Phillips, R. v
The sentencing court retains a residual discretion to reduce sentences in cases of excessive delay, but is not obliged to do so; statutory provisions governing remand credit and recall are clear and must be applied; no injustice or breach of Article 6 ECHR occurred in these cases; disparity between co-accused is justified by differing recall status.
- Parties
- Appellant: Nathan David Phillips; Appellant: Ronan John O'Brien; Appellant: Kavel Kalychurn; Respondent: Crown
- Jurisdiction
- England and Wales
- Judgment Date
- 13 February 2015
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Appeal / Judgment
- Outcome
- appeals dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Consecutive and Concurrent Sentences, Remand Credit, Delay in Sentencing, Recall on Licence, Article 6 ECHR
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Nathan David Phillips
Appellant
Ronan John O'Brien
Appellant
Kavel Kalychurn
Appellant
Crown
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether sentencing courts have discretion to reduce sentences for recalled prisoners due to delay and loss of remand credit
- 2 Whether delay in sentencing constitutes a breach of Article 6 ECHR
- 3 Whether disparity in actual time served between co-accused amounts to injustice
Ratio Decidendi
The sentencing court retains a residual discretion to reduce sentences in cases of excessive delay, but is not obliged to do so; statutory provisions governing remand credit and recall are clear and must be applied; no injustice or breach of Article 6 ECHR occurred in these cases; disparity between co-accused is justified by differing recall status.
Court Disposition
appeals dismissed
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