UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC v Enterprise Rent-A-Car (UK) td [2025] EWHC 2317 (Ch) (11 April 2025)

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 2317 (Ch) Case No: BL-2025-MAN-000006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN MANCHESTER BUSINESS LIST (ChD) 11th April 2025 B e f o r e : HIS HONOUR JUDGE PEARCE ____________________ Between: UK & EU CLAIM LAWYERS LLC Claimant/First Respondent - and - ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR (UK) LIMITED Defendant/Applicant (2) PAUL RHYS HUTCHINSON (3) PHILIP SIMON HUTCHINSON (4) DEBT RECOVERY & ENFORCEMENT LTD Respondents And between PHILIP HUTCHINSON Claimant - and – ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR (UK) LIMITED Defendant And between PHILIP HUTCHINSON Claimant - and – ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR (UK) LIMITED Defendant ____________________ Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd 291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG Tel: 020 7269 0370 legal@ubiqus.com ____________________ NO APPEARANCE by or on behalf of the Claimants/Respondents MR JAMES MALAM appeared on behalf of the Defendant/Applicant ____________________ HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED ____________________ Crown Copyright © HHJ PEARCE: This is my judgment on the application that is before the Court. The defendant in this case seeks various orders, the upshot of which would be the striking out of four claims brought against it, as well as making associated declarations that matters are totally without merit. In due course, the defendant has indicated that it will seek a civil restraint order, but it accepts that, partly through a shortage of time and partly through the desirability of in particular Mr Philip Simon Hutchinson having notice of exactly what is being sought, the issue of the making of civil restraint orders should be dealt with on another day. The claim raises serious issues which involve allegations that Mr Hutchinson has been involved in a concerted attempt to defraud Enterprise through the use of court procedures. it is alleged he has similarly used court procedures to attempt to defraud Canada Goose, a well-known brand of clothing, as well as an airline, Wizz Air. As I indicated during the course of this hearing, it has come to my attention that there is another outstanding claim by Mr Hutchinson against Banco Santander where for all I know (although I do not know much of the detail of that claim) similar allegations may arise. The public interest in the matters that are before this Court have reflected themselves in various ways. In the first instance, I having had some considerable involvement in this case, have been involved in contacting those responsible for money claims online and the Civil National Business Centre whose processes, it might appear, have been abused. I have been in contact with the designated civil judge for the online court, HHJ Ranson, and I have been in contact with HHJ Berkley sitting in Bristol who has dealt with the Canada Goose case. There has been a considerable amount of information brought before the Court, much of it appearing at very short notice. Indeed, a number of the matters that I shall refer to have only become apparent during the course of today and further investigations have taken place. It is, in my judgment, appropriate that a transcript of this judgment be obtained at public expense so that the judgment can be readily shared with other judges who have to deal with cases involving similar issues and the same or some of the same parties as well as those responsible for the processes of the Civil Courts, especially the online parts of the Civil Court. My understanding is that the particular issue that has caused difficulty in this and at least one other case has already been attended to in respect of money claims online, but nevertheless it will undoubtedly be helpful for those involved in the processes of of those courts to have the best overview of what has gone on. I am much obliged to Mr Malam of counsel who has addressed me on a series of issues today and who has responded to points that I have raised that might be argued on behalf of those responding to this application of Mr Hutchinson and who has carried out additional research as necessary. The background to this claim is as follows. Enterprise Rent-A-Car is a well-known vehicle hire company with branches around the country. In November 2023, Mr Philip Hutchinson hired a van from Enterprise's Winchester branch. When he returned the van there was some cardboard left in the rear of it. The volume of rubbish was too great to fit inside Enterprise's bins within the branch, so their manager placed the rubbish outside of the bin area. The following morning the rubbish had been removed. It transpired that it had been removed by the local council who believed it had been fly-tipped. It would seem that the rubbish removed must have identified Mr Hutchinson because the local council indicated that they wished to interview him about the allegation of fly-tipping. In the event, the material before me indicates that no such interview took place nor was any legal action taken against Mr Hutchinson. Nevertheless, it would appear to be this event which has formed the basis for the majority, if not all, of the four cases that are before the court today. Mr Hutchinson himself issued particulars of claim against Enterprise in September 2024. The particulars of the claim state: "Our client was investigated for fly-tipping. Enterprise made admission it was their mistake after having to buy business class round-trip tickets from Dubai to attend interview under precaution at a police station. Also had to instruct a lawyer to represent me, costs which exceeded £10,000. I must pass this cost on to you since it was all your fault this happened." That claim was issued in the Online Civil Money Claims Court. Judgment in default was entered in that claim against Enterprise. Enterprise accepts that it was properly served with those proceedings and that it failed to deal with them. Hence the judgment entered against it was a regular judgment and the defendant, Enterprise, seeks to set aside the judgment. I shall come back to that point in a moment. Bailiffs attended Enterprise's premises at Heathrow Airport in December 2024 and that forced Enterprise to pay the judgment sum plus costs. Pursuant to an order I made, those monies are now frozen and in due course Enterprise seek their return. The second claim with which I am concerned is one issued by a claimant called PUCC Limited. PUCC Limited brought its claim by proceedings issued in the Civil National Business Centre which led to judgment being entered against Enterprise. In the box completed by the Claimant "What is the claim for?" the following is stated: "Additional compensation following a fly tipping incident in Winchester whereby we incurred legal fees and travel expenses relating to possible criminal proceedings against a staff member due to the mistake you admitted to. No response following any pre-action protocols, however openly admitted the debt based on a phone call with the area manager of Enterprise." The sum claimed there is £10,000 plus court fee of £455.00 and solicitors' costs of £100. That judgment has not been satisfied and indeed a consent order has been lodged, purportedly signed on behalf of PUCC Limited, consenting to the judgment being set aside and that claim being struck out. As yet that has not been resolved, and it is one of the matters before the Court today. On 20 January 2025, an entity called UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC issued a claim. The particulars of the claim state: "Damages claim on behalf of a client. The claimant claims interest under section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984 at a rate of 8% a year from 17 January 2025 to 18 January 2025 of £300 and also interest at the same rate up to the date of judgment or earlier payment at a daily rate of £9,999.99." A fourth claim has recently come to light under number 571MC260. That is a claim issued in the money claims online portal by Mr Hutchinson against Enterprise for the sum of £10,000. The claim is stated before "CMC-Monies Owned." I am told that claim has been transferred to the County Court in Romford. It has become apparent as I have indicated already that there have been other claims brought apparently by Mr Hutchinson or people related to Mr Hutchinson. The first I deal with is what has been called the Canada Goose claims. In proceedings in the Circuit Commercial Court in Bristol under number CC-2025-BRS-000002, HHJ Berkley sitting as a judge at the High Court at Bristol Civil Justice Centre on 24 February 2025, was asked to transfer proceedings into that court and to make orders preventing enforcement of claims in three matters brought against Canada Goose. HHJ Berkley made an order on 24 February 2025 and then had a further hearing on 6 March 2025. By the time of that order HHJ Berkley had in front of him a quantity of material including a witness statement from Mr Hutchinson. It is not clear to me that HHJ Berkley consented to that witness statement being used for purposes beyond the particular proceedings in front of him. It seems to me highly unlikely that he would have done so had he been asked to do so. It is, as I indicated during submissions, a discourtesy to him not to have asked his permission, though I make clear that I have no reason to think that that discourtesy is in any way the fault of those who appear in front of me today. In any event, the witness statement is significant material that I ought to bear in mind, not least because it purports to exculpate Mr Hutchinson, essentially his case being that, apart from one of the claims against Canada Goose, he himself is the victim of fraud by an impersonator who has used his name, details relating to him and details relating to his company to attempt a fraud on Canada Goose. HHJ Berkley's order of 6 March 2025 records that the respondents, who include Mr Hutchinson, did not attend the hearing and were not represented at the hearing. He found three claims, the so-called original claims, and a further series of claims, the so-called remaining claims, of which there are I think nine in total, to be (I quote from the preamble to his order) "probably or highly likely to be fraudulent claims." He found the claims to be totally without merit, and he found that one of the respondents, Taylor Trauthoff, had made two or more claims in those proceedings which were totally without merit. He made a civil restraint order in respect of her and made various other orders. Separately to that, it is apparent that proceedings were brought against two incarnations of the budget airline Wizz Air, namely Wizz Air Hungary Limited and Wizz Air UK Limited. I have before me a copy of the order of Murray J, which was made on 4 April 2025, one week ago. That follows the granting of injunctive relief by Fordham J on 24 January 2025 against a series of claimants, including Mr Philip Hutchinson and Mr Paul Hutchinson, who would appear as the brother; Ms Taylor Kralkoff as the third claimant, and I note as the sixth claimant, Debt Recovery and Enforcement Limited; as the ninth claimant, PH Property Group Limited and as the sixteenth claimant, UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC. The preambles to Murray J's orders set out the history of matters that are before the Court, and record as the final preamble to the order: "Upon the Court finding on the evidence there is strong prima facie evidence that the Hutchinson claims and the Schedule 2 claims are all fraudulent." Murray J set aside judgments made on the so-called Hutchinson claims and required the Hutchinson claimants, as they are called, which include Mr Philip Hutchinson, to repay a sum of £219,983.13. He made a series of associated orders, including a freezing injunction against the Hutchinson claimants. That, then, is the background to matters as they come before this Court. The first matter that I deal with is the question of service. The defendant's case is that it has served all of the parties against whom it seeks orders in this case at an address Office 4, Unit C, Hubert Road, Brentwood, CM14 4JE. That is an address which is linked to the various parties against whom orders are sought in the following ways. In respect of Mr Hutchinson himself, and the claim that he brings, his address is not given as Office 4, Unit C, it is a different address from Hubert Road, but his solicitor is given as PH Property Group Limited, Office 4, Unit C, Hubert Road, CM14 4JE. The address also appears as Mr Hutchison's address on a Companies House filing for Debt Recovery and Enforcement Limited, a company of which he is said to have been appointed as CEO on 20 April 2024. There is some slight puzzle about the documents from Companies House insofar as they also record him as resigning as a director on that date, but I note that the difference there may be between being CEO and director. In any event, the defendant's position is that, in respect of claims brought by Mr Hutchinson, either he has given his solicitor's address and his solicitors at PH Property Group Limited, so proper service is on them at Office 4, Unit C, the address stated in the claims form on the original Hutchinson claim; or that this is an address that he has given as a director upon which he can properly be served pursuant to section 1140 of the Companies Act 2006. I am satisfied that Mr Malan is correct and that Mr Hutchinson can be served for any purposes at that address having regard to the terms of section 1140(3) of the Act. I should add also that in the latest claim, the money claims online case 571MC260, the court file reveals that Office 4, Unit C, Hubert Road, Brentwood is the address which Mr Hutchinson has apparently given for himself. Thus, it would seem in any event to be his last known residence and address upon which he could properly be served. In the claim brought by PUCC, that gives a different address for the claimant, but the name and address for payment on the judgment of the claim, by acceptance to which I shall come in a moment, is given as Office 4, Unit C, Hubert Road, Brentwood, CM14 4JE. Thus, that would appear to be an address given for service in that claim. I should add that in the claim form, the solicitor is stated to be Debt Recovery Enforcement, again of the Office 4, Unit C address. Again, the solicitors' costs were claimed implying that that is a solicitor whose name and address had been given for service. If in fact PUCC Limited were not a solicitor such that, in spite of the fact they have been stated to be such, they could not be named as a solicitor properly. I note also from paragraph 6(b)(viii) of the witness statement of Mr Pugh dated 20 March 2025, that that is the registered office of the claimant PUCC Limited, so any which way Office 4, Unit C is a proper address upon which the company PUCC Limited could be served. In respect of UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC, the claim form is available. That shows an address 20-22 Wellock Road but again gives an address for sending documents and payments if different as Debt Recovery and Enforcement, Office 4, Unit C, Hubert Road, Brentwood, CL14 4JE. That is an address given for service. Service at that address is, in my judgment, clearly valid service. The material in the bundle before me shows that my previous orders and the materials relevant to this application have been served at the address given. I find, therefore, that there is good service in all claims. Those who instruct Mr Malan have sought to contact Mr Hutchinson by two means today, an email address that he has used before and a phone number that has been provided. Neither have led to his successfully being contacted but, in my judgment, on the material before me, Mr Hutchinson knows of the hearing today and his non-attendance is through choice rather than ignorance of the hearing or any other inability to attend the hearing. That then takes me to the various applications that are before the Court in respect of the claims. I start off dealing with Mr Hutchinson's own claim, the original claim brought by Mr Hutchinson, the one in which a default judgment was entered. As I have indicated it is conceded by the defendant in any event, that this is a regular judgment and therefore the application proceeds by way of application to set aside judgment on the basis of a prompt application in a case where the defendant says it can show that it has a real prospect of success in defending the claim. The evidence put before the Court by the defendant is to the effect that although Mr Hutchinson may have been troubled by being contacted by the relevant Local Authority in respect of an allegation of fly tipping, no doubt something that one would wish had not happened, nevertheless it cannot be the case that he has incurred any significant expense as a result of that, still less the alleged cost of travelling from Dubai for an interview, given the defendant's evidence that no such interview took place and therefore no such travel would have been required. In those circumstances, and in light of draft defence put before the Court, I have no hesitation in saying that the defendant shows a real prospect of success in defending the claim. The application set aside was made within 10 days of the defendant being aware of the judgment. This judgment ought to be set aside on conventional grounds. The second claim brought by Mr Hutchinson ending in number MC260, is one where on the material before the Court there is no evidence that judgment has been entered. Given that this material was obtained today, it seems to me unlikely that judgment had been entered in that case and, therefore, there is no order that needs setting aside. I turn then to the position in respect of the claim brought by PUCC. What has happened in this case, and this is where particular concern has been raised about the online court system, is that PUCC Limited entered judgment on what is, in the terms of money claimed online, called an "acceptance" for a sum of £10,610. As I have indicated, the defendant has filed a consent order, signed purportedly on behalf of PUCC Limited, consenting to this judgment being set aside and consenting to the proceedings being struck out. I was not minded to make that order on the previous occasion without Mr Hutchinson and/or PUCC having an opportunity to make submissions to the Court because it appeared that it might be the case that Mr Hutchinson would argue that the consent order was a further act of somebody seeking to impersonate him or impersonate his company PUCC Limited and that, therefore, he should have an opportunity to advance that argument. He has not advanced the argument and hence this Court is left in the position of considering whether this judgment ought to be set aside, given the defendant's clear and unequivocal evidence that he did not accept the claim brought by the claimant. The problem that has arisen in online money claims is that an acceptance of this kind can be filed by the claimant without any proof that the defendant has consented to the order being made or accepted the liability within the case. As I have indicated that problem has, I am told, been put right but it has been the cause of difficulties in several cases. The first and by no means straightforward issue that arises in respect of setting aside this judgment is whether it is a judgment that cannot be set aside procedurally in this kind of way but rather requires fresh proceedings to be brought for it to be set aside. The defendant seeks to rely on CPR 3.17 for the set aside for which it contends. Rule 3.17 gives the power in the court to make an order revoking or varying an order. The potential difficulty that Mr Malan has rightly flagged up is the limited power that the Court has to vary or revoke a final order. Interim orders are more easily revoked or varied under CPR 3.17, but the principle of finality in court orders has led to a series of cases where the Court has had to consider whether the power of CPR 3.17 can be revoked to vary what is called a final order. I am satisfied that the judgment that is entered here is a final order in this sense. I say that because it is an order, it seems to me, which gives rise to an issue estoppel unless and until it is set aside then it is not open to the defendant to dispute that it is liable to PUCC for the sum that is claimed. In the case of Terry v BCS Corporate Acceptances Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2422 , Hamblen LJ, as he then was, said at paragraph 72: "The circumstances in which CPR 3.1(7) can be relied upon to vary or revoke an interim order are limited. Normally, it will require a material change of circumstances since the order was made, or the facts on which the original decision was made being misstated. General considerations such as these will not, however, justify varying or revoking a final order. The circumstances in which that will be done are likely to be very rare given the importance of finality." Terry was a case involving a default judgment and as has been pointed out, default judgments carry with them their own procedural code under CPR Part 13. Indeed, it may properly be the case that what Hamblen LJ was speaking of in Terry was the particular context of setting aside a default judgment, not the broader context of setting aside any procedural judgment that may be the subject of challenge. In this regard, my attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [2022] UKSC 16 , which points to an approach in which there may be a rather broader exercise of a discretion, even where the result of a variation in order might be to infringe the so-called finality principle. As Lord Briggs and Lord Sales say in paragraph 39 of the judgment of the Court: "The question is whether the factors favouring re-opening the order are, in combination, sufficient to overcome the deadweight of the finality principle on the other side of the scales, together with any other factors pointing towards leaving the original order in place." My attention was also drawn to the interesting case of UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 99 dealing with anti-suit injunctions, albeit that I am not persuaded that the particular context of that case is able to add very greatly to the jurisprudence which is summarised by the Master of the Rolls in his judgment at paragraph 20, involving, as it does, consideration of Terry , AIC and of the judgment of Lewison LJ in Vodafone . In my judgment, it would be an affront to justice if a party or a person were able to forge an acceptance or untruthfully assert that a defendant had accepted a liability to obtain a judgment and then to argue that that judgment could not be set aside under CPR 3.17. True it is that the setting aside of this judgment does inevitably have weighed against it the fact that it offends the finality principle. However, where that finality is obtained through what must seem to be the bare fraud of asserting the admission of a claim where that claim had not been admitted, thereby bypassing all of the procedures of the court, I have no hesitation in concluding that the Court's wide discretion, albeit one to be exercised with caution under CPR 3.17, permits of the setting aside of the order. The evidence here is all in one direction that this claim was not an admitted claim. The evidence from the Canada Goose and Wizz Air cases suggests that some of the parties who were named in this claim have been involved in similar allegations in respect of other claims. In any event, it would seem that the PUCC claim is a direct overlap with one if not both of Mr Hutchinson's claims. In my judgment, this is clearly a judgment that ought to be set aside. I turn to set aside in the UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC claim. The first issue in this case is who the claimant is said to be, since it is entirely unclear whether that is a body that is said to have any legal personality. In any event, like the PUCC claim, this is a claim made on a purported acceptance where the defendant's evidence is that it did not admit the claim. As with the PUCC claim, the claimant has been given the opportunity to file any evidence that the defendant had accepted the claim. It has not done so. This, however, is perhaps an even more stark example of an apparent abuse of the procedures of the court. The amount claimed in the claim for Wizz Air as I have indicated already is £300, together with a court fee of £35 and legal representatives' costs of £50, a total of £385. The claim includes a claim of interest at the rate of 8% a year from 17 January 2025 to 18 January 2025, that is to say one day, on the figure of £300 at a daily rate of £9,999.99. That is an absurd claim that makes no sense at all. It is a claim in the claim form which gets translated to a judgment for £100,067.99 for debt and interest to the date of the judgment, together with £140 for legal costs. The same issue arises in this case as arises in respect of the PUCC claim as to whether to the Court has the power to set aside the judgment for the same reasons I indicated in respect of the PUCC claim. In my judgment, the Court clearly does have that power. Furthermore, the circumstances in respect of this claim are even more stark than those in respect of the claim brought by PUCC for reasons that I have given already. That then deals with setting aside judgments, such as the position is now that there is no judgment against the defendant on any of the four claims. The next application that I consider is the application to strike out the claims. These will be essentially dealt with by the Court of its own motion because of the developing nature of the case and because the application as formulated before the Court originally did not anticipate necessarily seeking such orders. However, in my judgment, there is powerful evidence here that there is a scheme in which PUCC Limited, Debt Recovery and Enforcement, plus or minus the word "Limited" in its name, PH Property Group Limited, UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC (if that is in fact a legal person) and Mr Philip Hutchinson have engaged a scheme which is based in the fraudulent abuse of the processes of the Court and which has successfully led not only to the obtaining of judgments but in respect of one of those judgments to the enforcement of the judgment, even though the underlying claim lacks merit. In those circumstances, the Court should look very seriously at striking out the cases concluding that they are an abuse of the process of the Court as part of a coordinated attempt to disrupt the Court's process and cause harm to the defendant. I have borne in mind that the respondents to this application, and most particularly Mr Hutchinson, who on the face of it seems to be the moving spirit behind the various other bodies who engage in this case, is not here to explain himself. On the other hand, he has been served, and he has had the opportunity to do so. Indeed, insofar as acceptance was said to have been filed or made by on behalf of the corporate defendants, a specific direction has been made for the provision of proof that that is so. None of the respondents to this application have engaged with the process of the Court. The claim in particular by UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC is ridiculous for reasons that I have indicated already. It should be added that there is another technical, but by no means insubstantial, point to be made in that case, which is that UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC appears to be claiming damages on behalf of the client rather than any loss that it has suffered. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that each of the claims before the Court is one which is an abuse of the process of the Court, and which ought not to be allowed to continue. It is open to any of the respondents to this application to argue that the order that I have made ought to be set aside on grounds that the proceedings took place in their absence, albeit that if, as I found, they were indeed served with the applications, that may not be without its difficulty. However, given the draconian nature of the order that I am making, I will give an express liberty to apply to set aside or vary the order that I make today in order to enable the respondents, even at this late stage, to come before the court if they wish to do so and argue that their claims were genuine and that those claims ought not to be the subject of a strike out. That then takes me to the question as to whether there are before the Court claims and/or applications that are totally without merit. As I have indicated already, any question as to civil restraint order will not be dealt with today, giving the respondents an opportunity to attend on the next occasion with, in light of the transcript of the judgment, an opportunity to see what it is that I have had to say. However, it should, in my view, be the case that the Court at this stage addresses the question as to whether any of these matters are totally without merit. In considering whether an application or claim, as the case may be, is totally without merit, I bear in mind the test applied by the Court of Appeal in the R (Wasif) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR, where at paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Court of Appeal sets out the relevant test, in particular repeating the words of Maurice Kay LJ in the case of R (Grace) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1 WRL 3432: "No judge will certify an application as TWM unless he is confident after careful consideration that the case truly is bound to fail." Mr Malan has been deliberately and rightly cautious, as to what it is that he contends to be totally without merit, but of the claims before the Court he contends that the claim by Mr Hutchinson under number 571MC260 (issued through the portal) and the claim by UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC under claim number (now) BL-2025-MAN-000006 are totally without merit. In the first case that is in light of knowledge from the court file that the claim is "CMC-Monies owed." That is clearly a wholly inadequate particularisation of the case. I have no hesitation in concluding that a claim for monies owed with no further particularisation totally lacks merit. In the case brought supposedly by UK & EU Claim Lawyers LLC, he makes several points: the claim is ridiculous in amount; the judgment was obviously one that could not be obtained; it is, in any event, a claim brought by a body that appears not to have any legal personality. In my judgment in all respects Mr Malan's points were well made. That is a claim which clearly and obviously on any test is totally without merit. I should note in respect of the other two claims before the Court, the first claim in Mr Hutchinson's name, issued though Online Civil money Claims, does at the very least appear to arise out of a true incident in which he might say that he was the subject of a wrong, even though for reasons that I have indicated already, it is a claim which in the circumstances appears to be pursued as a part of an attempt to take advantage of court procedures as against the defendant. Given that the claim arises out of genuine circumstances, it is at least possible that there is some true and genuine underlying claim there, even though I have struck out the claim as it has been put before the Court. I accept and indeed agree with Mr Malan's formulation that the Court cannot say that claim was totally without merit. As to the PUCC claim that looks suspiciously like an exact copy of the claim brought by Mr Hutchinson originally in his own name but as Mr Malan rightly concedes that is not necessarily the case. Strike out there arises on the back of a concession by PUCC that the claim ought to be struck out and in those circumstances it seems to me I could not properly say that that claim is without merit. That then leaves the question of whether or not any applications that have been made are totally without merit. I confess to having been a little troubled by the question as to whether the filing of an application or the filing of an acceptance, such that judgment by acceptance is granted, truly amounts to an application within the meaning of CPR Part 3 and the Practice Direction thereto dealing with civil restraint orders. I have indicated to Mr Malam that there are obvious reasons of policy why such a request of the Court might be treated in the same way as an application, and I have pointed out during the course of submissions that default judgment is often obtained on a request. However, Mr Malan has stated that he has not been able to find any reported cases as to whether a request that is totally without merit is dealt with in the same way as an application that is totally without merit. I can see powerful arguments as to why it ought to be, but rather than reach a conclusion on that issue at the end of what has been a long court day, given that issues are going to be adjourned in any event, I shall put that matter over to the next occasion for consideration at that stage. That concludes my judgment on the issues before the Court. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII