R v Sarkaut Yasen

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION [2025] EWCA Crim 452 No: 202300741 B1 Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Friday, 17 January 2025 Before: LORD JUSTICE COULSON MR JUSTICE GOOSE MR JUSTICE FOXTON REX V SARKAUT YASEN __________ Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd, Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court) _________ Mr R Wright KC appeared on behalf of the Appellant. Mr D Brooke KC appeared on behalf of the Crown. _________ J U D G M E N T LORD JUSTICE COULSON: Introduction 2 4 This is a case in which the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply. That means, under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. For the purposes of those watching online, can I make plain that that is not an empty form of words. It is a warning which has a legal effect. If anyone is in breach of that warning, they will be in contempt of court and I will send them to prison. The appellant is now 39. On 7 February 2023, in the Crown Court at Leeds before His Honour Judge Phillips QC ("the judge") and a jury, the appellant was convicted of one count of trafficking within the UK for sexual exploitation, (Count 12), and three counts of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring rape, (Counts 13 to 15). On 4 April 2023, he was sentenced by the judge to a total of 15 years' imprisonment. The appellant's grounds of appeal raise three separate issues. Ground 1 submits that the judge should have allowed the appellant's application of no case to answer at the end of the prosecution case. On 18 October 2024, the full court granted the appellant permission to appeal on Ground 1. In addition, the appellant raises two other grounds of appeal. Ground 2 is that the judge was wrong to exclude evidence of a previous incorrect identification made by Complainant 1 of another subject of a police investigation. Ground 3 is that the judge failed properly to direct the jury in relation to the confusion regarding the Red Shop, a location referred to in some of the evidence. The full court did not grant permission to appeal on those two grounds, but indicated that an application for permission to raise those grounds could be made at this hearing. We have had the benefit this morning of lucid submissions on behalf of the Crown by Mr David Brooke KC, (who appeared at trial), and Mr Richard Wright KC for the appellant, (who did not). We are very grateful to both of them for their careful analysis of the issues. It should be explained that appeals of this sort involve a large amount of paperwork, and skeleton submissions prepared by both counsel. We have read and been hugely assisted by those documents. It is unnecessary for counsel to repeat them during oral arguments, but they are a critically important part of the appeal process. That will be seen now, when we set out in some detail the relevant facts involved in this appeal and the issues which arise from them. The Relevant Facts 6 The case against the appellant was investigated as part of Operation Tourway, which involved allegations of grooming, sex trafficking and sexual abuse of three young women between 2002 and 2012 by a number of Kurdish/Iraqi men in South and West Yorkshire. Six of the appellant's co-accused were convicted at this or at a separate trial. In respect of two more, when the jury in this case could not agree, a retrial was ordered and they were subsequently convicted. A ninth and final co-accused was acquitted on one count, and no evidence was offered at the retrial in relation to the other count against him. The case against this appellant involved one of the three complainants, whom we shall call Complainant 1. Her story, sadly, is all too familiar. She was born in 1990. Aged about 13, in foster care and playing truant from school, she began to drink and take drugs. She met two Kurdish man, ‘Alan’ and Sergei, (also known as Savigan Ali). Their first meeting took place close to the bus station in Dewsbury. Sergei lived for a while at 47 Hanover Gardens in the Westtown area of Dewsbury. At a Social Services planning meeting on 11 February 2005, Complainant 1 described ‘Alan’ as her boyfriend. Complainant 1 was raped by both men and others at the location in Hanover Gardens. Complainant 1 referred to an incident where she was taken to Wakefield to have sex with other Kurdish/Iraqi males. She said that she remembered one man, "That kind of clung to me and he ended up taking me." It was the Crown's case that this was the appellant. He drove her to a flat in Wakefield and the men there had sex with Complainant 1. Thereafter, she said that the same man drove her to Sheffield, and she recalled the journey both there and indeed back, the journey back being memorable because it was slow due to heavy traffic on the motorway. In the flat in Sheffield, Complainant 1 was again forced to have sex with the men there, and that included anal sex. Thereafter, the same driver took her back to Dewsbury. It was established that this particular driver was only involved on this one occasion, and the period covered by the indictment against the appellant was between 25 June 2024 and 9 June 2005. The Identification Evidence Generally 9 In her first interview, which took place on 17 May 2016, Complainant 1 had said that she probably would not recognise the driver, given the 12 year gap between the offending and the interview. However, at a second interview the following day, she said she probably would recognise him. In her third interview, she described him as being Kurdish, a, "short dude with black hair" and that he was, "dead skinny, dead thin". She said he was shorter than her. She