PUNJABI VRS. ASIEDU AND ANOTHER (C1/46/2022) [2024] GHAHC 485 (20 February 2024)
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SITTING AT KOFORIDUA ON TUESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2024 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP NANA YAW GYAMFI FRIMPONG, J. MANOJ PUNJABI PLAINTIFF SUIT NO. C1/46/2022 OSU, ACCRA VRS. 1. JOSEPH ASIEDU 2. NANA AKOTO DARKO...
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- [2024] GHAHC 485
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- C1/46/2022
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SITTING AT KOFORIDUA ON TUESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2024 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP NANA YAW GYAMFI FRIMPONG, J. MANOJ PUNJABI PLAINTIFF SUIT NO. C1/46/2022 OSU, ACCRA VRS. 1. JOSEPH ASIEDU 2. NANA AKOTO DARKO III DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION The Plaintiff instituted the instant action against Defendants on 18th October, 2021 claiming per his writ of summons the following reliefs: i. A declaration that the purported sale of the land to the 1st Defendant by the 2nd Defendant is null, void and of legal effect; ii. A declaration that the purported lease dated 11th November 2017 executed between the 2nd Defendant is null, void and of legal effect; and the 1st Defendant over the land and same be cancelled; iii. An order directed at the Lands Commission, Koforidua, in the Eastern Region to cancel and expunge from the records the purported registration of the land in dispute by the 1st Defendant; iv. A declaration of title to all that piece of or parcel of land lying and being at situate Mangoase in the Asuogyaman District measuring approximately 0.46 of acres in the Eastern Region; v. Recovery of possession; vi. General Damages for fraud vii. An order for Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by themselves, or their agents, privies, successors-in-title or whomsoever or of whatever description from entering, developing, selling, assigning and in any way whatsoever that will adversely affect the legal and beneficial interest in the land in dispute; viii. Cost inclusive of legal fees; ix. Any other order (s) as the Court may deem fit. THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE The case for the Plaintiff as stated in his statement of claim and the witness statement filed on 21st June, 2021 is that he is a businessman and operates a Restaurant at Kanda in Accra. It is the case of the Plaintiff that he acquired his parcel of land measuring 0.46 acres from Nana Akoto Darko II, the predecessor of the 2nd Defendant. The transaction for the acquisition of the land was reduced into writing in the form of a lease dated and executed on 1st April, 2003 which he registered with the Land Valuation Board, Accra. This instrument has Job No. 1589/2016 and Registered as RE 1422/2004 which he tendered in evidence as Exhibit “A”. Plaintiff says that he went into immediate possession after the grant and constructed a perimeter wall around the land and tendered in evidence Exhibit “B” series, being photographs of the wall. In addition, he has been paying all the Statutory Rates, being ground rents anytime a demand is made on him particularly, the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands. According to Plaintiff, he has been exercising uninterrupted and quiet acts of ownership over land until recently when the 2nd Defendant stopped him from mounting a security post to the wall and started laying adverse claim to the land. The Plaintiff said since Defendants have evinced all intentions not to stop laying adverse claim to his land, the only option was to commence this instant action against them for the due process of the law to take its course. The Plaintiff said the 2nd Defendant has trespassed onto the land, the subject matter of the instant and has fraudulently sold the land to the 1st Defendant by a Deed of Lease executed on the 22nd day of November 2017, who has evinced every intention to develop the land to the detriment of Plaintiff and prayed that such a situation must not be allowed to happen. It must be put on record that the Defendants did not contest the case. Though the 2nd Defendant entered appearance and filed a defence, he did nothing further to participate in the subsequent proceedings. In respect of the 1st Defendant, in spite of the fact that he was served with all the processes, albeit, by substituted service, he did not even bother to enter appearance to the writ. This means no issues were joined between Plaintiff and the and 1st Defendant. The Plaintiff filed application for directions in accordance with order 32 R 2(1) of C. I. 47 for the issues in the case to be formerly set down for trial and served same on the 2nd Defendant but he did not respond to the application. The writ of summons together with the statement of claim, which was issued on 18th October, 2021 and was served on the 2nd Defendant personally on 23rd November, 2021 as confirmed by the proof of service filed by Salamatu Abubakari, a Bailiff attached to the Court dated 23rd November, 2021. The 2nd Defendant entered appearance to the writ on 1st December, 2021 through his lawyer, Frank Yankey, Esq. of Kyidom Chambers D695/3 Derby Link, Accra, who also filed a defence on his behalf on 23rd December, 2021. Plaintiff filed a Reply to the defence on 30th November, 