West Berkshire District Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2304 (KB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION Case No: KB-2025-004667 Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 7 September 2026 Before: HHJ Sylvia de Bertodano sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge West Berkshire District Council Claimant - and – (1) UK LAND HOLDINGS 1 LTD Defendants (2) CAROLINE BERRY (3) NORA CONNORS (4) PATRICK FAGAN CONNORS (5) JIMMY O’CONNORS (6) JOHNNY WALL (7) PATRICK JAMES CONNORS (8) JOHN JUDE O’BRIEN (9) MICHAEL WALL (10) JERRY GROGAN (11) RICHARD O’BRIEN (12) JOSEPH DOYLE (13) NOREEN FLYN (14) PATRICK STOKES (15) BERNARD STOKES (16) TOMMY STOKES (17) VINCENT CRUMLISH (18) HUGHIE STOKES (19) BENJIT SINGH DHESI (20) THOMAS FLYNN (21) MARTIN STOKES (22) PERSONS UNKNOWN (THOSE WITH AN

INTEREST IN OR INTENDING TO

UNDERTAKE WORKS OR INTENDING TO OCCUPY THE LAND KNOWN AS “LAND SOUTH OF READING ROAD, ALDERMASTON, READING”) () CHRISTY STOKES (23) GHEORGHE GHEORGE (24) RODICA GHEORGHE (25) OWEN STOKES (26) THOMAS STOKES (27) PATRICK CRUMLISH (28) CHRISTOPHER RYAN (29) CHRISTOPHER STOKES (30) JAMES FLYNN (31) SERGU CACUI (32) NICOLE FILIPOPILSCHI (33) PATRICK STOKES (34) MICHAEL BERRY (35) MARGARITA CONNORS (36) JAMES CONNORS (37) SHANNON CONNORS (38) PATRICK CONNORS (39) FRIDA CONNORS (4) ELIZABETH WALL (41) BRIDGET O’BRIEN (42) DONNA WALL (43) RACHEL FLYNN (44) PATRICK WALL (45) EILEEN WALL (46) MICHAEL WARD (47) SINNITA WARD (48) WILLIAM HARTY (49) JANETTE O’SHAUGHNESSY (50) MICHAEL CORCORAN (51) EILEEN CORCORAN (52) FRANCIS CORCORAN (53) WINIFRED STOKES (54) MARTIN STOKES (55) BERNADETTE DOHERTY (56) JOHN MONGAN (57) RACHEL O’BRIEN (58) JOHN WARD (59) DEBBIE STOKES (60) CHRISTOPHER KIELY (61) MARTIN JOYCE (62) HELEN STOKES (63) MICHAEL STOKES (64) MARGARET STOKES (65) MICHAEL WARD, Plot 12A (66) MICHAEL WARD, Plot 1 (67) JOHN WARD, Plot 18 (68) JOHN EDWARD WARD, Plot 1 (69) JOSEPH MCDONAGH, Plot 12B (70) EDWARD JAMES BARRETT, Plot 16 (71) EDWARD MCDONAGH, Plot 12 (72) JAMES MCDONAGH, Plot 12A (73) JIMMY CONNORS, Plot 4 (74) DANNY MAURICE DARLING, Plot 20 Emmaline LAMBERT (instructed by Nicola Thomas, Service Lead, Legal & Democratic Services for West Berkshire District Council) for the Claimant Alan MASTERS (instructed by Brilliance Solicitors) for the Defendants Numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10,11, 12, 13, 35, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67 Hearing dates: 8-10 June and 8 July 2026 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

JUDGMENT This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00 am on Monday 7th September, 2026, by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ............................. Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. The Claimant is the Local Planning Authority for an area including the land “south of Aldermaston Road, Aldermaston, Reading”, edged in red on the plan attached to this order (hereinafter “the Land”). The list of Defendants, which has been added to and subtracted from over time, comprises persons who have or have expressed or demonstrated an interest in the Land. The first Defendant is the original owner of the Land, and has not objected to the continuation of the order. The second to 13th Defendants were all named on an invalid planning application dated 31 October 2025 for change of use of the Land to a traveller site with 13 plots. The 14th to 21st Defendants have applications pending for transfers of parcels of land. Other Defendants have been added and removed as the Council has become aware of individuals with interests in the Land, or have been informed by Brilliance Solicitors that they are instructed for further Defendants. Brilliance Solicitors represent all the Defendants now named as parties in these proceedings with the exception of the 1st Defendant and the 22nd Defendant. The 22nd Defendant is identified only as “Persons Unknown” and refers to other persons with an interest in or intending to undertake works on or occupy the Land. On 18 December 2025 on a without notice application Cotter J granted the Claimant an interim injunction in relation to the Land

(“the First Order”). This prohibited Defendants from allowing the use of the Land for human habitation, and from bringing items onto the Land, and from building structures on the Land. An exception was made for the caravan inhabited by a single family at the time of the injunction. Provision was made for alternative service, including service as follows: “Affixing sealed copies of the Order in transparent waterproof envelopes at conspicuous locations at the accesses to the Land, at each separate plot within the Land and on each of the caravans/mobile homes on the Land and on stakes, at various intervals within the Land where possible.” This was effected on 19 December 2025. There was also provision for service by posting to known addresses. On 12 January 2026 at an inter partes hearing at which Defendants were not present but were represented, a further order was made by Tim Moloney K. C. sitting as a deputy High Court Judge (“the Second Order”) under which the terms of the First Order were continued “until the final hearing date or further order”. There was a similar provision for alternative service, which was effected on 13 January 2026. The Claimant made an application dated 1 July 2026 applying to add 10 further named defendants who have come to the Claimant’s attention either by virtue of correspondence from Brilliance Solicitors or by virtue of the latest

planning applications. The application is granted, and the persons are added to the list of defendants at numbers 65-74. The four-day hearing before this court is the application of the represented Defendants to vary the terms of the First Order on the basis that their occupation should not be prohibited. It was adjourned on a number of occasions for reasons which are not necessary to detail in this judgment. Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 9. The Claimant argues that the terms of the First Order as granted on 18 December 2025 and continued on 12 January 2026 should remain in effect. Factual Background 10. Towards the end of August 2025 reports began to be received that there was suspicious activity around the Land suggestive of an intention for development. Activity increased over the weekend of 1-2 November 2025. On 3 November 2025 West Berkshire Council received a planning application for the creation of 13 pitches on the Land. On 4 November 2025 Senior Planning Enforcement Officer Fenella Woods visited the site with two colleagues. She served a Temporary Stop Notice requiring cessation of all works.

