Boateng Vrs Mckeown Investment Ltd [2020] GHASC 3 (5 February 2020)

Boateng Vrs Mckeown Investment Ltd [2020] GHASC 3 (5 February 2020)

The Court of Appeal erred in admitting and acting on a second notice of appeal filed without leave, contrary to binding Supreme Court authority. On the merits, the plaintiff was the first purchaser from the common grantor, registered her interest, and was in possession before the defendant's grantor acquired title. The family did not act timeously to set aside the plaintiff's grant. It would be inequitable to deny the plaintiff title; thus, the trial court's judgment in her favour is restored.

Citation
[2020] GHASC 3
Parties
Plaintiff/respondent/appellant: Dora Boateng; Defendant/appellant/respondent: Mckeown Investment Ltd
Court
Supreme Court
Jurisdiction
Ghana
Judgment Date
5 February 2020
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Supreme Court Final Appeal
Outcome
Appeal allowed; Court of Appeal judgment set aside; trial court judgment restored in favour of plaintiff.
Legal Topics
Family Land Alienation, Capacity to Sell Land, Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet, Appellate Procedure, Double Sale of Land
Source Language
English

Case Brief

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Parties

Dora Boateng

Plaintiff/respondent/appellant

Mckeown Investment Ltd

Defendant/appellant/respondent

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Supreme Court Final Appeal

  1. 1 Whether the Court of Appeal erred in admitting and treating a second notice of appeal as additional grounds without leave of court
  2. 2 Whether Kwame Kissiedu Kwaasi had capacity to alienate the disputed land
  3. 3 Whether the principle of nemo dat quod non habet applied to the facts

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal erred in admitting and acting on a second notice of appeal filed without leave, contrary to binding Supreme Court authority. On the merits, the plaintiff was the first purchaser from the common grantor, registered her interest, and was in possession before the defendant's grantor acquired title. The family did not act timeously to set aside the plaintiff's grant. It would be inequitable to deny the plaintiff title; thus, the trial court's judgment in her favour is restored.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; Court of Appeal judgment set aside; trial court judgment restored in favour of plaintiff.

Orders

  • Second notice of appeal dated 26th January 2016 struck out
  • Submissions fashioned as 'issues' in defendant's written submission struck out