2022. The 1st Defendant could however not be served by personal service as indicated by the affidavit of non-service dated 13th January, 2022 filed by the Bailiff who tried to effect service of the processes so Plaintiff applied to the Court for to leave to serve 1st Defendant by substituted service which was granted on 24th January, 2022 and Plaintiff caused the postings of the processes to be done as required by the order. The posting was done on 31st May, 2022 and poof of service of posting of the writ of summons and the statement of claim was confirmed by affidavit of posting dated 3rd June, 2022. The 1st Defendant upon being served by substitution did not enter appearance to the writ so Plaintiff applied for interlocutory judgment in default of appearance under Order 10 R 4 of C. I. 47 against him which was granted on 8th December, 2022. Thereafter, the interlocutory judgment in default of appearance and all the subsequent processes were served on the 1st Defendant by substituted service by an order of the Court. Plaintiff applied for directions on 1st December, 2021 which was granted on 16th June, 2023 and the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant were ordered to file their witness statements. Plaintiff complied and filed his witness statement and pre-trial checklist but 2nd Defendant did not; that of the Plaintiff was served on the 2nd Defendant. Case Management was conducted on 19th July, 2023 and completed on 28th July, 2023; the case was adjourned to 28th July, 2023 for hearing at 11:00am after ordering the Plaintiff to serve the Defendants with Hearing Notices. When the Court resumed on 28th July, 2023, Plaintiff had not been able to serve 1st Defendant with the Hearing Notices so he was ordered to do so by substituted service with a Hearing Notice and the Courts Notes for that day’s proceedings and the case was adjourned to 12th December, 2023. When the Court reconvened on 12th December, 2023, there was evidence per affidavit of posting dated 25th November, 2023 that Plaintiff had complied with the order and so Plaintiff was given the opportunity to prove his case. I have taken the trouble to recount all these proceedings to show that Defendants were offered every opportunity to defend the action but chose not to do so. Plaintiff’s case as contained in his witness statement was essentially the same as the averments in his statement of claim which was adopted as his evidence-in-chief together with his Exhibits as marked at Case Management Conference, that is Exhibits “A” “B”. “C” “D” & “E”. Plaintiff in proving his case filed a statement for one witness, one Adamu Mumuni who testified as PW1. In in absence of any cross-examination from any of the Defendants, Plaintiff closed his case with the evidence of PW1 and the case was adjourned to 19th January, 2024 for Counsel for Plaintiff to file her closing addresses. This is an action for declaration of title to land and recovery of possession and as well an order for perpetual injunction and the law is settled that a party who seeks those reliefs must lead credible evidence to prove that claim on the preponderance of probabilities. This is the burden imposed by law and unless the party is able to discharge that burden to the satisfaction of the Court, then that party cannot expect to have a ruling or judgment given in his favour. This means that Plaintiff in this case assume the legal obligation to prove her case by introducing credible evidence to discharge this burden in satisfaction of sections 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 of the Evidence Act, (NRCD 323), so that on the preponderance of probabilities and based on that evidence, the Court can say that Plaintiffs have discharged that evidential burden imposed by those provisions. See the case of MADAM AKOSUA DUFIE & ANOR. VRS MADAM AMMA FOSUA & ANOR. [2009] SCGLR 376 where Ansah JSC. delivering his opinion in the unanimous decision of the Court, gave a detailed discussion of Sections 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). In KWESI YAW v. KWAW ATTA [1961] GLR 51 Adumua-Bossman, J. (as he then was) said in respect of the question of burden of proof that: “it seems unnecessary to remind ourselves of the legal position that the Plaintiff having sought the declaration, assumes the onus of satisfying the Court: “that he is entitled on the evidence brought by him to a declaration of title.” In ODOI V HAMMOND [1971]2 GLR 375, CA, Azu Crabbe, JA, (as he then was), said at pg 382 that: “it is now common learning in this country that in an action for declaration of title to land the onus is heavily on the Plaintiff to prove his case, and he cannot rely on the weakness of to the Defendant’s case.” The case of OGBARMEY-TETTEH v. OGBARMEY-TETTEH [1993-94] 1 GLR 35 in which the Supreme Court held in holding (4) that: “In an action for a declaration of title, a Plaintiff who failed to establish the root of his title must fail because such default was fatal to his case.” This legal obligation to prove his case in satisfaction of the law is by no means taken away because the Defendants decided not to contest the action. Thus, even where the Defendants have admitted that Plaintiff is the owner of the land, Plaintiff must still prove his title to the land by credible evidence. In the case of EDMOND ASANTE-APPIAH VS. MADAM KATE AMPONSAH ALIAS YAA MANSAH [2009] SCGLR 90, Plaintiff