11. Work did not stop, and on 18 December the Claimant obtained an ex parte injunction (“the First Order”) which was sealed and served on site on 19 December. Works continued thereafter, and a second injunction in the same terms was obtained on the return date, 12 January 2026, and served on 13 January. A number of defendants were represented at this hearing. They applied for a variation, and the application for variation was adjourned and was eventually heard in the four-day hearing following which I now give judgment.

12. In the meantime, there were further applications for planning permission. Sixteen planning applications were received on 26 May 2026. All were incorrectly completed and therefore invalid. At the date of hearing, over eight months since the works started, there was still no valid application for planning permission in relation to the Land.

13. Works have continued throughout the period since the service of the First Order and the Second Order. Many more structures have been brought on to the Land. There is now a large number of families living on the Land on at least 22 separate pitches. 14. 15.

16. On 22 May 2026 an Enforcement Notice was served by the Claimant, alleging “a change of use of the land as a residential caravan site for the stationing of caravans and occupation for residential purposes by gypsy and traveller households.” The notice came into effect on 1 July and gave an 8-week time period for residential occupation to cease. This expires on 26 August unless the Defendants appeal, which they state in the Skeleton Argument submitted in these proceedings they intend to do “as soon as practical”. The Defendants “are happy to undertake to appeal the notice as soon as possible and also to undertake that they will leave the land within the compliance period set on appeal should they not succeed in their appeal.” I note that this is a hypothetical undertaking to do what in any event they would be obliged to do if they failed in their appeal. But it may be that the undertaking means that they no longer intend to apply for planning permission if their appeal is refused. I note that there is no evidence that any of the families were present in the area before their occupation of the Land. It appears that they came from other parts of the country, and from Ireland. They were not people towards whom the Claimant had any obligations in advance of their travelling to this local authority area and taking up residence on the Land. I also note that The Claimant has

demonstrated a five-year supply of Gypsy and Traveller sites. It has updated its five-year supply statement since Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others Fenella Woods’ first witness statement, and Cheryl Willett confirms that the Council can still demonstrate a five year supply. This was not seriously challenged by the Defendants. Parties’ positions 17. 18. 19.

20. The Claimant’s position is that, with the exception of one family, the Defendants were not living on the Land at the time that the First Order was served, and therefore all other Defendants who are now in occupation are in contempt of the First Order. It submits that it has provided strong evidence that breaches of planning control have taken place, and that there is a real risk of further breaches. There has to date been no valid planning application. The sixteen planning applications which were received on 26 May are all invalid due to multiple deficiencies, and no further applications have been submitted since that date. The continuation of the terms of the First Order will “hold the ring” until such applications are made and considered. The Claimant does not ask for a mandatory injunction at this stage; its position is that only one family was in occupation at the time of the injunction, that is 18 December 2025; the Claimant wishes to preserve the status quo at that point. If the court were to find that more than one family was in occupation at that point, the Claimant would review its position as to whether it wished to make a further application. The Defendants’ principal argument is that many families were in occupation prior to the granting of the injunction. They therefore seek to vary that order to reflect what they say was the status quo on 18 December 2025,

allowing the Defendants to stay on the land until the final determination of their planning application. They argue that because the ex parte injunction was made on a factually incorrect basis, their Article 8 rights were engaged but were not considered. They argue that the Claimant is in fact requesting an “eviction injunction”. I note that while the Defendants say that they support a status quo injunction , preserving the status quo as it stood on 18 December, I have not been provided with a complete list of the families that the Defendants say were in occupation prior to 18 December. My understanding is that they now say that all the Defendants now joined in these proceedings, with the exception of the first Defendant and the 22nd Defendant (Persons Unknown) should be excepted from the terms of the injunction as they were all living on the Land before the First Order was served on 19 December.

21. It is therefore key to my decision to settle the factual issue of who was in residence on the Land when the First Order was made. Evidence of occupation before 18 December Claimant’s evidence 22.

23. The Claimant’s principal witness was Fenella Woods, a Senior Planning Enforcement Officer employed by the Claimant. She first visited the site with 2 colleagues on 4 November 2025 following reports of works being undertaken. She had with her 25 copies of a Temporary Stop Notice. She Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. saw a family at the front of the site, a number of men working, and a digger. She had a conversation with up to six men and when they refused to take it from her, she read out the Temporary Stop Notice. She also attached copies of it to posts at both entrances. The group of men included Joseph Doyle and John Jude O’Brien. She was told to come back on Friday 6 November when the owner would be there. On that date there were 2 static mobile homes, 9 touring caravans, and a motor home on the site. She saw Mrs O’Brien and her children. They were very settled and their caravan was nice and well looked after. On 5 November she walked past the site and did not enter. Work was continuing and the Temporary Stop Notices she had put up had been taken down. On 14 November she returned with three colleagues and two police officers to map the site. It had been raining heavily, and the site was wet and muddy. She visited a plot with a touring caravan, a static caravan, and a

silver camper van. She spoke to Mrs O’Brien who was in the touring caravan with her children. Mrs O’Brien said she lived there with her husband and children. She also spoke to a man she later found out was John Jude O’Brien. Lorries were coming in and out of the site and there was tarmac being laid. Several plots had been enclosed and two had letterboxes and number placed on them. A brown static caravan which had been there on 4 November had been moved, and was placed at a “slightly odd angle” with a generator attached to it. “It was empty but looked like it was serving as a place of respite from the weather for the workers.” All the other people she saw were men. She spoke to Richard O’Brien who told her his wife and children would join him but they were not there yet. She visited again on 15 December 2025 with three colleagues and two police officers. The purpose of the visit included seeking personal circumstances of those on the site, assessing whether further breaches of the Temporary Stop Notice had taken place, and taking photographs. Works were continuing and a layer of earth was being applied to the ground by “a caterpillar style machine with a snow plough type attachment”. The land was in poor condition and was flooded. It looked as though there was an attempt to create an area which could be laid to hardcore. The brown static mobile home was now at the centre of the

site and when she looked through the window she saw two artificial Christmas trees on the floor. The eastern part of the site was very muddy, there were lots of puddles from heavy rainfall and several fence panels had fallen down. The western part was more complete, with tarmac down, pitches fenced in and three with numbers and post boxes outside. There were three portaloos, and two generators which were not plugged in. There were fourteen caravans in total. Only the O’Brien’s plot had more than one caravan. The others had one touring caravan and nothing else. Some of the caravans had doors left open and broken windows.

