TH v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS Heard at The Priory Courts, Birmingham On 28 September 2026 Before FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LE GRYS Between TH (ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE) and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Representation: For the Appellant: For the Respondent: Mr K. Kola, Home Office Presenting Officer Mr R. Ahmed, instructed by Shawstone Associates

DECISION AND REASONS

DECISION 1. The appeal is dismissed.

REASONS Appellant Respondent 2. The Appellant, who claims to be a citizen of Eritrea, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 13 May 2024 to refuse his protection claim made on 14 November 2023. As such, sections 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION 3. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because this is a protection appeal and the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (“UK”) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice in the particular circumstances of the case. © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026 Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024

BACKGROUND 4. 5.

6. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS, and includes a stitched bundle (the “SB”) of 593 pages. Any references in this decision to page numbers will be to the PDF page. The Respondent’s decision summarises the Appellant’s immigration history and asylum claim. In short, the Appellant claims to be at risk as a Pentecostal Christian who left Eritrea illegally, and who will be considered a draft evader. The Respondent does not accept that the Appellant is Eritrean, and instead asserts that he is Ethiopian.

HEARING Preliminary issues 7. The Appellant was assisted throughout the hearing by an Amharic interpreter. Both confirmed that they fully understood each other and no issues were raised in respect of the interpretation. Issues in dispute 8. At the outset, I clarified the issues with the representatives. The following was agreed: (a) The Appellant’s claim, taken at its highest, is advanced for the Convention reasons of religion and political opinion, and the treatment he claims to fear would amount to persecution. (b) The Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of an earlier claim, made on substantially the same basis, was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Barker in a decision promulgated on 14 December 2021. Judge Barker found that the Appellant was, on the balance of probabilities, Ethiopian. (c) If the Appellant is credible in his claim to be Eritrean, the Respondent does not dispute that he would be at risk there. Likewise, if the Appellant is not found to be credible in his claim to be Eritrean, he does not advance a positive case as to why he would be at risk in Ethiopia. In short, the appeal turns on the issue of nationality. (d) The Appellant does not rely on Article 8 as a standalone matter, and this accordingly stands or falls with the protection appeal.

9. The following issue is in dispute: (a) Whether the Appellant is credible in his claim to be a national of Eritrea. Evidence Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024 10. I heard evidence from the Appellant, who adopted his witness statement of 8 January 2025 as his evidence examined. I heard closing submissions from both parties. I reserved my decision. chief and was cross in - - -

LEGAL FRAMEWORK 11. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to section 32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities: (a) Does the Appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them? (b) Does the Appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?

12. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that: (a) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and (b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the Appellant.

13. I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the Appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the Appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.

14. A person may be granted humanitarian protection where they do not qualify as a refugee but substantial grounds exist for believing that, if returned to their country of origin, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm; that they are unable, or owing to that risk unwilling, to avail themselves of the protection of that country; that they cannot reasonably relocate internally; and that they are not excluded from humanitarian protection.

15. In respect of Article 3, the burden of proof is on the Appellant to show a breach to the lower standard of proof, that is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ or ‘real risk.’ Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3; in accordance with Bouyid v Belgium (Application no. 23380/09) and AA (Morocco) [2025] EWCA Civ 144, this will depend on all the circumstances of the case. If the Appellant establishes substantial grounds for believing that expulsion would violate Article 3, then the burden shifts to the Respondent to dispel any serious doubts.

16. Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 confirms that expert evidence must be considered in the round, alongside the totality of the evidence. There is no prescribed order in which different categories of evidence must be addressed, provided that the overall assessment is holistic and properly reasoned.

17. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 it was restated that there is no requirement for an Appellant to adduce corroborative evidence. However, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024 value. Supporting documentary evidence is not required where the requirements of paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules are met. Where those requirements are not met, a judge may take into account the absence of supporting documentary evidence which might reasonably be expected.

18. As per Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, documentary evidence should be appraised in the light of the evidence about its nature, provenance, timing and background evidence and all the other evidence in the case.

19. In Devaseelan 2002 UKIAT 00702 it was said that, where an appeal follows an earlier appeal on substantially the same issues, the first Tribunal’s determination stands as an assessment of the claim the Appellant was making at the time of that determination. It is not binding on the second Tribunal but the second Tribunal is not hearing an appeal against it. There will be occasional cases where the circumstances surrounding the first appeal were such that it would be right for the second Tribunal to look at the matter afresh.

FINDINGS 20. I have taken account of everything I have heard and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round. I shall refer to the evidence and submissions so far as necessary to explain my findings and reasons. Appeal on asylum grounds 21. As this appeal follows an earlier claim made on substantially the same basis, it is helpful to begin by summarising the previous findings. This is not intended to be a comprehensive record, and I have taken into account every part of that decision, even if not referred to here. In short, Judge Barker found: (a) The Appellant’s accounts were “littered with inconsistencies, and are vague in any real detail” (at [29], SB537). For example, he initially claimed to have been educated to 6th grade, to have worked as a labourer in Eritrea, to have a wife called [HM], born in 1995, who was either born or living in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and said that he had spent 17 years living in Ethiopia (at [30]) before travelling to Sudan and Libya. In his next account, however, he was educated to 4th grade, never worked in Eritrea, and his wife was [HD], an Eritrean national (at [31]). He now claimed to have left Eritrea in 2002, not 1998, and said he had never even visited Ethiopia (at [32]). The differences in the accounts were “stark” (at [33]). (b) While the

Appellant’s representative invited the judge to find that there were interpretation issues, there was no evidence of such issues, nor had the Appellant taken the opportunity to check the recordings of the interviews and provide his own translations. The nature of the discrepancies, such as whether he lived in Ethiopia for 17 years or had never been there, left no obvious room for such error (at [34]). The Appellant himself never raised such issues (at [35]). (c) There were further discrepancies in the Appellant’s account about his wife which “sit oddly with the rest of the Appellant’s claim.” This included that the date of birth he gave for her was inconsistent with the age he gave in his witness Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024 statement, while another date of birth, given in his asylum interview, made the discrepancy even greater (at [37]). (d) The Appellant’s corrections to his screening interview came only after the Appellant had given his first substantive interview, and some of the comments he made in the second substantive interview were themselves inconsistent with the corrections (at [38]). (e) While the Appellant’s apparent lack of knowledge about Eritrea might be attributable to the young age at which he claims to have left, this did not explain an inconsistency relating to the church he claimed to have attended in Sudan (at [39]). Furthermore, his lack of knowledge

about Sudan was seemingly inconsistent with his claim to have lived there for 16 years, as was his inability to speak any language other than Amharic (at [40]). Indeed, his language skills amounted to another area of inconsistency, for example in respect of whether he could speak or understand Tigrinya. His account was “inconsistent throughout, giving the impression that he is trying to fit his account to the evidence that is put to him” (at [41]). (f) The Appellant claimed in respect of documentation not to have “anything at hand.” When asked to expand on this, he said it was “something that could be with his mother”, something the judge found to be “very odd” given that he claimed his mother died in 2005. The Appellant also gave a “vague and contradictory account” as to how he proved his identity in Sudan (at [44]). (g) The Appellant travelled through Italy, France, and Belgium on route to the UK. His credibility was damaged by his failure to provide a sufficient explanation for not claiming asylum earlier (at [46]). (h) Even to the lower standard, the Appellant had not shown that he was Eritrean (at [47]). Furthermore, it was a situation where there was really only one alternative, such that the judge was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant was in fact Ethiopian (at [49]).

22. I accordingly take these findings as my starting point and turn to the evidence said to provide sufficient basis to depart from them. In particular, the Appellant relies on his purported birth certificate, said to show his place of birth in Eritrea and nationality as Eritrean (SB550); a purported death certificate for his father, said to show that his father was also Eritrean (SB547); and supporting letters said to be from individuals including his wife (SB553); his former landlady in Eritrea (SB35); and the person said to have sent the documents to him (SB45). He also relies on two expert reports from John Birchall, said to confirm the authenticity of birth and death certificates.

23. I find, however, that this new evidence is significantly undermined, such that I attach very little weight to it. This is for a number of reasons.

24. First, there are a number of significant discrepancies and inconsistencies on the face of the documents themselves, and within the supporting letters. For example: (a) The death certificate for the father states that he died in 2013. The Appellant had provided a witness statement in 2021, however, in which he stated his father “was Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024 in the army. He is still in the army” (SB368). When asked to account for this, he said that when he had left Eritrea, his father was still in prison, and so that was all he knew. When asked why his first statement did not, therefore, say this, but instead was unambiguous in asserting that he remained in the army in 2021, he said that he had known he was a soldier. (b) The Appellant’s wife gives her name as [HD]. The evidence of the person said to have sent the documents to the Appellant, however, says that she is called [LD]. (c) The person who sent the documents to the Appellant calls himself [ME]. The Appellant, however, described him in his written and oral evidence as [MA] (for example, at [4], SB29), as does the Appellant’s wife. (d) ME calls the Appellant “my very close friend”. The Appellant’s oral evidence was, however, that ME was his wife’s friend, who he only came to know when he sent the documents. (e) ME states that the Appellant married his wife in July 2022. By that time, however, the Appellant was in

the UK. (f) ME states that the wife “came to Sudan from Ethiopia”. The Appellant’s oral evidence was that his wife went straight to Sudan from Eritrea. (g) ME referred to the Appellant’s wife not having an identity card in Sudan, but states that he has sent her Eritrean citizenship documents “as requested”. No such Eritrean ID card was provided within the bundle; instead, there is what is described as a “non-skilled workers ID card”, which makes no reference to nationality (SB556). Furthermore, certain details on the card are clearly incorrect, for example “employee’s phone and address” is followed by a date. (h) [HA] states that the Appellant’s mother had previously rented her house, and left behind some of their possessions, which [HA] was then able to locate in February 2022. The Appellant’s evidence, however, is that he left Eritrea in either 1998, or 2002. It was accordingly unclear as to why [HA] had kept documents relating to a previous tenant for over 20 years, particularly given that she describes having moved herself in the meantime. While the Appellant attributed this to [HA] recognising the importance of the documents, her written account is that she “discovered” the birth certificate, and she does not otherwise suggest that she was intentionally keeping it safe.

25. The Appellant sought to explain many of these inconsistencies as being no more than an issue with the translations, and claimed that the originals showed something different. This explanation rather overlooks the fact, however, that the translations were provided by the Appellant himself. He was unable to explain why the documents had been served if they seemingly contained so many errors, and simply said that he did not know.

26. I therefore note that Judge Barker previously found a number of inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence, in a manner which suggested that he was trying to fit his account to the questions. Far from addressing those inconsistencies, his further evidence in Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024 fact introduced a significant number more. I take this into account when considering matters in the round.

27. Second, additional inconsistencies arose during the Appellant’s oral evidence. For example, Judge Barker had noted how the Appellant variously claimed that his wife was born on a specific date in 1995; or to have been 23 (in 2021); or to have been born in 1993. In oral evidence, however, the date of birth he gave for his wife was in 1993, but was now one day different to that previously given.

28. When questioned about the discrepancy, the Appellant initially denied that Judge Barker had taken issue with the date of birth, and then said that there might have been a mistake in the writing of his first statement. This does not, however, adequately explain why the same day and month, now said to be incorrect, appear in both his screening interview (Q1.19, SB359) and his first asylum interview (Q21, SB379). I therefore take into account the fact that the Appellant has now provided four different dates of birth for his wife, in respect of an apparently basic detail where some level of consistency can reasonably be expected.

29. Third, the Appellant did not suggest during the previous appeal that any documentation might exist, other than what Judge Barker has noted as his peculiar response that something might be with his mother. In his oral evidence in this appeal, however, he accepted that he had known at the time that he had a birth certificate, but said he had not known where it was. He also accepted that he did not tell Judge Barker that his family had left their possessions with someone called [HA]. In this respect the Appellant appears to have failed to mention potentially relevant information, that was within his knowledge, during that earlier appeal.

30. He has also provided three different dates as to when he spoke with [HA], stating in oral evidence that it was in early 2022, in his statement of 23 October 2023 that it was in the middle of 2022, and in his statement of 8 January 2025 that it was February 2023 (at [6], SB29). Whichever is correct, he provided very little detail as to how he was able to resume contact with either [HA] or his wife, and claims to have now lost contact with them again.

31. I therefore take into account the fact that the documents were potentially available before the previous appeal, but were neither supplied nor referenced, and that the Appellant’s explanations as to why this was were themselves vague and inconsistent.

32. Fourth, I note that the documents were sent to the Appellant from Ethiopia (SB544), notwithstanding the claim that the person who was said to have been in possession of them, [HA], resides in Eritrea. The Appellant’s account was that [HA] passed them to his wife’s uncle, who gave them to his wife, who gave them to [ME], who sent them to him. When asked why [HA] took what appeared to be a relatively convoluted approach rather than simply send the documents directly to the Appellant, he said that he had wanted to protect [HA], who might be in trouble if it was discovered that she had been helping someone who left the country illegally. When asked why she would be in trouble for posting the documents but not for handing them over to someone else, he said that the person she gave the documents to could be trusted. Such an explanation seemingly overlooks, however, that [HA] is said to have then sent the Appellant a written statement, which she provided through the use of an advocate in Eritrea (SB39). In this respect it remained unclear as to why she could not post the documents, Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024 but could tell an Eritrean lawyer that she had sent them. I therefore take into account the fact that the evidence said to show receipt of the documents does not, in itself, corroborate the claim that these originated in Eritrea, and instead connects them to Ethiopia.

33. Fifth, I give very little weight to the reports of John Birchall, which purport to confirm that the birth and death certificates are genuine documents. His initial report of 2 June 2023 (SB557) does not comply with the requirements for an expert report in a number of ways, which includes the absence of a statement of truth, or a declaration of understanding of the expert’s duty to the Tribunal. In any event, the bulk of the report comprises relatively generic background material about matters not in dispute, such as providing a brief history of Eritrea. In respect of the actual document verification, the brief conclusions are largely limited to observations such as that they “appear to me to be genuine” and the “design, content and general appearance are as I have seen on other Eritrean documents” (SB569). He nevertheless accepts that “fake documents do appear in this part of Africa” but then asserts, without making clear the basis of that assertion and in a sentence that is somewhat incoherent, that the Appellant would not have been in a position to “acquire sophisticated fakes”.

34. The Respondent accordingly made a number of entirely fair comments about the report in her refusal decision. In response, the author’s second report (SB54) again fails to comply with the basic requirements for an expert report, and he instead appears to take personal offence at the criticisms, asking the “Home Office to think sensibly about making some rather harsh statements” (SB56). Furthermore, the second report suggests that even the brief conclusions of the first were not, in fact, made on as strong a footing as had been suggested. For example, he describes Eritrea as a “little-known corner of Africa”, and repeatedly refers to the “difficult decision” he was required to make that “on balance”, led him to the opinion that the documents were genuine. Furthermore, he suggests that “very few Eritrean documents” have been seen in the UK, but that he has seen “some”, and that he has also checked with colleagues who have seen “but a few”.

35. Overall, therefore, the author’s comments across the two reports do not create confidence that he has the necessary expertise to independently verify Eritrean birth and death certificates. He has seen few actual examples, and instead appears to be basing his conclusions largely upon matters such as details he might expect to see, combined with assumptions as to the Appellant’s ability to obtain fraudulent examples.

36. Furthermore and in any event, I remind myself that even genuine documents may not be reliable, something of particular relevance in circumstances where the Appellant’s own claimed expert accepts that fakes do exist, and can be obtained by bribing “poorly paid officials.” When everything is taken together, I attach very little weight to these reports.

37. Sixth, I attach very little weight to the Appellant’s purported efforts to obtain clarification from the Ethiopian embassy. He confirmed in oral evidence that he simply asked them if they could provide him with documents if they thought he was Ethiopian, and told them that he had nothing he could give them to show who he was. In the circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that they were unable to assist, and I accordingly find this to be of very little assistance in determining the issue of nationality. Appeal Number: PA/65761/2024 38. Taken together, I take Judge Barker’s findings as my starting point and do not find good reason to depart from them. Far from clarifying the account in a manner which suggests that Judge Barker’s conclusions might be wrong, the additional evidence instead introduces yet more inconsistencies and discrepancies, in respect of basic details about which a degree of consistency and coherence can reasonably be expected. The Appellant then blames what is essentially his own evidence for not showing what he claims it should.

39. In all the circumstances I attach very little weight to this further evidence, and do not find that it has been shown to be reliable.

40. Given that Judge Barker was not satisfied even to the lower standard that the Appellant was Eritrean, and in light of my findings as to the reliability of the further evidence, I find that the Appellant has failed to establish the factual basis of his claim, there being essentially no more reliable evidence before me than was before Judge Barker. In such circumstances, I have no good reason to depart from the finding that the Appellant is, in fact, Ethiopian. It is accepted that he has not advanced any reason why he would be at risk on return to that country, and the asylum appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal on humanitarian protection and human rights grounds 41. For the reasons already given I do not find the Appellant to have established substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm on return, or that he would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The appeal on Article 8 grounds stood and fell with the protection appeal.

NOTICE OF DECISION The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds. The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds. The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award. Signed: J Le Grys First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys Date: 30 September 2026