Director of Public Prosecutions v Wells & Anor

Director of Public Prosecutions v Wells & Anor

Section 89 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 applies to prosecutions for exceeding temporary speed limits imposed under section 14, and the Divisional Court is not bound by Platten v Gowing, whose relevant remarks were obiter and per incuriam. The statutory amendments since Platten have removed any distinction in penalty or procedure between sections 16 and 89.

Parties
Claimant: Director of Public Prosecutions; Defendant: Wells; Defendant: Halliwell
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
12 December 2007
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Crown Court on Case Stated
Outcome
appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Speeding Offences, Temporary Speed Restrictions, Statutory Interpretation

Case Brief

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Parties

Director of Public Prosecutions

Claimant

Wells

Defendant

Halliwell

Defendant

Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Crown Court on Case Stated

  1. 1 Whether prosecution for exceeding a temporary speed limit imposed under section 14 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 can be brought under section 89 of the same Act
  2. 2 Whether the decision in Platten v Gowing remains binding and precludes prosecution under section 89 for temporary speed limits

Ratio Decidendi

Section 89 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 applies to prosecutions for exceeding temporary speed limits imposed under section 14, and the Divisional Court is not bound by Platten v Gowing, whose relevant remarks were obiter and per incuriam. The statutory amendments since Platten have removed any distinction in penalty or procedure between sections 16 and 89.

Court Disposition

appeal allowed

Orders

  • Matter remitted to Crown Court at Southampton for continuation of hearing
  • No order as to costs