Nadeem Manzoor v Tasurraf Shah & Ors

[2025] UKFTT 01451 (PC) REF/2023/0483 PROPERTY CHAMBER, LAND REGISTRATION DIVISION FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE FROM HM LAND REGISTRY BETWEEN Applicant NADEEM MANZOOR and (1) TASURRAF SHAH (2) ABDUL AZIZ (3) MAMOONA AZIZ (4) RENEE HILTON (all as trustees of the Ayup Sultan Trust, Charity No. 1143088) Respondents Property Address: 191 & 193 Waterloo Road, Blackpool FY4 2AE Title Number: LA622400 Before: Judge Laura D’Cruz Sitting at: Bradford Tribunal Centre On: 2nd & 3rd September 2025 Representation: Mr Israr Khan, of Ashwells Law LLP, for the Applicant; the First Respondent in person Key words: Alteration – forged TR1 – Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 DECISION 1. The matter that has been referred to the Tribunal is the Applicant’s application to alter the register to restore him as the registered proprietor of the property known as 191 & 193 Waterloo Road, Blackpool FY4 2AE, registered under title number LA622400 (“the Property”), pursuant to paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 to the Land Registration Act 2002 (“the Act”). The primary basis of the application is that the transfer of the Property dated 30th November 2013 (“the TR1”) is void as neither he nor Mr John Hamilton, the solicitor witnessing his signature, signed it. Introductory matters 2. The TR1 was purportedly from the Applicant to “Tasurraf Shah & Syed Hussain Shah as Trustees of Noor A Madina”. Noor A Madina is the former name of the Ayup Sultan Trust, a registered charity with Charity No. 1143088 (“the Charity”). Tasurraf Shah is the First Respondent and remains a trustee of the Charity. Syed Hussain Shah is her former husband, who was then a trustee but was removed in or around 2019. When I refer to the Charity, I am using it as shorthand for the trustees at that point in time. 3. 4. 5. 6. Both the First Respondent and Mr Shah were given notice of the Applicant’s application by HM Land Registry. The First Respondent objected. She was later directed to provide the names and contact details of the current trustees, leading to the Second, Third & Fourth Respondents being added as parties so that they are bound by the decision. I note that only the First & Second Respondent are named as trustees on the Charities Commission website, but the First Respondent explained that it needs to be updated. I also note that the Second & Fourth Respondents provided witness statements in support of the First Respondent, but neither gave oral evidence, and in any event their statements were of, at best, peripheral relevance. The final hearing was listed for May 2025 (an earlier date having been vacated due to the ill-health of a witness). However, for a variety of reasons, this was ultimately used as a case management hearing, which gave the Tribunal the opportunity to flag up a number of issues that had perhaps not been fully appreciated by the parties. One of these issues was the operation of Schedule 4 of the Act. The Applicant’s case on one level is very straightforward – the Applicant did not sign the TR1, the TR1 is void, the Property therefore remained his, and the register should be altered to restore him as proprietor. However, this overlooks the requirements for alteration contained in Schedule 4. The pertinent parts of Schedule 4 can be summarised as follows: (a) an application for alteration amounts to an application for rectification as it involves the correction of a mistake and prejudicially affects the title of a registered proprietor (paragraph 1); no alteration may be made without the registered proprietor’s consent in relation to land in his possession unless he has by fraud of lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made (paragraph 5); if the power to alter exists, the application must be approved, unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration (paragraph 6). (b) (c) 7. At the case management hearing, the Applicant’s solicitor confirmed that it was accepted the Property was in the possession of the Charity (though I note it is not being used pending these proceedings). Therefore, the Applicant is also required to prove either that the Charity has by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or that it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made. He also confirmed that the Applicant was alleging that the Charity had by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, more particularly that the First Respondent and/or Mr Shah are the perpetrators of forgery. 8. 9. Since the end of Mr Shah’s involvement in the Charity, and certainly for the purposes of these proceedings, it appears that the First Respondent is to all intents and purposes the face of the Charity. I explained that, if I was persuaded the signatures were forgeries, I would likely be persuaded there had been fraud or lack of proper care on behalf of the Charity, as the Charity is the beneficiary of the mistake. This did not mean I would have to find that the First Respondent was personally responsible for, or aware of, the forgeries, although that was a case the Applicant could pursue. I also drew to the parties’ attention that (a) I had looked at the Charity’s entries on the Charities Commission website (some of which were in evidence anyway); (b) I had become aware that Mr Hamilton currently has some conditions on his practice certificate; and (c) I would likely report my findings to the Charities Commission, if I found against the Charity, or the Solicitors Regulation Authority, if I made particular findings against Mr Hamilton. Evidence 10. I do not outline all of the evidence and arguments here, but only those that I consider necessary to explaining my decision. I will elaborate on this further later. 11. The Property is part of a row of shop units owned by the Applicant. In or around 2009/2010, there were discussions between the Applicant on the one part and the First Respondent and Mr Shah on the other about occupying the Property and other units either side for religious/charitable purposes. There is some dispute as to exactly when this was, whether the Charity was specifically mentioned at this stage, and whether the Charity’s ultimate intention to use it as a mosque was made clear, but nothing turns on these points. 12. The Applicant relies on a document evidencing an agreement in relation to the period from April 2009 to April 2012 (“the Licence Agreement”), which he says was agreed and produced prior to that period. The Licence Agreement states it was “made on the -------------------- Two Thousand and Nine to Two Thousand and Twelve” between the Applicant on the one part and the First Respondent and Mr Shah. It relates to 3 shop premises, known as 189-197 Waterloo Road (and so including the Property), to be used “for and as a shop for religion”. It is said to be “for the period of 48 months from and including the April 2009 to and including the April 2012” (it appears the dates are missing), even though that interval is only 36 months. The consideration was stated as £0.00, but with the licensee to pay all rates and utilities. The final licensee covenant is “Cannot evict before payment of property is made and then the property will go in to noor a madina strust”, even though that cannot properly be described as a licensee covenant at all. The copy in the bundle is signed by the First Respondent and Mr Shah but not the Applicant; the First Respondent accepted it was her signature, although she did not recall the document itself. 13. There are some issues with the Licence Agreement, for example in relation to the duration and covenants, and I note the First Respondent maintains that the Charity did not occupy the Property until 2010. However, the contents appear to be largely in line with both parties’ version of events: the arrangement was that the Property (and others) could be used for religious/charitable purposes rent-free whilst money was raised, the intention being that the Property (and others) would be sold to the First Respondent & Mr Shah/the Charity in due course. 14. The Charity occupied the Property as agreed. There are disputes over payments and obligations during this period: the Applicant avers that there were issues with the Charity failing to pay council tax, and that there were notices and fines relating to illegal constructions; the First Respondent avers that the Applicant, or more often than not people acting on his behalf, would visit the Charity demanding payments and/or that payments were made to bailiffs seeking to enforce debts relating to the period prior to the Charity’s occupation on the Applicant’s behalf. I will return to this as necessary later. 15. The next key step is that, towards the end of 2012, the Applicant on the one part and the First Respondent and Mr Shah on behalf of the Charity on the other agreed to a sale of the Property. This is evidenced by a sale agreement dated 12 th November 2012 (“the Sale Agreement”). 16. The Sale Agreement records the purchase price of £66,000, including a deposit of £25,000. The copy I have seen appears to have been signed by the Applicant on 5 th November 2012. The Agreement appears to have been exchanged on 12th November 2012, and it gives the completion date as also being 12th November 2012. 17. The Applicant and the First Respondent agree that the deposit was paid through their respective solicitors at the time of exchange, but that the balance of £41,000 was payable within 12 months, notwithstanding that this is not in line with the stated completion date. Neither side offered an explanation for this. 18. Mr Hamilton gave oral evidence at the hearing and confirmed the handwritten annotation to the top right of the first page was his annotation relating to the manner and time of exchange, meaning exchange using Formula B between himself and NK at 11.57, although he could not now recall who NK was. He explained that he was instructed to exchange and complete on the same date. He could not remember receiving the £25,000. When he was asked if he remembered the transaction, he said he remembered some parts – that he took instructions in respect of a notice to complete, but the seller was “quite a laid back chap”, there was “some connection”, and there were no instructions to enforce (or words to that effect). 19. The Applicant avers that he did not receive the balance outstanding and so the sale was never completed. It was only later, in 2018, that he came to discover that the Property had been registered in the name of the Charity, prompting him to report the matter to ActionFraud and ultimately to make this application. 20. The First Respondent avers that the balance was paid and the TR1 executed. The TR1 is dated 30th November 2013, so approximately one year after the Sale Agreement, largely in line with the agreed 12 months to pay (notwithstanding the completion date). 21. In relation to payment of the balance, she relies on a document entitled “Moneys paid towards purchase price of Masjid (193 Waterloo Road)”, which outlines payments between 2010 and 2014 said to total £101,000, including a cash payment of £40,000 on 12th November 2012, this being the supposed completion date. She also relies on various handwritten receipts, some of which show donations being made to the Charity and some of which purport to acknowledge the receipt of money by people acting on the Applicant’s behalf. There is considerable dispute between the parties as to these payments, this being the focus of much of the evidence. I note in particular that the Applicant accuses the First Respondent of fabricating some of the receipts. 22. In relation to the TR1, the First Respondent does not claim to have seen the Applicant or Mr Hamilton signing the TR1; she says that it was provided to her by her solicitors with their signatures already on it. I pause to note that no-one has been able to provide the relevant conveyancing files, but that is not surprising given the lapse of time. 23. The First Respondent accepts that the TR1 was not immediately registered. Her case is that the Charity’s occupation of the Property essentially carried on as before, including demands for and the making of various payments (her “Moneys paid” document suggests that over £15,000 was paid after the execution of the TR1). She says that, in around 2018, she left Mr Shah, who she accuses of domestic violence. She also says that she was feeling harassed by the demands for payment, looked into the ownership of the Property, and found that the TR1 had never been registered. She instructed solicitors to take steps to do this, and the Property was registered in the name of the First Respondent and Mr Shah as trustees of the Charity on 7 th August 2018. 24. There are a number of factual disputes between the parties. However, the key dispute is whether the Applicant signed the TR1 and/or whether Mr Hamilton witnessed him doing it and signed it himself accordingly. 25. I have reproduced the relevant part of the TR1 below. TR1 Excerpt 26. The First Respondent’s case is that this has been signed by the Applicant, and witnessed and signed by a JS Hamilton. The panel has, however, not been completed correctly. For example, it should state the name of the witness next to “In presence of”, and have their signature (rather than their name in block capitals) next to “Signature of witness”. Indeed, it is arguable that it does not in fact contain the signature of a witness at all. 27. The Applicant and Mr Hamilton both gave oral evidence at the hearing and both deny signing the TR1. Mr Hamilton particularly said that he would not have signed the TR1 in this way, he would have signed it in his own name rather than the name of the firm As outlined above, the First Respondent herself cannot speak to who signed it. There is no expert handwriting evidence in this case, neither side having sought permission to rely on any. 28. I note for completeness that Mr Tahir Mahmood, the Applicant’s uncle, also gave evidence. This largely related to the payments, the First Respondent alleging that many of the payments were made to him on the Applicant’s behalf, and that he had signed receipts, which was denied. The First Respondent also alleged that the Property, whilst it had been registered in the name of the Applicant, was owned beneficially by Mr Mahmood, which was also denied. Discussion 29. The Applicant’s case contains some bad points (for example, a denial that he was dealing with the Charity, even though the Sale Agreement specifies as much) and some good points (for example, the lack of documentary/accounting evidence in relation to payments). But really this case can be dealt with swiftly and without descending into all of these issues. 30. This is because, quite simply, I accept Mr Hamilton’s evidence. He attended trial to give oral evidence. He was straightforward. He was clear about what he could and could not remember (there is nothing surprising in the fact he could not remember the payment of £25,000, and I reject the First Respondent’s submission that this damaged his credibility). No reason was put forward as to why he might be lying. 31. 32. In addition, the signature panel itself is odd. It has not been completed correctly. The Applicant did not pursue a separate argument that the TR1 had not been properly executed for this reason, and I need not make any decision on that, but it seems to me it is relevant to my assessment of whether I accept Mr Hamilton’s evidence that he did not sign it. It seems to me unlikely that a qualified solicitor would have completed the panel in this way. Furthermore, the First Respondent’s evidence of payment of the balance is poor. Her case would have more credence if there were good evidence showing that the balance was paid prior to the TR1, but there is not. Even if I were to accept her own oral evidence and reject the Applicant’s contention that she has fabricated receipts, this is still not enough to persuade me that the balance was paid: she did not know who created the “Moneys paid” document; the receipts themselves are insufficient as they are not a complete set; and when she was asked about why payments were made from 2010 through to 2014, she was only able to make generalised statements that the payments were made towards the purchase of the Property and future purchase of other units, without, for example, being able to explain which payments related to which. 33. All of that said, in my judgment, the First Respondent was not a dishonest witness. She explained the circumstances of her relationship with and separation from Mr Shah, and how that left her with limited documentation. She recalled in some detail travelling to Oldham to sell gold in order to meet a demand for payment. It seems to me unlikely she fabricated documentary evidence, not least because the evidence in question is really quite poor: for a start it is incomplete, and in any event it presents much more as a rough and ready attempt by a small charity to try and keep records than paperwork that has dishonestly been created to mislead the Tribunal. Whether such a level of record-keeping is sufficient for Charities Commission purposes is not a matter with which I need to deal. 34. I have considered whether to make any further findings in relation to the payments (for example, what payments were made and what they were for), but, on balance, I have decided not to. It is not necessary for the purposes of making my decision. I am conscious that it is part of a much wider factual matrix: there may be issues over the parties’ respective rights and obligations in relation to the time during which the Charity was in occupation, and there are also the other neighbouring units to consider. I urge the parties to co-operate with any issues that remain outstanding following this decision, and record that I was pleased to hear the Applicant’s solicitor and the First Respondent indicating at the end of the hearing that they hoped to work together going forward. 35. My finding that Mr Hamilton did not himself witness a signature and/or sign the TR1 is itself enough for me to find that the TR1 is void. This means that the registration of the Property in the name of the Charity is a mistake. 36. I am also satisfied that the Charity has by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake. Someone has caused signatures to be placed on the TR1. It follows logically that that someone was acting on behalf of the Charity, as it is the Charity that benefits. I reject any suggestion that it was the First Respondent herself, although that was not in any event pursued with much force. Mr Shah is conspicuous by his absence in these proceedings, and there is of course the possibility that it was him, although I need not (and do not) make such a finding. 37. The final matter for me to consider is whether there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration. The First Respondent did not make any particular submission in this regard. I am not satisfied that there are. Conclusion 38. For the reasons given, I will direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the Applicant’s application dated 15th November 2022 as if the objection of the First Respondent had not been made. I will also arrange for a copy of the decision to be sent to the Charities Commission. 39. I turn to consider costs. Ordinarily, the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party: see rule 13(1)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and paragraph 9.1(b) of the Practice Direction. Costs are recoverable from the date of the references to the Tribunal, which in this case took place on 21st August 2023. 40. Here, that would mean an order that the First Respondent (as trustee of the Charity) pay the Applicant’s costs, unless there is some good reason to make a different order. I know of no reason why it would not be just to make the usual order in this case. 41. Any application for costs shall be made by 5pm on 9th December 2025 and shall include an estimate of the amount of costs sought. Further directions will then be given as appropriate. Dated this Tuesday 11th November 2025 Laura D’Cruz BY ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL 8