31. In her statement she said as follows: The majority of the touring caravans were very old, dented, set at odd angles, and looked as if they had not been lived in for years. They gave the impression of being Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. ‘dumped’ there as a marker rather than as a place of respite. […] She produced photographs which are exhibited in the bundle. She agreed that she did not take photographs or look inside each of the caravans. Her view was that at that date the only settled base was the O’Brien plot. Cheryl Willett, a senior planning officer employed by the Claimant, also attended on 15 December. She said that there was evidence of occupation on the O’Brien site. She saw a teenage boy, but other than that, no women and children. The injunction was served by Rob Sutill on 19 December 2025 by the means specified in the First Order. He confirms that he spoke to the men present. He says that there were 15 caravans on the land – one more than when Fenella Woods had visited on 15 December 2025. He attached documents to wooden stakes in front of caravans; wooden stakes next to entrance/exits; wooden stakes around the outer perimeter; and pinned documents to fences at completed pitches. He attaches photographs. There was also service by post to multiple addresses as

set out in a table in the bundle provided to the court. On 7 January 2026 Fenella Woods returned to the site. She saw the O’Brien family. By that date there were 21 caravans and 2 static homes. The brown static caravan had gone and been replaced by a white one. There was however no evidence of further occupation. Rob Suttill confirms that he served the Second Order on 13 January at the site. On Fenella Woods’ next visit on 19 January there were many more signs of occupation; the site was busy, and she spoke to women and children who were “lovely”. The men when they arrived were more hostile. In the months following the granting of the injunction, work has continued apace on the site. When she visited on 22 May 2026 there were 22 plots instead of the original 13. Defence evidence 39. Many Defendants say that they were in occupation prior to 18 December. I heard evidence from the following: 40. Joseph Doyle (who used to use the surname O’Brien) was the original purchaser of the Land and he sold off 12 plots. He was not originally planning on living there. He was “pretty certain” he moved in to Plot 13 on 1 November with his partner and two young children. At that time there were 10-12 families living there with wives and children. He had a caravan and the brown chalet, and his motorhome arrived a day or two later. They were moving in gradually. He slept in the brown chalet a number of times before his wife arrived with the motor home. There were health visits from a lady called Eileen and another called Jade.

41. On 15 December people were preparing for Christmas. He and his family left for Christmas on 22 December and stayed away until 8 January. Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 42. 43.

44. The planning application was filled in after a two-minute phone conversation, and any errors were those of the solicitor and the planning agent. He was not on the list of families occupying; that was their error. John Jude O’Brien gave evidence that he lived in Plots 7 and 8 with his wife and four children. He said that there were others living on the Land apart from him and his family before 18 December. These included Joseph Doyle, from whom he had bought the land, and his wife and children, who were there from 1 November. There were 9-10 families, including Michael and John Ward. He did not know them all. John Ward gave evidence that he was living on Plot 1 in his caravan with his disabled brother. He had two touring caravans. He saw Ms Woods there before 18 December, but she did not knock on his door. He and his brother were both there every night between 1 and 18 December. He worked all day and took his brother with him, so if anyone knocked on the door no-one would be in.

45. Michael Ward gave evidence that he lives at Plot 15 on the site with his adult daughter who has mental health problems. He was not sure about dates, but he moved there “a lot more” than a week before Christmas. Fenella Woods came to the door of his caravan and saw him there on a day before 18 December. He bought the plot from his nephew Francis Corcoran. His daughter moved on in April 2026.

46. Michael Corcoran was unable to attend court as he was in hospital in Kent at the time of the hearing having fractured his knee. His statement says that he began occupation of Plot 14 on 16 December, and travelled away for Christmas from 21 December 2025 to 8 January 2026.

47. I have been provided with a number of other written statements by defendants who did not give evidence as follows: i. ii. iii. iv. v. Patrick Fagan Connors states that he moved onto Plot 3 on 1 November with his wife and son and two touring caravans. He travelled for Christmas on 20 December. Johnny Wall says that he and his wife and three children moved in to Plot 5 on 1 November 2025. He travelled for Christmas on 15 December leaving behind a single wheel caravan. He attaches photos of his family which appear to have been taken on various dates in November and which say “Reading” or “Reading – Aldermaston” at the top. Richard O’Brien says that he and his wife and three children were in occupation of two caravans on Plot 11 by 14 November 2025. He produces a medical letter dated 17 December from a GP Surgery in Limerick, and a maternal discharge summary for his wife showing she was in hospital in Limerick from 12-16 December. Both give home addresses in Limerick. Patrick Wall says that he and his wife and children moved on to Plot 12 on 1 November with two caravans. They travelled from 16 December to 10 January. Francis Corcoran says that he and his wife and three children began occupation of Plot 15 in mid-December 2025. (This is the same plot which Michael Ward said in evidence that he occupied with his adult daughter). Judgment Approved by the court for handing

down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others vi. Martin Stokes says that he and his family moved in to Plot 16 on 12 December with two touring caravans. They left for Christmas on 22 December. vii. viii. John Mongan says that he and his wife and four children began occupation of Plot 17 on 10 December 2025 with two touring caravans. They travelled for Christmas between 23 December and 7 January. John Ward (not to be confused with the John Ward occupying Plot 1) says he and his family began occupation of Plot 18 with two caravans on 15 December. They travelled to Ireland on 17 December, although he says that he interacted with Rob Suttill who served the First Order on 19 December. ix. Christopher Kiely says that he began occupation of Plot 19 on 10 December with two touring caravans and travelled to Ireland for Christmas on 16 December returning on 12 January. x. Martin Joyce says he and his wife and three children began occupation of Plot 20 from the end of November. He says they left on 18 December and returned on 2 January, although he also says he was on site when the injunction was served on 19 December. xi. Michael Wall says that he moved to the site on 1 November with his wife and 3 children. He has a single touring caravan and a camper van. His wife travelled for the Christmas period. He does not give dates of travel. 48.

49. Reverend Chadwick gave evidence that he has known Joseph O’Brien for some time, having married him in Winchester two and a half years ago. When the Aldermaston site came up it was seen as a real breakthrough in terms of stability. He made two visits before 18 December. He went there on 6 December and saw Joseph O’Brien and his wife and children. He saw other people but not to speak to. He noticed that there were very well-defined plots and a least a dozen of them had caravans or mobiles or both. He returned to the site on Sunday 14 December at the invitation of Joseph Doyle. It was pouring with rain. He went to two plots and went inside the caravans – Joseph Doyle’s and John O’Brien’s. He said he was “pretty clear” he saw both those families on 14 December. There were two plots where families were definitely living in caravans. Because it was a dreadful day and the ground was waterlogged he was unable to visit from plot to plot. He was outside but only briefly. He saw domestic vehicles shifting stuff, and people including women. He saw gas bottles – in his experience when you see gas bottles and saloon cars you know people are there.

