Torbay Council v M & Ors [2017] EWFC 97 (B) (06 October 2017)

[ Home ] [ Databases ] [ World Law ] [ Multidatabase Search ] [ Help ] [ Feedback ] [ DONATE ] England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> Torbay Council v M & Ors [2017] EWFC 97 (B) (06 October 2017) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2017/97.html Cite as: [2017] EWFC 97 (B) [ New search ] [ Printable PDF version ] [ Help ] This judgment is being handed down in private on 6 th October 2017.. The Judge has given permission for the judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition that in any report, no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them (and other persons identified by name in the judgment itself) may be identified by name, current address or location [including school or work place]. In particular the anonymity of the children and the members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and current addresses of the parties will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain. NEUTRAL CITATION NUMBER : [2017] EWFC 97 (B) IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING IN PLYMOUTH DATES OF HEARING : 18 th - 21 st September 2017 JUDGMENT HANDED DOWN ON : 6 TH October 2017 Before HER HONOUR JUDGE SEARLE Between Torbay Council pplicant and M First Respondent and F Second Respondent And A, B,C, D Through their Children's Guardian Third-Sixth Respondent Representation for the Hearing For the Applicant :Judi Evans, Counsel For the First Respondent : Claire Wills Goldingham QC Counsel and Carla Flexman, Counsel For the Second Respondent: Abigail Bond, Counsel For the Third- Sixth Respondents: Chris Godfrey , Counsel. Representation for the Judgment For the Applicant : Katrina Forsythe, solicitor for Torbay Council For the First Respondent : Claire Wills –Goldingham QC, Counsel For the Second Respondent : Chris Evans , Solicitor. For the Third- Sixth Respondent : James Hayward, Counsel. HER HONOUR JUDGE SEARLE: 1. In this case I am concerned with four children: A now nine years old; B now seven years old; C, now three years ; and D, now two years old. 2. Their mother is M. She has attended each day of this final hearing and has been represented by both junior and leading counsel. The father i. He has not attended any day of this final hearing but he has been represented through his counsel. The other parties are the Local Authority - who bring this case - and the Guardian for the children. Both have also been represented by counsel. 3. This is a final hearing before me where the Local Authority seek Final Care Orders in relation to all four children, and Placement Orders in relation to the youngest two boys, C and D. 4. Background to this Case/Finding. 5. The children were removed from the parents' care in March 2016 as a result of bruises being found on D's perineum. The Local Authority immediately issued proceedings and case management orders were made which led to the listing of a fact finding hearing. 6. For 15 days between March and May of this year I heard the fact finding that was brought by the Local Authority who were seeking findings against both the mother and the father. At the end of that case I gave judgment on 1 st June, making findings against both parents. The findings that I made have been listed in the document which has been helpfully drafted by counsel for the Local Authority and is dated 12 th September. This I refer to as the "Findings Document". It is my intention that this judgment should be read with my judgment of 1 st June 2017, as well as with the Findings Document. 7. I summarise those findings, for the purpose of this judgment, as follows: Under the heading of "Domestic Violence and Domestic Abuse", I made findings that both parents had exposed the children to domestic violence incidents witnessed by the children, which had caused significant emotional harm and a risk of physical harm to all of the children; that the father had a long history of being unable to control his temper, resulting in his being violent to the property and people. I made findings that the father was physically aggressive to the mother; that the father had a fiery temper and was regularly violent to the mother during the relationship; that up until D was seen with bruises, the parents argued daily. I made findings that the father had been controlling of the mother; that the parents had regular arguments in front of the children; that the parents were regularly separated due to the arguments and that when separated the children were still exposed to arguments between the parents. 8. I also found that the mother failed to protect the children by failing to inform the authorities about the physical abuse of the father. 9. Under the heading of "Sexual and Physical Abuse of D", I made findings that the father caused a number of bruises/a linear injury to D's perineum, the tops of his thighs and buttocks and the injury to D's anus, and that he caused the injury to the anus by poking his finger into D's anus and that he caused all of the injuries as a result of losing his temper with D. 10. Under the heading of "Sexual Abuse of A and B", I made a finding that the father touched A and B in a sexually inappropriate way by regularly playing a game whereby the children were naked and he would use his pointed finger to try to touch each child's bottom and anus. I also made a finding that the father had a perverted interest in the bare bottoms of his sons. 11. Under the heading of "Emotional Harm and Neglect" the mother made a number of admissions. She accepted that she had at times been physically and emotionally unavailable to the children. She accepted that the children have suffered significant harm as a result of neglectful parenting that they had received by her and she accepted the children had missed a number of medical appointments. She also accepted that she had been unavailable to provide consistent guidance and boundaries and has struggled to manage the children's behaviour. 12. That completes the information that the court had as a result of the fact finding. 13. Progress of the Case Since the Fact Finding Judgment. 14. At the time of the judgment in the fact finding, the children were placed as follows. A and B continued to live with their foster carer. They had contact with their mother once a month. C continued to live with his foster carer with whom he had been placed since December 2016. He was having contact with mother once a month and D continued to stay with his foster carer. He also was having contact with the mother once a month. 15. The case was already listed for an IRH and fact finding. What has happened in this case since? 16. The timetable for the filing of evidence has been beset by problems and for completeness I set out the relevant case management orders as follows. 17. At the hearing on 1 st June 2017 when the judgment was handed down certain directions were made including the following. The Local Authority were to file its final evidence by 4 th August 2017, the issues resolution hearing was listed for 4 th September 2017 and the final hearing was listed on 15 th September for five days before me. I also directed that Dr. Candy, a clinical psychologist, should be instructed to prepare and file a psychological assessment by 28 th July 2017. 18. By 12 th July 2017 the Local Authority required an extension of the time to file its evidence in light of the fact that the Independent Social Worker undertaking the Special Guardianship Report of the maternal grandparents had requested more time. The court was also notified that as the transcript of the judgment was not available, the Local Authority was warning the court that this might have a delaying effect on the filing of Dr. Candy's report. 19. In this chronology it is right to note that as at 25 th July 2017 the mother gave birth to a baby girl named E. The paternity of the baby has not been established but mother is currently reported to be doing well in a mother and baby foster placement in Torquay. 20. I continue with the chronology with regard to the case management hearing. 21. On 26 th July 2017 the paternal grandparents sought leave to have an independent assessment of their parenting ability. 22. By 27 th July, by which time the approved transcript had been sent to the parties, the court extended the time for the filing of documents as follows. The Local Authority to file the schedule of findings, extended to 10 th August. Dr. Candy to file her report, extended to 3 rd August. The Local Authority to now file its final evidence by 23 rd August; the parents now to have until 4 th September to respond to the Local Authority's evidence and any placement application; and, lastly, the Guardian now has until noon on 8 th September, which was still a week before the case started on 15 th September. The IRH of 4 th September was vacated and replaced by a telephone hearing on 12 th September. 23. The matter came before the court on 8 th August. when the court heard the application by the paternal grandparents for a further assessment. That was dismissed but a direction was made for Dr. Candy to consider their position concerning contact with the children. 24. On 23 rd August the time for the Local Authority to file its evidence came and went. By application of 24 th August the Local Authority sought a further extension for filing its evidence to Wednesday, 13 th September - that is two days before the hearing was due to start on 15 th September - claiming that, "the production of this documentation has been delayed owing to unavoidable change in Social Work personnel". 25. That hearing was heard at the IRH on 11 th September. At that hearing, which was by telephone, I was informed that some time between 1 st June and the application of 23 rd August, the Social Worker had had a motor accident causing the case to have to be reallocated. 26. I heard that application - and bearing in mind that the next available dates for a final hearing would be in February - I directed a timetable that would ensure that the case still proceeded. I vacated the hearing on Friday, 15 th September. It was to now start on the following Monday. The Local Authority was to file its evidence by noon on 12 th September, the parents by noon on 15 th September and the Guardian by 9 o'clock on the morning of the first day of the hearing on 18 th September. This was a tight but just about a workable solution. 27. However, the matter was brought back to court again that week on 14 th September, the Thursday. The hearing was prompted by an email to the court on behalf of the father, notifying the court that the Local Authority had yet again not complied with the timetable, but filed the care evidence by noon on Wednesday, 13 th September; but - and it later transpired - the placement papers were not served until early on the afternoon of that same day. 28. The father also maintained that the explanation given by counsel on 11 th September for the delay - that is that the Social Worker had had a motor accident - was incorrect. I heard on behalf of the father that this delay in the timetable had created problems with regard to the father absorbing the evidence from the Local Authority in time to file a statement for the hearing. 29. I directed that the parents should file and serve a position statement in bullet points by the afternoon of 15 th September, that the narrative statement could be produced by the Monday and that the Guardian could then consider it overnight on the Monday. This was at the suggestion of the Guardian's counsel. 30. I did not take the case out of the list but indicated that I would consider what issues could still be dealt with at the start of the hearing. I further directed that the Local Authority should file statements from the relevant Social Workers to explain the delay. I will deal with these at the end of this judgment. 31. On Monday, 18 th September, I was informed that the mother and father had in fact both been able to file their statements, both in narrative form, by late Friday, 15 th September. I was also informed that although the Guardian had only the weekend to consider her analysis her report was almost complete. It was filed and served that afternoon. 32. I did not start hearing evidence that Monday, 18 th September, primarily due to information that I was provided with by the father's counsel, who was on that day attended by her instructing solicitor. I asked father's counsel if the father required more time to consider the Local Authority's evidence and in order to provide it in more detail in a another narrative statement. I was informed that the father was not seeking more time to do so and was not proposing to file any further statement. Having noticed that the father was not in court, the father's counsel addressed me and sought an adjournment of the hearing as a whole, due to the father not being able to attend during that week due to his work commitments. I was informed that the father, who works only in the mornings, had recently been taken on as permanent staff at his place of work and that in order to have time off work he needed to have given a week's notice, but he had not expected the case to go ahead and he had not given the required notice and that he did not wish to take the time off at present for fear of losing his job. 33. I decided that the case needed to go ahead but I delayed the start of the case until 12 noon the following day, observing that that would give father the time after his work shift to attend at his solicitors to give further instructions, and that I would expect him to be at court then for the rest of the week. The father never turned up. Each day I would ask for a report as to his non-attendance and it would appear that it was understood that the father was not attending court as he was at work. There was no explanation proffered as to why he did not attend court during the afternoons when he was not at work. 34. So what is the position of the parties at this hearing? 35. Local Authority. 36. The Local Authority seek Care Orders in relation to all the children. By the end of the case the position of the Local Authority was as follows. Concerning A and B, that they should remain in foster care, preferably with the foster carer the foster carer; that the mother should have contact with the boys every eight weeks; that the father should not have contact and the court should grant the Local Authority permission under section 34(4) to withhold contact with the boys. 37. This was, in fact, a change in the Local Authority's position, as when the case started its plan was that the boys should see the father, like the mother, once every eight weeks and the Local Authority plan was that contact would be considered to the paternal grandparents, subject to a further assessment. 38. Concerning C. The Care Plan that I have seen is that there should be an Adoption Order and that the mother should have two-way letterbox contact. However, by the end of the hearing the Local Authority had made it clear that although this was their preferred position, if the court did not approve the Care Plan their Plan B was one whereby C would remain in foster care, preferably with the current foster carer, and mother would be having contact every three months. 39. Lastly concerning D, the Local Authority Care Plan was that D was to be adopted with two-way letterbox contact with mother. 40. Mother's Position. 41. Concerning all four boys she accepted that she could not care for them. 42. Concerning A and B, she agreed that they should remain in foster care, preferably with the current foster carer. 43. Concerning contact. She currently has contact with them once a month and wanted this frequency to continue. 44. Concerning C. She wanted him to remain in foster care with his current carer and she wanted her contact to remain at monthly. 45. With regard to D. With great reluctance, she accepted that it was in D's best interests to be adopted and she accepted the plan that post-adoption she should have two-way letterbox contact. For the purposes however of the Adoption and Children Act, she does not technically consent to the adoption. 46. Father. 47. The father seeks that all or any of the children should be returned to his care. He accepts that it is unlikely that the court will order that now and seeks further assessment. 48. Concerning A and B, his preferred position is that they are returned to him. His second position is that they remain in foster care but having continued contact with him. 49. With regard to C, his preferred position is that C is returned to him. His second position is that C is not adopted and that he has some contact. 50. With regard to D, his preferred position was that D would return to his care. His second position is that D would be cared for by his parents - the paternal grandparents - and his third position is that D is adopted. That is in preference to any question of D returning to the mother's care. 51. The Guardian's Position. 52. Concerning A and B, the Guardian supported the Care Plan that they remain in care, hoping that it would be with their current foster carer. 53. However, concerning contact she felt that the contact with the mother should be once every six weeks rather than once every eight weeks and, concerning the father, she did not consider that A and B should have contact with the father. This was a change from the recommendation in her report and her position at the start of the hearing, which was that A and B should see their father once every eight weeks. 54. Concerning C. The Guardian did not agree with the Local Authority Care Plan that C should be adopted, but considered that he should remain in foster care in the care of, hopefully, his current foster carer; and, concerning D, she agreed with the Care Plan for adoption and the proposed letterbox contact with the mother. 55. Before considering the case further I remind myself of the law. 56. The Local Authority's first application is for a Care Order and under section 31(2) a court may only make a Care Order if it is satisfied that the child has suffered or is likely to suffer significant harm and that harm is due to the care given not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give. 57. Here the threshold is crossed by the findings that were made at the fact-finding. 58. I further remind myself of the following provisions under section 1 of the Children Act, namely that the welfare of each of these children is the court's paramount consideration and that there is a general principle that any delay in determining the question concerning a child's upbringing is likely to prejudice the welfare of a child; and, also, that I need to apply the Welfare Check List as set out in section 1(3) of the Act. 59. I remind myself that the court must consider the Article 8 rights of the children and parents in respect of their family life and that any interference with those rights must be proportionate to the risks involved; but I remind myself that in the case of C and D the Care Plan is for adoption and the Local Authority seek a Placement Order, so I therefore look at section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. 60. I remind myself of the fact that I must remember that my paramount concern is the welfare of D and C throughout their lives; and, again, under this Act, that as a general principle delay in coming to a decision is likely to prejudice their welfare. 61. I look at the Welfare Check List for a Placement Order which is similar to that in the Children Act but more far-reaching, and therefore apply this Welfare Check List as it applies to D and C throughout their lives. 62. I remind myself that in this case under the Adoption and Children Act the court may not make a Placement Order unless the child is subject to a Care Order and the court is satisfied that conditions under section 31(2) - that is the threshold - is met; and, further, that the court may only make a Placement Order in the case of each parent where the court is satisfied that the parents consent should be dispensed with. 63. I remind myself that the court cannot dispense with the consent of any parent of a child being placed for adoption unless the court is satisfied that the parent cannot be found or is incapable of giving consent and that the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with. In considering the options, the court must consider an analysis of the competing options and when considering a plan for adoption analyse whether anything else will do. A holistic evaluation of the children's needs, needs to be undertaken. 64. I remind myself of Re B, and the fact of where nothing else will do. I remind myself of the words of Lord Justice Mumby in Re G , where he said he emphasised the words "global holistic evaluation" and where he quoted Lord Justice Macfarlane in referring to the fact that what is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and where it is own positives and negatives and each option is then compared side-by-side against the competing option or options. 65. I remind myself of the case of Re CM v Blackburn with Darwen BC [2014] EWCA and the following passages: That the court must undertake a welfare analysis of each of the realistic options of the child; that that analysis involves a balance sheet of benefits and detriments; that the court must decide whether an option, and if so which option, safeguards the child's welfare throughout their lives, and then the fact that that decision feeds into section 52 of the Adoption and Children Act as I have mentioned above. 66. Then, finally, I remind myself that it is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of investigating the hearing and the court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress; and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything. This is the Lucas direction. 67. The Evidence. 68. The court bundle is comprised into four files. I have read every document that I have been taken to and more. The documents that I have read include: The statements of the parties. The statements of the Social Workers. The viability statements of the paternal grandparents The assessment by ARC. The parenting assessments. The Special Guardianship Reports of the paternal grandparents and the maternal grandparents The Care Plans The Initial Clinical Psychological Report of Dr. Noakes The Clinical Psychological Reports of Dr. Candy dated 2 nd August and 8 th September. The Guardian's Analysis. 69. I have also seen within these proceedings a contact note of 12 th September, which was the contact that A and B had with their father after the initial contact in July. 70. I have seen documents that the mother produced within these proceedings. One document had on its face a series of photographs of the father apparently playing in the surf with two young children. 71. The second document is a screen shot of a series of Facebook messages dated 25 th March between the paternal grandmother and the father, in which the paternal grandmother comments on the photos and is informed by the father that he had spent the night at the home of the children with someone else. 72. The third document was a letter dated 29 th August to the maternal grandfather, apparently with reference to complaints that the maternal grandfather had made that nothing had been done about his alerting the Local Authority to the fact of these photos and messages that I have referred to. 73. I have also been shown a series of emails between Dr. Candy and the Social Worker, and the Social Worker and her team manager, as well as including emails from the Local Authority solicitor concerning Dr. Candy's request to observe contact. 74. With regard to oral evidence, I have heard oral evidence from the current Social Worker, Louise Butcher, the mother, Dr. Candy and the Guardian. 75. Louise Butcher was the Social Worker in the unenviable position in this case. She had taken on the role as allocated Social Worker on the 24 th July 2017. She had a case load at that stage of 13 to 14 cases. On my calculation, she had a total of seven weeks to absorb the details of this case before she swore her statement and I remind myself that the bundle for the fact finding was of some 19 files. Within that time she also had other cases for which she had to file evidence for final hearings. Further, there was not handover of the case to her. She had a good knowledge of the issues of the case; but, not surprisingly, she did not have the comprehensive knowledge of the case that one might expect. It is my view that that lack of a feel for this case through no fault of her own led to the Local Authority making a decision that was not in the interests of some of the children. This I will refer to later. 76. What Louise Butcher was able to do and do well, was to update the court as to the position concerning the carers. She was able to inform the court about the views of the foster carer of A and B - and all the parties, save the father, hope that that foster carer will continue to look after A and B. 77. Miss Butcher told the court that A had now had two incidents whereby he had shown sexualised behaviour. There was one incident when he had exposed himself to B, and one when he had been overhead in the swimming pool asking another child to expose himself. 78. The Social Worker told the court that the foster carer had concerns about the safety of her own grandchildren with A whilst A was about. The Social Worker was able to inform the court that, although it was hoped that A and B would remain with the foster carer, if the foster carer decided that she could not offer him a home then the plan would be for both A and B to be placed with another foster carer. 79. The Social Worker was asked about contact and it was during her evidence that it became apparent that, in addition to the contact of July mentioned in Dr. Candy's report, that there had been further contact. Her initial evidence on this subject was that she had, "reinstated contact between A and B and the father", and she was not sure as to why there had been no contact prior to this reinstatement. 80. When the Social Worker was speaking about why she felt that the contact of A and B to both parents independently should be restricted to every eight weeks, she said she felt that the children need to be settled with the foster carer. She said that A and B do want to have the contact but their behaviour indicates otherwise. She mentioned that B has night terrors. She then attributed the response of B in the context of his contact with father and said that the only reaction to mother's contact was that A was a bit quieter before and after that contact. 81. Concerning C. The Social Worker accepted that she said that the reason that the Local Authority Care Plan was for adoption was that he was very young, that he had already had three carers and that there was a concern that if he was placed in a foster placement there would be more risk of the placement breaking down. Therefore she felt that it was only fair to look at adoption. She said that C had made progress and that maybe he cannot be adopted but she wanted C to be able to look back at this process and see that the Local Authority did their very best for him. 82. When the Social Worker was asked about the current foster carers in the context that Dr. Candy had recommended that C remain with his foster carer, she said that the foster carer had asked for two days a month respite care if the carer was going to continue to look after him long term. She was not able to say whether that would be approved. She was not able to say, at that point, what respite the foster carer had had so far. It was later established that the foster carer of C had had no respite care in the whole of the nine months that she had been caring for him. 83. The Social Worker said that she considered that A and B's contact to both mother and father should be similar because of the needs of the boys to settle. She did not accept that there should be a difference in approach. She did accept that the mother had made huge changes and further accepted that C remaining with his foster carer may be positive for him. 84. When the Social Worker was shown the screen shots and the Facebook messages that I have referred to, she accepted that the mother had informed her on the 23 rd August of her suspicions that the father was in a relationship with a woman who had children and that she told the court that as a result of this, she had consequently told her manager. She said that she had only met the father once on 25 th August and that she had not asked him about what the mother had said. At that interview with the father he had told her that he did not accept the findings and that he was appealing the findings. 85. Concerning the Social Worker's view of the need for a settling-in period, she accepted that as it was hoped that A and B would remain with the foster carer, that perhaps there was not need for a settling-in period. 86. With regard to C, when the Social Worker was asked whether he was ready for adoption, she said, "He has made a great deal of progress; I will seek further assessment". She accepted the Local Authority Care Plan was to try for only some eight months to place C for adoption. 87. The Social Worker was asked about how C now was and she said that his self-soothing behaviours had improved a lot and agreed that the foster carer had followed the recommendations made by Dr. Candy. These were that when he does rock himself, he is to be held and rocked by the foster carer as part of co-regulation, thus allowing him to be comforted. She accepted that the foster carer had been doing all the things suggested by Dr. Candy in order to help C. 88. It is important to note that this evidence of the Social Worker was given before that of Dr. Candy. More than once the Social Worker indicated that she would be prepared to be guided by Dr. Candy's view, especially concerning contact. 89. The Local Authority case at this juncture was quite clearly that A and B should have contact with the father. This was the view that, at that stage, was still supported by the Guardian. 90. The next witness was the mother. She bravely sat through the whole hearing. She was clear in setting out her position that she supported the Care Orders for A and B. She opposed the Care Order for C for adoption but had taken the very hard decision not to oppose the Care Plan that D be adopted. She was keen that the court should understand that her own difficult experiences in foster care had fed into that decision in regard to D. She said that with regard to A and B, she wanted her current monthly contact to continue but would consider her position if the foster carer thought that things were a bit rocky. 91. The mother said that she had read Dr. Candy's report and accepted that she had a responsibility in causing the boys the trauma that they had suffered and specifically for her part in the arguments and domestic violence and in not informing the Local Authority of what was happening. When asked, she said that she was happy to write an apology letter to the children apologising for her part in what happened. She currently has contact separately to A and B. She accepted that A was the favourite child of the paternal grandmother. 92. I had seen the mother given evidence in the fact finding. The woman giving evidence this time appeared a much more confident individual. I was impressed by the mother. She has in the last two months given birth to another child. She must have wanted to be with that child and yet she attended court every day - a court which was at least an hour away - in order to ensure that she had done the best for her boys, and she made what I consider to be a very child-focussed and brave decision that she was no longer opposing the adoption of D. 93. It was during the mother's evidence that more evidence was provided by the Local Authority concerning the contact that A and B had with the father. I will deal with this later; but, suffice it to say that the mother, although aware that Dr. Candy was going to observe some contact, was not notified of the decision that there would be further contact in September. 94. Concerning the father I comment that, sadly, he did not appear in this case. I remind myself that he was making a positive case for the return of all the children to his care and in default of that for further assessment, but he was not here to promote his case and he was not here to be cross-examined. 95. The next witness that I heard was Dr. Candy. She was instructed as a Part 25 expert. There had already been an instruction of Dr. Noakes, but there was a universal view among the parties that she had gone beyond her brief and therefore Dr. Candy was instructed. 96. Dr. Candy provided two reports. Her main report of 2 nd August dealt with a number of questions. She first provided a psychological overview of each child. 97. Concerning A, she said that as at August - the date of her report - her assessment of A was that he showed some positive signs of psychological progress but that there continued to be significant emotional and psychological issues of concern. She referred to the report of Dr. Noakes. Dr. Candy summarises that A continues to present as a child who has experienced significant trauma. His level of traumatisation is impacting on his emotional well-being. He continues to present with disorganised attachment but is benefitting from the attachment security offered in his current placement. Dr. Candy stated in her report that she had seen several positive examples of A prioritising B's needs above his own and empathising with his brother. 98. Concerning B, Dr. Candy said: "There is no doubt he continues to experience significant trauma symptoms and a range of trauma events and experiences "domestic abuse and violence, neglect, sexual abusive acts, sibling rivalry potentially fuelled by favouritism, health conditions, transition into foster care", that would constitute complex developmental trauma. 99. Dr. Candy states that there continues to be significant and concerning issues relating to his disorganised attachment. 100. Concerning C, Dr. Candy concluded that currently there is no doubt that C continues to present as a highly traumatised and complex child with disorganised attachment behaviours who will require consistent predictable nurturing and emotional experienced care in order to alter his current psychological trajectory. 101. Concerning the section of Dr. Candy's report considering the possible alternatives for meeting the children's needs, she reported as follows. 102. Concerning A and B, Dr. Candy commented that having seen them, the benefit of the work of the foster carer was clear to see and that there had been huge advances in the brothers' ability to share and be mindful of each other's needs. She stated that it is a testament to the quality of the care that A and B had been provided with, that the evidence now suggested that A and B would be able to remain together in the placement. Her report stated that if the boys remained with the foster carer, this would be by far the best outcome in terms of future placements for these brothers. 103. Dr. Candy stated in her report that she did not believe that either parent understood the full trauma that A and B had experienced and nor understand their needs. Therefore she had no doubt that they should not be returned to the care of the parents. 104. Dr. Candy's report states at paragraph 68: " A and B have a strong sense of parents. If they remain in their current placement, which I would strongly support, I believe that there should be some ongoing contact with each parent". 105. Dr. Candy opined, however, that contact should be eight weekly so that the boys had time when they were not thinking of a past or future contact. 106. Concerning C. Dr. Candy states at paragraph 73 that C was an extremely complex and traumatised child but currently he is making progress in a therapeutic placement which seems well matched to his needs. Dr. Candy refers to the fact that the Guardian had informed her that C's foster carer was committed to him and continues to offer care. She stated that the foster placement offers C attachment security and it is clear that he is making impressive progress. 107. Dr. Candy continues that nevertheless C is going to require considerable resources for the foreseeable future and she said: "I cannot imagine him requiring anything less than the type of therapeutic foster placement in which he is currently settled. I strongly recommend that this is continued". 108. Dr. Candy reports that discussions with C's parents indicate their lack of understanding his difficulties and therefore she could not recommend the return of C to either parent. 109. Concerning D, Dr. Candy says that he continues to be vulnerable to environments lacking stability, security, consistency and warmth. 110. Concerning the father, Dr. Candy states that the father acknowledges that he is not a primary attachment figure for D, and given the father's position as a perpetrator of abuse and his lack of understanding of D's needs and that he does not have the necessary skills to care for D, it was her opinion that D could not be cared for by his parents and, as referenced in this judgment, not by his father. 111. To assist the court Dr. Candy recommended that A would benefit from specialised life story work, which would focus on keep safe work, to focus on his experience of sexual abuse and supporting him to recognise sexual norms and behaviour. 112. Dr. Candy required the same for B, but also suggested that there should be some attachment specific intervention, such as dyadic developmental practice and also some trauma focussed therapy, such as trauma focussed cognitive behavioural therapy. 113. Concerning C, Dr. Candy suggested that he needed a sensory attachment and processing assessment and she recommended the co-regulation action of the foster carer rocking with him in an attempt to support his night-time rocking. 114. Dr. Candy's second report was prompted by a direction from myself, as a result of my seeing the viability assessment of the paternal grandparents, in which there was a recommendation that there should be consideration of continuing contact between them and A and B. 115. The second report of Dr. Candy was a paper assessment. She made no comment as to whether there should be contact but said that if it did happen it should be supervised and not very frequent, two contacts a year, and that it should be supported to ensure that there was equality in the way that the paternal grandparents treated A and B. 116. In her oral evidence Dr. Candy was consistent with most of the opinions that she had given in her report. She was very supportive of the idea that C should remain with his current foster carer, recounting the affection that she had witnessed on the part of the carer when looking after C and the fact that it was her view that C was in the early process of forming an attachment to the foster carer. She said: "I could not support the plan for adoption. I greatly fear that any adoptive placement will break down". 117. Dr. Candy went on to say that C was such a long way from being ready for adoption and that she would contemplate that it would be years before he would be ready. When asked about the idea of a therapeutic adoptive placement she said that he is beginning to show an attachment and that if he is moved now he would be pushed back in that process. 118. Concerning the frequency of the mother's contact to A and B and to C, Dr. Candy kept to the recommendation of her report. 119. However, there was one stark area about which Dr. Candy ended up giving a very different view to that expressed in her report, and that was the issue of the contact of A and B with father. 120. Before she started giving her oral evidence Dr. Candy was shown the contact note of the contact that had taken place on 12 th September. She said that its contents surprised her. It surprised her that it had occurred. She had understood that it was agreed that the contact that had taken place in July at her suggestion, was a one-off contact. She discussed the preparation that she felt had taken place in advance of the contact that she had observed in July. She mentioned that B was nervous about it and had a safe word. She said that she herself had offered support. She said that she spoke to B and that she had reassured him that she would be there and that the foster carer would be present in the next room. When comparing the contacts of the recording that she had been shown of the 12 th September contact with the contact in July when she had been present, she said that they were not dissimilar. That initially B was reluctant and stepped back but not as much as she had read about his behaviour on 12 th September. She said that A had been more confident and had gone to the father spontaneously. She said that this 12 th September contact caused her concern. She said: "It remains a concern through the level of trauma that the boys presented and I am concerned what we see in that description is the expression of B's anxiety and potentially the re-living of re-traumatising symptoms". 121. Dr. Candy said that she was further concerned that having observed that the boys had made remarkable progress in their sibling relationship, that on the 12 th September contact their level of threat was blocking their ability to empathise with each other. She said of the 12 th September contact: "Initially B experienced re-traumatisation as the level of threat increased. His ability to empathise was affected and so it was reciprocated in A's response". 122. Dr. Candy said that there is an awful lot of research that outcomes for children in permanent foster placements can be improved if there is contact with the birth family and wherever possible she would seek to recommend it. However she also said: "Research tells us in certain circumstances where there is significant sexual abuse/or domestic abuse/or a significant level of neglect, the process of contact causes such stress that it becomes a destabilising factor and undermines the child's ability to settle in placement". 123. Dr. Candy went on to say that having heard from the Guardian of B's distress and B not wanting to go to contact but that he was happy for his brother to go, it began to reveal the level of trauma that might be triggered. She said: "It begins to look like a case, at least until there is more time to settle, where contact is not in their best interests". 124. Dr. Candy was asked about A, who had for a while been saying that he wanted to have contact and said that he wanted to see father on 12 th September. Dr. Candy said that she felt that this had to be put in the context of A's profile of disorganised attachment and that he is keen to please and not wanting to upset his parents. She said that one has to balance the potential harm against giving him the opportunity of settling in a good placement with his sibling. She commented that in the contact of 12 th September, the contact supervisor had felt that he had had to take over the lead in the contact and that the children did not feel secure during the contact session. 125. That is the evidence that Dr. Candy gave in chief and it was understandable that this part of her evidence became the subject of much questioning. 126. Dr. Candy, as a Part 25 expert, was asked why this recommendation of no contact was opposite to that in her report. At certain parts of her evidence she seemed to suggest that contact could only take place with the father if the father wrote a letter of apology and the boys did life story work and keep safe work. In other words, that contact was still a possibility between the father and the boys, A and B. However, she later accepted that a letter of apology was no guarantee of a shift in the father's position. 127. However, her view at the end of her evidence was very clear, and that was that there should be no contact between A and B and father. 128. Although in her report, Dr. Candy reported instances of sexualised behaviour of A, she did not appear in the oral evidence to be aware of the incident of 4 th August. 129. Dr. Candy went on to accept that during the contact in July there were concerning features, namely when A noted a picture that the baby was naked, which reads: " A noted on picture that baby is naked. Both boys laughed and the father responded, 'Trust you to notice'". 130. Dr. Candy accepted that this was a worrying feature in the context of the findings against the father in relation to those two boys. When she was alerted to the incident of A encouraging another child to expose himself a short time afterwards, she agreed that it was possible that even that contact - that is the contact in July - may well have re-traumatised A and B. She accepted that if A's sexualised behaviour continued, that there was a risk of being separated from B or, at the very least, moving from the foster carer, neither of which would have been in A or B's best interests. 131. Much scrutiny was given as to how it was decided in the first place that Dr. Candy should observe contact between A and B and the father. 132. It was the appearance of Dr. Candy and her views about the contact that A and B had with father that contributed to the shift in the view taken by both the Guardian and the Local Authority. In her evidence she said that she had asked to see the children with the father in order to be able to properly answer the question about attachment. When I asked whether there was no other way with questioning an observation to assess attachment, she said that this was indeed possible but that viewing the child with the parent provided more information. 133. In her evidence with regard to C, Dr. Candy said she thought that no contact had better take place between C and Mr. H because of the trauma he had suffered and she stated that in her view, the balanced the potential gain of such contact was outflanked by the potential harm. She did not seem to come to the same conclusion with regard to A and B. 134. Concerning D, Dr. Candy said that she agreed with the Social Worker that the foster carer could be present but that it did not happen. 135. I remind myself that the findings were made that the father had seriously sexually abused D and that D had been barely six months old when he had last seen father. I cannot see what benefit there could have been in proposing such a contact. How would the adult D be reassured that his best interests were being addressed, when child professionals were trying to set up a contact between himself and his abuser, who still does not accept that he had abused D? 136. Dr. Candy is well known to these courts; but, it was clear to me, that when she was given an opportunity to consider the decision to reintroduce father to A and B,she realised that it was not in their best interests. 137. The Change in Dr. Candy's Evidence Raises Certain Concerns. 138. One concern for me is how the contact was allowed to take place in the first place, and by "contact" I am including the contact requested by Dr. Candy as well as the contact agreed by the Social Worker that took place on 12 th September. Dr. Candy was asked a lot about how that contact took place. She said, as I have indicated, that she was being asked to assess attachment. She asked to see the children with the father. 139. It is fair to say that Dr. Candy had no notice of this issue when she came to court and no notice that she would be scrutinised about it, so when she gave evidence about it she did not have the benefit of seeing the supporting documents. I have, and those documents have provided shows exactly what has happened. 140. It is apparent that Dr. Candy did request the contact, that the Social Worker at the time sent on that request to the Local Authority and her team manager, both very appropriately, in my view, expressed a view that the contact was not in the children's best interests. I quote from the email from the team manager, Ben Short: "I am aware that the psychologist has been asking about observing contact for the purposes of her assessment. This worries me. I have seen the email from Dr. Candy to Brenda suggesting that she needs to see the contact and has reviewed the contact notes and can see no reason why not. I recall Sam W, before she left, and what she described to me about the children was very worrying indeed". 141. The Social Worker goes back to Dr. Candy, having been asked to check with Dr. Candy that Dr. Candy has seen everything with regard to the findings, etc. of the reports, before contact is put in place. The Social Worker reports back to the team manager that Dr. Candy says that she has read everything. It has now been clarified within these court proceedings that at that stage when she was requesting contact, Dr Candy had seen the summary of the findings, the facts and summary of the case. 142. The Social Worker reported that Dr. Candy said that she herself had not seen adverse behaviour in the boys, that the boys were asking to see the father and that she, Dr. Candy, would find it difficult to recommend contact being diminished unless she had observed the contact. The team manager at that point accepts that it should go ahead and I am clear that he was under the impression that Dr. Candy was insistent that the contact should go ahead. 143. There is an issue here that needs to be addressed and that is with regard to the role of the Local Authority in safeguarding the children and the role of the expert. 144. The team manager was expecting the expert to advise as to whether it was safe and appropriate for the children to see the father. In her evidence Dr. Candy made it quite clear that she felt that the safeguarding decision should be one for the Local Authority. 145. What is my view? 146. My first position is that I was astonished that in the context of the father's non-acceptance of his abuse of the boys and in the context of the findings and their behaviour, that any contact at all with the father was thought to be in their interests. Once it was agreed that the first contact should take place, it appears to me that the impact of the abuse on B and A and the safeguarding issues faded into the background. It was the fact that that first contact took place that led to the view of Dr. Candy that there should be contact between father and A and B. It also fed into the Guardian's first recommendation about this, that there should be contact between father and A and B. It also fed into what I have referred to as "the appalling contact" of 12 th September. 147. I accept that for the current Social Worker - then only some four days as the allocated worker - that when she was being asked for contact by the father, once she saw the report from the expert recommending contact, it was understandable that she felt that it was not going to be a safeguarding issue. 148. I am clear that the contact in July should never have taken place. 149. After what has happened in this case, I hope that the Local Authority will review the way it approaches requests from experts for there to be contact between a child who has been found to be abused and the person who is found to have abused the child. My own view in these circumstances is that the safest way forward is to ensure that the matter is brought back to court. Much less serious issues between parties are brought back to the court every day. There can be no criticism of a Local Authority bringing this to a court's attention. 150. The other concern with regard to the change in Dr. Candy's evidence was raised by counsel for the father. The submission went that I should not feel confident in relying on Dr. Candy's evidence as a whole as, firstly, she had changed her mind with regard to the father having contact with A and B; and, secondly, that even when changing her mind she was at times not clear whether she still felt that it may be possible. 151. I have considered this submission. 152. Does the fact that Dr. Candy changed her evidence mean that I should be wary on relying on any of her evidence? 153. I am less concerned about the fact of Dr. Candy changing her evidence, than I am about the fact that she asked for the contact in the first place and recommended it in her report; but how do I view the submission? 154. In considering it I find that I am helped by reminding myself that Dr. Candy was not the only child expert in this case that changed her view. 155. I now come to the oral evidence of the Guardian. The Guardian is Jane Kemp. Jane Kemp is, to my knowledge, one of the most experienced Guardians on the Western Circuit. She is held in great respect by the professionals. Yet it is to be noted that after the hearing of the evidence of Dr. Candy, she too changed her mind about the issue of A and B having contact. She said that it was partly due to the change in evidence of Dr. Candy and partly due to the fact that she had had little more than 48 hours to consider her final analysis because of the late filing of the Local Authority evidence and, upon her thinking about the issue of contact, she considered that she had been wrong in recommending contact take place. 156. I must stress that it is only in the change of view on contact does the Guardian mirror the position of Dr. Candy. Unlike Dr. Candy she did not personally endorse either contact taking place. 157. What of the rest of the Guardian's evidence? 158. The Guardian was consistent with her analysis. She is absolutely clear that C should not be adopted. The Guardian was able to tell the court that C's foster carer told her, "We love him to bits and will keep him forever". 159. She was hopeful that the foster carer would keep A and B but that it had to be in their interests to be placed together if they could be, and that the trauma of contact with father would militate against this, as there was a risk of prompting A's sexualised behaviour. 160. I have no difficulty with the Guardian's position. I agree with her that her earlier position was wrong. I accept that she corrected it and that is effectively the same position as Dr. Candy. It was a mistake to seek contact between abused children and an abuser when the abuser had not had any shift in his view concerning acceptance of responsibility. 161. It seems to me that what happened at this hearing was once the Guardian had seen the contact record of the problems of A and B had in dealing with the contact in September, she realised that their behaviour was much worse than she had thought. It caused her to reflect on her views on contact. Further when she was informed about the dates of A's sexualised behaviour and was reminded about what actually happened in the contact of July such as the noticing and the comment made by father with regard to the naked bottom of the baby, the veils came down from her eyes and she realised how profoundly these boys had been affected by abuse and would be if contact continued. 162. It was not an easy time for Dr. Candy in court. I am sure she has regret for her part in facilitating that contact; but, does that negate her views otherwise, or indeed create a situation where I cannot rely or consider what she says about A and B now? 163. I remind myself that the role of the expert and court are distinct. It is the court that is in the position to weigh up expert evidence against other evidence. Here I do that, and I am satisfied that I can rely on the conclusions of Dr. Candy in relation to the matters that she now says, for two reasons. They are supported by the Guardian to a great extent; and, further, I myself follow the logic of her arguments. 164. I now consider the realistic options in relation to each child. I will deal with A and B together. Where there are differences, I will set them out. 165. What are the realistic options? 166. Well, the mother no longer puts herself forward but the father does. 167. I have read the Parenting Assessment of Beth Yates. I note that as at July 2016, A and B were viewed to be responsive to father. I also note my observations in the judgment of the role that father took in the day-to-day care of the children. 168. The father says there is a gap in the evidence. I do not consider that there is. The father has shown no real wish to engage with these proceedings, nor indeed the Guardian. So, with regard to the submission that there is a gap in the evidence, I do not agree. 169. When considering alternative carers there are no positive assessments of family carers and, therefore, the only other option besides that of the father, is foster care. 170. I need to do a global holistic evaluation of the children going back to live with father and going into foster care and compare the negatives and positives. I refer to the Welfare Check List. I refer to them both, as I say, because both A and B have very similar needs. Where they are different I will point them out. 171. Concerning the ascertainable wishes. 172. Well, the boys have been with the foster carer for over a year. They are fond of her and are content to remain with her, but I must approach this correctly because although it is the hope of all parties, save the father, that the boys stay with the foster carer, the Care Plan is not and cannot be that they remain with her as a named carer but that they are placed in foster care. 173. A is already showing sexualised behaviour. It is the hope that this will settle down, but the foster carer has made it clear that she has worries about looking after A if that continues because she wants to protect her grandchildren. 174. Therefore, what would be the boys' views about being moved to another foster carer? 175. I anticipate that there would be real feelings of loss. the foster carer has been a good support for the boys. She has allowed them to re-establish their sibling bond; but to be in foster care without her would be very different and I believe it is not something that they will be keen to happen. 176. Would they want to go to father? Yes, I suppose A might say that he would and possibly B; but, whether they would mean that, I do not know. Their views and ascertainable wishes would have to be seen in the context of their behaviour, and I refer specifically to the behaviour of 12 th September and the trauma that I observed within that contact note. 177. The physical, emotional and educational needs. 178. The children need to be cared for well and to feel safe and be encouraged and also to engage with education. They need to feel safe. The father has proved to be physically and sexually abusive to his youngest child and sexually abusive to these boys. I am clear that their emotional needs will not be met by the father. One only has to look at the trauma that the boys exhibited on having contact with father on 12 th September to see how they have suffered. These boys were sexually abused by the father. He does not accept that he abused them. He has been found to have physically and sexually abused their little brother when a defenceless baby. How can these boys be safe with him? 179. There are positives in the history of the case such as the father's commitment to them, but it is outweighed overwhelmingly by the risk factors. 180. The Likely Effect of a Change in Circumstances. 181. Neither boy would want to leave the foster carer; but, if they had to leave, their needs would be addressed and they would be cared for and safe. With the father they would not be safe. Both boys are of an age where they have memories of home. They have both suffered trauma and have disorganised attachments as a result. A has been considered the favourite by the paternal grandparents and this has had an adverse effect on his relationship with B, but this is now improving. B needs trauma-based therapy. 182. What harm have they suffered? 183. As I have said, they have both suffered sexual abuse at the hands of the father and, if they were to return to his care, my fear would be that they would be at risk of that continuing. It is to be expected that in foster care these boys would be safe from further abuse. 184. How capable are each of the parents of meeting their needs? 185. Dr. Candy addresses this in her report. As the mother effectively does not put herself forward, I deal with the father. As far as she is concerned the father does not have insight into the needs of the boys and, even not considering the safeguarding issues, it would not be in their interests to be with him because he does not understand their psychological needs. 186. With regard to the range of powers. 187. Although I have considered the total Welfare Check List, it is the fact that the father has been found to be the abuser. Yet, not only does he not accept the findings, he does not accept that he should be even treated as if the findings were made. It is three months since the judgment and he is refusing to accept responsibility. 188. He cannot be a carer for these children; but what of the submission that he should be further assessed? 189. As I have indicated, I have refused that but I refer to what Mr. Godfrey reminded the court about what Dr. Candy said as to why the father should not have contact: "The father is still saying he does not accept the finding. He does not apologise for his role. He is not here in court. His parents do not consider him to be a risk. Under consideration of the contact record of 12 th September, it is my view that that sums up the concerns". 190. Therefore, as I have said, I refuse any question of further assessment. 191. I am clear that there is only one course and that is that there should be a Care Order. I approve the Care Plan for foster care. 192. Concerning contact, the father shall have no contact and I make a section 34(4) giving the Local Authority permission to refuse the father contact. 193. I approve the Care Plan with regard to the reduction in the mother's contact. I am aware that the mother will be disappointed, but this will be subject to review and I am persuaded by the evidence of Dr. Candy of the need for these boys really to focus on their lives now remaining in foster care, hopefully with the foster carer. Of course it will be subject to review but I will not make any specific order. 194. I now deal with regard to C. 195. It seems to me that the three realistic options that I consider in my evaluation are (1) return to father, (2) adoption, (3) foster care. 196. I refer to the Adoption and Children Act 2002 Welfare Check List as it is more far reaching. 197. Going through that Check List I remind myself, of course, that the welfare of C is my paramount. That is his welfare throughout his life. 198. Children's ascertainable wishes. Where does he wish to be? 199. There is an assumption that I make here that he would wish to remain with the foster carer with whom he has formed an attachment. This is a huge step forward for C, whose behaviours have given more concern to the professionals than any of his siblings. I take the view that he would wish to remain with his foster carer. 200. With regard to the child's particular needs. 201. Dr. Candy stated at paragraph 73 of her report that C was an extremely complex and traumatised child. She goes on: "He needs a therapeutic placement. That is what he currently has with his foster carer. If he was adopted he would need a therapeutic adoptive placement. I have been informed by the Local Authority that such placements are available". 202. The likely effect of C being adopted or being in care. 203. C has been in care since March of last year. He has been with his current foster carer since about December. If he was adopted he would have to leave that foster carer. Dr. Candy's views are that in the context that he is now at last beginning to show signs of attachment, any change of home would set him back. 204. What would be the other effects of being adopted? 205. C would have the chance of a forever home. Research suggests that children have a better chance of stability if they are adopted rather than stay in the care system. I must be careful here because the alternative Care Plan of the Local Authority is not to place C with his current foster carer but a placement in foster care. What is relevant to this court because is that all the evidence points to the fact that this foster carer is committed to C and enjoys parenting him, despite the high demand that it places on her. She loves C and intends to keep caring for him permanently. 206. The evidence of Dr. Candy and the Guardian - which I accept - is that the current placement for C is the best for him. He is making progress. If he was adopted he would lose all connection with his birth family. He has monthly contact with his mother now. That would be affected. Life story work would of course ameliorate this and help. 207. However, if he was with father, of course he would still be within his birth family. Although I have referred to this option as a realistic option, in reality it is not. I have dealt with the negatives of the father's case when dealing with his wish to care for A and B above. The overwhelming negative in this analysis is the fact that findings have been made about the father of sexual and physical abuse. These are in relation to D when he was a baby and B and A of sexual abuse. It includes a perverted interest in the bottoms of his sons. The father has not in the past three months accepted these findings. 208. When a court, who has as its paramount concern the welfare of the child, is asked to consider placing a child in such a person's care, it is difficult to understand how realistic that request is. It is, perhaps, reflected in the fact that the father has not been in court during this trial and even when his work hours allowed, he has not attended. No real positive case has been put forward because of the very fact that the elephant in the room was the fact that the father had been found as the abuser of the children, and there was no evidence that the risk he presented was in any way reduced. 209. In the case of C, Dr. Candy's view - which I accept - was that her discussions with father indicate a lack of understanding as to his difficulties. I remind myself that I must be satisfied that nothing else will do before I can approve a Care Plan for adoption. The case for the Local Authority is not put on that basis. The Social Worker said very firmly that, although she needed confirmation that C was ready to be adopted, she wanted to be able to look back and say that the Local Authority did their best for him. 210. Here the evidence is overwhelming that the best for C is to remain exactly where he is. Dr. Candy has said this, the Guardian says this and I accept their evidence. They both say that moving C would not be in his best interests. 211. I have been informed by the Local Authority that if I do not approve the Care Plan for adoption, that they have an alternative Care Plan for long-term foster care, which will immediately be provided. 212. I do not find that nothing else will do. I find that the foster care will do very well for this little boy. I take on board the fact that as a child in care he will be subject to the overseeing of his childhood by outside agencies; but, the benefit of his staying with his current foster carer overcomes any negatives. 213. I therefore make the order approving the alternative Care Plan for long-term foster care. 214. With regard to father's contact, I give the Local Authority permission under section 34(4) to refuse father's contact. I approve the reduction of mother's contact to once every three months. I was satisfied on the evidence that C finds the fact of contact very difficult to cope with and the after-effects of that contact. He needs an opportunity, in my view, to settle with his carers. He is obviously making progress and my view is that he needs to be able to focus on that. As a child in care, his contact, of course, like that of A and B, will be subject to statutory review. 215. With regard to sibling contact I make no further comment, save to say that that will also be subject to statutory review and that I hope in future that that might take place. 216. With regard to D, the realistic options before me are as follows: (1) return to father, (2) placement; and, for completeness, I think I should consider whether foster placement should be an option. 217. I again refer to the Welfare Check List of the Adoption and Children Act. 218. Concerning the ascertainable wishes and feelings, D is too young to express these views. However, the most serious abuse was against D. How can a court consider any possibility of returning a child to the father? It cannot. 219. The Child's Needs Through its Life. D Needs a Safe and Secure Home. 220. Concerning D, Dr. Candy said that he continues to be vulnerable to environments, lacking stability, security, consistency and more. Concerning the father, she states that the father acknowledges that he is not the primary attachment figure and as a perpetrator of abuse he does not have the necessary skills and it is Dr. Candy's opinion with regard to all of those factors, that he cannot be adequately cared for - she says by the parents but I apply that to father. 221. I say with regard to father that I accept that father would love him; but, of course the problem, as I have already said in father's case, is the overwhelming problem that he is the abuser. He has been found to be the abuser. There is no indication that there is any amelioration or any reduction in the risk. There have been findings against him for physically and sexually abusing D. Although I will go through the rest of the check list, the reality is that he has to be ruled out. 222. The likely effect of the child throughout life ceasing to be a member of the original family. 223. Life story work will be done here. If D is adopted what would D think or feel about the fact that he has been adopted. He will have his life story work to help him understand what has happened. Would he feel rejected by his birth family when he knows that his brothers were not adopted? That is possible; but, this is a case where the mother has, in my view very bravely, accepted that it is best for D to be adopted. It is just the father who seeks his care. 224. It is my view that upon making an order for placement, if such is made, that there should be a recital reciting the facts, the views of the mother, that it is with reluctance and in the belief that it is in the best interests of D that she has not opposed the making of this order. 225. With regard to his age, sex and circumstances. 226. The most marked history about this child, who is aged two, is that he has been the victim of serious sexual abuse by the father. If he is returned to the father's care it is my view that he would not be safe. 227. There is no other family carer available for D and able to commit to him permanently. 228. Having assessed the options, only placement for adoption will do. 229. The Care Plan sets out post-adoption two-way letterbox contact for D with mother. This is in his interests. I endorse that. In the context of the findings and the father's non-acceptance, I see no benefit to D at all for there being letterbox contact with the father. 230. I remind myself that the test for severing the relationship between the parent and child is very strict and only in exceptional circumstances where there are overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short where nothing else will do. I recognise the Article 8 rights of D and of mother and father; but, again, I come to the conclusion that nothing else will do. 231. I remind myself that the court cannot make a Placement Order unless there is a Care Order. 232. I am satisfied that the conditions of section 31(2), as I have indicated, are met. Threshold is met and I am satisfied that the Care Plan for placement adoption is the only possible order that can be made. 233. I therefore order that upon the court finding the facts in the threshold document as proved, as per the fact finding, it is ordered that there is a Care Order. 234. I remind myself that I must only make a Placement Order if the court is satisfied the parents have consented or that consent should be dispensed with. I remind myself under section 52(1) that a court cannot dispense with consent unless one of the reasons being the welfare of the child requires it. It is my view that the welfare of D does require it. I therefore dispense with the consent of both the mother and the father and I make the Placement Orders. 235. I consider all orders are necessary and proportionate to the needs of the respective children. 236. In the context of the delays on the part of the Local Authority in filing their final evidence I requested the Social Workers involved in this case to file statements to explain what had happened. I have now read those statements. 237. It is my view that the delays have occurred are as a result of human resources and staffing issues. That is the reason; but, I must stress that in a case such as this, those issues provide no excuse. In this case I am concerned that the Local Authority lost focus, as a result of which the timetable was constricted unnecessarily. I hope that the Local Authority will view this case as one where lessons might be learnt and mistakes should not be repeated. 238. I have logged the details of the delays in this case and also the details with regard to the issue of contact with the child after findings were made. I will certainly not expect these to be repeated. 239. That concludes my judgment. ---------------------- BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2017/97.html