PINTO VRS. PINTO AND OTHERS (E12/114/2018) [2024] GHAHC 171 (9 January 2024)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT ‘B’ – HELD IN TEMA IN THE GREATER ACCRA REGION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA BEFORE HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE PATRICIA QUANSAH (JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT) ON TUESDAY THE 9TH OF JANUARY 2024. SUIT NO. E12/114/2018 SARAH PINTO F/169, ASHAIMAN OFFICIAL TOWN ASHAIMAN PLAINTIFF VRS 1. AYIKU PINTO aka EMMANUEL AYIKU ABEBLEH (DEC’D) SUBSTITUTED BY GRACE DOKUYO ABEBLEH ASHAIMAN 2. ABU PINTO aka ABU SENYEMI UNNUMBERED HOUSE NEAR GOD IS GREAT RESTAURANT LEBANON – ASHAIMAN 3. SETH PINTO UNNUMBERED HOUSE DEFENDANTS GOLF CITY TEMA JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 1 4. ATSWA AYIKU SUBSTITUTED BY EMMANUEL AYIKU ABEBLEH (DEC’D) SUBSTITUTED BY GRACE DOKUYO ABEBLEH ASHAIMAN 5. THE MORTICIAN TRINITY HOSPITAL ASHAIMAN, LEBANON 6. DERRICK PINTO ________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF PRESENT 1ST DEFENDANT PRESENT AND SUBSTITUTING AS THE 4TH DEFENDANT ALSO 2ND AND 4TH DEFENDANTS PRESENT 3RD DEFENDANT REPRESENTED BY DR JOHN TETTEH 5TH DEFENDANT ABSENT 6TH DEFENDANT PRESENT ________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 2 I. PROLOGUE [i] The Plaintiff herein contends that she is the legal spouse of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh and therefore instituted this action; after the death of the said Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh for the following reliefs (which were subsequently amended): a. A declaration that the Plaintiff is the legal spouse of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh. b. An order of interim injunction directed at the 1st to 4th Defendants to be restrained from organizing any funeral in respect of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh without the involvement of the Plaintiff as the legal wife of Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh. c. An order of injunction restraining the Mortician (5th Defendant) assigned to the Trinity Hospital, Lebanon – Ashaiman, from releasing the mortal remains of the deceased, Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh until the final determination of this case. d. Any other relief(s) this court deems fit. 2. FACTS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE [ii] According to the Plaintiff, she got married to the deceased sometime in April 1999 at Akwatia in the Eastern Region of Ghana; and the marriage was subsequently registered at the Accra Metropolitan Assembly. The marriage JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 3 between the Plaintiff and the deceased was said to have been blessed with one daughter. According to the Plaintiff, the parties co habited in harmony until about seven years to the time this writ was instituted, when the Plaintiff stated that the deceased became ill and went to the hospital for treatment. The deceased was subsequently said to be developing mental illness and was referred to the Pantang Psychiatric Hospital and later to the Valley View Hospital at Dzorwulu. [iii] At all material times, the Plaintiff contended that she took care of her ailing husband singlehandedly, with the assistance of only her younger brother, Gabriel Anokye. The deceased eventually recovered, but he developed cancer and kidney problems; and the deceased succumbed to death from his ailments. [iv] According to the Plaintiff, in spite of her dedication and sacrifice as a wife to the deceased, she was informed that the family of the deceased, including the Defendants were planning the funeral and burial of the deceased without the involvement of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff further saw a funeral poster which excluded her as a widow. Additionally, since the death of her husband, the Defendants and other family members had been intermeddling with the estate of the deceased; and some family members of the deceased even threatened that they will make sure the Plaintiff’s name was removed as a wife to prevent her from benefitting from any future distribution of her husband’s property. The above, among others, compelled the Plaintiff to institute this action against all the Defendants for the reliefs indicated above. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 4 4. STATEMENT OF DEFENCE AND COUNTERCLAIMS AS PUT FORTH BY ALL THE DEFENDANTS [v] In their defence, and which was subsequently amended with the leave of the Court on the 12th of April 2019, the Defendants vehemently denied that the Plaintiff was the wife and surviving widow of the deceased. They contended instead that the Plaintiff filed a petition for divorce in 2004 and same was granted by the High Court, Tema in 2005 and so the Plaintiff was not the surviving spouse of the deceased. The Defendants nevertheless confirmed that the deceased had one daughter with the Plaintiff herein. [vi] Per the Defendants, the Plaintiff only resurfaced a few years prior to the death of the deceased with a 7 – year – old child by another man in tow. The Defendants additionally denied each and every averment of the Plaintiff, that it was the Plaintiff who solely took care of the deceased whilst he was on admission at the hospital. The Defendants contended they would put the Plaintiff to strict proof, adding that the Plaintiff never even visited the deceased during the periods he was hospitalised at the Valley View Clinic. Furthermore, the Defendants affirmed that the Plaintiff was never married to the deceased for the entire period of eighteen years because the Plaintiff had a child by another man. [vii] The family was also not secretly planning any funeral; and that it was rather the Plaintiff who had failed to cooperate with the family; and had among others, adopted a very aggressive and hostile attitude towards the family. The Defendants thus concluded by asserting that the Plaintiff was not entitled to her reliefs and counterclaimed for the following reliefs: JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 5 5. COUNTERCLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANTS i. An order of declaration that the Plaintiff is not the legitimate wife of the deceased Isaac Pinto. ii. An order of declaration that in law the Plaintiff cannot hold herself as a beneficiary of the deceased’s estate. iii. Costs. iv. Any other relief(s) which this Honourable Court may deem fit. 6. AMENDED REPLY AND DEFENCE TO COUNTER-CLAIM [viii] The Plaintiff then filed an amended Reply and a Defence to the counterclaim, and as is usually the case, she denied the material averments of the Defendants. She averred that she was separated from the deceased for only two years and they came back together. Indeed, the deceased was aware the Plaintiff had become pregnant by another man and yet, he took the Plaintiff back and catered for that child as if she was his own. The Plaintiff further contended that to the best of her knowledge, the divorce petition she filed was not granted; and even if it was, it was of no consequence because the deceased took back the Plaintiff after their separation. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 6 Further, at a meeting held after the death of one George Pinto, the younger brother of the deceased, the deceased admitted before his half-siblings that he had taken the Plaintiff back, when the deceased was questioned; and so according to the Plaintiff, she was the wife of the deceased. Indeed, one John Tetteh and Agnes even considered the Plaintiff as a wife, from the Plaintiff’s averments in her amended Reply and Defence to counterclaim; and so the Plaintiff sought to aver that she was entitled to her claims. 7. APPLICATION FOR DIRECTIONS [ix] Pleadings then closed and at the Application for Directions stage, the following issues, additional issues and further additional issues were all filed and set down for trial the as follows: ISSUES FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF a. Whether or not there was ever a marriage between the plaintiff and Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh (now deceased). b. If there was a marriage between the Plaintiff and Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh, whether or not the said marriage was dissolved. c. Whether or not Derrick Pinto or any other child or children apart from Alexis Pinto, presented after the death of Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh as his children are his children. d. Any other issue disclosed by the pleadings. e. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to her claims. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 7 ADDITIONAL ISSUES FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS a. Whether or not the Plaintiff filed a petition for divorce against Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh (deceased) during the subsistence of the marriage. b. Whether or not the Plaintiff subsequently left the matrimonial home and has a child, i.e. Elly, by another man. c. Whether or not the Plaintiff and Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh (deceased) lived as marriage couples (sic) prior to his death. FURTHER ADDITIONAL ISSUES FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS a. Whether or not the said petition for divorce was granted by a Tema High Court in 2005. b. Whether the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh was mentally incapacitated before his death. c. Whether the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh merely allowed the Plaintiff access to his house to take care of her daughter (Alexis Pinto). 8. INTERVENING MATTERS JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 8 [x] The Court subsequently granted a joinder of the 6th Defendant, Derrick Pinto; and so the Plaintiff filed an amended writ and statement of claim, pursuant to the joinder; and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff were also amended to include the following: AMENDED RELIEFS SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF: a. A declaration that the Plaintiff is the legal spouse of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh. b. An order of interim injunction directed at the 1st to 4th Defendants to be restrained from organizing any funeral in respect of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh without the involvement of the Plaintiff as the legal wife of Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh. c. An order of injunction restraining the Mortician (5th Defendant) assigned to the Trinity Hospital, Lebanon – Ashaiman, from releasing the mortal remains of the deceased Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh until the final determination of this case. d. A declaration that the 6th Defendant is not a son of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh and further that apart from Alexis JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 9 Pinto, the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh had no child anywhere. e. Any other relief(s) this court deems fit. [xi] The Defendants also filed an amended defence and counterclaim pursuant to the joinder, and a further amended defence and counterclaim pursuant to leave granted by the Court on the 30th of November 2021; contending therein that the 6th Defendant was a legitimate son of the deceased. The deceased further had two other children, Darlington and Blessed Pinto, among others; but the counterclaims of the Defendants did not materially change. [xii] Then on the 30th of October 2019, the Court made an order for a DNA test to be conducted on the four children said to be children of the deceased, to determine their paternity as to whether or not they are the children of the deceased; and the following order was subsequently drawn up: ________________________________________________________________ IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE TEMA – A. D. 2019 SUIT NO. E12/114/2018 JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 10 SARAH PINTO - PLAINTIFF F/169 ASHAIMAN OFFICIAL TOWN ASHAIMAN VS. 1. AYIKU PINTO DEFENDANT UNNUMBERRED HOUSE 1ST NEAR THE HEALTH CENTER, ASHAIMAN 2. ABU PINTO DEFENDANT 2ND UNNUMBERED HSE. NEAR GOD IS GREAT RESTAURANT, LABANON-ASHAIMAN 3. SETH PINTO DEFENDANT 3RD UNNUMBERED HOUSE, GOLF CITY, TEMA 4. ATSWA AYIKU DEFENDANT HEALTH CENTRE, ASHAIMAN 4TH 5. THE MORTICIAN 5TH DEFENDANT JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 11 TRINITY HOSPITAL, ASHAIMAN, LEBANON _______________________________________________________________ __ (sgd) EMMANUEL ANKAMAH (MR) (JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT) COURT ORDER ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- THIS CAUSE having come before HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE EMMANUEL ANKAMAH on the 30th day of October, 2019. AND UPON HEARING MR. YAW AWUKU-ASABRE, Counsel for and on behalf of the Defendant herein, and MR. SALLAH, Counsel for and on behalf of the Plaintiff herein; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital, Accra conducts the DNA test on Alexis Pinto, Derrick Pinto, Blessing Pinto and Darlington Pinto and reports its findings to the Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff who is disputing the paternity of Derrick Pinto, Blessing Pinto and Darlington Pinto do bear the expenses involved in the carrying out of the DNA test on them whilst the Defendants do bear the expenses in respect of the test that will be conducted on Alexis Pinto. Registrar of this Court is ordered to liaise with the parties and Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital to carry out this order. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 12 GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THE HIGH COURT THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2019. (sgd) SEBASTIAN A. AGBO (REGISTRAR) ________________________________________________________________ For some reason, the hospital later changed to the Trust Hospital, and another order to the Trust Hospital was subsequently drawn up for the parties. There is however nothing on record on the Court’s docket to demonstrate that this Court received any DNA test report from any medical institution. Indeed, there were so many issues concerning the exact kind of test, whether DNA testing or an avuncular testing, the contact person or the neutral person, the samples to be used because the father, for whom the paternity was required, was deceased etc. All in all, it appeared there was no conceivable way to get a paternity test because there was no biological brother or sister of the deceased available, only half siblings; and the Court also did not appear to have answered the concerns of the Defendant on record in connection with the avuncular test, and so no test was undertaken. In the Plaintiff’s Counsel’s supplementary address, he submitted that the Defendants failed to comply with the Court’s orders, but I find that is not JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 13 entirely correct because the four children, the Plaintiff and the Defendants all initially visited the Trust Hospital, but the hospital was unable to perform the DNA test. It is on record that the Trust Hospital wrote to the Court about an avuncular test instead; and so this Court ought to have addressed the concerns of the Defendants’ Counsel and the contact person chosen by the Court, so the necessary procedure(s) could be undertaken, but that was not done and so there was no test on any of the children. Pleadings eventually closed; Directions were finalised and the parties were ordered to file their respective witness statements. 9. WITNESS STATEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND HER WITNESSES [xiii] The Plaintiff filed her witness statement and a supplementary witness statement; and stated therein that upon the orders of the Court, the burial and funeral rites of the deceased had been undertaken. The Plaintiff then proceeded to state that she was married to the deceased and tendered in evidence ‘Exhibit A series’, said to be pictures of the Plaintiff’s said traditional marriage to the deceased; as well as Exhibits B and C, again said by the Plaintiff to be pictures of the registration of the said marriage and the marriage certificate issued in respect of the registered marriage between the Plaintiff and the deceased. The Plaintiff added that save a two-year separation between the deceased and the Plaintiff, the parties lived in their matrimonial home at house no. F/169, Official Town, Ashaiman, until the death of the deceased. Plaintiff further repeated the averments that she took care of the deceased when he fell ill and tendered in evidence ‘Exhibit D’, said to be one of the deceased’s hospital cards. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 14 [xv] Additionally, the Plaintiff contended that after she had been taken back by the deceased, the deceased presented her to his relatives as his wife during a meeting convened after the death of the deceased’s brother. As such, the deceased’s siblings called her to check on the deceased when he was unwell. Consequently, the Plaintiff tendered in evidence ‘Exhibit E’, said to be whatsapp correspondence between the Plaintiff and one John Tetteh concerning the well-being of the deceased; as well as ‘Exhibit F’, another whatsapp correspondence between one Agnes and the Plaintiff, again concerning the health of the deceased at the time the deceased was unwell. [xvi] Among others, the Plaintiff concluded that she, at all material times, acted as the wife of the deceased; and tendered in evidence ‘Exhibit G’ series, being prescription forms, receipts and other documents relating to the respective treatments of the deceased and prior to his death. Per the Plaintiff, the Defendants were only interested in depriving the Plaintiff of her fair share of the deceased’s properties; and that the Plaintiff’s daughter was the sole surviving child of the deceased. The Defendants’ counterclaims ought to be dismissed and the Plaintiff’s claims granted in their entirety. [xvii] A witness statement was filed for PW1, one Richard Agbeko, to testify for and on behalf of the Plaintiff. PW1 testified to the effect that he was present at the said meeting convened after the death of George Pinto, and it was there that the deceased admitted he had reconciled with his wife, the Plaintiff, and had taken her back. The Plaintiff also performed some rites reserved for the wives of brothers when the deceased’s late brother, George died. It could therefore be surmised from the witness statement of PW1 that he sought to confirm the Plaintiff’s assertions that the Plaintiff was the wife of the deceased during the deceased’s lifetime; and consequently, the surviving spouse of the deceased. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 15 10. WITNESS STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR WITNESSES [xviii] A witness statement was filed for DW1, one John Tetteh, who stated he was the older brother of the deceased. DW1 tendered in evidence ‘Exhibits 1’ and ‘2’, the divorce petition and the proceedings/ruling of the Court granting the dissolution of the marriage between the deceased and the Plaintiff on the 28th of January 2005. A copy of the divorce certificate was also tendered in evidence as ‘Exhibit 3’. DW1 further proceeded to narrate how the Plaintiff then left the deceased after the divorce for over 9 years, got married, had another daughter from that marriage and later came back to the deceased, purporting to visit their daughter who was in the custody of the deceased and ended up staying with the deceased. Per DW1, it was at a time that DW1 was out of the jurisdiction that the Plaintiff had access to the deceased and held herself out as a wife, when she was not. DW1 made further assertions concerning the Plaintiff’s purported aggressiveness and the Plaintiff’s refusal to allow the deceased’s family members access to the deceased’s house and even their business at paragraphs 21 following of his witness statement; all in a bid to aver that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the reliefs she seeks. [xix] DW1 additionally filed a supplementary witness statement and exhibited a marriage certificate between the deceased and Sarah Jenkin (the Plaintiff), contending that the said marriage was dissolved by the High Court. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 16 Further, DW1 stated that the whatsapp correspondences referred to by the Plaintiff between the Plaintiff and DW1 and one Agnes were also incomplete and self-serving; and in no way a confirmation by the relatives of the deceased that the Plaintiff was a wife because the correspondences were not cordial and the Plaintiff remained largely unresponsive to queries made by DW1 and the said Agnes. DW1 thus attached the complete correspondence and same were marked as Exhibits 12, 13, 14 and 15 series. DW1 further testified to the effect that the Plaintiff illegally took over the Defendants’ and the deceased’s business premises; and also tendered in evidence some pictures to confirm same. [xx] A witness statement was also filed for DW2, Grace Dokuyo Abebleh, an Aunt of the deceased. DW2 was however later substituted as the 1st Defendant when the original 1st Defendant passed away. DW2 was also produced to state that even though the Plaintiff had a daughter with the deceased, she was not aware of any marriage contracted between the Plaintiff and the deceased; either before or after the deceased took ill. Nonetheless, DW2 stated she had been informed that the Plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a divorce against the deceased. DW2 added that the 6th Defendant was also a biological child of the deceased and one Mercy Addo, and that D6 was out-doored and named by the deceased’s family in accordance with the custom and tradition of the people of Ningo; and so the 6th Defendant was indeed the son of the deceased. Moreover, during his lifetime, the deceased never denied fathering the 6th Defendant as he cared for, lived with, and educated D6 to the university level before his death. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 17 DW2 also filed a supplementary witness statement with the leave of the Court and exhibited two birth certificates, said to be for two other children of the deceased, namely Darlington and Blessing Pinto, ostensibly to state that the deceased had children other than the Plaintiff’s daughter and contrary to what the Plaintiff sought to allege, that her daughter was the sole surviving child of the deceased. [xxi] A final witness statement was filed for the original 1st Defendant; but it appears he passed away before the hearing and was thus substituted with DW2, Grace Dokuyo Abebleh. The trial came to a close after the various parties and their witnesses had testified and had been cross-examined by Counsel on the other side. 11. INCIDENCE OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES [xxii] The burden of proof on a party in a civil suit is on a balance of probabilities, as was held in the case of Adwubeng v Domfeh [1997 - 98] 1 GLR 282, and also at sections 11(4) and 12 of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323. Section 12 of NRCD 323 provides: (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 18 (2) "Preponderance of the probabilities" means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence. The Supreme Court, further, by a majority decision in the case of BISI AND OTHERS v. TABIRI ALIAS ASARE [1987-88] 1 GLR 360-413 held that “The standard of proof required of a plaintiff in a civil action was to lead such evidence as would tilt in his favour the balance of probabilities on the particular issue. The demand for strict proof of pleadings had however never been taken to call for an inflexible proof either beyond reasonable doubt or with mathematical exactitude or with such precision as would fit a jig-saw puzzle.” [xxiii] Again, the Supreme Court, in the case of DON ACKAH V PERGAH TRANSPORT LTD LIMITED [2010] SCGLR 728, section 10 of NRCD 323 was espoused thus: “It is a basic principle of the law on evidence that a party who bears the burden of proof is to produce the required evidence of the facts in issue that has the quality of credibility short of which his claim may fail. The method of producing evidence is varied and it includes the testimonies of the party and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary and things (often described as real evidence), without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 19 credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the court or tribunal of fact such as a jury. It is trite law that matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more reasonable than its non-existence.” The above, the Supreme Court stated, was a requirement of the law on evidence under sections 10 and 11 of NRCD 323. [xxiv] Again, in Dzaisu v Ghana Breweries Limited [2007-2008] SCGLR 539, the Supreme Court per Adinyira JSC (as she then was), in expounding on section 14 of NRCD 323, held as follows: “It is a basic principle in the law of evidence that the burden of persuasion on proving all facts essential to any claim lies on whosoever is making the claim.” The Learned Justice of the Supreme Court went on to state: It is trite law that a bare assertion by a party of his pleadings in the witness box without proof did not shift the evidential burden onto the other party. 12. THE EFFECTS OF A COUNTERCLAIM JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 20 [xxv] The Defendants also counterclaimed and in the unreported Court of Appeal case of Nii Ayittey Animeley &1 or v Laura K. Gyampoh (Civil Appeal No. H1/82/2018) of 29th May 2018, the Court held: A counterclaim is an independent suit which the Defendant has to lead evidence on to prove to the satisfaction of the trial court. the Defendant carries the same burden of proof on the counterclaim just like the plaintiff carries on his writ. It is also trite that where a Defendant files a counterclaim, he assumes the same onus of proving the counterclaim as that placed on a Plaintiff. The above was the holding of the Apex Court thus: However, when a defendant also files a counterclaim, then the same standard or burden of proof would be used in evaluating or assessing his case. This means that he assumes the same position as the plaintiff in respect of the counter-claim. See Jass Co. Ltd. v Appau [2009] SCGLR 265 (holding 1). The Defendants therefore bear the onus, just as the Plaintiff herein, to adduce sufficient evidence to establish satisfactorily to this Court, even on a balance of probabilities, that they are entitled to the reliefs sought in their counterclaims. 13. EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL VIS-À-VIS THE LAW JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 21 [xxvi] In seeking to evaluate and analyse the evidence adduced at the trial and the relevant laws, I find that the Defendants stated in their pleadings that at the hearing of this matter, they were going to raise the issue of the Plaintiff’s capacity as a preliminary legal point to dismiss the instant suit. As such, I find on record that an application was formally made by the Defendants to have the Plaintiff’s writ struck out, but that application was refused and dismissed by the Court. No evidence was thus adduced at the trial to place the capacity of the Plaintiff in issue, and so I will proceed to deal with the issues set down for the trial as follows: 14. ISSUES (a) and (b); ADDITIONAL ISSUES (a) and (b); FURTHER ADDITIONAL ISSUE (a) a. Whether or not there was ever a marriage between the Plaintiff and Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh (now deceased). b. If there was a marriage between the Plaintiff and Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh, whether or not the said marriage was dissolved. a. Whether or not the Plaintiff filed a petition for divorce against Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh (deceased) during the subsistence of the marriage. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 22 b. Whether or not the Plaintiff subsequently left the matrimonial home and has a child, i.e. Elly, by another man. a. Whether or not the said petition for divorce was granted by a Tema High Court in 2005. [xxvii] From the entirety of the trial, there is no doubt that the deceased was once married to the Plaintiff, and they had a daughter together. The Defendants in their pleadings denied that the deceased was ever married to the Plaintiff; and all the Defendants’ witnesses averred that no member of the deceased’s family was part of any group that went to perform any marriage rites for and on behalf of the deceased for the Plaintiff’s hand in marriage. DW1 however annexed a marriage certificate between the Plaintiff and the deceased and further admitted at paragraph 3 of his witness statement that the deceased informed DW1 that he was going to get married to the Plaintiff. There is also no doubt that in 2005, the High Court, Tema, lawfully dissolved the marriage between the Plaintiff and the deceased, and DW1 himself tendered in evidence Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 in support of the dissolution of the marriage between the parties; and which included the proceedings of the Court and the divorce certificate granted by the Court. Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted in his written address that the order dissolving the marriage was not referable to the Plaintiff’s marriage to the deceased because the Court order referred to a marriage dated 21st May 2000 when the Plaintiff’s marriage to the deceased was actually on the 21st of March JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 23 2000. He also made submissions on some allegedly different names used for the parties, among others and concluded that there was never any dissolution of the marriage between the deceased and the Plaintiff; and so the marriage stood undissolved until the death of the deceased. With all due respect to the Plaintiff’s Counsel, the error in the month is a triviality that this Court ought not to dwell on, because the Plaintiff clearly filed for the divorce and she did not dispute same. The Plaintiff further stated the proceedings were not concluded because of the loss of the docket or so, and yet, she stated under cross-examination that she remarried the deceased. I find the exhibits tendered in evidence by the Defendants’ witness properly referable to the Plaintiff and the deceased; and the submission of the Plaintiff’s Counsel will not be countenanced by this Court. [xviii] Consequently, the Defendants, having tendered these documents in evidence; and there being no strenuous objection from the Plaintiff, the presumption here is that the Plaintiff and the deceased, at the time, both voluntarily submitted themselves to the Court and the Court dissolved whatever marriage there originally was between the Plaintiff and the deceased. The Plaintiff’s Counsel can therefore not submit that the dissolution was improper on account of the erroneous month when this was not raised at the trial for the Defendants to respond to same; and when the Plaintiff further accepted and relied on the dissolution and left the matrimonial home and even had a child with another man. [xxix] Indeed, the Plaintiff expressly admitted same under cross-examination that the divorce was granted; when earlier in the pleadings filed and the witness statements of the Plaintiff, she had sought to state that to the best of her JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 24 knowledge, the divorce proceedings were not completed at the Court because at a point, the docket could not be found or some excuse to that effect. I however find that in the light of Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, the Plaintiff was not entirely truthful to this Court when she contended that the divorce between the deceased and herself was not finalised. Even under cross-examination, the Plaintiff sought to again state that the divorce was not granted; but she subsequently agreed that it was granted when confronted with Exhibit 3 as follows: Q: In the year, 2004, you filed a petition for divorce. A: Yes, my Lord. Q: In 2005, the petition for divorce was granted. A: Not correct. Q: I put it to you that the Court dissolved the marriage as per our Exhibit ‘3’. A: That is correct, however, in 2009, we got married again. (Emphasis is mine) From the evidence adduced before this Court, I hold that there is a rebuttable presumption that there was a valid marriage contracted between the deceased JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 25 and the Plaintiff as evidenced by the Plaintiff’s Exhibits A, B and C, including the certificate of marriage dated the 21st of March 2000. That marriage, I again hold, was validly dissolved by the Court on the 28th of January 2005; and as again evidenced by DW1’s Exhibits 2 and 3. [xxx] There is also sufficient proof to establish to this Court that the Plaintiff, after the divorce left the deceased, and the Plaintiff herself confirmed in her amended reply and defence to counterclaim that she separated from the deceased. It is therefore clear that within that period, the Plaintiff and the deceased did not live together. Again, the Plaintiff was inconsistent with her answers under cross-examination; but she again eventually admitted she left the matrimonial home when further questioned as follows: Q: I put it to you that you left the matrimonial home in 2005, because the Court had already dissolved the marriage. A: That is not correct. Q: Which year did you leave the house. A: March, 2005. The Plaintiff further confirmed that she became pregnant by another man and had a second daughter; and gave the answers below under cross-examination: Q: In your witness statement you stated clearly that there was a separation between you and deceased person for two years. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 26 A: Yes, my Lord. Q: When was the period of separation? A: Between 2005 and 2007. Q: Within this period of separation did you get married to anyone else? A: No, but I had a child with another man. Q: Which year did you give birth to that child? A: 2008. Q: Were you still separated when you gave birth to the child. A: Yes, my Lord. Q: Then I put it to you that you were separated for more than two years. A: That is correct. Q: So how many years were you separated? A: 3 years considering the time I gave birth to the said child. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 27 From the above and in resolving the first set of issues, I hold that there was a marriage between the deceased and the Plaintiff; but the Plaintiff herein instituted a divorce petition against the deceased and same was granted by the High Court, Tema in January 2005. The marriage between the Plaintiff and the deceased was therefore duly dissolved. Thereafter, the Plaintiff left the matrimonial home and did have a child with another man. [xxxi] Having therefore established from the above that there was no marriage between the deceased and the Plaintiff after the 28th of January 2005, I proceed to deal with another set of legal issues set down as follows: 15. ADDITIONAL ISSUE (c) AND FURTHER ADDITIONAL ISSUE (c) c. Whether or not the Plaintiff and Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh (deceased) lived as marriage couples (sic) prior to his death. c. Whether the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh merely allowed the Plaintiff access to his house to take care of her daughter (Alexis Pinto). [xxxii] There is no doubt that the Plaintiff came back to live in the matrimonial home years after the divorce had been granted and after she had left the matrimonial home. I am not completely sure of when the Plaintiff came back; but the Plaintiff stated she came back after the birth of her second daughter in 2008. Within that time, the Plaintiff stated the deceased and herself got remarried; but the Plaintiff admitted she had no documentary proof of the remarriage under cross-examination thus: JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 28 Q: I put it to you that the Court dissolved the marriage as per our exhibit ‘3’. A: That is correct, however, in 2009, we got married again. (Emphasis is mine) Q: What documentary evidence do you have that you remarried again? A: I do not have. Q: I put it to you that, you came back to live with Pinto as boyfriend and girlfriend, and not married couple. A: That is not correct. Q: Under what circumstances did you come back to live in the house. A: Pinto came to see my family and he brought me back. He performed the necessary rites before I moved to the house. (Emphasis is mine) Q: The first marriage at Akwatia, pictures were taken of the traditional marriage. A: Yes, my Lord. Q: Where are the pictures covering the 2nd marriage? JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 29 A: We did not take any pictures because it was not a big ceremony. Q: Which of Pinto’s family members accompanied him to perform in the 2nd marriage rites? A: None, except 3 of his business associates. (Emphasis is mine) Q: I put it to you that you are not telling the truth. A: That is not correct. [xxxiii] With all due respect to the Plaintiff and her Counsel, the gravamen of the entire controversy between the parties is whether or not the Plaintiff is a surviving spouse and so the onus is on the Plaintiff to satisfactorily establish to this Court that she got remarried to the deceased. In law, the Plaintiff sought and was granted a divorce; and so before this Court, the Plaintiff ought to satisfactorily establish that she was remarried to the deceased. The Plaintiff nonetheless did not call any of the said business associates of the deceased or any other witness to confirm her oral averments that there was any “remarriage”. Indeed, all throughout her pleadings, the Plaintiff never stated that the deceased had remarried her in any formal ceremony; and neither did the Plaintiff’s witness, PW1. All the Plaintiff and her witness contended was that the deceased informed his family at a meeting that JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 30 he had taken the Plaintiff back as a wife; but the deceased is not present to confirm same. This “remarriage” came up only under cross-examination; and so I find that the Plaintiff ought to adduce cogent evidence in support of the said remarriage; but no such evidence was adduced by the Plaintiff. The issue of the remarriage ought to have been pleaded and adequate evidence adduced on same; and not just pop up as an answer(s) under cross-examination, I hold. [xxxiv] I again find that nothing in the whatsapp conversations exhibited by the Plaintiff is proof that she was remarried to the deceased, unfortunately, especially when the Plaintiff admitted under cross examination that she did not respond to the messages in confirmation of DW1’s assertions as follows: Q: Exhibit ‘E’ contains whatsapp messages to you from Dr. Tetteh which you relied on to say that you were indeed married to Isaac Pinto. A: Yes, my Lord. Q: What is in Exhibit ‘E’ that shows that you were the wife of Isaac Pinto? A: They were always asking me of the health of their brother (Isaac) and they asked me to help him in his psychiatric treatment. Q: You never responded to any of the messages. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 31 A: No, I did not respond to their messages, because they had already accused me of being evil. Consequently, and in confirmation of the Defendants’ Counsel’s questions, I also found nothing in those whatsapp messages to satisfactorily establish to this Court that the deceased remarried the Plaintiff at that time. Living with the deceased and taking him to the hospital is unfortunately not proof of remarriage, in the light of the evidence adduced before this Court, that the marriage between the deceased and the Plaintiff was dissolved in 2005. Moreover, when the Plaintiff herein filed the petition for divorce in or around 2004, she clearly intended to bring the marriage between the deceased and herself to an end. Therefore, the Plaintiff ought to reasonably know that once the marriage between them had been dissolved formally, she would again need a formal acknowledgment and ceremony to reinstate same. [xxxv] The Plaintiff further contended at paragraphs 22 to 26 of her witness statement filed on the 26th of June 2019 thus: 22. The late Isaac presented me as the wife to perform this rite which I duly performed by presenting drink and money at Old Ningo. 23. After the funeral a meeting was summoned in the 4th Defendant's house at Ashaiman to enquire from the late Isaac why he presented me as the wife notwithstanding the fact that JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 32 late Isaac and I separated at a point and during the period of separation I had a child for another man. 24. The late Isaac told the gathering that he wanted his wife back so he went for me so that was not an issue. 25. I believe that John Tetteh, Agnes, Abu, Mary all of whom are half siblings of the late Isaac and 4th Defendant were present at the meeting. 26. From my side my uncles Carlos Lumor (who is presently outside Ghana), Richard Agbeko and Simon Agar were present. The said Richard Agbeko was the one produced as PW1; and whilst under cross-examination and answering questions on the so-called meeting alluded to by the Plaintiff, PW1 gave the answers below: Q: Which people were present at that meeting? A: The two families. Q: How many people were at the meeting? A: Many Q: Can you mention two names from each family A: Mr Ayiku and Abu Pinto from their side. And me and Femeyigbor Adika JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 33 Q: What did the Plaintiff say? A: She was not at the meeting. (Emphasis is mine) If the Plaintiff was not at that meeting, where then did she get her information from, that the deceased had presented the Plaintiff as his wife at that meeting? Presumably from PW1, but PW1 did not mention the other names mentioned by the Plaintiff at paragraph 26 of her witness statement. Indeed, no other witness who was purportedly at the said meeting was produced by the Plaintiff to corroborate the averments of PW1; and the Plaintiff also did not state the date when this alleged meeting took place. [xxxvi]Nonetheless, DW1 also averred at paragraphs 10 following of his supplementary witness statement that he summoned a meeting at the request of the deceased on the 25th of September 2015; and the Plaintiff and her mother were present at that meeting. If the Plaintiff was present at this 25th September 2015 meeting with DW1, then it could not have been that same meeting where PW1 stated he was present at but not the Plaintiff. The narrations by PW1 and DW1 in respect of what happened at that meeting are also completely different; and so it is clear both parties are not referring to the same meeting. Be it as it may, I hold that none of the meetings mentioned by both sides demonstrated that the Plaintiff and the deceased were remarried; especially where there is proof that the marriage was dissolved in Court. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 34 Also taking into consideration paragraph 37 of the Plaintiff’s witness statement, as follows: “To the best of my knowledge the divorce petition filed was not granted because we were going to court and at a point the docket could not be found so we were told to start all over again. At the time I did not have enough money so I decided not to proceed anymore. However, but even if same was granted the same is of no consequence now as the late Isaac has taken me back after our separation as recounted above and have publicly presented me as the wife which is the reason why I am in the matrimonial home and have carried out various acts which clearly showed that I could not be anything other than the wife of the late Isaac.” (Emphasis is mine) I hold that I find no satisfactory evidence adduced by the Plaintiff to establish that the deceased publicly presented the Plaintiff as his wife at any point. The deceased is unfortunately not present to speak for himself; and so I am minded to scrutinize the evidence adduced before this Court; and also rely on the case of Ofori Agyemang v Madam Akua Bio (substituted by Agartha Amoah) [2017] 114 GMJ @ 13, where it was held: “It must be noted that a court could rest its decision on the relevant testimony of only one competent witness if it passes the twin test of personal knowledge and credibility, such evidence when offered against a deceased person ought to be accepted only when it is the truth.” (Emphasis is mine) JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 35 I further rely on the case of Tanoh v Abban-Mensah & Or [1991/93] 1 GLR 308 following on Moses v Anane [1989 - 90] 2 GLR 694, where it was again held: “… A claim against a deceased’s estate must be scrutinized with the utmost suspicion and the evidence in support ought to be utterly convincing. Proof must be strict and utterly convincing, as one of the protagonists was dead and could not assert his claim”. [xxvii] The Plaintiff contends that the deceased presented her as a wife and “which is the reason why I am in the matrimonial home and have carried out various acts which clearly showed that I could not be anything other than the wife of the late Isaac.” The acts said to have been carried out by the Plaintiff were basically described by the Plaintiff herself as living in the matrimonial home, taking the deceased to the various hospitals and exhibiting the prescriptions, receipts etc of payments made. With all due respect to the Plaintiff, is living in the matrimonial home and taking the deceased to the hospital when he became unwell adequate proof of cohabitation, leading to a conclusive marriage between the Plaintiff and the deceased? Not in my candid opinion. I unfortunately do not find satisfactory evidence to establish that the Plaintiff and the deceased lived as husband and wife after the Plaintiff moved back into the matrimonial home, in the light of the evidence adduced by the Defendants’ witnesses; that the deceased approached family members to get the Plaintiff out of the matrimonial home and a meeting even held to that effect, but the Plaintiff adduced no evidence in contradiction of those testimonies and averments. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 36 In the case of Essilfie & Another vrs Quarcoo [1992] 2 GLR 180-194, it was held as follows: “… on the authorities there were two forms of valid marriages known to our customary law: … and secondly, where although the customary marital rites had not been performed, the parties had consented to live in the eyes of the world as man and wife and their families had consented that they should do so, and the parties actually lived as man and wife in the eyes of the whole world. The consent of the family could be either actual and express or implied and constructive. Since on the evidence, … the plaintiffs' family obliged the defendant to perform the necessary customary rites of a son-in-law on the death of the deceased's father … the plaintiffs' family knew and accepted the defendant as the husband of the deceased. Accordingly, all the ingredients essential to a customary law marriage between the deceased and the defendant had been proved. I see no resemblance in the circumstances of the above case to the Plaintiff’s case; and the Plaintiff, I hold, cannot rely on the mere assertion that the deceased took her back to contend that she is a wife or a surviving spouse of the deceased. Further, the Plaintiff averred that the deceased had caused the Plaintiff to perform some rites at the death of the deceased’s younger brother, George Pinto, and PW1 merely repeated same; but the Plaintiff, for instance, did not give any details of whatever rites she performed or the circumstances to confirm same. In the case of JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 37 IBM v HASNEM [2001/2002] SCGLR 393 at 402, the Supreme Court per Adzoe JSC held: “It is one thing pleading a cause and repeating it in court, and another thing providing evidence in support of the cause so pleaded.” See also Majolagbe v. Larbi & Ors. [1959] GLR 190-195 [xxviii] In all this also, I find that no evidence was adduced to also establish that the Plaintiff came to the deceased’s house only to take care of the daughter she had with the deceased, because the Plaintiff came with her second daughter too. The lack of proof that the Plaintiff was in the house to only take care of her daughter is not to be taken as evidence or proof that the Plaintiff lived as the wife of the deceased, not at all, because the onus lay on the Plaintiff to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that she was a wife; but I hold that the Plaintiff failed to discharge that burden. [xxix] Indeed, the Plaintiff could very well have been taking advantage of her previous relationship with the deceased and their daughter to benefit from the deceased by going to stay with the deceased; and so there ought to be cogent and satisfactory evidence adduced by the Plaintiff to establish she is a wife; but no such evidence was adduced. For instance, there was no proof whatsoever that it was the Plaintiff’s own personal resources that was used to pay the hospital bills and invoices presented before this Court because all the receipts, bills and invoices were in JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 38 the name of the deceased; or even the type of employment the Plaintiff was involved in to enable her afford these bills, for instance. On the basis of the above, therefore, I unfortunately cannot arrive at the conclusion that the Plaintiff and the deceased lived as a husband and wife when the Plaintiff moved back to live with the deceased. I ground my decision on the case of Owusu v Nyarko [1980] GLR 428, where it was held that in such circumstances, the parties at best lived in concubinage; and there could not be said to be a customary law marriage between the parties. I proceed to deal with the following issue: 16. ISSUE (c) c. Whether or not Derrick Pinto or any other child or children apart from Alexis Pinto, presented after the death of Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh as his children are his children. [xxx] As stated, the issue of the paternity of the 6th Defendant was put in issue when he was joined to this suit; and it was in that regard that this Court made the order stated above, for the parties to pay for DNA tests to be undertaken for all four children presented as the children of the deceased. Again, as stated, there was a whole lot of issues and concerns arising out of the DNA or avuncular test to be undertaken and which remained answered and unresolved by the Court. As a result, no tests were undertaken, and no results were presented to the Court. Therefore, the DNA testing, having failed, the JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 39 presumption here is that the four children are the children of the deceased, based on the evidence so far adduced at the trial. I rely on section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323 as follows: Section 32—Children of a Marriage. (1) A child born during the marriage of the mother is presumed to be the child of the person who is the husband of that mother at the time of the birth. (2) A child of a woman who has been married, born within 300 days after the end of the marriage, is presumed to be a child of that marriage. (3) This section applies both to monogamous and polygamous marriages. [xxxi] The parties herein are ad idem on the fact that Alexis Pinto was born to the deceased and the Plaintiff. The family of the deceased also acknowledge that Derrick, Blessing and Darlington belong to the deceased. DW2 tendered in evidence some birth certificates and the Plaintiff’s Counsel sought to state they were inauthentic because the dates for the birth of the children as given by DW1 were different from the dates on the actual birth certificates. There was no other evidence adduced to discredit the birth certificates, and so I find the presumption that the children are not that of the deceased not adequately rebutted. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 40 Again, having failed to utilize the opportunity afforded to the parties to conclusively establish the paternity of the children, it does not lie in the mouth of any of the parties to now seek to contest or object to the paternity of any one of these children. I will also not belabour this issue and rely on the case of Mrs Vincentia Mensah v Numo Adjei Kwanko II (Civil Appeal No. J4/17/2016) dated the 14th of June 2016, where the Supreme Court, per Anin Yeboah JSC (as he then was) held at page 7 of the judgment thus: “… It must however be made clear that a court of law is not bound to consider every conceivable issue arising from the pleadings and the evidence if in its opinion, few issues could legally dispose off the case in accordance with the law…” Relying further on the Vincentia Mensah case (supra), I hold that the following issue: FURTHER ADDITIONAL ISSUE (b) b. Whether the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh was mentally incapacitated before his death. is not worth discussing because it becomes irrelevant to the determination of the gravamen of the issues before this Court on account of the above findings. I will conclude by proceeding to deal with the final set of issues as follows: JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 41 17. CONCLUSION [xxxii] ISSUES (d) AND (e) d. Any other issue disclosed by the pleadings. e. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to her claims. The Plaintiff sought the following reliefs from this Court: a. A declaration that the Plaintiff is the legal spouse of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh. But I find that the above relief cannot be granted by this Court because the Plaintiff failed to discharge that burden imposed upon her, even on a balance of probabilities, to satisfactorily establish that she remained the wife and consequently the surviving spouse of the deceased. The above relief fails and is thus dismissed. The following reliefs: b. An order of interim injunction directed at the 1st to 4th Defendants to be restrained from organizing any funeral in respect of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh without the involvement of the Plaintiff as the legal wife of Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 42 c. An order of injunction restraining the Mortician (5th Defendant) assigned to the Trinity Hospital, Lebanon – Ashaiman, from releasing the mortal remains of the deceased Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh until the final determination of this case. become moot because the parties, upon agreement and with the orders of this Court undertook and performed the burial and funeral rites of the deceased, Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh. The final reliefs of the Plaintiff: d. A declaration that the 6th Defendant is not a son of the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh and further that apart from Alexis Pinto, the late Isaac Kabutey Pinto Abebleh had no child anywhere. e. Any other relief(s) this court deems fit. Be and are hereby also dismissed for the foregoing reasons. [xxxiii] The Defendants also counterclaimed for the following reliefs: i. An order of declaration that the Plaintiff is not the legitimate wife of the deceased, Isaac Pinto. ii. An order of declaration that in law the Plaintiff cannot hold herself as a beneficiary of the deceased estate. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 43 iii. Costs. iv. Any other relief(s) which this Honourable Court may deem fit. And I do hereby declare that the counterclaims of the Defendants succeed in their entirety. The Plaintiff’s claims, having been dismissed, Judgment be and is hereby entered in favour of the Defendants on all their counterclaims. Considering the entire circumstances of this case, I will award costs of Gh¢20,000.00 against the Plaintiff and in the Defendants’ favour. SGD. JUSTICE PATRICIA QUANSAH HIGH COURT ‘B’ TEMA GREATER ACCRA REGION. 9TH OF JANUARY 2024. COUNSEL JUSTICE KWAKU SALLAH ESQ. COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF PRESENT JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 44 ERIC ASUMAN ADU ESQ. COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS PRESENT, WITH SAMUEL ANGUAH ESQ. JUDGMENT – SARAH PINTO vrs AYIKU PINTO & 5 ORS 45