argued that the Defendant had on many occasions, admitted at various forums that Plaintiff was the owner of the property and was therefore bound by that statement. The Court held that Plaintiff was still under obligation by law, as the party claiming title to the house in dispute, to produce evidence in proof of his claim. The Court held in holding 5 per Brobbey, JSC that: “…The law is well established that where a party’s claims are for possession and perpetual injunction, he puts his title in issue. He thereafter assumes the onus of proving his title by a preponderance of probabilities, like any party who claims a declaration of title to land. Consequently, the Plaintiff should have led evidence to establish that he single-handedly and exclusively bought the disputed property. In other words, by operation of law, the onus was on the Plaintiff to have established his title. However, the Plaintiff could not lead any evidence to as to how bought the property, when he bought it, the documentary proof establishing his title after the alleged sale.” The substance of Plaintiff’s case is that he acquired his parcel of land measuring 0.46 acres, from Nana Akoto Darko II, the predecessor of the 2nd Defendant. The transaction for the acquisition of the land was reduced into writing in the form of a lease dated and executed on 1st April, 2003 which he registered with the Land Valuation Board, Koforidua. This instrument has a Job No. 1589/2016 and Registered as RE 1422/2004 which he tendered in evidence as Exhibit “A”. Plaintiff says that he went into immediate possession of the land after the grant and constructed a perimeter wall around the land and tendered in evidence Exhibit “B” Series being photographs of the wall. A look at the pictures of the wall show that it was not recently constructed. In addition, he has been paying all the Statutory Rates, being ground rents anytime a demand is made on him particularly, the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, Eastern Region, Koforidua some of which he tendered in evidence Exhibit “C” Series. These Exhibits are demand notices and receipts from Administrator of Stool Lands, Eastern Region, Koforidua. The conduct of the Defendants, particularly the 2nd Defendant made Plaintiff wonder whether the registration of the documents in respect of the land went through so for a confirmation, he conducted a search with a copy of his site plan attached to the lease on 31st March, 2021 at the Lands Commission, Koforidua after he had commenced the action. Fortunately, paragraph 3 of the Search Report signed by one Augustine Opoku Dampare, Assistant Land Administration Officer for the Regional Lands Officer, Koforidua, which he tendered in evidence as Exhibit “D” stated the following: The site again is affected by a Deed of Lease dated 1st April, 2003 and made between Nana Akoto Darko II as Lessor and Manoj Punjabi as the Lessee”. An examination of Exhibit “D” shows that it was conducted at the proper source, that is the Lands Commission, Koforidua on 31st March, 2021 and that Plaintiff’s registration went through the proper processes. Plaintiff also supported his claim with Exhibit “A”, the lease executed in his favour by his grantor. On the face of Exhibit “A” with a Job No. 1589/2016 and Registered as RE 1422/2004 and there is no indication that it was not issued from the appropriate source or institution or that it was obtained by fraud or suffers any of the vitiating factors. Again, the document does not suffer any of the grounds by which it cannot be admitted into evidence, for example, for lack of stamping or registration or not satisfying a valid contract for the sale of land. On the face of the document, it appears as having been properly executed, registered and stamped by the appropriate authorities thus making it valid and authentic. It also shows that the land in dispute as described in the instrument and shown on the site plan attached or included in it, was granted to the Plaintiff by the 2nd Defendant’s predecessor, Nana Akoto Darko II. Section 25 (1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) with the dealing Facts Recited in Written Instrument provides: (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, the facts recited in a written document are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties to the instrument, or their successors in interest. The facts recited in Exhibit “A” between the Plaintiff and Nana Akoto Darko II the immediate predecessor of 2nd Defendant, who also go by the Stool name, Nana Akoto Darko III are binding on him as his successors in interest. It is also provided by S. 37(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) under the heading- Official Duty Regularly Performed as: S. 37 (1) It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. The presumption is however rebuttable for it was stated in GPHA V. NOVA COMPLEX LTD. [2007-2008] SCGLR 806 that: “… The presumption has a prima facie effect only and the presumed fact may therefore be replaced by evidence. A rebuttable presumption, in the language of S. 20 of (NRCD 323) imposes upon the party against whom it operates the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion as to the non-existent of the presumed fact.” This provision which is a re-statement of the common law that there is a presumption that officials perform their duties regularly apply to people acting in their official capacities, was applied in the case of GPHA V. NOVA COMPLEX LTD. [2007-2008] SCGLR 806 where it was held as follows” “… it follows (from sections 20 and 37(1)) that whenever the maxim is applied, the person against whom it is invoked and who is entitled to lead evidence to refute the presumption, is at liberty to prove that there was in fact no due regularity or performance of the official or statutory duty in question. Evidence may be led to show also, for example, that the person is not a public officer or is not duly authorised so to act, or that the person acted outside the limits of his discretion.” In the present case, no evidence was offered to rebut this presumption since the Defendants decided not to contest the action. They did not show any interest in the suit and therefore the presumption stands rebutted. Thus, Plaintiff’s Exhibit “A” having gone through the registration processes and satisfied all other legal requirements, I accept it in proof that it vested interest in the said land in Plaintiff in 2004 before 2nd Defendant purportedly sold it to the 1st Defendant. The effect is that, at the time the 2nd Defendant purported to sell the land to the 1st Defendant, his Stool and for that matter he himself as the immediate predecessor of Nana Akoto Darko II had divested themselves of title in the land and had no interest to convey to the 1st Defendant. This is a case where the principle of nemo dat non quod habet is applicable. In SALOMEY SHORME TETTEH & Anor. VRS MARY KORKOR HAYFORD (SUBSTITUTED BY STELLA LARBI & COMFORT DECKER), Civil Appeal No: J4/34/2011 dated 22nd February, 2012, Jones Dotse, JSC said at page 16 of the judgment thus: “Again, as rightly found by the Court of Appeal, the Asere Stool having divested itself of its interest in the land in favour of the original Defendant long ago in 1974, per the nemo dat quod non habet maxim, had nothing (with regard to the divested land) to convey again, and so any purported sale of the already divested land to the Plaintiff subsequently is null and void.” His lordship also referred to an earlier consolidated suit of the Court entitled MRS. CHRISTIANA EDITH AGYAKWA ABOA- VS. MAJOR KEELSON (RTD.) AND OKYEAME YIMA & ANOR. V. MAJOR KEELSON- unreported. Suit No. 81/92 and L. 20/92 dated 16th March, 2011 where the Court also held on the nemo dat quod non habet maxim as follows: “It can thus be safely concluded that, the principle nemo dat quod non habet applies whenever an owner of land who had previously divested himself of title in the land previously owned by him to another person, attempts by a subsequent transaction to convey title to the new person in respect of the same land cannot be valid. This is because an owner of land can only convey what he owns, and having already divested himself of title, the new occupant of the Begoro Stool Nana Antwi Awuah III cannot revoke what his predecessor had done.” The 2nd Defendant’s immediate predecessor Nana Akoto Darko II, Plaintiff’s grantor sold the land to Plaintiff in 2003 and the 2nd Defendant purported to have sold it in 2017 to the 1st Defendant, some fourteen (14) years after that transaction. It can also be safely concluded on the nemo dat quod non habet maxim that, the interest of the Stool of Nana Akoto Darko II became extinguished and the transaction also became bound on his successors-in-title especially the 2nd Defendant, being his predecessor. According to Plaintiff, he has been exercising uninterrupted and quiet acts of ownership over same until recently when the 2nd Defendant stopped him from mounting a security post to the wall and started laying adverse claim to the land. The Plaintiff said since Defendants have evinced all intentions not to stop laying adverse claim to her land, the only option was to commence the instant action against them for the due process of the law to take its course. The Plaintiff said the 2nd Defendant has trespassed onto the land, the subject matter of the instant and has fraudulently sold the land to the 1st Defendant by a Deed of Lease purported to have been executed on 22nd day of November, 2017. This has given the 1st Defendant the courage to go onto the land with every intention to develop it to the detriment of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s act of possession of the land after the grant is evidenced by the construction of the perimeter wall around it in 2004 of which he tendered photographs as Exhibit “B” Series. A look at the wall shows that it is quite old and there is nothing to doubt that it was constructed around 2004 as Plaintiff testified and corroborated by his only witness, Adamu Mumuni, who said he constructed the wall. Again, a look at inside the wall also shows that some farming activities have been going on the land. PW1 testified that he is a caretaker of the land and he is the one who has been farming on it which also confirms that Plaintiff has been exercising uninterrupted and quiet acts of ownership over the land. This uninterrupted possession was however disturbed when the 2nd Defendant prevented Plaintiff and his workers from mounting a security gate to the wall. Exhibit “E”, the Deed of Lease executed by the 2nd Defendant for the 1st Defendant is dated the 22nd day of November, 2017. This means, Plaintiff, at least enjoyed fourteen (14) years of uninterrupted and quiet possession of the land until Defendants started laying adverse claim to same. Assuming the land belonged to the Defendants, they did nothing about Plaintiff’s presence and possession for the period that he was on the land until they decided to interfere with that possession. It is trite law that possessory rights, even in respect of a squatter is a better title against the whole world except the true owner. Thus, it was held in OSEI (SUBSTITUTED BY) GILLARD V. KORANG [2013-2014]1SCGLR 221 that: “… Now possession in law is nine points of the law and a Plaintiff in possession has a good title against the whole world except the one with a better title. It is the law that possession is prima facie evidence of the right of possession and is being good against the whole world except the true owner.” In ABAKAM EFFIANA FAMILY & ORS. V MBIBADO EFFIANA FAMILY & ORS. (1959) GLR 326, it was held that: “where a Defendant has been in long undisturbed possession and occupation of land he is entitled to the protection of the law against all who cannot affirmatively prove a better title.” It should also be noted that it is not the Defendants who brought the Plaintiff to Court to claim the land as the owners or challenge Plaintiff’s possession. Thus, a proof of his possession is good title to the land except a person who can prove a superior title, which entitles him to maintain the instant action against them, something Defendants failed or refused to do. In ACQUAH PERGAH TRANSPORT LIMITED & ORS [2010] GLR 729 @ 736 Adinyira (MRS), JSC described the method of producing evidence in these words: “The method of producing evidence is varied and it includes the testimonies of the party and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary and things (often described as real evidence), without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the Court or tribunal of fact such as a jury.” I am satisfied that Plaintiff has been able to prove his case by a preponderance of probabilities and has discharged the burden imposed on him by law, not only in terms of exhibits “A” & “B”, but also acts of the Plaintiff on the land in dispute as a person in possession before Defendant trespassed onto it. FRAUD Plaintiff pleaded fraud which he particularized in paragraph 11 of his statement of claim as follows: Paragraph 11 i. That the 2nd Defendant knew or ought to have known that the land had already been sold to Plaintiff by the 2nd Defendant’s predecessor in the person of Nana Akoto Darko II”; ii. That the 1st Defendant knew or ought to have known that the land was not available for sale by the 2nd Defendant; iii. That the 2nd Defendant knew or ought to have known that he had no power to sell the land to the 1st Defendant; iv. That the 1st Defendant knew or ought to have known that the land having been fenced with a wall belonged to the person who has taken possession.” Plaintiff however did not lead any evidence to prove the fraud; the only attempt he made to prove the issue of fraud was by tendering in evidence Exhibit “E”, a Deed of Lease executed in favour of the 1st Defendant by the 2nd Defendant purported to have been executed on 22nd November, 2017. This document is however incomplete since page 2, which is supposed to have the recitals and the relevant information relating to the truncation or conveyance has been removed. Though this document was admitted in evidence at the trial, I will invoke Section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) and reject same. The said Section with the heading- Power of Court to Exclude Evidence provides: “Evidence that would be inadmissible if objected to by a party may be excluded by the Court on its own motion.” The averments in the particulars of fraud do not support that claim. Plaintiff did not prove that at the time the 2nd Defendant purported to sell the land to the 1st Defendant, he was aware that they had already been granted to Plaintiff by his predecessor. The fact that a perimeter wall had been erected around a land in itself does not mean it has been granted or allocated to somebody unless the person who subsequently sought to allocate it to a different person knew or ought to have known, by information available to him, that it had already been allocated. In the absence of any proof of fraud, the claim of fraud is rejected. DEFENCE As I have said, the 2nd Defendant entered appearance and filed a defence but he and his lawyer abandoned the case. Though he was served with all the processes including Hearings Notices, the last one being ordered by the Court on 8th November, 2023 for the hearing of the case on 12th December, 2023. Though the 2nd Defendant filed a defence in which he raised some issues, they became mere allegations at the trial since he offered no evidence to prove same. The law is settled that where a Defendant files a defence to Plaintiff’s action but fails to participate in the trial to lead evidence in proof of the allegations therein contained, it becomes mere allegations which the Court must not consider in its judgment. In OFORI AGYEKUM V. MADAM AKUA BIO (DEC’D) (SUBSTITUTED BY AGARTHA AMOAH); Civil Appeal No. J4/59/2014 Benin, JSC who delivered the judgment of the Court stated that: “Where no evidence is adduced on a fact that has been pleaded, it is treated as having been abandoned by the pleader, the Court does not call it into question in its judgment. The Court’s only duty is to consider the evidence the party has proffered in determining whether or no he has the right standard of proof”. Even if this Court decides to be charitable and consider the defence filed by the 2nd Defendant, the only conclusion I can arrive is that there is no merit and it is better he did not come to Court to attempt to prove same. The substance of his defense is contained in paragraph 12 of his statement of defence as follows: Paragraph 12 The 2nd Defendant avers that on 9th October, 2009, he demanded the document of all the occupants of the land, time started to run against all the occupants. 12 years after the announcement, fell on 9th October, 2021, and since the instant suit was issued on 11th October, 2021, Plaintiff is statute barred from instituting any action to recover the land. Indeed, the announcement about the production of the documents by all the occupants was made by Kwame Ansah who reported back that all the occupants had been informed on the above date, 9th October, 2009. A cursory look at these averments impresses on the mind that it was prepared by a person who is not a lawyer or has no legal background. Surprisingly, it was prepared by a lawyer. Since I read these averments, I have engaged my mind in every legal gymnastic and I have been struggling to understand how an announcement made by a Chief informing occupants on his land to submit their documents for verification can translate into the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54) so that Section 10 of the Act can be invoked to bar Plaintiff from instituting an action to recover the land for failing to submit his documents within the time limit set by the 2nd Defendant. It is unfortunate that some newly enstooled chiefs have been using this practice to recover lands granted by their predecessors long before they ascended the Stool. Plaintiff did not allege or prove any damage on the part of the Defendants on the land and did not also lead any evidence to show how he has been affected by the presence of Defendants on the land. Counsel for Plaintiff has submitted that since considering the threat of the 1st Defendant to develop the land and the cost of serving the Defendants with almost all the process he filed by substituted service, Plaintiff should be given nominal damages of GH¢200,000.00 and in support of that cited the cases of MAHAMA V ISSA & ANOR. [2001-2002]1 GLR 694 AND PEDEBOH V. GHANA TIMBER COMPANY [1964] GLR 134. I do not think this should be the basis of awarding such a cost. Applying to serve processes by substituted service is part of the legal machinery and should not translate into award of damages. Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendants have actually entered the land or carried on any activity on same. Mere threat to enter onto somebody’s land does not call for any damages either. The 2nd Defendant admitted in his statement of defence that he had endorsed the sale of Plaintiff’s land to the 1st Defendant which compelled him to institute the instant action. As I said, Plaintiff has been able to prove his case on the balance of probabilities. Accordingly, I enter judgment in favour of the Plaintiff for the reliefs as endorsed on her writ as follows: i. A declaration of title to all that piece of or parcel of land lying and being at situate Mangoase in the Asuogyaman District measuring approximately 0.46 of acres in the Eastern Region as particularly described in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim filed on 18th October, 2022; ii. An order is made for Plaintiff to recover possession of the land; iii. It is hereby declared that any purported sale of the land in dispute to the 1st Defendant by the 2nd Defendant is null, void and of no legal effect; iv. It is accordingly declared that the purported lease dated 11th November, 2017 executed by the 2nd Defendant affecting the land in dispute is null, void and of no legal effect; v. The Lands Commission, Koforidua, in the Eastern Region is hereby ordered to cancel and expunge from the records the purported registration of the land in dispute by the 1st Defendant; that is, the purported lease dated 11th November, 2017 executed between the 1st and the 2nd Defendant affecting the land in dispute and any other instrument (s) affecting the land registered in favour of the 1st Defendant; vi. An order for Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by themselves, or their agents, privies, successors-in-title or whomsoever or of whatever description from entering, developing, selling, assigning and in any way whatsoever laying adverse claim in the land in dispute; vii. By their conduct Plaintiff, could not have developed the land even if he wanted to when he instituted the action. Plaintiff said also that the Defendants prevented him from mounting a security post in 2023; the cost of doing so now will certainly not be same as at the time he wanted to do so. Plaintiff is entitled to General Damages which the Court will access at GH¢20,000.00; viii. Plaintiff’s claim for General Damages for fraud is however dismissed. ix. I will award Cost of GH¢10,000.00 in favour of Plaintiff against the Defendants. (SGD) NANA YAW GYAMFI FRIMPONG, J. JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT COUNSEL: 1. EDWARD SAM CRABBE, ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF 2. THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEFEND THE ACTION 18