statement with exhibits. Neither party had applied for permission to adduce fresh evidence, notwithstanding, in Mr Mavin's case, the clear direction given by Andrews LJ in the order of 12 August. On 13 October, I made an order that if either party wished to rely on the statements filed without permission, they should file a notice of application to that effect which would be considered at the start of the appeal hearing, then listed for 28 October. On 20 October, Mr Mavin filed an application to adduce fresh evidence. On 23 October 2025, Mr Mavin emailed the Civil Appeals Office asking for an adjournment. He asserted that he was awaiting a response from the office to requests for clarification, that he was "a disabled and vulnerable litigant in person, with ongoing mental health difficulties (PTSD and anxiety disorder)" and that proceeding without clarity on those issues would place him at a serious disadvantage and risk procedural unfairness. The court responded that the application for an adjournment would be considered at the start of the hearing. On 27 October, the day before the hearing, Mr Mavin emailed the court asking for permission to attend via video link. He said that, over the previous week, his PTSD symptoms had worsened as a result of not receiving responses to his requests for directions from the court and that attending the hearing in person would pose a serious risk to his mental health and "could trigger a crisis episode". The application was refused but the court informed Mr Mavin that it would consider any request for reasonable adjustments to facilitate his participation at the hearing. At 10.10 hrs on the morning of 28 October, Mr Mavin sent another email to the Civil Appeals Office stating that he was at Stoke Mandeville Hospital "in a severe mental health crisis" and unable to attend the hearing. After hearing submissions from the respondent's advocate, the Court adjourned the hearing to a date to be fixed and gave the following directions: "The appellant shall, by 12 noon on 11 th November 2025, file and serve evidence to demonstrate his reasons for not attending the hearing on 28 October 2025. Such evidence must comply with the guidance in Levy v Carr [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch) and Bruce v Wychavon District Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1389 , para 36. In particular, it must include evidence from a medical practitioner: Identifying the medical practitioner and giving details of their familiarity with the appellant's medical condition and details of all recent medical conditions. Identifying, with particularity, the appellant's medical condition and the features of that condition (which in the medical practitioner's opinion) prevented the appellant's participation in the hearing on 28 October 2025." On 10 November, Mr Mavin filed the following documents: (1) a discharge summary dated 28 October 2025 drafted by Stoke Mandeville Hospital Emergency Department; (2) a GP's note dated 5 November 2025; (3) a letter dated 6 November 2025 from his mental health safety planning outreach worker, and (4) a request for reasonable adjustments including that any oral hearing be conducted remotely. On 3 December 2025, having concluded that the documents did not comply with the directions given on 28 October, this Court made an order (1) re-listing the adjourned appeal and application for an extension of time to file the appeal notice, and the application to adduce further evidence, for hearing on 16 December 2025, (2) directing Mr Mavin to attend the hearing in person, and (3) directing him to file and serve a document setting out his proposals for reasonable adjustments to enable him to participate at the hearing, to be prepared in consultation with his outreach worker. On 8 December, Mr Mavin sent a further email to the court asking for an adjournment of the hearing listed on 16 December, putting forward two reasons. First, he said that, having tried but failed to obtain legal representation from firms named in the email, he had on 24 November submitted an application to Advocate who had replied that they would be unable to assist on 16 December and required at least three weeks to determine whether a litigant was eligible for assistance. Secondly, Mr Mavin reiterated his contention that he was unable to attend the hearing in person because of his various medical conditions, and made a further application for reasonable adjustments. The application for an adjournment was refused, as were two further applications for an adjournment sent the following day and an application sent on 13 December for permission to attend by video link. The Court reiterated that it would consider any request made for reasonable adjustments to facilitate Mr Mavin's participation at the hearing. At the hearing on 16 December 2025, Mr Mavin attended in person. In the event, he said very little, other than to repeat in a faltering voice words to the effect that his medical condition was affecting his ability to concentrate, process questions and communicate. He failed to answer a number of questions put to him by the Court. It was not possible to determine whether he was unable to communicate or simply choosing not to do so. After hearing submissions on behalf of the respondent, the Court agreed to adjourn the hearing to allow Mr Mavin one final opportunity to obtain legal representation. Under the order made following the hearing, Advocate was invited to arrange for legal representation for Mr Mavin, or alternatively refer him for legal representation. The Court further ordered that, provided he was legally represented at the adjourned hearing, Mr Mavin could attend the hearing via video link. Through Advocate, Adam Tear of Scott-Moncrieff and Associates and Christopher Jacobs of Counsel were duly instructed to represent Mr Mavin. This Court is very grateful to all for their assistance. On 14 January 2026, Mr Mavin was granted legal aid to be represented on the appeal. On 5 February 2026, following an application from Mr Mavin's solicitor, I made an order amending the timetable for filing documents, including transcripts of the hearings in the court below, which had been requested but were not yet available. At the Master's direction, a further application on behalf of Mr Mavin for leave to adduce fresh evidence was adjourned to the appeal hearing. The appeal Five grounds of appeal were put forward in the appeal notice: (1) The orders were made in the appellant's absence even though he had valid grounds for non-attendance. He did not have a proper opportunity to be represented or explain his position or put together his defence. (2) He was not made aware of his right to appeal until he received the order of Recorder Wood dated 24 July 2025. (3) His ability to participate in and respond to the proceedings has been seriously hindered by his health conditions including diagnosed PTSD and medical emergencies. Although these were supported by legitimate medical evidence, the hearings went ahead. The court did not ensure he was able to participate, in breach of natural justice. (4) There are strong reasons for believing that the process leading to the committal order was unfair and failed to take account of his circumstances. (5) The court was aware of Mr Mavin's vulnerabilities but failed to consider them or his need for an intermediary. Before considering the merits of the appeal, there are a number of preliminary applications made on behalf of Mr Mavin which must be addressed. The first is the application to extend time for filing the appeal notice, which also encompassed the second ground of appeal. The second is an application to adduce fresh evidence. The third, which was made by Mr Jacobs in the course of the hearing before us, is an application to amend the grounds of appeal. I deal first with the application to extend time. The appeal notice ought to have been filed twenty-one days after the decision under appeal. In this case it was filed twelve days after the expiry of the period in respect of the sentencing order and twelve weeks after the expiry of the period in respect of the findings of contempt. The Denton principles for granting relief from sanctions apply to applications for an extension of time for appealing against orders for committal for contempt of court: Yaxley-Lennon v Solicitor-General [2025] EWCA Civ 476 paragraph 24. CPR rule 81.8(7) provides that "the court shall inform the defendant of the right to appeal without permission, the time limit for appealing and the court before which any appeal must be brought." Mr Jacobs pointed out that neither the order dated 16 April 2025 nor the warrant of committal dated 25 June 2025 contain information about the right to appeal. Mr Mavin was, of course, not present on either occasion. Mr Jacobs added that the order dated 16 April was drawn on the General Form of Judgment or Order and not on the standard form N603 prescribed for an order on determination of proceedings for contempt of court, which contains information in compliance with rule 81.8(7). In his appeal notice, Mr Mavin said that he had only been made aware of his right to appeal on reading the order made by Recorder Wood on 24 July and that he then immediately started the appeal process, filing his appeal notice four days later. Mr Jacobs submitted that the fact that Mr Mavin made an attempt to set aside the order is evidence that he wanted to challenge it but was unaware of his right to appeal. As soon as he was informed about the right, he filed the appeal notice. The fact that there was a failure to comply with the obligation to inform him of his right to appeal, coupled with the prompt action taken after receiving the order of 24 July informing him of the right, and the fact that Mr Mavin's liberty is at stake, persuade me that the application to extend time should be granted. Next, I consider the application to rely on fresh evidence on the appeal. In fact, there are two applications. The first was made in December 2025 when Mr Mavin was still acting in person. The second was made by his representatives prior to this hearing. Under CPR 52.11(2): "Unless it orders otherwise, the appeal court will not receive... (b) evidence which was not before the lower court." Prior to the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules, the requirements for the admission of fresh evidence on appeal were expressed in the form of three criteria identified by Denning LJ in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 : (1) the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained for use at the trial; (2) the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have had an important influence on the result of the case (though it need not be decisive); and (3) the evidence is apparently credible though it need not be incontrovertible. It is well established that, although the Ladd v Marshall criteria are no longer primary rules, they "effectively occupy the whole field of relevant considerations to which the court must have regard in deciding whether in any given case the discretion should be exercised to admit the proffered evidence", per Laws LJ in Terluk v Berezovsky [2011] EWCA Civ 1534 at paragraph 32. In the first application, Mr Mavin said: "The evidence I now seek to rely upon includes: (a) Medical records – confirming my PTSD diagnosis and treatment. (b) Ambulance and hospital records – confirming the emergency on 25 June 2025. (c) Correspondence with Oxford County Court – including my email explaining why I had to leave on 16 April 2025. (d) Evidence contradicting the Respondent's case – documentary material which undermines the findings that I engaged in deception or used forged documents to avoid eviction. This includes a contemporaneous note of a telephone call I made to the National Court Contact Centre (NCCC) on 12/02/2024. During this call I was advised that, while my Breathing Space application was still pending, I should provide my own reference number to the Court. I acted on this advice in good faith, believing it to be correct procedure. This directly contradicts the Respondent's allegations that I deliberately sought to mislead the Court." The evidence on which Mr Mavin sought to rely was appended to the application. The "medical records" cited in (a) consisted only of a medical report dated 8 March 2024. It is clear from the transcripts of the hearing on 9 April 2025 and of the judgment delivered on 25 June 2025 (both quoted above) that the report was produced to the judge. It is therefore not fresh evidence. The "ambulance and hospital records" cited in (b) seems to be a single sheet confirming that Mr Mavin was at hospital on 25 June between 8am and 2pm. It does not contain any evidence of any treatment provided. In my view it does not comply with the guidance as to the medical evidence required to explain non-attendance at court given in Levy v Ellis-Carr [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch) and approved by this Court in Bruce v Wychavon District Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1389 , para 36. I would therefore refuse to admit it on this appeal. The document cited under (c) is the email sent to the court shortly before 2pm on 16 April 2025 which was before the judge at the hearing and is thus not "fresh evidence". The documents produced under (d) fall into two categories. The first is a note made by Mr Mavin on 29 September 2025 of a telephone call he made on 12 February 2024 about a pending breathing space application. Mr Mavin has not provided any explanation as to why the contents of this note could not have been produced before the hearing on 16 April 2025. The second is an exchange of emails on 20 November 2024 and 12 December 2024 concerning Mr Mavin's application for breathing space in November 2024. This material, which relates to counts 6 and 7, is, in my view, potentially admissible as fresh evidence. But as for reasons set out below, we have concluded that as the judge's findings on those counts cannot stand, it is unnecessary to admit it. The second application to admit fresh evidence was made by Mr Mavin's legal representatives shortly before the hearing. It consists of three statements: (1) a statement signed by Mr Mavin dated 9 February 2026; (2) a statement signed by Lucy Scott-Moncrieff, the managing director of the solicitors' firm now representing Mr Mavin on this appeal, dated 30 January 2026; and (3) a statement from Benjamin Goodearl, a paralegal employed by the firm, dated 17 February 2026. The statement by Mr Mavin concerns committal counts 6 and 7. In my view it satisfies the Ladd v Marshall criteria and should be admitted. The statements by Ms Scott-Moncrieff and Mr Goodearl testify to the shortage of solicitors willing to represent litigants in committal proceedings. Ms Scott-Moncrieff addresses the issue in general terms, whereas Mr Goodearl gives an account of the specific difficulties in Mr Mavin's local area. Their evidence is certainly credible and this Court is aware of the problems to which Ms Scott-Moncrieff refers. For reasons set out below, however, I do not consider that their evidence would probably have had an important influence on the result of the case. The third preliminary application is to amend the grounds of appeal. As noted above, the five grounds were drafted at a point when Mr Mavin was acting in person. Following the late instruction of his legal representatives, the focus of the argument changed, in particular in respect of ground 4. In the course of the appeal hearing, it became clear that the arguments which Mr Jacobs was pursuing were not sufficiently covered in the grounds drafted by his client. We therefore agreed to his application to amend ground 4 by the addition of the following: "The committal order dated 16 April 2025 and the order/warrant dated 25 June 2025 were vitiated by procedural unfairness in the following respects: (a) The procedure by which counts six and seven were included was unfair. Further or alternatively the procedure by which counts six and seven were included was not in accordance with the law (b) Failure to take steps for Mr Mavin to attend at both hearings, by failing to issue a warrant (c) Failure to take sufficient steps to give Mr Mavin a fair opportunity to be legally represented at either hearing. The sentencing of Mr Mavin was vitiated by procedural unfairness." Having considered all the preliminary applications, I turn to the substantive appeal. Mr Jacobs submitted, first, that the addition of counts 6 and 7 relating to Mr Mavin's actions on 20 and 21 November 2024, was unfair. There was nothing to indicate that the respondent made any application to amend or add to the grounds on which she was seeking Mr Mavin's committal, nor was there any evidence that Mr Mavin had been served with such an application or otherwise expressly notified of the proposed two new counts. Mr Jacobs submitted that the extra counts had been added by the respondent without any procedural step being taken at all. In his statement dated 9 February 2026, which I would admit as fresh evidence, Mr Mavin says that at the date of the hearings on 16 April and 25 June 2025 he was not aware that counts 6 and 7 were being advanced or treated as separate contempt charges. There was nothing in the transcript of the hearing on 16 April 2024 to demonstrate that the judge's attention was drawn to the fact that two counts had been added after service of the affidavit dated 15 October 2024 without notice being given to Mr Mavin. Furthermore, there was no evidence before the court to support the two additional counts which post-dated that affidavit. In support of these submissions, Mr Jacobs cited the decision of this Court in Inplayer Limited v Thorogood [2014] EWCA Civ 1511, in which it was held that a committal was procedurally unfair inter alia because the respondent had not been informed at any time before judgment of a number of alleged contempts which the judge had found proved. In response to a submission that the procedural unfairness would not have affected the outcome, Jackson LJ said (at paragraph 39): "I am afraid this will not do. A judge hearing a committal application should confine himself or herself to the contempts which are alleged in the application notice. If the judge considers that other alleged contempts require consideration, the correct course is to invite amendment of the application notice and then provide any necessary adjournment so that the respondent can prepare to deal with those new matters." Mr Jacobs further submitted that the court failed to make any or any reasonable adjustments to accommodate Mr Mavin's known vulnerabilities. It is said that he has long-standing, formally diagnosed, conditions – PTSD, anxiety, and a heart condition – all of which substantially affected his capacity to participate in court proceedings under stress without adjustments. He was under the care of his local mental health crisis team. The court was made aware of these health issues in advance of the hearings and provided with medical evidence to support Mr Mavin's assertions. Despite that, the court not only refused an adjournment of both the hearing on 16 April and 25 June but also failed to make reasonable adjustments to allow Mr Mavin to participate at the hearings, for example by arranging for Mr Mavin to attend the hearings remotely. In those circumstances, Mr Jacobs submitted that it was wrong of the judge to proceed with the hearing on 16 April. Mr Mavin had attended in the morning but left court for reasons fully explained in an email which he sent to the court before the case was ultimately called on at 2pm. Given what was known about Mr Mavin, the judge ought not to have proceeded in his absence. Similarly on the morning of 25 June 2025, Mr Mavin was taken to hospital by ambulance due to a respiratory emergency. The court was notified that morning prior to the hearing and a discharge letter was submitted shortly afterwards. Despite this, the judge proceeded to sentence Mr Mavin in his absence. Mr Jacobs submitted that both occasions there was a legitimate reason for Mr Mavin's non-attendance and that the judge's decision to proceed in his absence was prejudicial and unfair. In the alternative, Mr Jacobs submitted that, given what was known about Mr Mavin's vulnerabilities, the appropriate course for the court to take on 16 April and 25 June 2025 was to issue a bench warrant. He relied on the observations of Rimer J in Phonographic Performance Ltd v Inch [2002] All E R (D) 253 and of HHJ Birss QC (as he then was) in Westwood v Knight [2012] EWPCC 14 at paragraphs 148-9. Procedural fairness required that Mr Mavin should have a reasonable opportunity to be heard and the judge ought to have taken all reasonable steps to ensure that Mr Mavin was allowed that opportunity. It was further argued that, as a litigant in person with recognised and proven heath conditions and vulnerabilities, Mr Mavin ought to have been provided with more support to enable him to participate and defend himself. The judge was well aware that Mr Mavin had been actively seeking legal representation, but at the hearing on 16 April wrongly took issue with his failure to obtain it. She should have recognised that there is a dearth of legal aid solicitors who practice in the field of contempt cases. In support of this last argument, Mr Mavin's representatives sought this Court's leave to adduce evidence from his solicitor to the effect that defendants to contempt applications face obstacles in obtaining representation. Mr Jacobs cited the observations in this Court in Brown v LB Haringey [2015] EWCA Civ 483 1 WLR 542 (McCombe LJ at paragraph 44) and in Re O (Committal): Legal Representation [2019] EWCA Civ 1721 4 WLR 140 (Peter Jackson LJ at paragraph 2). In the latter case, Peter Jackson LJ said: "The case is a reminder that respondents to committal proceedings are entitled to be provided with legal representation if they want it and that they will qualify for non-means-tested legal aid. There is an obligation on the court to ensure that this protection is made available. Where this does not happen any resulting order for committal may be procedurally irregular." Discussion In the course of the hearing, it became clear that the respondent had no answer to the submissions made by Mr Jacobs in respect of counts 6 and 7. There was no proper application to amend the allegations of contempt which had been served pursuant to DDJ Warriner's order. No evidence was filed in support of the further allegations relating to 20 and 21 November 2024. Mr Mavin was given no notice of them. The judge was unaware of these omissions. It is clear from the transcript of the hearing on 16 April that Mr Richards did not draw her attention to them. At the conclusion of the hearing, we therefore informed the parties that the appeal would be allowed in respect of counts 6 and 7. I have concluded, however, that the appeal in respect of counts 1 to 5 of the contempt order must be dismissed. Having regard to the history of the proceedings, I find the judge was entitled to take the course she did on both 16 April and 25 June and that there was no procedural irregularity on either occasion which rendered the outcome unfair. On 9 April, the judge had decided not to proceed in Mr Mavin's absence but instead issued a bench warrant. That was duly executed with the result that Mr Mavin was brought before the judge on 14 April. She had then released him with a warning that if he did not attend the hearing two days later she would proceed in his absence. Mr Mavin duly attended on 16 April but then left court without informing anyone that he was doing so. In those circumstances, the judge was entitled to conclude on 16 April that it would be wrong to adjourn again and issue another bench warrant. In reaching that decision, the judge took into account all that she knew about his health and vulnerabilities. I infer that this included not only what she had read but also what she had learned at the hearing two days earlier after he was arrested when she had had what she described as a "good conversation" with him. A court dealing with a committal application is under an obligation to ensure that the defendant is aware of his right to legal representation and allowed a fair opportunity to obtain it. In this case, it is clear that Mr Mavin was aware of his right to representation. The judge found, as recorded in the order of 9 April, that he had been served with a copy of the order dated 17 December 2024. That order contained a full description of Mr Mavin's rights, including a right to legal representation, a right to time to prepare, and a right to remain silent. On 2 April 2025, Mr Mavin had applied for an adjournment of the hearing on 9 April on the grounds that, although he had found a solicitor, he needed more time to prepare. The judge rejected that application without a hearing, stating in the order that Mr Mavin "has had almost four months since the last hearing to seek to obtain legal advice". She added, however, that, as the order had been made without a hearing, Mr Mavin could apply to set it aside at the hearing on 9 April. Mr Mavin did not attend that hearing, but renewed his application to adjourn, in part because his solicitor had not had sufficient time to prepare "and did not have anyone free to attend a hearing". The judge rejected that application, noting that although Mr Mavin had told her in his application on 2 April that he had found representation, no solicitor had come on the record. By issuing a bench warrant, however, the judge was effectively allowing more time for preparation. In the event, no solicitor came on the record or attended the hearing on 16 April. In her judgment on that date, in giving her reasons for continuing with the hearing on 16 April, the judge said that "the court has really bent over backwards to try and assist Mr Mavin in giving him every opportunity to obtain legal advice". I agree. Having made the findings of contempt, the judge then properly adjourned the case and listed it for a sentencing hearing sixteen days later on 2 May. On the day before the adjourned hearing, Mr Mavin filed a further application for a further adjournment on the grounds that he was trying to obtain legal advice. The judge allowed this application and adjourned the hearing for a further four weeks, until 29 May. On that day, Mr Mavin emailed the court to say he was in hospital. The judge adjourned sentencing for a further two weeks, to 12 June. Four days before the hearing, Mr Mavin emailed again seeking another adjournment so he could obtain legal advice. The judge initially refused that application on paper. At the start of the hearing on 12 June, which Mr Mavin attended, he gave the judge details of the legal representatives he had consulted via a homeless charity. The judge went so far as to speak to the charity to confirm what Mr Mavin had told her. On that basis, she agreed to what was described in the court order as a "final adjournment" of the sentencing hearing for thirteen days, but again warned Mr Mavin that if he did not attend, she would proceed in his absence. On 25 June, Mr Mavin again failed to attend, sending an email stating that he was in hospital and that he had been in contact with a solicitor on 21 June. In her judgment, the judge said she could not understand why he had not been in contact with the solicitor before that date, given what had been said at the hearing on 12 June. She therefore decided to pass sentence in his absence. It would have been open to the judge on 25 June to issue a bench warrant so that Mr Mavin could be brought before the court when sentence was passed. Given the history of the proceedings, however, I do not consider that she was obliged to do so. The sentencing hearing had already been adjourned three times. On the third occasion, the judge again warned Mr Mavin, who was present, that if he did not attend, she would sentence him in his absence. When he failed to attend, she proceeded to take that course. In her judgment, the judge observed that she had been trying to sentence him since 2 May and that she had "little to no confidence" that if she adjourned again he would attend and be legally represented. She made those observations having been involved with this case for several months, conducted a number of hearings, and met Mr Mavin on two occasions. She had previously recorded, in the order of 9 April 2025, that Mr Mavin had "indulged in a pattern of very late applications to adjourn, or to suspend warrants, without good reason for the lateness". That pattern had continued after the contempt hearing. In those circumstances, I find that the judge was perfectly entitled to conclude that Mr Mavin had been given a fair opportunity to obtain legal representation. There is no basis on which this Court could say that the judge was wrong to proceed to sentence him on 25 June 2025. Although it seems that Mr Mavin had some difficulty locating a solicitor, the fact is that he found a solicitor who was willing to represent him before the contempt hearing and a (different) solicitor to represent him at the sentencing hearing in June. In each case, there was a period of about two weeks between the date on which Mr Mavin spoke to the solicitor and the hearing. The evidence given by Ms Scott-Moncrieff and Mr Goodearl as to the paucity of solicitors' firms willing to act in this type of case, whilst plainly credible, would have had no impact on the judge's decision on each occasion to proceed with the hearing. For those reasons, whilst allowing the appeal against counts 6 and 7 in the contempt order, I dismiss the appeal against counts 1 to 5. I also reject the argument on Mr Mavin's behalf that the sentencing hearing was unfair. But the procedural irregularity that has led me to set aside counts 6 and 7 also infects the judge's sentencing decision. The fact that he must be sentenced now for five, as opposed to seven, contempts, and the fact that the period over which the contempts for which he falls to be sentenced was five months (February to July 2024) as opposed to the nine months (February to November 2024) which contributed to the judge's decision not to suspend the sentence, persuade me that the sentencing exercise must be carried out again. I would therefore set aside the sentence of nine months' immediate imprisonment passed on 25 June 2025. In the course of the hearing, we canvassed with the parties the course to be followed if we came to this decision. It would be open to us to remit the matter to the judge. We concluded, however, that we would be in an equally good position to determine the sentence. The parties agreed, and we therefore gave directions for the preparation of a medical report and a further statement from Mr Mavin to assist us in the event that the appeal against counts 1 to 5 was dismissed. The matter will therefore be listed before us on another occasion when we will determine the appropriate sentence. LORD JUSTICE SNOWDEN I agree. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII