Lynch v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 882 (8th November, 2001)
Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 does not conflict with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The reverse onus is justified, proportionate, and within reasonable limits, given the public interest in deterring the carrying of knives and the fact that the defendant is proving something within his own knowledge.
- Citation
- [2001] EWHC Admin 882
- Parties
- Appellant: Stuart Lynch; Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
- Jurisdiction
- England and Wales
- Procedural Posture
- Appeal by Way of Case Stated / Divisional Court Judgment on Appeal From West London Youth Court
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Reverse Burden of Proof, Possession of Offensive Weapons, Presumption of Innocence, Compatibility With European Convention on Human Rights, Interpretation of Statutory Defences
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Stuart Lynch
Appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Appeal by Way of Case Stated / Divisional Court Judgment on Appeal From West London Youth Court
Legal Issues
- 1 Does section 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 impose a probative burden on the defendant incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights?
- 2 Should section 139 be read under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to impose only an evidential burden?
Ratio Decidendi
Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 does not conflict with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The reverse onus is justified, proportionate, and within reasonable limits, given the public interest in deterring the carrying of knives and the fact that the defendant is proving something within his own knowledge.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed
Orders
- Certification of point of law granted
- Permission to appeal to House of Lords refused
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
Sign in to read
Sign in to read the full judgment text
Sign in to read the full judgment text. Downloads and additional research tools may depend on your plan.
Sign in to read the full judgment