Rollins, R. v

Rollins, R. v

The FSA has the power to prosecute offences beyond those referred to in sections 401 and 402 of FSMA 2000, including offences under sections 327 and 328 of POCA 2002, by virtue of its common law right of private prosecution, which is not excluded by FSMA 2000 or any other statute.

Parties
Respondent: Regina; Appellant: Neil Rollins; Appellant: Michael McInerney
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
09 October 2009
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Preparatory Hearing and Application to Discharge Restraint Order
Outcome
Appeals dismissed
Legal Topics
Prosecutorial Powers of the Financial Services Authority, Money Laundering Offences, Private Prosecution, Interpretation of Statutory Powers

Case Brief

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Parties

Regina

Respondent

Neil Rollins

Appellant

Michael McInerney

Appellant

Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Preparatory Hearing and Application to Discharge Restraint Order

  1. 1 Does the Financial Services Authority (FSA) have the power to prosecute offences under sections 327 and 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002)?
  2. 2 Are the FSA's prosecutorial powers limited to those offences expressly provided for in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000)?
  3. 3 Is the FSA entitled to bring private prosecutions for offences outside FSMA 2000?

Ratio Decidendi

The FSA has the power to prosecute offences beyond those referred to in sections 401 and 402 of FSMA 2000, including offences under sections 327 and 328 of POCA 2002, by virtue of its common law right of private prosecution, which is not excluded by FSMA 2000 or any other statute.

Court Disposition

Appeals dismissed

Orders

  • Rollins' appeal dismissed; judge's ruling upheld.
  • McInerney granted leave to appeal but substantive appeal dismissed; refusal to discharge restraint order upheld.