Odum Vrs Republic [2023] GHAHC 132 (24 May 2023)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE WINNEBA, HELD ON MONDAY THE 24TH DAY OF MAY, 2023, BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, JUSTICE ABOAGYE TANDOH, HIGH COURT JUDGE. SUIT NO. CC15/004/2022 JACOB ODUM … APPELLANT VS THE REPUBLIC …. RESPONDENT JUDGMENT _________________________________________________________ The Appellant herein Jacob Odum currently a convict, was charged with the offense of Conspiracy to commit robbery under sections 23(1) and 149 of the criminal offenses Act, 1960 (Act 29) and Robbery under section 149 of the criminal offenses Act, 1960 (Act 29) as amended. However, two other persons who were alleged to have committed the offenses of Conspiracy and Robbery are still at large. The Appellant was arraigned before the Circuit Court Ofaakor in the Central Region of Ghana on the 8th of January 2020 where the Appellant pleaded guilty on his own plea on both counts. Having pleaded guilty on his own plea on both counts (one and two) the Appellant was accordingly convicted and sentenced to fifteen (15) years IHL on each count to run concurrently. With the period for appeal ordinarily elapsed, but that notwithstanding, the Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Section 325 (2) which states thus: (2) The High Court may for good cause admit an appeal though the period of limitation prescribed by this section has elapsed. On the strength of s 325 (2) of Act 30, the Appellant’s application and prayer to this court to lift the time limitation for appeal to enable him appeal against his conviction and sentence was granted on the 15th day of September, 2021, hence this appeal. BRIEF FACT OF THE CASE The complainant Christian Hlordjie is a driver age 47 and a resident of Fiifi, a suburb of Gomoa Nyanyano. Accused JocobOdum is a Hebalist residing at cemetery junction, Winneba. On the 5th day March 2017 about 8:30pm, the complainant who owns an ash and yellow Hyundai Atos taxi cab with registration No. GW8872-17 was intercepted by accused and his accomplices, Kwame Charles now a convict, two others and a lady who are currently at large, hired his services from Kasoa to Nyanyano. On reaching the Nyanyano curve, accused and his accomplices attacked the complainant with a knife and held his neck from behind. Complainant struggled with them and managed to ran away, but accused and his accomplices chased and caught him back into the taxi and beat him mercilessly, cut his right arm with a knife, used a veil to cover his eyes and drove him all the way to Nsuoakyere, a suburb of Winneba and dumped him on the roadside and sped off the car valued at GHC24,000.00 including his Samsung mobile phone valued at GHC80.00 and cash the sum of GHC40.00. A complaint was made to the police and a medical form was prepared and issued to the complainant to go to the hospital for treatment and report. Convict Kwame Charles was arrested and arraigned before this Honourable court on 24/04/2017 and after trial he was convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. On the 2nd day of January 2020, intelligence led to the arrest of accused JocobOdum by Winneba police and brought to Gomoa Nyanyano police station. After investigations, he was charged with the offences before this Honourable court. The Appellant pleaded guilty on his own plea on both counts of Conspiracy and Robbery and he was sentenced to fifteen (15) years IHL to run concurrently on the 8th day of January 2020. Dissatisfied with his conviction and sentence, the Appellant has mounted this appeal before this court. GROUNDS OF APPEAL 1. The judgment is not supported by the evidence adduced before the court 2. The court failed to appreciate the case of the accused now convict and Appellant. 3. The Honourable trial judge erred in law in convicting the Appellant for the offence of Robbery contrary to section 149(1) of the criminal offenses Act, 1960 (Act 29) when same was not proved. 4. That the sentence is harsh and excessive as the Appellant is a young first offender. It is trite that an Appeal is by way of re-hearing especially in the instant appeal where the judgment is being challenged as not supported by the weight of the evidence. This principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court speaking through Appau JSC in the case ofEVELYN ASIEDU OFFEI V YAW ASAMOAH ODESHE KWAKU AGYAPONG1thus: “… An appeal is by way of rehearing, particularly where the appellant alleges his notice of appeal that the decision of the trial court was against the weight of evidence. In such a case, it is the duty of the appellate court to analyses the entire record of appeal, take into account the testimonies…it is immaterial whether the appeal is a second one from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.” See: TUAKWA V BOSOM (2001-2002) SCGLR 61. This position of the law that an appeal is by way of re-hearing especially when the evaluation of the evidence by the Court below is in doubt, was re-echoed by the Supreme Court speaking through Adinyira JSC as well as Dotse JSC in the cases Ackah v Pergah transport & Others [2010]SCGLR @ 728 – 739 and Abbey & Others v Antwi V SCGLR 17 @ 34 – 35. This no doubt allows the appellate court the opportunity to re – examine the record and arrive at its own decision one way or the other. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A CRIMINAL CHARGE Section 11(2) of the Evidence Act 1975 NRCD 323 states; “In a criminal action the burden of producing evidence when it is on the prosecution as to any fact which is essential to guilt requires the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind will find the existence of the facts beyond reasonable doubt.” Section 13(1) of the Evidence Act 1975 NRCD 323 provides the extent of proof or the burden on the prosecution in a criminal action thus: (1) In a civil or criminal action, the burden of persuasion as to the commission by a party of a crime which is directly in issue requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the failure on the part of the prosecution to discharge the burden according to the legal standard which standard is beyond reasonable doubt, will lead to the acquittal and discharge of the accused or convict as the case may be. See Donkor v The State {1964} GLR598, SC Yeboah v The Re (Consolidated) {1972} 2 GLR 281 Republic v Adams {1960} GLR 91 at 95 CA Mali v The State {1965} GLR 710 SC The criminal in Ghana is settled that one cannot ground a conviction if the prosecution if it bases is findings on mere probabilities if not beyond reasonable doubt which clearly draws a distinction between our civil law and the criminal law. See Oteng v The State {1966} GLR352 – 354,SC. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in all criminal cases. What “beyond a reasonable doubt” means is that, the prosecution must overcome all reasonable inferences favoring innocence of the accused. Discharging this burden is a serious business and should not be taken lightly. The doubts that must be resolved in favour of the accused, must be based on the evidence, in other words, the prosecution should not be called upon to disprove all imaginary explanations that established the innocence of the accused. The rule beyond a reasonable doubt, can thus be formulated thus:- “An accused person in a criminal trial or action, is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.” See article 19 (2) (c) of the Constitution, 1992 and Dotse JSC in the case of Richard Banousin v the Republic , Appeal # J3/2/2014, 18/03/2014 See also: 1. Frimpong @ Iboman v Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 297 2. Gligah&Anor. V The Republic [2010] SCGLR 870 3. Amartey v The State [1964] GLR 256 S. C Section 11(1) of the Evidence Act 1975 NRCD323 define the burden of producing evidence as the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling on the issue against that party. The extent of onus on the defense on the other hand is provided by section 13(2) of the Evidence Act 1975 which states: “Except as provided in section 15 (3), in a criminal action, the burden of persuasion, when it is on the accused as to a fact the converse of which is essential to guilt, requires only that the accused raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt.” See Commissioner of Police v Antwi {1961} GLR 408 SC. THE CHARGES, THE EVIDENCE AND THE APPLICABLE LAW I will first of all deal with grounds 1, 2, and 3 together and proceed to deal with ground 4. This has become necessary because the three grounds dove – tail into each other as they all border on the view on the Appellants that the conviction was not supported by the evidence on record or that the evaluation of the evidence that led to the conviction did not appreciate the case of the Appellant neither was the offense of robbery proved. . For the avoidance of doubt, grounds 1, 2 and 3 as filed were: Therefore, the appellate court is enjoined to re – examine and analyze the entire record and arrive at its own conclusion. I will first of all examine and discuss the records with respect to the offense of Conspiracy and proceed to deal with the offense ofRobbery. The charge of Conspiracy under section 23(1) of the Criminal Offenses Act,1960 Act 29 states thus: “ If two or more persons agree or act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime with or without any previous concert or deliberation each of them is guilty of conspiracy to commit or abet that crime as the case may be.” In the case of REPUBLIC v. MAIKANKAN AND OTHERS [1972] 2 GLR 502-514 the court, per ABOAGYE J. as he then was held thus: “For a charge of conspiracy to succeed under section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), there must be evidence that the accused persons agreed or acted together with a common purpose to commit the offence.” Despite the comprehensive view or principle discussed in the Maikankan case(SUPRA), the charge of conspiracy encountered some legal challenges by virtue of the wording during the Review of the Law Commission which seems to have amended the previous legal position. The wording before the amendment reads thus: “ If two or more persons agree or act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime, whether or without any previous concert or deliberation, each of them is guilty of conspiracy to commit or abet”. The wording after the Review reads thus: “ Where two or more persons agree to act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime, whether or without any previous concert or deliberation, each of them is guilty of conspiracy to commit or abet”. In the case of the Republic v Augustine Abu & Ors unreported ACC/15/13 where the Learned senior brother MarfulSau JA sitting as additional High Court Judge held the view that in an offense of conspiracy, the prosecution had to prove that there was prior agreement to act together and not by simply acting together. This in the view of MarfulSau JA arose because of the seeming amendment of s23(1) of the Criminal Offenses Act, Act 29 by the Law Review Commission when it had no mandate so to do and invited Parliament to take a second look at the law. However, the Learned author Dennis Adjei JA discussed the departure of the Court Appeal from the view expressed by MarfulSau JA with the view that once the Law Review Commission had no such mandate and exceeded its powers so, all the amendment with respect to s23 (1) of Act 29 is null and void and proceeded to consider the original law as good law. See Republic v EkeneAnozie Suit # H2/44/12 delivered on27/06/13, unreported. Dennis Adjei JA in his book Modern Approach to the Law of Interpretation in Ghana, first Edition, was of the view that the Court of Appeal could not suomoto strike down the law and that the amendment occasioned by the Law Review Commission could only be corrected by an amendment by Parliament if deemed necessary. Accordingly, the current position of the law is as captured in the Law Review Commission which requires two or more people to agree to act together and not to agree or act together. There must therefore a prior agreement to act together. As a result the reference of the agreement should not be drawn solely on the acting together but also on the prior agreement. This position of the law in the case ofAzametsi v The Republic [1974] 1 GLR 228 CA was a good law then but unfortunately there is now a clear departure of the law of conspiracy from the previous Azametsi principle where merely acting together could ground a conviction. Therefore, the issue for consideration was whether or not there was any prior agreement on the part of the 1stconvict and 2nd Appellantto commit the offenses charged ( Conspiracy) against them. And in the often quoted case of The State Vrs. Otchere&Ors. [1963] 2 GLR, 463, the Supreme Court observed at page 471 thus:- “That the law of conspiracy as stated in our Criminal Code embodies the principles of the English law of Conspiracy as enunciated in judicial decisions of the English Courts.” The Supreme Court made references to the following English cases- In the case of R. v Meyrick [1929] 21 Cr. App p.94 at 99, Lord Hewart C. J delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England referred to two passages from the judgments in the cases of R vs. Mulcahy [1868] LR 3HL 306 HL and R vs. Brisac [1803] 4 East 164; 102 ER. 792 respectively and to the charge to the jury in R. vs Parnell as together embodying the English Law on the subject. In R v Mulcahy, Willess J stated thus;-“A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means”. In R vs. Brisac, Grose J stated, “conspiracy is a matter of inference deduced from certain criminal acts of the parties accused done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them”. In R vs. Parnell, Fitzgerald J in his reference to the jury said: “It may be that the alleged conspirators have never seen each other, and have never corresponded, one may have never heard the name of the other, and yet by the law they may be parties to the same common criminal agreement”. “Thus in some of the Fenian cases tried in this country, it frequently happened that one of the conspirators was in America the other in this country, that they never seen each other but that there were acts on both sides which led the jury to the inference, and they drew it, that they were engaged in accomplishing the same common object, and when they had arrived at this conclusion the acts of one became evidence against the other”. See John David Logan And Frank David Laverick V The Republic, Criminal Appeal NO. J3/1/2006, 7th February 2007. S. A. B. AKUFFO (MISS) J. S. C. (PRESIDING), BROBBEY, J. S. C. ANSAH, J. S. C. ANINAKWA, J. S. C. ADINYIRA (MRS.), J. S. C. The idea of having an application of an aspect of the criminal law of Ghana similar to that of England is not necessarily what matters most but how the application of the law in the offense of conspiracy is in conformity to s23(1) of the Criminal and Other Offenses Act, 1960, (Act 29). The Learned author S. A Brobbey in his Book Practice and Procedure in the Trial Courts and Tribunals of Ghana at page 160, para 340(iv) writing on evidence during trial in conflict with previously written statement said in quoting the State v Otchere (1963) 2 GLR it was held that a witness whose evidence on oath is contradictory of a previous statement made by him whether sworn or unsworn is not worthy of credit. Also in the case of Buoir v The State (1965)GLR SC the court held that if a witness has previously said or written something contrary to what he has testified at the trial, his evidence should not be given much weight. Having discussed the principle underlying the offense of conspiracy, I will proceed to do same for that of Robbery and determine whether or nor the appeal will succeed or not. 2. Robbery Section 149 of the Criminal and Offenses Act 29, 1960 states: “A person who commits robbery commits a first degree felony” Section 149 of Act 29, 1960 as amended by Act 2003 per sections 149 (1) (3) reads as follows (1) Whoever commits robbery is guilty of an offense and shall be liable, upon conviction on trial summarily or on indictment , to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, and where the offense is committed by the use of an offensive weapon or offensive missile, the offender shall upon conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years. And (3) In this section “offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use to cause injury to the person or damage to property or intended by the person who has the weapon to use it to cause injury or damage; and “offensivemissile” includes a stone, brick, or any article or thing likely to cause harm, damage or injury if thrown” The minimum sentence of ten years and fifteen years when an offensive weapon or missile is used is a clear indication of the seriousness of the offense of robbery. In the case ofKwakuFrimpong a.k.a Iboman v The Republic(SUPRA), the Supreme speaking through Dotse JSC gave the evolution of the offense of robbery and the sentences associated with same. The Supreme Court per Dotse JSC referred to the unreported criminal appeal case of Daniel Ntow v The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. CRA No. H2/25/05 dated 6th April, 2006 the Court of Appeal, Coram Owusu-Ansah JA presiding, Jones Dotse JA as he then was, and Iris May Brown J (Mrs) as she then was in a consideration of the legal regime and effect of the various amendments to section 149 of the Criminal Code, 1960 Act 29 observed as follows:- “In an attempt to rationalize the seriousness which society attached to the menace of armed robbery, NRCD II” (which is the suppression of Robbery Decree 1972, NRCD II) went to the other extreme by limiting the courts to only two sentences upon conviction in a robbery charge, namely:- 1. Life Imprisonment and 2. Sentence of death This was the situation until Act 646 was enacted in 2003 which has indirectly amended and or repealed not only the original section 149 of Act 29 referred to supra, but also NRCD II as it is relevant and applicable to section 149”. Continuing further, the Court of Appeal observed in the Daniel Ntow v Republic case referred to supra as follows:- “In effect, the result of the enactments in Act 646 are to do away with life imprisonment and sentence of death in all cases of robbery, even where violent means are used which results in death.” The Supreme Court in reducing the sentence in the Iboman case from 65 years to forty years did not take away the gravity of the offense of robbery except to say that there must be some uniformity in sentencing especially when the minimum without a maximum may even make the sky as the starting point` in the sentencing regime. SeeKwashie v The Republic [1971] 1 GLR 488 at 493 where it was stated thus:- “In determining the length of sentence, the factors which the trial Judge is entitled to consider are: i. The intrinsic seriousness of the offence. ii. The degree of revulsion felt by law abiding citizens of the society for the particular crime. iii. The premeditation with which the criminal plan was executed. iv. The prevalence of the crime within the particular locality where the offence took place, or in the country generally. v. the sudden increase in the incidents of the particular crime vi. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances such as extreme youth, good character and the violent manner in which the offence was committed.” See The Republic v Adu-Boahen, [1972] GLR 70-78 Even though the court has no limitation to the extent if can go in sentencing, we are encourage not to operate in a vacuum but be guided by case law and sentencing guidelines. Section 150 of Act 29,1960 defines robbery thus: “ A person who steals a thing commits robbery a. if in , and for the purpose of stealing the thing, that person uses force or causes harm to any other person, or b. If that person uses a threat or criminal assault or harm to any other person, with intent to prevent or overcome the resistance of the other person to the stealing of the thing. The definition of robbery is contained in section 150 of the Criminal Offences Act and the ingredients for robbery arising out of the definition have been established as follows: 1) “That the accused persons stole from the victims. 2) That in stealing from the victims the accused persons used force, threat, criminal assault or caused harm to the victims. 3) That they did so with the intent to prevent and overcome any resistance from the victims to stealing of the items.” It is instructive that having regard to the offence of robbery, it is necessary in law to make reference to stealing in the Criminal Offences Act and its definition in section 125 that “a person steals if he dishonestly appropriates a thing of which he is not the owner.” The ingredients of the offence of stealing per section 125 of Act 29 1960, are three and well known to the basic law student. Section 122(2) of Act 29 which further explains the appropriation of a thing connected with stealing has been defined to mean“any moving, taking, obtaining, carrying away or dealing with a thing with intent that some person may be deprived of the benefit, or of his ownership or of the benefit of his right or interest in the thing, or in the value of proceed or any part thereof.” SEE the case of ShaibuSando v Republic unreported, suit # H2/23/2010, July 18, 2013 per Kanyoke, Owusu M, and Sowah C, JJA. OseiHwere, J. (as he then was) in the case of Behome vrs The Republic [1979] G. L. R. 112 in holding 5 explained robbery as follows:- “50 Under Section 150 of Act 29, A would only be guilty of robbery if in stealing a thing, he used any force or caused any harm or used any threat of criminal harm to B with intent thereby to prevent or overcome the resistance of B or C to the stealing of the thing. The fear might be either or personal violence to the person robbed or to a member of his family in therestrictive sense of a man, wife and children. And the thing stolen must be from the person or the one threatened or in his presence if the property is under his immediate and personal care and protection.” To sustain a charge of robbery, the Prosecution is required to prove the following ingredients beyond reasonable doubt. “1. That there was stealing. 2 That force or threat of criminal harm was used or employed and 3 That the force or violence or threat of criminal harm was intended to prevent or overcome the resistance of anybody during the stealing.” In R v Dawson [1977] 64 CAR 170, the court held that when a person is charged with robbery, the sole question is whether he used force on any person in order to steal. Robbery is basically stealing and the intention of the accused is primarily to dishonestly appropriate as under section 120(1) of Act 29 something from another person. LEGAL SUBMISSIONS, ANALYSIS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW In determining the Appeal before me, I will combine grounds 1, 2 and 3 together and deal with them given that they all lead to the same conclusion and consequences and finally deal with ground four. 1. GROUNDS 1, 2, and 3 1. The judgment is not supported by the evidence adduced before the court 2. The court failed to appreciate the case of the accused now convict and Appellant. 3. The Honourable trial judge erred in law in convicting the Appellant for the offence of Robbery contrary to section 149(1) of the criminal offenses Act, 1960 (Act 29) when same was not proved. I will proceed to analyze grounds 1, 2, and 3 as argued and make a determination thereof. It is argued for and on behalf of the Appellant that the appellant was deceived or otherwise compelled by the police investigator to plead guilty. It was further argued on behalf of the appellant that if the trial court had knowledge of the appellant’s deception in pleading guilty, the court would have come to a different conclusion because the court has a duty to re-hear a matter on appeal and draw its own conclusion and referred to the case of Tuakwa v Bosom [2001 – 2002] SCGLR 61 as well as that of Djin v Musa Baako[2007 – 2008] SCGLR 686. It was further argued on behalf of the Appellant that his plea of guilty was not given voluntarily and contrary to section 120 of the Evidence Act 1975, NRCD 323. In opposing the view argued for and on behalf of the Appellant, the Respondent held the view that the trial complied with the provisions under section 171 of Act 30. For the avoidance of doubt, Section 171 of Act 30, 1960 states: (1) If the accused appears personally or, under section 70 (1), by his advocate, the substance of the charge contained in the charge sheet or complaint shall be stated and explained to him, or if he is not personally present, to his advocate (if any), and he or his advocate, as the case may be, shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. In stating the substance of the charge the Court shall state particulars of the date, time, and place of the commission of the alleged offence, the person against whom or the thing in respect of which it is alleged to have been committed, and the section of the enactment creating the offence. (2) If the plea is one of guilty the plea shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used, or if there is an admission of guilt by letter under section 70 (1), such letter shall be placed on the record and the Court shall convict the accused person and pass sentence or make an order against him, unless there shall appear to it sufficient cause to the contrary. In the instant appeal, both the Appellant and the Respondent seem to agree that the charges were read and explained to the Appellant when he was arraigned before the Court below and the Accused/Convict/Appellant pleaded guilty to count 1, 2 and, he was then convicted and sentenced. What Counsel for the Appellant differ from that of the Respondent was that the Appellant pleaded guilty because he was compelled by the police investigator to plead guilty to the charges. And that if that had come to the attention of the trial Court Judge, he would have not convicted the Appellant. In the instant appeal before this Court, the facts of the case were readily filed on the docket and the Court below referred to same as recorded. Also the facts of the case as recorded were all part of the processes and documents transmitted to this Court for consideration. The decision of the trial court was rightly supported by the evidence on record as argued on behalf of the Republic or Respondent except the offense of Conspiracy which the trial Court should have acted with caution, especially when those who were alleged to have conspired with him were absent when his plea was being taken. Therefore, I find that the court below rightly found the Appellant guilty of Robbery having pleaded guilty on his own, and convicted him. I further find that the argument on behalf of the Appellant that he was compelled to plead guilty contrary to section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1975 and also fueled by spending more than 48 hours in custody prior to arraigning him in court, was an afterthought. Ground 4 It is argued on behalf of the Appellant that at the time of his conviction, he was twenty – four (24) years and that sentencing him for fifteen years IHL will deny him of his best use of his youthful age. Counsel for the Appellant further argued that he is a first offender and must be dealt with leniently. Counsel then supported his argument with the cases of Adu -Boahene v The Republic [1972] 1 GLR 70, Kwashie v The Republic [19971] 1 GLR 488 – 496 as well Apaloo v The Republic]1975] 1 GLR 156. Indeed the need to consider mitigation in sentencing especially first offenders is trite and same was agreed by the Respondent and I do also agreed to same. However, what eluded Counsel was the minimum sentence imposed by statue when Robbery is committed using an offensive weapon. In the instant appeal, the Appellant was found guilty of robbery, per pages 1, 2 of the record of appeal. The particulars of the offense of robbery, as committed by the Appellant read thus: JACOB ODUM HERBALIST : AGE 24 YEARS – You together with convict Kwame Charles and two others now at large on the 5th day of March , 2017 at Gomoa Nyanyano in the Central Region and within the jurisdiction of this court, for the purpose of stealing Hyundai Atos taxi cab with registration No. GW 872 – 17 valued at GH¢ 24, 000.00, Samsung mobile phone valued GH¢ 80.00 and cash the sum of GH¢ 40.00, belonging to CHRISTIAN HLORDJIE, did beat him mercilessly , cut his right arm with a knife , used a veil to cover his eyes with intent to overcome the resistance of the said CHRISTIAN HLORDJIE, to the stealing of the said taxi cab, mobile phone and cash. For the sake of emphasis and avoidance of doubt, I will reproduce the provision under section 149(1)(3) of Act 29 as amended; Section 149 of Act 29, 1960 as amended by Act 646, 2003 per sections 149 (1) (3) reads as follows (2) Whoever commits robbery is guilty of an offense and shall be liable, upon conviction on trial summarily or on indictment , to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, and where the offense is committed by the use of an offensive weapon or offensive missile, the offender shall upon conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years. And (3) In this section “offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use to cause injury to the person or damage to property or intended by the person who has the weapon to use it to cause injury or damage; and “offensivemissile” includes a stone, brick, or any article or thing likely to cause harm, damage or injury if thrown” From the foregoing and provided by statue, the minimum sentence for robbery during which a knife among other items were used, is fifteen years and the trial Court has no discretion but to impose the minimum or moiré and not less. Therefore the fifteen years (15) IHL sentence imposed by the trial court on the Appellant was supported by law and substantially mitigated. The sentence was therefore not according to law if even lengthy. CONCLUSION Upon conclusion of the totality of rge evidence adduced, and on record the legal submissions filed by both the Responded and the Appellant and the law, the appeal with respect to the first count (Conspiracy) is upheld because the Appellant could not have conspired with himself where there was no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence against the Appellant with respect to count one (Conspiracy) is set aside and the Appellant is acquitted and discharged on the conspiracy charge. However, the evidence on record with respect to the conviction and sentence on the charge of Robbery(Count 2) is consistent with the law on robbery and the minimum sentence of fifteen(15) years was imposed pursuant to section 149(1)(3) of Act 29 as amended. Accordingly, the decision of the court below with respect to the offense of Robbery against the Appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction and the sentence of fifteen years IHL on count two is affirmed. (SGD) JUSTICE ABOAGYE TANDOH HIGH COURT JUDGE HIGH COURT, WINNEBA. 22