ASHLEY JUDITH DAWSON-DAMER v TAYLOR WESSING LLP

ASHLEY JUDITH DAWSON-DAMER v TAYLOR WESSING LLP

Paragraph 10 of Schedule 7 to the Data Protection Act 1998 should be interpreted purposively to include all documents in respect of which Grampian would be entitled to resist compulsory disclosure in Bahamian proceedings. It is not reasonable or proportionate for TW to carry out the necessary search to determine privilege, and the real purpose of the subject access requests was to obtain information for Bahamian litigation, which is not a proper purpose under the Act.

Parties
Claimant: Ashley Judith Dawson-Damer; Claimant: Piers Dawson-Damer; Claimant: Adelicia Dawson-Damer; Defendant: Taylor Wessing LLP; Defendant: Michael Morrison; Defendant: James Burns
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
06 August 2015
Procedural Posture
Application Under Section 7(9) of the Data Protection Act 1998 / Judgment on Application
Outcome
application dismissed
Legal Topics
Subject Access Requests, Legal Professional Privilege, Disclosure Between Trustee and Beneficiary, Relevant Filing System, Discretion Under Data Protection Act
Data Protection Trusts and Equity Civil Procedure Subject Access Requests Legal Professional Privilege Disclosure Between Trustee and Beneficiary Relevant Filing System Discretion Under Data Protection Act

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Parties

Ashley Judith Dawson-Damer

Claimant

Piers Dawson-Damer

Claimant

Adelicia Dawson-Damer

Claimant

Taylor Wessing LLP

Defendant

Michael Morrison

Defendant

James Burns

Defendant

Procedural Posture

Application Under Section 7(9) of the Data Protection Act 1998 / Judgment on Application

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether Taylor Wessing LLP failed to comply with subject access requests under the Data Protection Act 1998
  2. 2 Whether legal professional privilege exempts disclosure of documents sought
  3. 3 Whether the manual filing system qualifies as a relevant filing system under the Act

Ratio Decidendi

Paragraph 10 of Schedule 7 to the Data Protection Act 1998 should be interpreted purposively to include all documents in respect of which Grampian would be entitled to resist compulsory disclosure in Bahamian proceedings. It is not reasonable or proportionate for TW to carry out the necessary search to determine privilege, and the real purpose of the subject access requests was to obtain information for Bahamian litigation, which is not a proper purpose under the Act.

Court Disposition

application dismissed