50. He visited the land about five times in total; the last time was 22 January 2026 when there was a bit more activity. Findings of Fact 51.

52. I have to consider whether the Claimant has proved that the only family which was resident on the Land before 18 December was the O’Brien family on plots 7-8. Fenella Woods final visit to the Land before the obtaining of the injunction on 18 December took place on 15 December. A limited amount turns on that, as the only defendant who says that they moved onto the land between 15 and 18 December is Michael Corcoran; he says he moved in on 16 December. Christopher Kiely says he Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others travelled to Ireland on 16 December; and John Ward (Plot 18) and Martin Joyce say they travelled on 17 December, although this must be incorrect as they both say they were present when the First Order was served on 19 December.

53. Joseph Doyle’s evidence is that he was living there from 1 November. This is supported by the evidence of Reverent Chadwick, who says he saw him there on 14 December with his family in a caravan that looked “lived in”. However, I must also look to the documentary evidence. On 5 December Joseph Doyle filled in a Planning Contravention Notice (“PCN”) sent to him by the Claimant. A number of his responses on this are inconsistent with his sworn evidence. When asked “Are you the owner or occupier” of the Land his response was “I am the former owner but have sold the land into 13 smaller plots.” When asked whether he was using the Land for residential purposes, he responded “I believe the new owners are”. When asked about what structures were on the Land he replied: “I am not sure as I no longer have the land.” When asked about units present he replied: “As far as I am aware there are plans but I have no ongoing interest in the land and do not know the current situation.” 54. In addition to these responses, there is a letter from the current solicitors to the Claimant saying that they act for Joseph Doyle but that he does not occupy the land. Nor is he listed on a table of occupants provided by them for the purposes of these proceedings.

55. When Joseph Doyle made his first (undated and unsigned) statement in these proceedings, he said that Noreen Flynn occupied Plot 13 and he was “knowledgeable of [… her] circumstances.” He said her occupation began in the first week of November. He does not say that she is his wife and he was living there as well. 56. 57. 58.

59. The photographic evidence of Plot 13 shows the brown static caravan full of boxes. There is an artificial Christmas tree on the floor. There is no evidence of occupation, rather than storage. He produces a screenshot of a letter which purports to be from a Jade Kneller, Community Midwife, who says she provided “Ante-Natal and Post-Natal care” to Diamond O’ Brien at Plot 13 Reading Road “until November 2025”. I have no evidence of Diamond O’Brien’s date of birth, but it is my understanding from Mr Doyle’s evidence that she was born before the family moved on to the Land. Viewed in those terms the letter makes no sense, as ante-natal care cannot have been provided after her birth; and in any event it appears to have been sent on an unknown date from an undisclosed email address on non-headed paper, and is not accompanied by a witness statement. It therefore has little or no evidential value. Evidence of the order of a generator on 5 December does not establish occupation. Nor do furniture orders with no delivery address. I am asked by the Defendants to find that these pieces of written evidence are all incorrect, and to prefer the account given by Mr Doyle in evidence. They point to Reverend Chadwick’s evidence as support for that account. However, I do not find Mr Doyle a satisfactory witness. His evidence is undermined by accounts he has given in the past, and by the

photographic evidence. I do not consider Reverent Chadwick’s evidence alone is sufficient to disprove the Claimant’s substantial evidence that Plot 13 was not occupied before 18 December. While I do not for a moment suggest that Reverent Chadwick was giving false evidence, he visited on a number of occasions Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others both before and after the injunction proceedings, there is a clear possibility of confusion about dates, and in any event, his evidence at its highest is that he visited briefly on one occasion in the afternoon and the caravan looked “lived in”. This is not sufficient to displace the weight of evidence the Claimant has produced to show that the Doyle family was not living on Plot 13 before 18 December. There are no photographs, no social media posts, and no messages or phone evidence of any kind to show that the family were living there. Given that most people document every day of their lives on phones, I agree with the Claimant that it is extraordinary that if this family had moved into a new home they are not able to produce a single photo, social media post, or even message to a friend or family member saying that this is the case. In short, the defence have produced entirely insufficient evidence to undermine the clear evidence of the Claimant that Plot 13 was

unoccupied on 15 December. I do not need to deal with the detail of John Jude O’Brien’s evidence, as it is accepted that he was in residence with his family at the time of the injunction. He provides little detail as to who else was living on the Land, although he named Joseph Doyle and John and Michael Ward. John Ward gave evidence that he was living on Plot 1 from 1 November, but there is no evidence beyond his account to support this. Caroline Berry is listed as the owner on the original planning application. Fenella Woods’s table from 4 November shows that the plot was empty on that date. 60. 61. 62.

63. Michael Ward said that he lived on Plot 15. This is the same plot that Francis Corcoran says in his unsigned witness statement that he and his wife and children were occupying. Francis Corcoran is shown as the owner on the planning application. Michael Ward was unsure about dates in evidence, and said at one stage that it could have been as late as 20 December when he moved in. A photograph taken by Fenella Woods on 15 December shows Plot 15 has nothing on it at all.

64. Michael Corcoran says that he moved onto Plot 14 with his children aged 12, 10 and 15 on 16 December. The Claimant’s evidence shows that the plot was empty on 15 December, and had a single tourer caravan in place on 7 January. A static caravan was not moved on until 19 January. Given that there is no evidence supporting occupation before the date of the injunction, beyond the assertion of the witness, I find that the Claimant has proved that the Plot was not occupied on 18 December. 65. 66.

67. A number of other witnesses made statements saying that they were living on the land before the injunction of 18 December. They do not include occupants of Plots 2, 3, 4, 4a, 6, 9, 10, 12a, 12b, 21 and 22. I have to consider these statements and this evidence in context of the evidence, including the photographic exhibits, of Fenella Woods. I find the evidence of the Defendants as to their occupation entirely unconvincing. It is in each case unsupported by any convincing documentary or photographic evidence. Had all these families been living on the site when Fenella Woods visited on 15 December, there would have been ample evidence of occupation. On the Defendants’ own accounts, there would have been at least 25 caravans, motorhomes or mobile homes, in addition to the two on the O’Brien plot, as well as any on the plots which I Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. am told were occupied but in respect of which there are no witness statements. Instead, there is a set of photographs of a muddy and waterlogged site on which there are individual touring caravans with no signs of occupation. There were 14 caravans in total. Two of these were on the O’Brien’s plot. The others had one touring caravan and nothing else. Some of them had doors left open and broken windows. The brown static was

full of boxes and was clearly being used for storage. The presence of two artificial Christmas trees, lying on the floor and undecorated, does nothing to undermine the assertion that the static was unoccupied. Only Michael Corcoran says that he moved in after Fenella Woods’s visit on 15 December 2025. While a number of Defendants say they went away for Christmas, none say that they travelled before her visit; John Wall says he and his family travelled on the day of her visit. So, with the exception of Michael Corcoran, the Defendants’ position is that the residential occupation on 19 December was the same as it was on 15 December. According to Fenella Woods, the number of caravans on 15 December other than those on the O’Brien plot, 7-8, was 12; this is consistent with the evidence of Rob Sutill, the process server, that there were 13 caravans when he served the injunction on 19 December. Fenella Woods’s evidence is that there were single caravans which were “old, dented, set at odd angles, and looked as if they hadn’t been lived in for years.” This is entirely inconsistent with the picture given in defence witness statements of many recently settled families with women and numerous children in full occupation. It is clear from Fenella Woods’s account and from the photographs that the site was not fit for family occupation at this time, and there was very significant work being

undertaken in order to make it ready for families to move in. I am provided with a large number of receipts showing that Defendants have made purchases of items for residential habitation such as tiles and carpets; this is entirely consistent with that factual scenario. I also take into account the fact that the Defendants have produced no evidence of occupation beyond their own accounts. I have said this in relation to the Doyle family, but I add more generally, that it is incredible that if these families had all moved in over the preceding weeks they are not able to produce one photograph, personal message, or social media post to show that this momentous event in their lives had taken place. The screenshots of photographs produced by Johnny Wall and attached to his unsigned and undated statement, even setting aside the fact that a screenshot can be easily manipulated as to date and location, cannot begin to prove that the family were resident on the site at the time they were taken. They show people in a caravan. There is no indication of the exact location of the caravan, and he did not give evidence at the hearing so that his account could be tested.

73. I do not intend to go through each piece of evidence, but I say in general terms that evidence of receipts showing items purchased or delivered do not demonstrate residential use. Screenshots of photographs are impossible to date, and in any event show a site under construction and not residential occupation. Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 74.

75. Against this I weigh the clear evidence and photographs produced by Fenella Woods which demonstrates that on dates on which she visited up to and including 15 December there was a great deal of construction activity, but no residential occupation, other than that of the O’Brien family. Assertions that people travelled to other locations for the Christmas period is not supported by any evidence of travel, and in any event, almost all say they travelled after 15 December. For all these reasons I find as a fact that the only family which was in occupation on 19 December when the injunction was served was the family of John Jude O’Brien on Plots 7-8. All others have moved onto the land in breach of that injunction. Planning permission 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

81. The defence case is that planning permission is being sought, and is likely to be granted. The Claimant argues that if a valid application is made it is highly unlikely to succeed, and cites a number of harms, which are summarised at paragraph 13.8 of the planning assessment as loss of green infrastructure, ecological harm, landscape harm, drainage, intentional unauthorised development, and overall conflict with the development plan as a whole. However, there is another very specific matter which would need to be taken into account in consideration of a planning application. It is a particular feature of this case that the Land is located very close to the entrance to a nuclear facility, AWE Aldermaston. The Claimant submits that this gives rise to serious issues of public safety and national security. AWE Aldermarston is one of only two sites in the UK responsible for the design, manufacture and maintenance of nuclear warheads. It is subject to the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2019 (“REPPIR”). This provides regulations which set out a precautionary approach to emergencies which have the potential to cause catastrophic harm. AWE Aldermarston is required to have an Off- Site Emergency Plan (“OSEP”). It cannot operate unless an adequate plan is in place. It is the duty of the Claimant to ensure that the public is adequately protected in

case of an emergency. There is a Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (“DEPZ”) into which the Land falls. The regulator is the Office for Nuclear Regulation (“ONR”). The ONR has stated in a letter of 23 April 2026 that occupants of this site on the Land are vulnerable. It states: “if ONR’s advice is sought on a planning application for this site, it is highly likely that we will ‘advise against’ the development unless the Local Authority can provide assurance that it can be accommodated within the OSEP.” I heard evidence from a number of witnesses on this issue. Tom Bennington is a senior civil servant working in the Defence Nuclear Organisation as part of the Warhead Group. He gave evidence as to the critical importance of AWE Aldermaston for the UK’s deterrent programme, and said that it will not be able to carry on its work if there is not an adequate OSEP. The OSEP is already under significant pressure. Any increase in population density increases the pressure. This puts the operation of AWE Aldermaston at risk. Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 82. Witness AE is head of delivery for AWE Aldermaston’s operational facilities. He confirmed that it is impossible for work at AWE Aldermaston to continue while the OSEP is inadequate. People in caravans are classed as being more vulnerable under REPPIR as caravans provide less protection than brick structures. The development on the Land places people who are vulnerable in very close proximity to the nuclear facility, and there is no adequate shelter. The fact that an emergency incident is unlikely does not mean those who run the facility are not obliged to provide for it. 83.

84. Carolyn Richardson is the service manager for the joint emergency planning unit for three councils including the Claimant. She said that while the ONR have not said that the OSEP is inadequate, they have expressed serious concerns particularly in relation to population creep. Any increase in population is likely to put the OSEP at severe risk of being deemed inadequate. While a ‘no notice’ event is unlikely, if it were to happen it would be in the highest impact category. The vulnerability of this site means that resources would have to be diverted towards it and away from the existing population. She has tried to assess the potential planning application and would strongly advise against it being granted. It is difficult to compare with decisions on other sites, in particular with cases before REPPIR came into force in 2019. All decisions are fact specific. There has been significant change in the attitude to risk. In response the Defendants called Dr Pearce, a nuclear physicist who has worked for Nuclear Electric and is a fellow of the Emergency Planning Society. He was Head of Emergency Planning at Nuclear Electric and successor companies for 9 years. He gave evidence that there were matters which would make this planning problem less of an issue. The DEPZ is bigger than it needs to be – if it were reduced in size, while the Land would clearly still be within it,

resources would go further. According to ONR’s own guidance, a nuclear site should not have a release that required shelter more than once in 100,000 years. Therefore the actual risk is minimal. Providing bomb shelters would be disproportionate to the risk. In his opinion, AWE Aldermaston do not have the power to say that the OSEP is inadequate, and therefore to discontinue operations. If the plan is about to fail, the first step would be to fix the plan. In any event, this is a small number of residences and is not a very big addition to the OSEP. The risk is not a reason for not allowing people to live here. It is correct that there would be a resource problem in an emergency, but the OSEP only requires the council to do what is reasonably practicable. They can add more resource. In any event, a Secretary of State would be far more likely to invoke an exemption than risk the continuous at sea nuclear deterrent.

85. Having summarised the evidence on this particular issue, I deal with it to the limited extent I need to in the following section. Discussion 86. I deal first with the fact that the 22nd Defendant is identified only as “Persons Unknown”. This refers to those other than named Defendants who have an interest in the Land or in undertaking works to the Land or are intending to undertake works to the Land or entering onto the Land intending to occupy the Land in breach of planning control. I deal with this briefly, as although “persons unknown” are included as a Defendant, as the injunction is intended to cover anyone who might intend to come to the land in the future, the real substance of this case relates to those currently residing on the land, who comprise almost all the named defendants. Every effort has been made Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 87. 88. by both parties to identify all the defendants possible, and is hoped that the list now includes every Defendant, but due to the ever changing number of people at the site it is important that this injunction should continue to include potential newcomers, otherwise there is a real risk that it would not be effective. In Wolverhampton City Council and Others v London Gypsies and Travellers and Others [2023] UKSC47 (hereinafter “the Wolverhampton

judgment”) the Supreme Court found that the granting of injunctions against “newcomers” is not constitutionally improper. In section 5 of the judgment at paragraph 187 the Supreme Court provided guidance on the practical application of the principles affecting an application for a newcomer injunction against Gypsies and Travellers. In summary: (1) There must be a compelling justification for the remedy; (2) There must be evidence of threat of abusive trespass or planning breach; (3) Identification or other definition of the intended respondents to the application must be as precise as possible; (4) The prohibited acts must be spelt out clearly and in everyday terms; (5) There must be strict geographical and temporal limits; (6) The application must be advertised in advance; (7) Effective notice of the order must be given; (8) There must be liberty to apply; (9) Costs protection may be appropriate; (10) A cross-undertaking in damages must be considered. In this case there is compelling justification in the fact that land in a highly sensitive location has been occupied and developed without planning permission and in breach of a Temporary Stop Notice and interim injunction. There is clear evidence of planning breaches. As many Defendants as possible have been identified, but the changing population of the Land means that others who are unknown to the Court at this stage and who

intend to develop or live on the land should be included. The prohibited acts are clearly spelt out and the geographical and temporal limits are clear. The application has been advertised in advance and proper notice was given in the manner set out in the previous two orders. Liberty to apply is included. There is no indication that costs protection or a cross undertaking in damages are appropriate.

89. Turning then to the substance of this application: Section 187(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides as follows: (1) Where a local planning authority consider it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction, they may apply to the court for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise any of their other powers under this Part. (2) On an application under subsection (1) the court may grant such an injunction as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining the breach. (3) Rules of court may provide for such an injunction to be issued against a person whose identity is unknown.

90. The exercise of the Court’s discretion in the granting of such injunctions is considered by the House of Lords in South Bucks District Council v Porter [2003] 2AC 558. Their conclusions are conveniently summarised in Davis v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council [2004] EWCA Civ 194 at paragraph 34: Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 1) Section 187B confers on the courts an original and discretionary, not a supervisory, jurisdiction, so that a defendant seeking to resist injunctive relief is not restricted to judicial review grounds; 2) it is questionable whether Article 8 adds anything to the existing equitable duty of a court in the exercise of its discretion under section 187B; 3) the jurisdiction is to be exercised with due regard to the purpose for which was conferred, namely to restrain breaches of planning control, and flagrant and prolonged defiance by a defendant of the relevant planning controls and procedures may weigh heavily in favour of injunctive relief; 4) however, it is inherent in the injunctive remedy that its grant depends on a court's judgment of all the circumstances of the case; 5) although a court would not examine matters of planning policy and judgment, since those lay within the exclusive purview of the responsible local planning authority, it will consider whether, and the

extent to which, the local planning authority has taken account of the personal circumstances of the defendant and any hardship that injunctive relief might cause, and it is not obliged to grant relief simply because a planning authority considered it necessary or expedient to restrain a planning breach; 6) having had regard to all the circumstances of the case, the court will only grant an injunction where it is just and proportionate to do so, taking account, inter alia, of the rights of the person or persons against whom injunctive relief is sought, and of whether it is relief with which that person or persons can and reasonably ought to comply.

91. Guidance on the relevant factors to be considered is set out in paragraphs 38-42 of the judgment of Brown LJ in the Court of Appeal decision in South Bucks District Council v Porter, quoted with approval by Lord Bingham in the House of Lords decision as follows: 20. The Court of Appeal's ruling on the approach to section 187B was expressed in five paragraphs of Simon Brown LJ's judgment, which I must quote in extenso : “The approach to section 187B 38. I would unhesitatingly reject the more extreme submissions made on either side. It seems to me perfectly clear that the judge on a section 187B application is not required, nor even entitled, to reach his own independent view of the planning merits of the case. These he is required to take as decided within the planning process, the actual or anticipated breach of planning control being a given when he comes to exercise his discretion. But it seems to me no less plain that the judge should not grant injunctive relief unless he would be prepared if necessary to contemplate committing the defendant to prison for breach of the order, and that he would not be of this mind unless he had considered for himself all questions of hardship for the defendant and his family if required to move, necessarily including, therefore, the availability of suitable alternative sites. I cannot accept that the consideration of those matters is, as

Burton J suggested was the case in the pre-1998 Act era, ‘entirely foreclosed’ at the injunction stage. Questions of the family's health and education will inevitably be of relevance. But so too, of course, will countervailing considerations such as the need to enforce planning control in the general interest and, importantly therefore, the planning history of the site. The degree and flagrancy of the postulated breach of planning control may well prove critical. If conventional enforcement measures have failed over a prolonged period of time to remedy the breach, then the court would obviously be Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others the readier to use its own, more coercive powers. Conversely, however, the court might well be reluctant to use its powers in a case where enforcement action had never been taken. On the other hand, there might be some urgency in the situation sufficient to justify the pre-emptive avoidance of an anticipated breach of planning control. Considerations of health and safety might arise. Preventing a gipsy moving onto the site might, indeed, involve him in less hardship than moving him out after a long period of occupation. Previous planning decisions will always be relevant; how relevant, however, will inevitably depend on a variety of matters, including not least how recent they

are, the extent to which considerations of hardship and availability of alternative sites were taken into account, the strength of the conclusions reached on land use and environmental issues, and whether the defendant had and properly took the opportunity to make his case for at least a temporary personal planning permission. 39 Relevant too will be the local authority's decision under section 187B(1) to seek injunctive relief. They, after all, are the democratically elected and accountable body principally responsible for planning control in their area. Again, however, the relevance and weight of their decision will depend above all on the extent to which they can be shown to have had regard to all the material considerations and to have properly posed and approached the article 8(2) questions as to necessity and proportionality. 40 Whilst it is not for the court to question the correctness of the existing planning status of the land, the court in deciding whether or not to grant an injunction (and, if so, whether and for how long to suspend it) is bound to come to some broad view as to the degree of environmental damage resulting from the breach and the urgency or otherwise of bringing it to an end. In this regard the court need not shut its mind to the possibility of the planning authority itself coming to reach a different planning judgment in the case. 41 True it is, as

Mr McCracken points out, that, once the planning decision is taken as final, the legitimate aim of preserving the environment is only achievable by removing the gipsies from site. That is not to say, however, that the achievement of that aim must always be accepted by the court to outweigh whatever countervailing rights the gipsies may have, still less that the court is bound to grant injunctive (least of all immediate injunctive) relief. Rather I prefer the approach suggested by the 1991 Circular: the court's discretion is absolute and injunctive relief is unlikely unless properly thought to be ‘commensurate’ — in today's language, proportionate. The approach in the Hambleton case [1995] 3 PLR 8 seems to me difficult to reconcile with that circular. However, whatever view one takes of the correctness of the Hambleton approach in the period prior to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 , to my mind it cannot be thought consistent with the court's duty under section 6(1) to act compatibly with convention rights. Proportionality requires not only that the injunction be appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the public interest objective sought — here the safeguarding of the environment — but also that it does not impose an excessive burden on the individual whose private interests — here the gipsy's private life and home and the retention of his ethnic

identity — are at stake. 42 I do not pretend that it will always be easy in any particular case to strike the necessary balance between these competing interests, interests of so different a Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 92. character that weighing one against the other must inevitably be problematic. This, however, is the task to be undertaken by the court and, provided it is undertaken in a structured and articulated way, the appropriate conclusion should emerge.” The court is therefore engaged in assessing proportionality. It must weigh the public interest not only in safeguarding the environment, but also in ensuring that planning procedures are adhered to, against the rights of individuals, in this case the Defendants. In this case, I am being asked by the Claimant not to put in place a new injunction, but to continue the terms of an existing injunction which has been continuously and flagrantly breached by the Defendants coming on to the Land in defiance of it. At the time the First Order was made, due weight was given to the consideration that “[p]reventing a gipsy moving onto the site might, indeed, involve him in less hardship than moving him out after a long period of occupation.” This is evidenced by the exception made for the O’Brien family. The fact that it is now being pressed on the court that people will suffer hardship if they are required to move out of sites they have now occupied for some time is the result of the fact that they moved on to them in breach of an order of this court prohibiting them from doing so. That is a factor that weighs heavily in the balancing exercise.

93. There is clear authority for the proposition that personal circumstances cannot be used to outflank court orders in Brentwood BC v Buckley [2021] EWHC 2477 (QB) in which Kerr J said at paragraphs 8-9: 8. […] It is well known on Court of Appeal authority that the court should not countenance a strategy of non-compliance coupled with an application to vary or discharge an order by means of the planning permission regime.

9. That would be, as it was put in the leading case, to cock a snook at the court. Rather, the party in breach of an order should first comply with it and, from a position of compliance, seek to get rid of it by legitimate and lawful means.

94. In Cheshire East BC v Maloney [2021] EWHC 350 (QB) Turner J said: 52. However, notwithstanding these features, to which I pay full regard in accordance with the decided cases, I am entirely satisfied that it would be wrong to countenance the continued presence of the five additional caravans. There is a strong public interest in ensuring that orders of the court are obeyed and that, all other things being equal, disobedience to such orders are not thereafter deployed to forensic advantage.

95. There is also authority for the proposition that suspension of an injunction to enforce planning laws should not be readily granted. In Mid Bedfordshire DC v Brown [2004] EWCA Civ 1709, the local authority claimant appealed a decision of the High Court suspending an injunction pending the determination of the planning application. In reviewing authorities in this respect Mummery LJ giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal said as follows: 8. The authorities contain an informative debate on the variety of competing interests and discretionary considerations which the court should take into account: the decision of the Council to seek an order; the practical problems of enforcement facing the court if the injunction is breached; the Council's position on the planning merits; the possibility that the Council might come to a different planning judgment; Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others the planning history of the site; the degree of flagrancy of the breach of planning controls; the availability of suitable alternative sites for the defendants; the degree of urgency in the application; the need to act compatibly with the human rights of the defendants guaranteed by article 8 of the European Convention with regard to respect for their home and private life; the personal circumstances of the defendants and

the personal hardship likely to be inflicted on them as a result of an injunction enforcing the planning controls by requiring them to move on, including humanitarian considerations of health, safety and education, in particular those adversely affecting any children involved; the length of the defendants' occupation of the land; any delay on the part of the Council in taking action; and any other relevant conduct and circumstances of the parties.

96. At paragraphs 25-28 he continued: 25. In our judgment, the judge's decision to suspend the injunction pending the determination of the planning application did not take proper account of the vital role of the court in upholding the important principle that the orders of the court are meant to be obeyed and not to be ignored with impunity. The order itself indicated to the defendants the correct way in which to challenge the injunction. It contained an express provision giving the defendants liberty to apply, on prior notice, to discharge or modify the order. The proper course for the defendants to take, if they wished to challenge the order, was to apply to the court to discharge or vary it. If that failed, the proper course was to seek to appeal. Instead of even attempting to follow the correct procedure, the defendants decided to press on as originally planned and as if no court order had ever been made. They cocked a snook at the court. They did so in order to steal a march on the Council and to achieve the very state of affairs which the order was designed to prevent. No explanation or apology for the breaches of the court order was offered to the judge or to this court. 26.. The practical effect of suspending the injunction has been to allow the defendants to change the use of the land and to retain the benefit of occupation of the land with caravans for residential

purposes. This was in defiance of a court order properly served on them and correctly explained to them. In those circumstances there is a real risk that the suspension of the injunction would be perceived as condoning the breach. This would send out the wrong signal, both to others tempted to do the same and to law-abiding members of the public. The message would be that the court is prepared to tolerate contempt of its orders and to permit those who break them to profit from their contempt. 27.. The effect of that message would be to diminish respect for court orders, to undermine the authority of the court and to subvert the rule of law. In our judgment, those overarching public interest considerations far outweigh the factors which favour a suspension of the injunction so as to allow the defendants to keep their caravans on the land and to continue to reside there in breach of planning control. 28.. We would add that the defendants would have attracted more sympathy from the court for their plight, if they had embarked on their plans to purchase and establish a caravan site, so that they could integrate with the community, by taking steps to obtain a site which had a reasonable prospects of being granted planning permission, by following the proper procedures for obtaining the necessary permission and by awaiting the outcome of the planning application, instead of taking the law into their Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others own hands, flouting orders of the court and asking the court to suspend the injunction in order to relieve them of the consequences of their unlawful conduct.

97. This last passage is worth quoting at length because of the similarity to the situation in which this court now finds itself. Defence counsel’s argument repeatedly refers to the injunction granted on 18 December as an ‘eviction injunction’. My findings of fact in this case make it clear that it was not one. There was only one family in residence on 18 December. They are specifically exempted from the terms of the injunction. All other current residents came to live on the land after the injunction had been granted, and in breach of its terms. The assertion that the Claimant or the court failed to take into account the Defendants’ Article 8 rights when the injunction was granted on 18 December 2025 falls away with the finding that these families were not living on the Land at the time.

98. What is being requested now by the Claimant is a continuation of that injunction. In the meantime, a large number of families have moved onto the Land in breach of the terms of the First Order. I am satisfied that they have done so deliberately, in order to undermine the whole purpose of the order by taking up residence on the Land in defiance of it. 99. 100. 101. 102.

103. I am not required or indeed entitled to make a decision on the planning merits. However, it is clear from the evidence I have heard that any application would face particularly serious obstacles due to the very specific issues which apply to land which falls within the DEPZ around AWE Aldermaston. It is far from obvious that this land is suitable for residential development due to the highly sensitive nature of the site, and it is certain that any application would be hotly contested by the ONR and those involved in the operation of AWE Aldermaston. The evidence of Dr Pearce does not significantly reduce these verry serious concerns. It is now more than nine months since the development of the Land began. There is still no valid planning application. Owing to delays in listing this return hearing, there has been ample time to ensure that this was done. There is no evidence of any sense of urgency on the part of the Defendants in ensuring that a valid planning application is submitted. There is no current time frame for a planning process by reference to which I could place any time limits on the current situation. I need to go on to consider what should happen next. It is clear from the case of Mid Bedfordshire DC v Brown that the court will take the breach of an injunction very seriously. In this case, as in that, it can be said that “the defendants decided to press on as

originally planned and as if no court order had ever been made. They cocked a snook at the court. They did so in order to steal a march on the Council and to achieve the very state of affairs which the order was designed to prevent.” The situation now is that a large number of families have settled on the Land. They have made it their home. I must bear in mind the obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides everyone with a right to right to respect for his private and family life. I note there are a number of children who now live on the Land. The United Kingdom has international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in particular article 3.1 which provides: Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others 104. 105. 106.

107. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. The Supreme Court in Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74 emphasised that the best interests of the child were an important part of any proportionality assessment under Article 8. It is clear that the Council have fulfilled their obligation to undertake welfare assessments since families moved on to the land. There was no serious challenge to the evidence that Ms Woods conducted welfare checks, as did two other officers. The Gypsy and Traveller Liaison Officer was appointed in January 2026 and has supported those on the site. It is always disruptive to move children from the home at which they have settled. However, it cannot be right that those who deliberately breach court orders can use the fact that they have brought children onto a site in disobedience to an injunction as a trump card to defeat its purpose. The court must consider whether there is reason to believe that if the terms of the First Order are continued, the children now living on the Land will have their welfare needs met. The court has little or no evidence as to where the named Defendants and their families were living prior to the

occupation of the Land. It is my understanding that all the families of named Defendants come from outside the area, and many come from Ireland. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court must be entitled to assume that the current occupants chose to move there from a place at which there was not a welfare risk, and that they can return to that place while the usual planning processes take their course. It cannot be right that the burden is on the Claimant in these circumstances to provide evidence of suitable alternative accommodation. The Defendants must provide evidence as to why the accommodation from which they came is not suitable for their return. It is absolutely clear that all these children are part of loving families who are caring for them and will continue to do so when they move off the Land. In those circumstances, the best interests of the children have been properly considered by the court, and the balance remains in favour of the continuation of the injunction.

108. While I do not pre-judge any future planning decision, I do take into account in making this assessment the fact that this is a site where, due to the fact that it is in the DEPZ around AWE Aldermaston, there are particular risks. It is less likely to be in the best interests of the children, or indeed any of the occupants, to live on a site where they are in danger of putting pressure on the OSEP such that they are not considered to be safe in case of an emergency of the kind I have heard evidence about. It is clear that the pressure their occupation will put on the OSEP creates knock-on concerns for the safety of others residing in the area, who also have rights which need to be protected. I make it clear that this factor is not determinative of my decision, but it is right that I should refer to it as a particular concern.

109. I have considerable sympathy with the difficulties experienced by these Defendants and other members of the travelling community in finding sites on which they can set up permanent homes. However, it cannot be right that if they ride roughshod over the orders of this court, they will succeed in defeating their purpose. If the Defendants, Judgment Approved by the court for handing down West Berkshire Council v UK Land Holdings 1 Ltd and others having breached the injunction, are now permitted to remain, the effect would be to render injunctions in such cases entirely toothless. The message conveyed would be that there is no need to comply with the terms of an injunction because, if a person simply continues to act as though the injunction had never been made, and moves onto the land in defiance of it, the Court will ultimately be compelled to regularise the resulting position by permitting that person to remain.

110. I have no doubt that, taking into account the rights of all the Defendants, the continuation of this injunction in the terms in which it was granted under the First Order is just and proportionate. Looking at the issue in American Cyanamid terms, there is a compelling justification for the remedy which arises from the continuing nature of the breaches; the Claimant cannot adequately be compensated in damages for a breach of this nature; and given that there is no evidence that the Defendants cannot go back to the place where they were living before they came on to the Land in breach of planning controls and in breach of the First Order, the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of preserving the lawful use of the Land and therefore of continuing the injunction. Conclusion 111. I am minded to set a period of 28 days from the date of this judgment to allow those who have taken up residence in breach of the First Order of 19 December 2025 to remove themselves from the Land. For the sake of clarity, this is all persons with the exception of the family of John Jude O’Brien on Plots 7-8.

112. At the request of the Defendants, I allow brief written submissions on this point alone to be filed by 4pm on Wednesday 9 September. Any response by the Claimant should be filed by 4pm on Friday 11 September, and I will rule by 4pm on Monday 14 September. However, Defendants should be aware that the likely date by which they must cease occupation is 5 October 2026.

113. The draft order with which I have been provided is agreed in all other respects. Once I have ruled on this point, parties will provide me with a final draft for approval. On that basis, no further listing of the case is required.