HON. OWUSU ALBERT 10 OTHERS VRS NANA FOSU GYEABOUR APENTENG III (C12/01/2020) [2024] GHAHC 214 (9 May 2024)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE WENCHI, BONO REGION,HELD ON THURSDAY THE 9TH DAY OF MAY, 2024, BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE FREDERICK A. W. K. NAWURAH. SUIT NO: C12/01/2020 HON. OWUSU ALBERT HON ALHAJI KUSPAN IBRAHIM JIM JOHN ZELU AGYEMANG PREMPEH DICKSON JOHN OBOUR NKETIA KWAKU ADJEI ESTHER NSIAH ATINGA JOHNSON ALALE EUNICE DAPAA BOATEMAA 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. HON GEORGE OPOKU 11. SAMUEL ADJEI DUKU ALL OF ASUBINJA PLAINTIFFS v. NANA FOSU GYEABOUR APENTENG III ASUBINJA HENE OF ASUNINJA DEFENDANT JUDGMENT The effect of a defamatory statement has been described in a Supreme Court of Canada case, Hill v. Church of Scientology (1995) 126 D. L. R. (4th) 129 at 176, as follows: “…a defamatory statement can seep into the crevasses of the subconscious and lurk there ever ready to spring forth its cancerous evil. The unfortunate impression left by a libel may last a lifetime. Seldom does the defamed person have the opportunity of replaying and correcting the record in a manner that will truly remedy the situation. The real damage cannot be ascertained and established. It is impossible to track the scandal to know what quarters the poison may reach hence damages being described as at large.” Per their amended writ of summons and Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs, who are members of a Committee established to manage the Community Health Planning and Services (CHPS) Compound at Asubinja in the Bono East Region, sued the Defendant, who is the chief of Asubinja, for the sum of forty thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵40,000.00) in damages for defamation. The Plaintiffs also seek an order directed at the Defendant to retract his defamatory publication against them and render an unqualified apology to them, and also an order of injunction restraining the Defendant from making any further defamatory publications against them. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that the Defendant defamed them when, without any reasonable basis, he maliciously wrote a letter dated 20th November, 2018, to to some offices including the Ministry of Health, Techiman North District; the Chief Executive, Techiman North; the Member of Parliament, Techiman North; the Acting President of Offuman Traditional Council, Nana Hemaa-Offuman; the Chairperson, CHPS Compound, Asubinja; and the Assemblyman, Asubinja Electoral area, and made very serious disparaging libelous statements against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs contend in the main that the letter imputes a lack of integrity on their part, and that they have used the funds raised in Support of the CHPS Compound to buy cattle for their own interest. The Plaintiffs further contend that the letter categorically states that the 8th Plaintiff is in the habit of abandoning his duty post at the CHPS Compound and taking his cattle to graze in the bush. The Plaintiffs conclude that the Defendant’s letter defamed them because it was calculated, amongst other things, to damage their businesses, their offices and political careers, and it also subjected them to public ridicule, by lowering their reputations in the eyes of right-thinking members of society. The Defendant, on his part, does not deny the authorship of the said letter, its reference to the Plaintiffs or the publication thereof, but maintains that he wrote the letter to stakeholders of the CHPS programme regarding the operation of the CHPS Compound. It is also the Defendant’s case that, as the Chief of Aubinaja, he has a social and moral duty and an interest in the running and management of the CHPS Compound, and those he copied the letter to have a corresponding interest and duty to receive it. Thus, in essence, the Defendant is pleading justification and qualified privilege as a defence. Defamation is, in essence, the publication of a false statement which reflects on a person’s reputation and tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or tends to make them shun or avoid him. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edition) (Reissue), Vol. 28, page 7, paragraph 10 defines defamation as follows: “A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business”. Liability for defamation is divided into the two categories of libel or slander and this division has important consequences. Whilst libel consists of a defamatory statement or representation in a more or less permanent form such as writing and broadcasting on both radio and television, slander, on the other hand, is defamation through a more or less transient or temporary medium such as by spoken words or gestures. Another distinction between libel and slander is that libel is actionable per se, that is, without proof of damages. Slander, on the other hand, is, generally, actionable only upon proof of damages. With slander, unless in certain specified circumstances where the language is slanderous per se, such as where it imputes that the Plaintiff has committed an indictable offense, or imputes that he has a loathsome disease or that he is unfit to perform his office, business or profession, proof of special damages is necessary. Proving damages involves proving, for example, that the slanderous statement has caused the Plaintiff to lose his job or has caused people to refuse to do business or associate with him. The Common Law rule of libel was that any publication proven libelous, even if by extrinsic facts (innuendo), was actionable without proof of special damages. In the case of Duffour v. Bank of Ghana & Anor. (2022) JELR 109685 (SC), the Supreme Court, per Prof. Mensa-Bonsu (Mrs.) JSC stated the position of the law on libel per se thus: “In addition to all of these above, it would also be important to state that at common law, Libel, is actionable per se, because damage is presumed. On account of the presumption, there need be no specific proof of damage. However, any particular damage that has occurred may be put in evidence and the court would take cognizance of it. Such damage may be aggravated by certain circumstances, and a court may take that into consideration as well.” In recent times, however, the Courts have begun to adopt the view that special, or pecuniary, damages must be proved to recover for innuendos (also known as libel per quod) while libel per se remained actionable without any such proof. Thus, in the case of Owusu-Domena v. Amoah [2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 790, Benin, JSC (as he then was) aptly stated the position of the law thus: “The issue of reputation is one of fact. It is the summation of facts, acts, events, conduct, etc. from which the esteem in which a person is held by other persons is adjudged. Thus unless the facts speak for themselves from which a negative effect on a person’s reputation may be inferred, the plaintiff must lead evidence to prove the nature or kind of reputation he had prior to the publication and in what way it has been affected by the publication. Is it in relation to his character, trade, profession or what have you?” [Emphasis mine] Whether defamation consists of libel or slander, the following elements are common to both and must be proved by the Plaintiffs: 1. That the words used by the Defendant are defamatory; 2. That the words refer to the Plaintiffs; and 3. That the words were published by the Defendant to persons other than the Plaintiffs. Thus, at the close of the pleadings the Issues which were set down for determination as contained in the Application for Directions filed by the Plaintiffs and adopted by the Court were as follows:- a) Whether or not the Defendant is the author of the letter dated 20/11/18 to Health Ministry Techiman North Assembly and copied other offices and personalities; b) Whether or not the contents of the letter dated 20/11/18 were defamatory; c) Whether or not the publication made per the letter dated 20/11/2018 were false; and d) Whether or not the publications made on 20/11/18 have lowered the reputations of the Plaintiffs. Upon a thorough examination of the issues above in the light of the admission by the Defendant that he authored of the said letter about the management of the CHPS compound and particularly about the 8th and 9th Plaintiffs’ attitude to work, and the that he wrote the letter to stakeholders of the CHPS programme regarding the operation of the CHPS Compound, it is obvious that the questions of authorship of the impugned letter, the reference of its contents to the Plaintiffs, and the publication of its contents to persons other than the Plaintiffs are not in issue here. The problem presented in this case is now one of whether or not the contents of the letter are defamatory of the Plaintiffs, and whether they have caused injury to the Plaintiffs’ reputations or they have a tendency to lower their reputations in the estimation of others. It is a basic principle of the law of evidence that a party who bears the burden of proof is to produce the required evidence of the facts in issue that has the quality of credibility short of which his claim may fail. It is trite law that matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence. See the case of Don Ackah v. Pergah Transport [2011] 31 GMJ 174 SC at page 183, per Adinyira JSC. See also sections 10 and 11 of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323. In Sections 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323 the law also provides: 14. Except as otherwise provided by law, unless it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence that party is asserting. 17. Except as otherwise provided by law, a. the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof. b. the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact. The effect of these sections quoted above are that the Defendant in a civil matter does not need to prove anything; the Plaintiffs who took him to court have to prove what they claim they are entitled to from the Defendant. The Plaintiffs’ duty is to substantiate their allegations by producing evidence which is satisfactory and in accordance with the requirements of the law. The elements the Plaintiffs have to establish in a claim for defamation were well set out by the Supreme Court in the case of Owusu-Domena v. Amoah (supra) at page 802. The Court, speaking through Benin JSC (as he then was) stated that a Plaintiff in an action for defamation must plead and lead evidence on the following matters in order to succeed: (i) That there was a publication by the defendant; (ii) That the publication concerned the Plaintiff; (iii) That the publication was capable of a defamatory meaning in its natural and ordinary sense; (iv) Alternatively or in addition to (iii) above, that the facts and/or circumstances surrounding the publication, it was defamatory of him, the Plaintiff; and (v) If the Defendant seeks the defence of qualified privilege or fair comment, that the Defendant was actuated by malice. Per the admissions made by the Defendant in his statement of defence and during the trial, there is no dispute there was publication of the letter to persons other than the Plaintiffs. There is also no dispute the publication concerned the Plaintiffs, some of whom are mentioned by name, and all of whom are generally referred to in the letter as the members of the CHPS Compound Management Committee. The question, therefore, is whether the said letter when read as a whole is capable of a defamatory meaning, in other words, when taken in its natural and ordinary sense? In their attempt to prove that the Defendant has defamed them, the Plaintiffs gave in their statement of claim and evidence before this Court, the particulars of the facts that they rely on in support of their claim. In establishing whether or not these statements made by the Defendant were defamatory, it is important to first determine whether or not the ordinary and natural meaning of the words published were capable of a defamatory meaning. In the case of Jones v. Skelton (1963) 1 W. L. R. 1362, at p. 1370-1371, Lord Morris described the ordinary and natural meaning of words thus: “...the ordinary and natural meaning may.....include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader guided not by any special but only by general knowledge, and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction would draw from the words.” Given that the Plaintiffs are relying on the ordinary and natural sense of the words in the Defendant’s letter, it is important and desirable to set out in extenso the entire letter to give the context of the words complained of in this suit. It is as follows: “I Nana Fosu Gyeabour Apenten III, Asubinja Hene and Twafohene of Offuman Traditional Council wish to draw your attention to the under listed problems. The problems are about the CHIP compound which was commissioned too us last year 1. After the commissioning of the CHIP Compound the committee came to my palace and rendered accounts to me. An amount of Thousand Five Hundred Ghana Cedis was realised. The committee told me they will open bank accounts with that amount and that the amount would be used to buy some equipment for the CHIP compound. What I am seeing today is that Mr Johnson and the committee are engaging in cattle rearing. 2. Mr Johnson is always seen with a Fulaani man following cattle to the bush for grazing leaving the compound to the nursery sister alone. 3. Besides all these Mr Johnson and the so called committee tried to find another means of getting monies from the various Churches by means of donations for their own interest. 4. The chairman Mr Albert Owusu changed the formation of the committee from what Mr Johnson told, me. He said that there should be a representative from Nananom, unity committee and some opinion leaders from the town. 5. The committee also presented some receipt to collect various amount of money from the citizen in the electoral area of winch I rejected from the first time. 6. They held various meetings without my knowledge and for this matter I will not sit down unconcerned to see my people suffering for the interest others. I am therefore writing officially to your faithfully office to transfer Mr Johnson from the town Asubinja and to find the correct means of forming new committee that will have the best interest of the people of Asubinja.” (sic). Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 16 at page 23 paragraph 16, states that in determining the natural and ordinary meaning, the Court takes into account not only the literal meaning of the words but also the inference which a reasonable person would draw from them in their context. Thus, the meaning of words in a libel suit is determined by the reaction of the ordinary reader and not by the intention of the publisher. I have examined the ordinary and natural meaning of the words contained in the letter as a whole as the words therein do not admit of any secondary meanings requiring better particulars and facts. Reading paragraph 1 of the letter, I find that the inference that could be drawn from the wording therein is that, rather than opening bank accounts for the money realised from the CHPS Compound and using same to buy equipment for the facility, the Plaintiffs have rather invested the money in cattle farming. Paragraph 2 of the letter also clearly accuses the 8th Plaintiff of dereliction of his duties at the CHPS Compound in favour of taking cattle out to graze in the fields. Paragraph 3 plainly charges the Plaintiffs with using the CHPS Compound Committee to solicit for funds from other sources, including churches, for their own private gain or use. The concluding paragraph of the letter states the Defendant’s intention very clearly; and that is to cause the transfer of the 8th Plaintiff from the Asubinja Township and to have the Committee dissolved and a new one formed in its stead. The Plaintiff’s witness (PW1), who is the Krontihene of the Asubinja Traditional Area, confirmed in his evidence-in-chief before this Court that a copy of the Defendant’s letter had been read out to him and other traditional leaders and they had met and invited the Plaintiffs to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the matter. The evidence of PW1 was to the effect that the allegations levelled by the Defendant against the Plaintiffs are unfounded and untrue and aimed at defaming the Plaintiffs. Under cross-examination by Counsel for the Defendant, PW1 maintained that, contrary to the Defendant’s allegations that the Plaintiffs failed to buy equipment for the CHPS Compound, they did indeed purchase the said equipment which he personally saw. PW1 also stated under cross-examination that the Defendant had stated in the letter that the Committee Members (the Plaintiffs) had used the money realised from the CHPS Compound to buy cattle. He further stated that even though the 8th Plaintiff owned cattle, he did not personally herd or handle them. These statements, read as a whole, are calculated to disparage the Plaintiffs in their office as members of the CHPS Compound Management Committee and cause the stakeholders of the CHPS programme to dissolve or disband the Committee. These are allegations which negatively affects the Plaintiffs’ reputation and which might affect the perception of their ability to do their jobs or to be taken seriously or deserving of respect. Such allegations of corruption or embezzlement of public funds are also capable of exposing the Plaintiffs to hatred, contempt or ridicule. Thus, in my considered opinion, the Plaintiffs have clearly established that the letter was capable of a defamatory meaning and that it did indeed defame them. In answering the question of whether the wording of the letter has caused injury to the Plaintiffs’ reputations or they have a tendency to lower their reputations in the estimation of others, the Plaintiffs, per the evidence-in-chief of the 1st Plaintiff in court, claim that the letter adversely affected their political careers, traditional positions, businesses, religious and other offices as efficient people. According to the 1st Plaintiff, some of the Plaintiffs who contested for positions as Assemblymen were challenged based on the allegations in the letter. He gives a whole litany of misfortunes that the said letter has brought upon the Plaintiffs including the forced resignation of some of the Plaintiffs from leadership positions in the society, questions from their churches and clergy and employers about the allegations of embezzlement in the letter, and opprobrium and ostracism from some colleagues and friends. It is not enough to merely narrate these instances of injury to the Plaintiffs’ reputations without adducing evidence in proof of same. In Majolagbe v. Larbi & Ors. (1959) GLR 190-195, Ollennu J. (as he then was) rehashed his definition in the case of Khoury and Anor. v. Richter (unreported) delivered on the 8th December, 1958 on the question of proof as follows: “Proof in law is the establishment of facts by proper legal means. Where a party makes an averment capable of proof in some positive way, e.g. by producing documents, description of things, reference to other facts, instances, or circumstances, and his averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the witness-box and repeating that averment on oath, or having it repeated on oath by his witness. He proves it by producing other evidence of facts and circumstances, from which the Court can be satisfied that what he avers is true.” It must be noted, however, that, in cases where the facts speak for themselves from which a negative effect on a person’s reputation may be inferred, there is no need for the Plaintiffs to show that the statement made had a particular effect on certain persons, or the public in general. See: Owusu-Domena v. Amoah (supra). Instead, the Plaintiffs must simply argue that the defamatory statements would have a negative effect on their reputation in the mind of an ordinary, reasonable recipient. Obviously, such clear allegations of corruption or embezzlement of public funds as alleged by the Defendant are very capable of exposing the Plaintiffs to hatred, contempt or ridicule in the minds of reasonable members of society. The Defendant has pleaded justification and qualified privilege as a defence. The Defendant failed to give particulars of the facts he relies on, as demanded under Order 57 rule 3(2). However, his case is essentially to the effect that the publication was made in good faith on a matter of public interest. As regards his defence of justification or truth, it should be noted that the burden of proof for showing