Celestial Aviation Trading Ireland Limited & Ors v Volga-Dnper Logistics B.V.

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1394 (Comm) Case No: CL-2022-000249 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES COMMERCIAL COURT Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL Date: 06 June 2025 Before : Nigel Cooper KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Between : (1) CELESTIAL AVIATION TRADING Claimants IRELAND LIMITED (2) CELESTIAL AVIATION TRADING 27 (3) CELESTIAL AVIATION TRADING 6 LIMITED LIMITED (4) CELESTIAL AVIATION TRADING 23 LIMITED - and - VOLGA-DNPER LOGISTICS B. V. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Defendant RUPERT ALLEN KC (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills LLP) for the CLAIMANTS NATHALIE KOH (instructed by CANDEY) for the DEFENDANT Hearing date: On Paper - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JUDGMENT ON COSTS Judgment Approved Nigel Cooper KC Nigel Cooper KC: CATI Ltd & Ors V-D L BV 1. In this judgment, I adopt the same definitions as are used in my Order of 13 May 2025 (“the Order”) and in my judgment of the same date (“the Judgment”). 2. By the Order, I dismissed the Variation Application and gave directions for the service of written submissions by the parties for any application by the Defendant for permission to appeal and in respect of the Claimants’ application for the Defendant to pay their costs of the Variation Application summarily assessed in the amount of £244,518.10 within 14 days. 3. The Defendant has not sought permission to appeal from me. Nor did the Defendant dispute in principle that it should pay the Claimants’ costs of the Variation Application in circumstances where I had dismissed that application. By written submissions dated 16 May 2025, the Defendant challenged the quantum of the Claimants’ costs and sought a form of order, which postponed the Defendant’s obligation to pay costs until either (i) it has a licence from OFSI to make payment or (ii) it ceases to be prohibited by sanctions from paying such costs without an OFSI licence. As to the amount of any costs to be paid, the Defendant submitted that the appropriate sum was £134,484.96 (or 55% of the sum claimed by the Claimants) and provided some detailed reasons as to why this should be. In support of its case as to the appropriate form of order, the Defendant submitted that: a. There would, otherwise, be a real risk that it will breach the Russia Regulations. b. The Claimants had not given any assurance that they will not pursue the Defendant for contempt, should the Defendant fail to make any costs payment ordered. c. The Court is entitled to consider the appropriate form of order afresh and is not limited to considering whether the test for variation of an original order is satisfied. 4. By written reply submissions dated 20 May 2025, the Claimants did not accept the reasons on which the Defendant challenged the amount claimed by them for costs but, taking account of the fact that the Defendant’s existing liabilities already significantly exceed its available assets, were prepared to accept that their costs be assessed at 55%, namely £134,484.96. As to the form of order, the Claimants opposed the Defendant’s submission that the order should allow for postponement of the Defendant’s obligation to pay the Claimants’ costs until either an OFSI licence was available or there was no longer any prohibition on the Defendant paying the costs without an OFSI licence. The Claimants opposed the form of order sought by the Defendant on the same grounds on which it had opposed the Variation Application noting in particular that at paragraphs [34] to [40] of the Judgment, I had already held that: a. UK sanctions were of limited relevance in circumstances where the only available assets were the ING Funds, which were insufficient to pay the interim payments ordered by Bryan J. Judgment Approved Nigel Cooper KC CATI Ltd & Ors V-D L BV b. There were significant difficulties with the Defendant’s submissions as to the effect of the Russia Regulations, since the giving of a payment instruction by the Defendant outside the United Kingdom would not involve any breach of the Russia Regulations and I was not persuaded that there would be a real risk of any breach of the Russia Regulations from the mere receipt of funds into a UK bank account, nor of the commission of any other criminal offence. 5. The Claimants were prepared to give an assurance that they would not pursue the Defendant for contempt of court in the event of a failure to satisfy any costs payment ordered. The Claimants submitted that the appropriate order was that the Defendant should pay the assessed costs to the Claimants within 14 days in the usual way. 6. In circumstances where it is now agreed between the parties that the Claimants’ costs should be assessed in the sum of £134,484.96, I summarily assess the Claimants’ costs in that amount. 7. So far as the form of order is concerned, I do not accept the Defendant’s submissions as to the appropriate form of order. I accept that I am entitled to consider the form of order afresh. But, I am not persuaded that there are any good reasons why I should make any other order than one which requires the Defendant to pay the Claimants’ assessed costs within 14 days. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the order to which the Claimants are entitled, in particular for the reasons set out in paragraphs 34 to 40 of the Judgment and taking into account the assurance given by the Claimants, is that the Defendant should pay the Claimants’ costs summarily assessed in the sum of £134,484.96 within 14 days of the date of the Order. 8. An order in these terms accompanies this judgment.