was 5 foot 3. On 11 December 2018, Complainant 1 attended a series of VIPER identifications, one of which featured the appellant. She positively identified the appellant as the man who drove her to Wakefield, on to Sheffield, and then back to Dewsbury. After the identification procedure, she said, "That were a difficult bunch, weren't it?" That was because of the similarity of the faces. She also said she was sure that the appellant had longer hair at the time of the offences. There was other evidence, (to which we refer in greater detail below), concerning the appellant's own links to Dewsbury, Wakefield and Sheffield during the period of alleged offending. The appellant denied the allegations against him, saying that Complainant 1 had mistakenly identified him as the man responsible. He said that he had never met Complainant 1, had not taken her anywhere, and that he knew nothing about the offences of rape which she alleged. He accepted that he had lived at addresses in both Dewsbury and Sheffield. He accepted that he had been skinnier when he was younger and would sometimes be clean shaven. He was 5 foot 8 inches tall. He accepted his hair was longer between 2008 and 2010. In this way, in relation to the case against the appellant, the essential issue for the jury was whether they were sure that Complainant 1 had correctly identified him as the man responsible for taking her to the flats in Sheffield and Wakefield where other males had forced her to have sexual intercourse with them. 11 The Judge's Ruling and Summing - up in Relation to the Identification Evidence (i) Incorrect VIPER Identification 14 Earlier in the trial, the judge had ruled as inadmissible evidence of an incorrect identification by Complainant 1 of another man in an investigation which was separate from and unconnected to the ten defendants in this trial. Subsequently, counsel for the appellant discovered the case of R v Stewart [2012] EWCA Crim 2488 and asked the judge to review that decision. The judge provided a written ruling, in which he carefully considered the Stewart case, and then explained in some detail how and why it was of no assistance in the present case. He concluded that: "The fact of one incorrect identification in relation to a suspect who is not suggested to be connected to the incidents being considered by this jury is, in the circumstances, not of relevance to the reliability of her identification of those defendants that she has identified in the present case." (ii) Ruling on the Submissions of No Case To Answer 15 On the 31st day of the trial, numerous defendants made applications of no case to answer. The judge rejected those applications and again produced a written ruling that we have seen. In respect of the counts against the appellant, who was one of those who made the application of no case, the relevant paragraphs of the ruling are paragraphs 15, 16 and 17. 17 The judge identified that the appellant's application was based on the submission that the identification evidence was poor, inconsistent, and unsupported, and was of insufficient quality for the case to be allowed to remain before the jury. The judge set out the particulars relied on by counsel in support of that submission. These included: (i) Her confusion over the circumstances in which she said she met the driver, a point linked to the alleged confusion about the connection between the appellant and the Red Shop in Dewsbury; (ii) Her evidence that at the time of the offending she was "too heavy on drugs" and said "drink, it was getting out of hand," so that her VIPER identification must be regarded as unreliable; (iii) Her inaccuracy as to the appellant's height and weight. The judge then set out the Crown's detailed response to that submission, which explained how and why the identification evidence could properly be left to the jury. These included: (i) Her evidence that she saw the driver over many hours in daylight and at close quarters, and that given what happened to her at the time she had every reason to remember the events of that day; (ii) Her evidence that she was not so affected by alcohol on the day in question to have been unable to have recognised her trafficker, and that in any event her evidence as to being generally affected by drink and drugs would be a matter for the jury; (iii) The identification had circumstantial support, particularly in respect of various locations in Dewsbury, Wakefield and Sheffield. The judge accepted the Crown's submissions and therefore dismissed the application of no case to answer. (iii) The Summing-Up The judge gave detailed directions about the identification evidence in his summing-up to the jury. Those directions, which were given in writing and then gone through with the jury orally, can be found in the transcript between page 7E and page 9B. He first set out the potential weaknesses in that evidence, which included the alleged confusion in relation to the Red Shop. He then set out the evidence that was capable of supporting the correctness of Complainant 1's identification. No criticism is made of that part of the summing-up. In our view, it was a full and fair summary of the relevant matters for the jury to consider in respect of Complainant 1's identification of the appellant. Mr Wright fairly accepted that it was indeed a reliable summary of the evidence for and against the accuracy of the identification. His point, he said, was that the matter should not have been left to the jury at all. 20 As to the case for and against the appellant in respect of Counts 12-15, the judge summed up the relevant evidence in considerable detail between page 57G and page 83F of the transcript. At the end of that part of the summing-up, when the jury had withdrawn, counsel then appearing for the appellant asked if the judge would remind the jury of certain other questions and answers relating to the Red Shop, describing the Red Shop as going "to the heart of the defence case". The judge declined, saying that he had already reminded the jury about the position in relation to the Red Shop, and had specifically told them that there was admitted confusion about it. He said that that was sufficient, and he declined to say any more on the subject when the jury returned for the subsequent parts of the summing-up the following week. The Appeal Against Conviction: Ground 1 21 Ground 1 (the ground in respect of which permission to appeal was granted), asserts that the judge erred in failing to allow the submission of no case to answer. The arguments that we have heard this morning, and those which are set out in the written documents, amount to a more detailed rerun of the arguments made before the judge on the 31st day of the trial. It is for this court to stand back and form a view as to whether the identification evidence was so flawed and inherently unreliable that the judge erred in law in concluding that it could be left to the jury. Separately, it is for this court to consider whether the appellant's conviction is, or could be, unsafe. It is necessary to examine these hurdles which the appellant must clear in order for the appeal to succeed in a little more detail. In our view, it is a relatively difficult task for a suspect who has taken part in and been identified during a VIPER procedure, (which is not itself criticized), to persuade a judge that, despite that, the identification evidence is so weak that it should not even be left to the jury. That is particularly so where, as here, this is not a fleeting glance case, where the witness in question would have only had a brief moment to identify and recognise again the suspect. This is also a case, as we shall come on to, where there is at least some other supporting evidence for the identification. Some at least of these difficulties might be said to be compounded on appeal, because this court has to defer to the trial judge's detailed knowledge of the evidence, the background, the context, and all he had heard over the preceding 30 days of the trial. Mr Wright set about his task with not only his customary skill but with conspicuous fairness. We have given anxious consideration to the points raised in relation to Ground 1, but we have concluded, for the reasons that we will give, that the appellant cannot surmount that relatively high hurdle. 23 We begin with the elements of the identification evidence which suggested, perhaps even quite strongly suggested, that Complainant 1's identification of the appellant was correct. First, as we have already noted, Complainant 1 picked the appellant out during a VIPER identification procedure, notwithstanding that it had been 12 or 13 years since she had seen him. The photograph used in the procedure had been taken in 2005. The complainant was, she said at one point in her evidence, “100 per cent sure” that it was him. No point was taken concerning the propriety of the VIPER procedure itself. It is fair and right to note that skilled cross-examination elicited a slightly less confident assessment, that Complainant 1, "did not think" that she had misidentified the appellant, but at no stage did she herself express any doubt about the accuracy of her identification. 26 28 It was suggested that because Complainant 1 had described the faces that she had been shown as, "a difficult bunch," meaning that they all looked very similar, the identification was not reliable. To the extent that that submission was maintained this morning, we reject it. Indeed, we consider that the fact that the faces were all similar, and that therefore identification was difficult, demonstrates that the identification procedure was properly prepared and undertaken. The point underlines, rather than undermines, the strength of Complainant 1's identification; notwithstanding the similarities of the faces she was looking at and her readiness to acknowledge that fact, Complainant 1 was still able to pick out the appellant, who was not a volunteer but a suspect. Second, Complainant 1 got a number of other things broadly right before she had even taken part in the identification procedure. She had always said that the driver on the day in question was Kurdish. The appellant is Kurdish, from northern Iraq. She said he was in his 20s. The appellant was aged 19 to 20 at the time of the offending. Thirdly, there was evidence about a particular location, at 47 Hanover Gardens in the Westtown area of Dewsbury. Complainant 1 gave detailed evidence as to her abuse there at the hands of Sergei and Alan, the men who she said had introduced her to the appellant. Other evidence demonstrated not only that Sergei and Alan lived at 47 Hanover Gardens in 2005, but also in 2005, the appellant had provided his address as being at Tweedale Gardens. Tweedale Gardens is just round the corner from Hanover Gardens in Westtown. That therefore provided circumstantial support for Complainant 1's identification of the appellant. Fourthly, Complainant 1 gave evidence as to the location in Sheffield where she had been abused by the men in the gang. The appellant had, for part of the period covered by the indictment in 2004, registered his address at a flat in Sheffield, where he was recorded as living for eight months. The appellant had given that address when stopped by the police while driving in Sheffield in January 2004. When police attended at that address, they found official documents confirming the appellant's identity and address. Notwithstanding some differences, Complainant 1's general description of that location was broadly consistent with the evidence about the block of flats where the appellant had lived at the relevant time. Again, that provided circumstantial support for her identification. In his interview, the appellant had said he could not say if the Sheffield address sounded familiar, and he denied knowing where the address was, evidence which the prosecution challenged as untrue on the basis of the evidence linking the appellant specifically to that Sheffield address. Fifthly, there was the unidentified location in Wakefield where Complainant 1 was abused, which was again an area where the appellant was shown to have connections. He said he had only visited Wakefield occasionally, but there was evidence that he had been stopped by the police in three different locations in Wakefield in 2005 and early 2006. We would suggest that it was obviously unlikely that he was stopped by the police on every occasion that he visited Wakefield. Again, therefore, that went to provide at least some further support for the identification. 30 When taken together, the location evidence showed that the appellant lived very close to one relevant location, possibly at or close to a second location, and visited the general area of the third relevant location. Circumstantial though such evidence was, it is impossible to say that it was properly to be ignored altogether, particularly in its cumulative effect. 31 Accordingly, we consider that this was a case where, on the face of it, the direct identification evidence was relatively strong and where the circumstantial evidence supported that identification. So why does the appellant argue that there was no case for him to answer? First, it is said that the circumstances of the original identification, (in other words on the day of the offending), were ‘difficult’. Reliance is placed on Complainant 1's general evidence that during the period covered by the indictment, she was often intoxicated with drink and drugs. 33 On analysis, however, we do not accept that the circumstances of the identification during the relevant day were ‘difficult’. Of course, the drink and drugs with which Complainant 1 was plied meant that her general recollection of this traumatic time was never going to be as sharp as someone who was sober throughout, but she had expressly said in her evidence that on the day in question she was relatively sober. Moreover, we are bound to note that Complainant 1 spent a good deal of time with the driver, going to three different locations -- Wakefield, then Sheffield, then back to Dewsbury -- during daylight hours, journeys which would have taken some time in normal conditions and one of which, the last from Sheffield back to Dewsbury, she said took a long time because of traffic on the M1. Complainant 1 therefore had plenty of time to take a good look at her trafficker in good light and conditions. So this was the polar opposite of what is regularly referred to as a ‘fleeting glance’ case. 35 In our view, at most, the question of intoxication was a matter that went to the weight and reliability of Complainant 1's identification evidence, and therefore was classically matter for the jury. Secondly, the appellant relies on the fact that Complainant 1 had said that he was shorter than her (she was 5'3"), when he was in fact 5'8". That error as to his height was a weakness in her identification evidence, and a point that the judge properly made to the jury in his summing-up. In the round, however, we consider that this was a relatively small point, given Complainant 1's identification of his face, and the fact that when he was driving he would have been sitting down, making the assessment of height at any rate more difficult. It also appears that Complainant 1 made the same mistake about Sergei's height. All of this goes, we consider, to weight, and was properly left to the jury. 37 Thirdly, Complainant 1 said that at the time of the offending the driver had been very skinny. The appellant argued that since he was no longer skinny, that could not be a reference to him. He accepted, however, that he had been, "very skinny compared to now". He relied on a photograph, he said taken at the time, which showed that he was not particularly skinny, but we do not think that that can possibly lead to a conclusion that this matter should have been withdrawn from the jury, even taking into account all of the other points. On one view, the jury had evidence that the driver was skinny, and the appellant accepted that he had been skinny at the time of the offending. It does not undermine the identification. Fourthly, to the extent that Complainant 1 associated the appellant with the Red Shop, the appellant said that that was plainly wrong, because the Red Shop only opened (on the site of the previous shop) a year or so after the period covered by the indictment. It is said that this too demonstrates the unreliability of her identification, and may have even contaminated, because she may have linked her recollection of the men involved, including the appellant, with the Red Shop. 38 We deal separately with the arguments about the Red Shop under Ground 3, but it is sufficient now for us to say that in our view, the appellant's submissions based on Complainant 1's alleged association between the appellant and the Red Shop have been, and were at the trial, exaggerated. Complainant 1's general evidence about the Red Shop was always rather confused, and her specific evidence about it, when properly analysed, did not make any direct link between the appellant himself and the Red Shop. More importantly for present purposes, any confusion about, say, when the Red Shop opened is immaterial to the strength or otherwise of the identification evidence given by Complainant 1. The precise circumstances in which a vulnerable teenager came to meet one of the many associates of this grooming gang is wholly irrelevant to the accuracy or otherwise of her positive identification of him 13 or 14 years later. For those reasons, we do not agree that the evidence about the Red Shop contaminated in any way Complainant 1's identification evidence. For all those reasons, we consider that Ground 1 should be rejected. The judge properly considered all those matters when considering the application of no case to answer. He concluded that, properly directed, the matter should be left to the jury. We consider that he was right about that. Whatever the flaws in the identification evidence, its strengths meant that it was plainly something which had to be considered by the jury. The judge then properly directed the jury on those very strengths and weaknesses. In those circumstances, we consider that this case falls well short of the sort of case where a judge as a matter of law has to direct the jury that there is no case to answer because of the inherent weaknesses in the identification evidence. Accordingly, we refuse Ground 1 of the appeal. The Renewed Application for Permission To Appeal in General 40 As we have said, there are two further grounds upon which the appellant does not have leave, but in respect of which permission to appeal is sought today. Ground 2 is that the judge wrongly refused to admit evidence of a previous incorrect identification by Complainant 1. Ground 3 is that the judge did not properly sum up the evidence in respect of the Red Shop. During the course of the oral submissions this morning, Mr Wright made succinct submissions on Ground 2, and as to Ground 3, he referred to the written submissions that had already been produced on behalf of the appellant. We deal with both grounds in detail in deference to all of the material that we have read on these two issues. Ground 2: The Previous Incorrect Identification The submission is that on another occasion, and in relation to a wholly different suspect, Complainant 1 incorrectly identified a volunteer on one of the numerous identification parades that she attended. So it is said that the evidence of that unrelated error should have been admitted so as to demonstrate what the appellant says is Complainant 1's potential unreliability as an identification witness. We have already referred to the judge's ruling on that issue and his refusal to admit that evidence. 42 We start by noting that when granting leave on Ground 1, the full court said about Ground 2 that they thought that the appellant, "would have a steep uphill struggle" on Ground 2. We respectfully agree with that. On our analysis, this point is not arguable. 44 46 First, the fact that on another occasion, when looking for a completely different person, encountered at a different time and in different circumstances, Complainant 1 identified a volunteer and not a suspect is irrelevant to the reliability of her identification of this appellant in these circumstances. Every identification is different, because the circumstances surrounding it will always be different. There may be numerous reasons why someone in the position of Complainant 1 picked the wrong person in that particular parade. For example, it might have occurred in just the sort of circumstances which are the opposite of this case, namely where there was no more than a fleeting glance. The error in another case says nothing at all about the reliability of Complainant 1's identification of the appellant in this case. It is, as we say, irrelevant. Secondly, it was submitted that the evidence of the mistake should have been admitted to show the truth in the maxim that even honest witnesses can make identification mistakes. We do not accept that submission. Juries are expressly told in every summing-up where identity is in issue that honest witnesses can make mistakes. That is a standard direction. It is not a direction that requires evidence to support it, particularly not evidence in relation to a different suspect seen in different circumstances. Thirdly, we note that the argument had originally been put by reference to the decision in Stewart. For completeness, we consider the judge was right to distinguish Stewart, and therefore, on the basis of the argument that he had, right to dismiss the application. Finally, we note the point made by Mr Brooke to the judge, and again repeated to us today, about overall figures. Although the judge did not have regard to it, it seems to us that it is of some relevance because we consider it to be another reason why the judge was right to reject this evidence. Complainant 1 attended numerous VIPER parades. There were a total of 35 suspects in those parades. Complainant 1 was able successfully to identify 32 out of those 35. If the appellant had been able to rely on one of those three unsuccessful identification parades, the Crown would have been entitled to respond by relying on all the successful identifications. The debate would then have become hopelessly mired in satellite issues. The jury had enough to deal with in this case without having to consider all of those additional issues. That again explains why, as a matter of pure case management, the judge was right to exclude the evidence of the incorrect identification. For those reasons, therefore, we consider that there is nothing in Ground 2. We do not grant permission to appeal on that ground. Ground 3: The Red Shop 49 The complaint is that the judge failed in his summing-up properly to direct the jury about Complainant 1's ‘confusion’ relating to the Red Shop and how and why this undermined her evidence against the appellant. We have considered that point carefully. However, we have also concluded that that point, too, is not arguable. In essence, the case advanced on behalf of the appellant is that Complainant 1 associated her knowledge of the appellant by reference to the Red Shop close to Dewsbury Bus Station. The point was made, both at the trial and in the written documents for this appeal, that since the Red Shop did not open until about 2009/2010, outside the period covered by the indictment, this undermined the reliability of Complainant 1's evidence. There are a number of reasons why we do not agree with that. First, we consider that on analysis, the evidence of Complainant 1 did not make any express connection between the appellant and the Red Shop. In her first interview, she said she came to know these men originally in the vicinity of the bus stop, which is where she had first met Alan and Sergei. In her third interview, she accepted she might have been confused when had she earlier mentioned the Red Shop, (perhaps because it was subsequently opened in the same area, close to Dewsbury Bus Station). But she never identified any specific link between the appellant and the Red Shop. Instead, she was very clear that the link came through Sergei, because he had subsequently worked at the Red Shop. 51 During that third interview, when Complainant 1 referred to the Red Shop, she was aware that the shop opened later than the period what she was primarily recalling. So when it was put to her that she went to the Red Shop at the time of the abuse, she said, "No, that were more recent, that's why I know that he [Sergei] works there now". Subsequently, during the trial, she was cross-examined about the Red Shop. Complainant 1 then said: "I only know that the ginger man [Sergei] served me in the Red Shop when I went there. That's the only connection to the Red Shop that I know of." She confirmed on a number of occasions that she did not meet any of the men who raped and abused her at the Red Shop. She repeatedly said that the only connection was with the man with red hair, Sergei. 53 55 In cases like this, where the police are investigating and the witnesses are giving evidence about events that happened a long time ago, some confusion and uncertainty can be inevitable. Mr Brooke accepts that he inadvertently added to that confusion when in his opening he referred to Complainant 1 saying in interview that she visited the Red Shop at the relevant time. On our reading of the interview, she did not say that, and Mr Brooke accepts that that was his misunderstanding, again potentially arising from the coincidence that the Red Shop subsequently opened in the area by the bus station where Complainant 1 had first met these men. The judge was plainly obliged to identify Complainant 1's admitted confusion in relation to the Red Shop and to summarise at least some of the evidence in respect of it. We accept Mr Wright's word used this morning, that there was a certain amount of "fluidity" about the evidence about the Red Shop. So it was something that clearly the judge had to remind the jury about. But we consider that that is what he did. He made a specific reference to the confusion about the Red Shop in his legal directions concerning the weakness of the identification evidence, and he referred specifically to Complainant 1's evidence about the Red Shop in the summing-up at pages 60, 62, 70 and 72. The further questions and answers about the Red Shop that were raised with the judge in the absence of the jury after he had summed up that evidence seemed to us to add nothing new. They only repeat that Complainant 1 had been confused on this point in interview. Moreover, it is arguable that at least one of the questions was based on a false premise, referring to something that Complainant 1 had allegedly said in interview which she had not actually said. In any event, the judge was quite right to say that there was no purpose in making any further references to the evidence on an issue which had already been fully covered in the summing-up. So the position is this: the case for the appellant had made much of, perhaps too much of, the alleged confusion about the Red Shop, and why Complainant 1's reference to it undermined her evidence. The judge had properly accepted that this was a matter that had to be included in both the legal part of his summing-up and in his summary of the evidence as a matter which potentially undermined the reliability of Complainant 1's identification. The judge fulfilled that task. The judge was not obliged to set out every last bit of evidence on every last point; see R v Reynolds [2019] EWCA Crim 2145. We consider that the summing-up of all of these matters was balanced and fair. No further expansion or repetition was required. For those reasons, therefore, we do not accept that Ground 3 of the proposed appeal is arguable, and we do not give permission for it. Conclusions 57 Accordingly, we have concluded that the judge dealt fully and fairly with each of the three points upon which reliance is now placed in the grounds of appeal. For the reasons that we have given, we reject each of those grounds. We are satisfied on the papers that we have read and the submissions that we have heard that the appellant's conviction is safe. The appeal on Ground 1 is dismissed. The application for permission to appeal on grounds 2 and 3 is refused. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk