Gill v Gill & Anor (Re the Estate of Pal Singh Gill) [2026] EWHC 848 (Ch) (03 February 2026)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 848 (Ch) Case No: PT-2024-BHM-000073 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN BIRMINGHAM PROPERTY TRUST AND PROBATE LIST (ChD) IN THE ESTATE OF PAL SINGH GILL DECEASED Priory Courts 33 Bull Street Birmingham B4 6DS 3 February 2026 B e f o r e : HIS HONOUR JUDGE RICHARD WILLIAMS (Sitting as a Judge of the High Court) ____________________ Between: KAMALJIT SINGH GILL Claimant - and - (1) MANJIT SINGH GILL (2) MANPREET KAUR Defendants ____________________ Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Tel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com ____________________ THE CLAIMANT appeared In Person THE DEFENDANTS appeared In Person with the 2nd Defendant assisted by an interpreter ____________________ HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ____________________ Crown Copyright © This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved. If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person. JUDGE WILLIAMS: Introduction This is my oral judgment following the trial of cross claims in respect of the last true Will of Mr Pal Singh Gill (" the deceased "), who died over ten years ago, on 11 June 2014. The claimant and the first defendant are the deceased's sons. The second defendant is the wife of the first defendant and the daughter-in-law of the deceased. Background The estate of the deceased comprises a property at 27 Booth Street, Handsworth, Birmingham, and property and land in India. The deceased and his wife became the registered joint owners of 27 Booth Street in 2004. In 2008, the defendants were married. In 2009, the deceased's wife passed away. On 9 February 2010, the first defendant was arrested in India following a criminal complaint made there by the deceased. The judgment of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, dated 10 June 2011, records the complaint as follows: "….. The complainant stated that he is a non resident Indian and is permanently settled in England. He had come to visit India about four months back….. His son, Manjit Singh, has also come …. from England … to India about two months back. Whenever Manjit Singh comes to India he keeps pressing the complainant to transfer his entire property in his name. On 8 February 2010…. the complainant and his son were sitting in the.. residential house of the complainant that he asked the accused to get out of house. Then the accused gave a blow on the back of his head with the sword held in his hand…… The motive for the attack was that the accused wanted the complainant to transfer his entirely property in his name exclusively. When the complainant did not as desired by the accused the accused gave injuries to the complainant….. During investigation of the case, Manjit Singh was arrested on 9 February 2010. The sword used by the accused during the occurrence was recovered. The accused was later released on bail." On 5 May 2010, the deceased made a further criminal complaint to the police in India. The judgment of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, dated 2 June 2015, records that complaint as follows: "On 5 May 2010…. he was going from Garhshankar to Anandpur Sahib in his car…. When complainant reached a kilometre ahead of Malewal Petrol Pump, his son, Manjit Singh brought his car in front of the car of complainant and stopped him. Complainant's son Manjit Singh was accompanied by his driver, Dilbagh Singh and Baldev Singh, father-in-law of Manjit Singh. All of them alighted from the car and Manjit Singh gave a Kirpan blow on the left side mirror of the car of complainant. All of them tied the hands of complainant with rope and took him Balachaur via Garhshankar. On the way, all of them were saying that as complainant did not give the land to them, hence, they will perform complainant's last rites by pouring liquor on him. When they crossed Balachaur, complainant requested them to untie his hands as he has to pass water, but however, complainant managed to untie his right hand. He jumped from the car and saved his life. Accordingly, matter was reported to the police." On 24 August 2010, the deceased signed a Will prepared by Murria Solicitors, which left the whole of the deceased's estate to the claimant. Attached to the 2010 Will is a witness statement of the same date in which the deceased explained why he was disinheriting his other children, including the first defendant, as follows: "[4] I have four children, namely as follows; Manjit Singh Gill... Dalbir Kaur….. Rugbir Kaur… Kamaljit Singh Gill…. [5] My two daughters got married in Germany but they are now divorced. They moved to the UK and are living with two Englishmen. I do not have any contact with them. [6] As far as my son Manjit Singh Gill……. I am having serious difficulties with him. Manjit stabbed me three times in the back in 1996, for which I was hospitalised in India. He tried to kidnap me in India. He also tried to kill me on 8 February 2010 by cutting my head with a sword and it was a lucky escape. There is a police case registered against Manjit in India. He is also on drugs. He is currently living at my house at 27 Booth Street as my late wife allowed him to live in the house without my permission. [7] I own a property and land ….. [in] India which has also been forcibly occupied by Manjit. [8] I wish to leave my estate in the UK and India to my younger son, Kamaljit Singh Gill, as he takes care of me. He used to have problems with alcohol and drug abuse, but he has now mended his ways and takes good care of me. [9] I do not wish to leave anything for Manjit and, in fact, I would like him to vacate my property situated at 27 Booth Street, so that whenever I come back to England I could stay in my own Property as at present I have been thrown out of my home both in UK and in India." Both the 2010 Will and the accompanying witness statement are endorsed with certifications to confirm that the contents of those documents were translated to the deceased in Punjabi prior to signature. On 10 June 2011, the first defendant was acquitted in India of the criminal charge arising from the first criminal complaint, primarily because the minor nature of the observed injuries was inconsistent with a blow from a sword. On 22 December 2011, the deceased signed a Will which left the deceased's estate to the claimant, the first defendant, and the second defendant in equal shares and appointed them executors. The 2011 Will, unlike the 2010 Will, does not contain any certification that the contents of that document were translated to the deceased in Punjabi prior to signature. On 11 June 2014, the deceased died. On 2 June 2015, the first defendant was acquitted in India of the charges arising from the second criminal complaint. On 8 March 2016, the defendants obtained a grant of probate in respect of the 2011 Will. On 1 July 2016, the first defendant issued proceedings in India seeking a declaration that the deceased's property and land there were now owned by the claimant and the defendants one third each pursuant to the terms of the 2011 Will and the grant of probate. The respondents to those proceedings were the claimant and the deceased's two daughters. On 28 February 2018, the court in India made the declaration sought by the claimant. The judgment recorded that notice had been given to the respondents through ordinary process as well as through publication, but none had put in any evidence in response such that the claim went totally unrebutted, unchallenged and uncontroverted. On 17 April 2024, the claimant issued these proceedings, claiming that the court should pronounce against the 2011 Will and pronounce for the 2010 Will. On 20 May 2024, the defendants counterclaimed that the court should pronounce for the validity of the 2011 Will. On 9 September 2025, by which time the parties were representing themselves, I made the following order: " AND UPON the Claimant in his Particulars of Claim challenging the validity of the 2011 Will on the grounds that: (i) the 1 st Defendant coerced the Deceased to sign the 2011 Will, or (ii) the Deceased did not know what he was signing because the contents of the 2011 Will were never translated to him in the Punjabi language. AND UPON the attesting witness to the 2011 Will, Daljeet Kaur Nijran, having signed a witness statement dated 10 June 2024 confirming that in her capacity as a solicitor she prepared the 2011 Will in accordance with the Deceased's instructions and which she then read out to the Deceased in Punjabi before he signed the 2011 Will. …… AND UPON the Claimant today seeking to challenge the validity of the 2011 Will on the new additional ground that the Deceased's signature is a forgery. This is, essentially, an allegation of fraud, which is a serious allegation to make. If the Claimant wishes to raise an allegation of forgery, he must make a formal application to Court (by way of a Form N244 which can be downloaded from the Ministry of justice website) to obtain permission to amend his Particulars of Claim. The Claimant will need to attach to any application his draft Amended Particulars of Claim, which must contain full and specific details of the alleged forgery and the factual basis upon which the allegation is made. …….. AND UPON a highly relevant fact in dispute in these proceedings being the nature of the relationship between the Defendants and the Deceased. It is the Defendants' evidence that they had a close relationship with the Deceased right up until his death in 2014. It is the Claimant's evidence that the relationship between the Deceased and the Defendants had permanently broken down by 2010, and as evidenced by the fact that the Deceased was arrested at Birmingham airport on his arrival back in the UK from India in 2014 in connection with [an alleged complaint of a sexual nature] made against the Deceased by the 2 nd Defendant. The Defendants deny that any such allegation was ever made. The Court considers that it is necessary to order Police Disclose in relation to this alleged criminal complaint to enable the court fairly to resolve the relevant factual dispute. AND UPON the Defendants seeking to challenge the validity of the 2010 Will in their Defence and Counterclaim (at para 9.(2)) on the ground that the Claimant put pressure on the Deceased (i) to make the 2010 Will, and (ii) at the same time to pursue false criminal allegations (of assault, battery and false imprisonment) against the 1 st Defendant in India. Therefore, it appears to the Court that the Deceased's two daughters have a potential interest in the outcome of this case, since if the Court were to decide that neither the 2011 Will nor the 2010 Will is valid, then under the rules of intestacy (which apply when there is no valid Will) the Deceased's estate would fall to be divided equally between all of the Deceased's four children. IT IS ORDERED ……. [4.] The claimant must within 14 days send to the Court any application for permission to amend his Particulars of Claim to allege that the 2011 Will is a forgery failing which he will be debarred from raising any such allegation at the adjourned trial. [5.] Notice of these proceedings shall be given to the Deceased's daughters by the sending a copy of this order to each of [them].. ……. If [they] wish to participate at the trial, they must write to the Court within 14 days of service of this order upon them asking to be joined as additional defendants to these Court proceedings failing which they will be bound by any judgment as if they were parties to the Court proceedings…. [6] Daljeet Kaur Nijran must attend court on 17 December 2025 pursuant to s.122 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for the purpose of answering questions relating to the 2011 Will……. …. [9] The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police shall send to the Court within 28 days of service of this order upon him copies of … any Police Investigation Report arising in connection with an allegation .. against the Deceased …and which culminated in an arrest in 2014…." The Deceased's daughters, having been given notice of these proceedings, chose not to participate. The evidence In compliance with the case management order: i) The Police disclosed the Police Investigation Report in connection with the Deceased's arrest in 2014. ii) Ms Nijran attended trial to give evidence and to answer questions put to her by the claimant in cross-examination. I read and heard evidence from the claimant and the first defendant. Although the second defendant was in attendance, and in the exercise of my case management powers to control evidence, I did not consider it necessary or appropriate for the second defendant to give oral evidence because, ultimately, this is a dispute between the brothers, and I wished to avoid the second defendant being cross-examined by her brother-in-law over a complaint of a sexual nature made to the Police concerning her late father-in-law (" the Criminal Complaint "). I should make clear that the Criminal Complaint is not the subject of any determination by this court, and it is referred to only insofar as it forms part of the wider factual matrix and the state of the relationship between the deceased and the defendants. Approach to fact finding This is not a criminal trial where the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt so that I must be sure before making a finding of fact. Rather, I apply the lower civil standard of proof, being the balance of probabilities. In other words, in making a finding of fact, I must be satisfied that more likely than not it is true. The witnesses I did hear from were seeking to recall events and conversations that took place many years ago, which necessarily gives rise to particular problems. Apart from the fact that it is often difficult for witnesses to remember accurately what happened or what was said so long ago, witnesses can easily persuade themselves that the accounts they now give are the correct ones. Further, the claimant and the first defendant are not independent and objective observers. Not only do they have a financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings, but there is also significant personal animosity between them and as evidenced by their continual arguments throughout the course of the trial and earlier case management hearings. Therefore, the claimant and the first defendant were subject to significant motivating forces and powerful biases. In all the circumstances, I have treated all the evidence I have heard with a substantial degree of caution. In making my findings of disputed facts in this case I have had particular regard to the contemporary undisputed documents, the inferences properly to be drawn from those documents, the parties' subsequent conduct and the overall probabilities, including by reference to the parties' motives. Knowledge and approval - the 2011 Will In his Particulars of Claim, the claimant alleges that the deceased did not know and approve the contents of the 2011 Will when it was purportedly executed, by reason of the following: (1) The deceased would not have understood the 2011 Will unless it was translated, as the 2010 Will was, and there is no evidence that this was done. (2) The deceased had no solicitors acting for him to advise him but only had limited assistance from a volunteer or employee at the community centre, as a result of which the 2011 Will is poorly drafted and unclear. (3) The witness, Daljeet Kaur Nijran, although a solicitor was not instructed to prepare and advise the deceased regarding his proposed will, she was newly qualified and does not appear to have practised in the area of Will drafting. So far as knowledge and approval, the burden is upon the defendants to establish that the deceased understood what was in the 2011 Will when he signed it, and what its effect would be. In seeking to discharge that burden, the defendants rely upon the evidence of Ms Nijran. In her written evidence, Ms Nijran stated as follows: "[1] I confirm that I am the solicitor who took instructions from Mr Pal Singh Gill and prepared the Will in 2011 in accordance with his instructions and I can clearly recall my interaction with Mr Pal Singh Gill. [2] I confirm that Mr Pal Singh Gill attended Shaheed Udham Singh Centre…. to provide his instructions for me for his Last Will and Testament. Mr Gill was clear with his instructions and informed me of his wishes. [3] On 22 December 2011, Mr Pal Singh Gill then attended the … Centre the following week once his Will had been drafted. I confirm that I read the Will to him in Punjabi, Indian dialect, and Mr Gill agreed to the contents and signed the Will and I confirm that I witnessed his signing as well as Mr Bharat Bhusan, who is the co-ordinator at the .. Centre. [4] After signing on 22 December 2011, I did not have any further interactions with Mr Pal Singh Gill. [5] I confirm that on the basis of personal information provided by Mr Pal Singh Gill, I did not note any issues in respect of his mental capacity or understanding of the Will and was clear with his wishes and no concern was noted by me. [6] I confirm that the Will was completed whilst I was working at Warwick Solicitors…. I confirm that Warwick Solicitors has since shut down and I do not have any attendance notes in respect of this matter." However, in her oral evidence, Ms Nijran confirmed that she could not recall this particular instruction and so her evidence was only by reference to what her standard practice had been at the time, which she described as meeting clients at the Centre to take instructions. She or an assistant would then draft the Will and arrangements made for the client to re-attend the Centre one or two weeks later to execute the Will. Around 50% of her clients were Punjabi speaking, in which language she was fluent. For such clients, Ms Nijran would translate the contents of the Will before they signed. Whilst Ms Nijran did not record on the face of the Will that the contents had been translated to the testator in Punjabi, this would be recorded separately in the attendance note, although there is no longer an attendance note available in respect of the deceased because the firm she was then working at has now closed. In his evidence, the claimant said that he had contacted Ms Nijran separately and had been told that she did not provide a translation service. Further, Ms Nijran's Law Society entries refer to her areas of practice being family, immigration, and personal injury, but not Wills, and the only language capability mentioned is English. On balance, I find that the 2011 Will was drafted by Ms Nijran on instructions from the deceased and for the following primary reasons: i) The first page of the 2011 Will is endorsed with the name and address of Warwick Solicitors, the firm that Ms Nijran was then working at. ii) The final page of the 2011 Will is endorsed with Ms Nijran's seal, which again makes reference to Warwick Solicitors. iii) It makes no sense that Ms Nijran would have witnessed the 2011 Will and endorsed it by way of a seal and on the first page with the name of her firm of solicitors if she had not drafted or prepared the 2011 Will on instructions. iv) Also, if the 2011 Will had not been drafted by Ms Nijran or her firm on instructions, then who else could have drafted it. The claimant said that it must have been the first defendant, but again that makes no sense because if drafted by the first defendant, and having witnessed their poor relationship over the course of many days in Court, it is inconceivable that the first defendant would have included the claimant as a one third beneficiary with a right to occupy 27 Booth Street. For the following reasons, I also find that Ms Nijran translated the contents of the 2011 Will to the deceased before he signed it: i) It is inherently unlikely that Ms Nijran, in discharging the professional duties that she owed to the deceased, would not have translated the contents to the deceased so that he knew what he was signing. ii) Whilst the claimant sought to criticise the quality of the drafting by way of some minor typographical errors, the substance is correct in terms of the names and addresses of the claimant and the defendants and the nature of the deceased's assets being 27 Booth Street and the property/land in India. That information must have come from the deceased, and so Ms Nijran must have been able to communicate effectively by speaking in the Punjabi language to the deceased. Indeed, at paragraph 7 of the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, the claimant admits that Ms Nijran could read Punjabi. iii) The Police Investigation Report records that, on 11 June 2013, the deceased travelled from the UK to India. On 13 June 2013, the second defendant made the Criminal Complaint. On returning to the UK on 26 February 2014, the deceased was arrested at Birmingham International Airport and bailed to live with the claimant. On 12 April 2014, the deceased told the police as follows: "The offender states that the [first defendant] and her husband, his son, are against him because Manjit, his son, has told his father to put all his properties and wealth into his name so when he dies he can sort it out. The offender has two sons and two daughters. The [deceased] has not included his daughters into his will before now but has now decided that he will share it equal between all siblings. Manjit is not happy about this as believes the girls should not be entitled to anything." The clear inference is that at that time the deceased knew his 2011 Will benefited both his sons to the exclusion of his daughters. iv) The claimant's subsequent conduct is striking and is entirely consistent with him having discussed the contents of the 2011 Will with the deceased, and which he knew represented the deceased's true wishes - a) It was the first defendant's evidence that the deceased had given him and the claimant copies of the 2011 Will in early 2012, which caused the claimant to then unsuccessfully challenge his father because his father was supposed to leave everything to the claimant. It was the claimant's evidence that he only became aware of the 2011 Will three or four months after the deceased had died. However, the claimant did not challenge the proceedings in India, which were ongoing between 2016 and 2018, and whereby the first defendant sought and obtained a declaration that the Indian property and land was owned in equal shares by the claimant and the defendants pursuant to the 2011 Will. In his oral evidence, the claimant sought to explain this away by saying that he had not been aware of those Indian proceedings. However, that is evidently not true because the judgment of the Indian court dated 28 February 2018 recorded that the claimant, at a hearing on 15 July 2016, had appeared through his attorney, Marjit Kaur, but later his counsel pleaded no instructions to appear, and as such the claimant was ordered to be proceeded against ex parte on 18 January 2017. b) Indeed, on 5 February 2018, the claimant even executed a specific power of attorney drafted by Jacobs Law Solicitors, which appointed the first defendant to manage, control, look after, and supervise his property and land in India. That power of attorney expressly referred to the 2011 Will and that if the property and land were sold, the sale proceeds were to be divided one third each to the claimant and the defendants. The claimant was simply unable to explain why he had executed that specific power of attorney if, as he now claims, the 2011 Will is invalid because his father did not know and approve its contents. The claimant could only say that he had revoked the specific power of attorney on 7 October 2019, which was no explanation at all as to why he executed it in the first place. c) The claimant did not commence these proceedings until some ten years after the deceased had died and some eight years after the grant of probate in respect of the 2011 Will. The claimant unconvincingly sought to explain this extraordinary delay by saying that he had been attempting to agree matters with his brother in the meantime. In light of all the available evidence and the appropriate inferences to be drawn from that evidence, I find that the deceased understood what was in the 2011 Will when he signed it, and what its effect would be. Undue influence – the 2011 Will I now turn to consider the claimant's alternative ground of challenge to the validity of the 2011 Will, being that even if the deceased knew what he was signing, the 2011 Will was obtained by the undue influence of the first defendant. The burden of proving that the 2011 Will was procured by undue influence rests upon the claimant. It is not enough to prove that the facts are consistent with the hypothesis of undue influence. What must be shown is that the facts are inconsistent with any other hypothesis. The question, in the end, is whether in making his dispositions, the deceased acted as a free agent – Re Edwards [2007] EWHC 1119 (Ch) . In his Particulars of Claim, the claimant sets out his particulars of undue influence as follows. i) The deceased had a difficult relationship with the first defendant and there was a history of violence from the first defendant. On 5 May 2010, the deceased had given a witness statement to police in India, in which he stated that he had been attacked by the first defendant with a sword, broke the window of the car in which he was travelling, that the first defendant tied the deceased's arms and threatened to kill him by setting him on fire if the deceased did not give his land to the first defendant. The deceased managed to escape by jumping through a broken window. ii) This was the background to the deceased making the 2011 Will in August 2010. The 2010 will was drawn up by Murria Solicitors. iii) On 24 August 2010, the deceased signed a witness statement which set out his reasons for making the provision that he did in his 2010 Will. iv) The first defendant continued to take advantage of the deceased, in particular by living at 27 Booth Street such that the deceased could not live there and had to live with the claimant. v) The deceased was an alcoholic and therefore was weak and frail and susceptible to being unduly influenced. He was frightened of the first defendant and was liable to be bullied by him. vi) It is the claimant's case, therefore, that the 2011 Will was the result of actual coercion being applied to the deceased by the first defendant. That is the only reasonable explanation for the deceased's change of mind at a time when he was still not on good terms with the first defendant, and which he later suggested to the claimant he regretted, although the deceased was not very clear about what it was he was regretting. In the Defence and Counterclaim, it is asserted as follows: i) The deceased had a good and close relationship with the defendants. The first defendant and the deceased had lived together since 2003, and the second defendant lived with them from 2009 onward following her marriage to the first defendant in late 2008. The second defendant provided considerable care for the deceased. ii) Whilst there was a difficulty between the deceased and the first defendant in 2010, which the first defendant believes was caused by false allegations made about him by the claimant, the estrangement between the first defendant and the deceased ended in May 2012, when the deceased said he wanted to drop the allegations about the first defendant. The deceased returned to live with the defendants in or around August/September 2012 and resided happily with them until he was taken into hospital in 2014 shortly before his death. iii) It is denied that the first defendant was ever violent towards the deceased; he was acquitted of the allegations made against him in India. iv) The 2010 will was drawn up during the period in which the false allegations were being pursued. The defendant believes the claimant put pressure on the deceased to make the 2010 Will, and that once reconciled with the first defendant the deceased decided to revoke it and make the 2011 Will. In his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, the claimant asserted: i) It is not correct that the first defendant and the deceased lived together since 2003. The deceased only resided with the defendants for a few days in 2011 when he made the 2011 Will. When the deceased stayed in the UK he stayed with the claimant or at the temple or he would rent a room. When the deceased returned from India in 2010, he found the first defendant staying in his house and refusing to leave. ii) It is denied that the second defendant provided considerable care for the deceased. Indeed, in 2014, when the deceased arrived in the UK from India, he was arrested because of [the Criminal Complaint] (which the claimant believes was untrue). iii) The first defendant found and collected the deceased on around 18 December 2011 and took him to his home. The claimant believes that the first defendant typed up the 2011 Will, took the deceased to the community centre to have the 2011 Will executed and then threw the deceased out on or around 23 December 2011. In my analysis, there is no dispute that at the time of the 2010 Will the deceased and the first defendant's relationship had broken down, and as evidenced by the fact the deceased had raised very serious allegations against the first defendant in India. Therefore, I consider that the central factual issue that I must determine is whether or not the first defendant and the deceased thereafter reconciled. If they did, then that is consistent with the deceased having decided of his own free will to make the 2011 Will. However, if they did not reconcile, then that would be inconsistent with the deceased having decided of his own free will to make the 2011 Will. In seeking to resolve that particular factual dispute, the evidence of the claimant and the first defendant was tainted by untruths; i) The claimant said that the deceased only resided with the defendants for a few days in 2011 when the deceased signed the 2011 Will. Otherwise, when the deceased stayed in the UK he stayed with the claimant or at the temple or he would rent a room. However, the Police Investigation Report records that the deceased confirmed that at the time of the Criminal Complaint in 2013 he was living with the defendants at 27 Booth Street where the deceased "has a room within the house where he stays most of the time." ii) The first defendant said that the deceased returned to live with the defendants in 2012 and resided happily with them until he was taken into hospital in 2014, shortly before his death. However, the Police Investigation Report records that the deceased travelled to India following the Criminal Complaint, where he remained for eight months, before being arrested at the airport on his return to the UK in 2014 and then bailed to live with the claimant. On balance, I find that at the time of the 2011 Will, the deceased and the first defendant had reconciled for the following primary reasons: i) The judgment of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate in dismissing the second criminal complaint in India against the first defendant, recorded as follows: "During the course of evidence, prosecution examined… Pal Singh, complainant deposed that on 5 May 2010, at about 10.00 a.m., he was going to Anandpur Sahib in his car. When he reached a kilometre ahead of Malewal Petrol Pump, some unidentified persons tried to surround him and inflicted injuries on his person. He further deposed that accused present in the court neither inflicted any injury on his person nor tried to kidnap him. This material witness turned hostile and accordingly he was allowed to be cross-examined at the request of the learned APP for the State as he was suppressing the truth, but during his cross-examination also, nothing favourable to the prosecution came out. He also denied that he was deposing falsely in collusion with the accused……. Since the material witness, i.e. complainant Pal Singh.. did not support the case of prosecution at all and did not identify the accused in the court, the accused cannot be connected with the commission of offence alleged to have been perpetrated by him." It makes no sense the deceased would have given evidence at the criminal trial in support of the first defendant, and to such an extent that the prosecution treated the deceased as a hostile witness, if the deceased and the first defendant had not reconciled. (ii) As recorded in the Police Investigation Report, the deceased was living with the Defendants at 27 Booth Street in 2013 and where he had his own room. In conclusion, this is not a case where the court has any direct evidence of alleged undue influence. In my judgment, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not point towards undue influence in the making of the 2011 Will, but rather the other way. At the time of the making of the 2011 Will, the deceased and the first defendant had reconciled, and the deceased had returned shortly thereafter to live with the defendants at 27 Booth Street. In those changed circumstances, it is entirely understandable that the deceased would wish of his own free will to update his will and benefit the defendants and the claimant in equal shares. Although the deceased was clearly in poor health when he returned to the UK in 2014, the Police Investigation Report records that when living with the defendants in 2013, prior to his departure to India, his health was better, he was able to take care of himself, and he used to go out locally on the bus. The defendants produced at trial their passports, which showed that they had been in India up until a week before the 2011 Will had been executed, and so they would have been out of the country at the time that the deceased likely gave instructions to Ms Nijran. It was Ms Nijran's evidence, which I accept, that she did not take instructions from a testator if family members were present. Further, if true that the 2011 Will had been procured by undue influence, then why did the deceased not revoke it and make a new Will when free of any such undue influence? The Police Investigation Report records that the deceased left 27 Booth Street in June 2013 to travel to India before returning in February 2014 to the UK, when he was bailed to live with the claimant. The deceased died in June 2014. In short, the deceased was free of any undue influence from the first defendant for a period of some twelve months when he would have had the opportunity to make a new Will, if he so wished. The Police Investigation Report records that the deceased was considering making a new Will shortly before his death, but not to disinherit the first defendant but rather to benefit all four children, including his two daughters. The deceased made no report or complaint to the police that the 2011 Will had been procured by the first defendant through coercion or fraud. Indeed, and I repeat, the claimant himself did not commence these proceedings until some ten years after the deceased had died. In the interim, the claimant, by absenting himself from the Indian proceedings and by executing the specific power or attorney, sought to give effect to the 2011 Will, at least in relation to the Indian property and land. Again, the claimant's subsequent conduct is wholly inconsistent with any genuine belief on this part that the 2011 will was procured by undue influence. For all these reasons, this aspect of the claim also fails. Other matters The claimant did repeatedly raise at trial that the signature on the 2011 Will was not that of the deceased. However, the claimant failed, in breach of the order dated 12 September 2025, to make any application to amend his Particulars of Claim to allege that the 2011 Will is a forgery, and as a result he is debarred from raising such an allegation at trial. I decline to consider that allegation. In addition, I do not need to consider the cross allegations in relation to the 2010 Will and decline to make any determination as to whether or not it was procured by undue influence exerted by the claimant over the deceased. This is because the 2011 Will expressly revoked the 2010 Will in any event. Overall conclusion I uphold the validity of the 2011 Will and will make an appropriate declaration to that effect. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII