Durant v Financial Services Authority

Durant v Financial Services Authority

Most of the information sought by Mr. Durant was not his 'personal data' within the meaning of the Act, as it related to his complaints and the FSA's investigation, not to him personally. The FSA's manual files were not part of a 'relevant filing system' as defined by the Act, and the FSA's redactions were justified. The court's discretion under section 7(9) would not have been exercised in Mr. Durant's favour even if the primary issues had been resolved differently.

Parties
Appellant: Michael John Durant; Respondent: Financial Services Authority
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
08 December 2003
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From County Court to Court of Appeal
Outcome
Appeal dismissed
Legal Topics
Personal Data Definition, Relevant Filing System, Redaction of Third Party Data, Judicial Discretion Under Data Protection Act

Case Brief

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Parties

Michael John Durant

Appellant

Financial Services Authority

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal From County Court to Court of Appeal

  1. 1 What constitutes 'personal data' under section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998?
  2. 2 What is a 'relevant filing system' for the purposes of manual files under the Act?
  3. 3 When is it reasonable to disclose personal data that includes information about another individual under section 7(4)?

Ratio Decidendi

Most of the information sought by Mr. Durant was not his 'personal data' within the meaning of the Act, as it related to his complaints and the FSA's investigation, not to him personally. The FSA's manual files were not part of a 'relevant filing system' as defined by the Act, and the FSA's redactions were justified. The court's discretion under section 7(9) would not have been exercised in Mr. Durant's favour even if the primary issues had been resolved differently.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed

Orders

  • The appeal is dismissed.
  • The Respondent will only seek to recover counsel’s fees in the sum of £15,275 inclusive of VAT from the Appellant, but will limit recovery to £7,500 inclusive of VAT if the Appellant complies with the payment schedule.