that a statement is true rests with the Defendant. If a statement is proved to be true, then this will form an absolute defence. The defendant does not have to show that every single characteristic of the statement made is true, merely that it is substantially true. See: Alexander v. North Eastern Railway Co. [1865] 6 B & S 340. The defence of qualified privilege, on the other hand, covers situations in which an individual is obliged morally or statutorily to communicate information. A qualified privilege permits a person to make a statement that would typically be considered defamatory, but because of particular circumstances, a particular statement made would not be considered to be defamatory. This defense applies when the statement is made without malice and in good faith, such as in the case of public officials or matters of public concern. Thus, if a statement is made on a matter of public interest, and the Defendant reasonably believes that publishing the statement is in the public interest, he is more likely to be protected even if the statement turned out to be false or defamatory. In Carter- Rock on Libel and Slander, Fifth Edition, at page 109, public interest is defined as follows: “Broadly speaking, everything which invites comments or which concerns a man as a subject of the realm is a matter of legitimate public interest. All matters of government, public institutions and their administration and the public acts of public men are certainly matters of public interest”. The principle laid down by Baron Parke in the old English case of Toogood v. Spyring (1834)1 CM and R 193 at p194 is the locus classicus on the definition of “public interest”. He stated that a person would be liable for a defamatory publication “…unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. … If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits.” In Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, Lord Phillips of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom laid down the definition of “public interest” in paragraph 33 of his judgment, thus: “By that we mean matters relating to the public life of the community and those who take part in it, including within the expression ‘public life’ activities such as the conduct of government and political life, elections… and public administration, but we use the expression more widely than that, to embrace matters such as (for instance) the governance of public bodies, institutions and companies which give rise to a public interest in disclosure, but excluding matters which are personal and private, such that there is no public interest in their disclosure.” It must be noted, however, that, even though qualified privilege protects the maker of an untrue defamatory statement, it does so only if the maker of the statement acted honestly and without malice. This means that if the defamatory statement is made with actual malice or the Plaintiff proves malice on the part of the Defendant then the Defendant will no longer be entitled to the qualified privilege. According to the book “The Law of Torts” by Harry Street, London: Butterworth & Co., 1955, at p.318, malice means either that the Defendant did not believe in the truth of his statement or was “recklessly careless whether the statement be true or false”; or that he was actuated by wrong motive, ill will, personal spite or abuse of privilege. In other words, malice will be said to exist if there is spite or ill will on the part of the Defendant or if the Court finds indirect and improper motive against the Defendant in publishing the words complained of. Thus in Angel v. HH Bushell and Co. Ltd. (1968) 1 Q. B. 813; (1967) 1 All ER 1018 a defamatory letter was found to have been motivated by anger, not by duty or any interest, so a defence of qualified privilege failed. It would suffice if the party alleging malice is able to prove spite or ill will or indirect motive on the part of the other party in the publication. See also: Turner v. Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Pictures, Limited (1950) 1 All ER 449. From the facts of this case, the Plaintiffs are made up of an assortment of farmers, civil servants, businessmen, traditional leaders and politicians from Asubinja and the surrounding communities who were appointed to represent their communities in the management of the National Health Planning and Services (CHPS) Compound at Asubinja, which is a public facillity. The issues surrounding the management of the facility are thus, in my view, a matter of public interest which presents the Court with the problem of having to balance the need to prevent defamation and the need to retain the ability of concerned citizens to report allegations freely. These realities together with the question of whether the allegations in the Defendant’s letter were made honestly and without any malice will determine whether the Defendant is indeed protected by qualified privilege. In answering this question, I have considered the list of factors which indicate whether a statement is made in the public interest or not, as provided by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 127. These include the seriousness of the allegations, the subject matter of the allegations, the source of the information, whether the information was verified, whether the subjects of the statement were given opportunity to comment or rebut, the tone of the letter and the circumstances surrounding its publication. For example, serious allegations are more damaging, so a serious false allegation is harder to defend on the grounds of public interest. Well- sourced information is also more likely to be protected, but if a statement comes from someone who obviously has an interest in spreading lies, or is paid for the story, then it is less likely to be protected on the grounds of public interest. Then again, where the tone or the language of the publication is violently excessive, or the attack is rather caustic or out of proportion for the situation, then same is a strong suggestion that there was a malice. In this instant case the Defendant, per his letter, has made very categorical allegations of mismanagement of the CHPS facility’s funds by the Plaintiffs which directly relate to misappropriation and attempts to conceal their dealings by working behind his back. He has also made very scathing allegations about the 8th Plaintiff’s dereliction of his duties at the CHPS facility and even gone to the extent of recommending that he be transferred from Asubinja and the Committee be disbanded. All these serious allegations touching on the reputation of the Plaintiffs could not be proved or confirmed by the Defendant except to state that the words used in the letter were not defamatory. From the concluding paragraph of the Defendant’s letter, it is quite clear that the removal or transfer of the 8th Plaintiff from the CHPS facility at Asubinja and the dissolution of the CHPS Compound Management Committee was the reason behind the letter. The evidence on record also shows that the Defendant had had serious problems with the 1st and 8th Plaintiffs over the membership of the Committee and the fact that the Committee had held some of its meetings without notifying him. These facts are clearly stated in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the letter (Exhibit “A”). Thus, quite clearly, there was bad blood between the Defendant and the Plaintiffs prior to the publication of the said letter. The Defendant therefore obviously had indirect motives, other than a sense of duty, in spreading those falsehoods against the Plaintiffs who were members of the said Committee in order to get the Committee dissolved and replaced. His defamatory letter was therefore actuated by malice and cannot be protected on the grounds of public interest. The defence of qualified privilege by way of publication made in good faith on a matter of public interest therefore fails in its totality. The Plaintiffs claim against the Defendant the sum of forty thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵40,000.00) in general damages for defamation. General damages in defamation are meant to compensate the Plaintiffs for the effects of the defamatory statement. Where the Plaintiffs are able to establish any special damage, the Court would take cognizance of it and award such aggravated damages as the circumstances permit. As in all matters on award of general damages, it is within the judicial discretion of the Court. The aim is not to enrich the Plaintiffs but the figure must be such as will serve as a deterrent to the Defendant from repeating such reprehensible conduct. In awarding damages, I have taken into consideration the seriousness of the allegations, as well as conduct of the Defendant from the time the libel was published down to today, in that he blatantly failed to remedy the situation upon realizing that he had no justification for the caustic and damning allegations he published against the Plaintiffs. I am therefore minded to agree with the sum being demanded by the Plaintiffs, especially as the said figure has obviously depreciated over time to amount to an automatic reduction in value which most Courts normally consider in such situations. I will award the sum of sum of forty thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵40,000.00) against the Defendant. As a further consequence of this judgment and the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs, I make the following orders: a) The Defendant is hereby ordered, within thirty (30) days of this judgment, to publish on three consecutive occasions, on the same platforms that he published the defamatory words, an unqualified retraction and an apology, with the same prominence as given to the issuance of the defamatory words against the plaintiffs. b) An order of perpetual injunction is hereby granted restraining the Defendant, his agents, assigns and servants from further publishing any defamatory words against the Plaintiffs. I award costs of seven thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵7,000.00) to the Plaintiffs against the Defendant. DECISION Judgment for the Plaintiffs. (SGD.) H/L JUSTICE FREDERICK A. W. K. NAWURAH JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT COUNSEL: ▪ ▪ Jacob Zurobire Soung, Esq. for Plaintiffs; Isaac Richmond Mensah, Esq. for Defendant. 19