Dankwa-smith Vrs Ansah [2023] GHACC 333 (10 July 2023)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT HELD AT TARKWA IN THE WESTERN REGION ON MONDAY THE 10TH DAY OF JULY, 2023 BEFORE HER HONOUR HATHIA AMA MANU, ESQ., CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE STEPHEN DANKWA-SMITH --- H/NO. 1/5, AGRIC HILL – TARKWA VRS: SUIT NO. C2/14/2021 PLAINTIFF SAMUEL ANSAH TARKWA --- DEFENDANT JUDGMENT PARTIES: Plaintiff – Absent. Defendant – Absent. Edem Diaba for Plaintiff. Appiah Agyei Yeboah Asuamah for Defendant. INTRODUCTION: On the 9th day of August, 2021 the Plaintiff herein by a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim instituted the instant action against the Defendant praying this honourable court for the following reliefs: 1. An order for the defendant to pay the amount of one million, two hundred and eighty-one thousand Ghana cedis (GH₵1,281,000.00) owes the plaintiff. 2. Interest on the said amount at the commercial rate from the 18th day of December, 2020 to the date of final payment. 3. Costs including legal fees. Upon service of the Writ and the Statement of Claim on the Defendant, he, on the 30th day of August, 2021 entered appearance through his Solicitor Appiah Adjei Yeboah- Asuamah Page | 1 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 1 The Defendant proceeded to file his Statement of Defence on the 30th day of August,2021 in which he generally denied liability and stated that all monies owed the Plaintiff were repaid in full together with outrageous interest exacted thereon. Directions in the instant cause were taken on the 5th day of October 2021 wherein three issues were set down for trial. The issues set down by this Honourable Court for trial are reproduced, thus: “ISSUES FOR TRIAL i. Whether or Not the the defendant owes the plaintiff the sum of One Million, Two Hundred and Eighty-One Thousand Ghana cedis (GH₵1,281,000.00)? ii. Whether or Not the Defendant signed the agreement with the plaintiff? iii. Whether or Not the Defendant repaid all monies he owed the plaintiff? iv. Whether or not the plaintiff on his own filled, completed and presented the cheque with the face value of GH₵1,281,000.00 without the defendant’s knowledge? SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S CASE The case of the plaintiff from a careful perusal of the pleadings is that, he is a money lender whilst the Defendant is a businessman who deals in gold bearing sand popularly called “tailing”. According to the Plaintiff, the two parties entered into loan agreement for the sum of GH₵1,104,500.00 and the said amount was to attract 20% interest. The said principal sum and interest was to be repaid to the Plaintiff on or before 31st December, 2015. It is the contention of the Plaintiff that the defendant defaulted with the reason that he was sick which led to an extension of the repayment period to 30th June, 2016 with Page | 2 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 2 interest thereon frozen for the extended duration but upon a second default, it will attract a flat interest rate of GH₵20,000.00 per month. That the said agreement was executed before the two parties with their respective witnesses. The Plaintiff pleaded that the Defendant paid GH₵44,400.00 and defaulted in the payment of the balance for which reason the Defendant issued a cheque to the Plaintiff to be drawn on his Stanbic Bank account on the 5th day of February, 2018. It is the case of the Plaintiff that the said cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds. This led to criminal proceedings against the defendant before this honourable court. The defendant herein and Accused therein was found guilty, convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of 50 penalty units or in default serve 12 months imprisonment with hard labour. The Defendant herein and Accused therein was ordered to refund the outstanding balance on the said cheque he issued. SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS’ CASE This can also be extracted from the Statement of Defence filed on 30 – 8 – 2021. It is interesting to note that the Defendant as is evident on his Statement of Defence generally traversed the Plaintiff’s Claim and alleged that he does not owe the Plaintiff a dime. The Defendant continued to aver that between 2015 and 2016, he was seriously sick and bedridden and could not have validly entered into any agreement with anyone. The Defendant contended that the cheque as pleaded by the Plaintiff in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim was filled, completed and presented without the Defendant’s knowledge. According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff demanded pre- signed blank cheques for which he – the plaintiff would fill as and when repayment schedules fell due and there were monies in the accounts when notified by the Defendant. Page | 3 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 3 The defendant in the main defence denied the Plaintiff’s claim categorically and stated unequivocally that defendant does not owe the plaintiff a dime and as such, the Plaintiff is not entitled to his reliefs. PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF DEFENCE In response to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, the Plaintiff denied paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 and stated that the defendant will be put to strict proof of the averments in the said paragraphs above. In further answer to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, the Plaintiff averred that he filled the cheque for the Defendant to sign because the Defendant earlier on made mistakes in filling the cheque and so spoilt two cheques in the process. In response to paragraph 8 of the Statement of Defence, the Plaintiff pleaded that the agreement was signed in the presence of witnesses including the wife of the Defendant who signed the agreement as a guarantor. In an answer to paragraph 9 of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, Plaintiff contended that when the said cheque was presented to the Defendant’s Bank, he was called by the bank to verify whether he issued the cheque before it would be processed. TESTIMONIES OF THE PARTIES AT THE TRIAL PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY The Plaintiff’s testimony comprised both documentary and oral testimonies. The Plaintiff tendered his Witness Statement and the attached exhibits filed on 29-10-2021 Page | 4 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 4 and relied on same as his evidence-in-chief without objections. The Plaintiff was cross-examined by Counsel for the Defendant. DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY The Defendant also testified through his Witness Statement filed on 12-11-2021 and was also cross-examined by Plaintiff’s Counsel. EVALUATION OF THE EVIDNCE LED IN THE TRIAL Without being repetitive, when the Plaintiff mounted the witness box, swore on oath and tendered his Witness Statement together with the attached exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’, the Defendant and his Counsel, exercised their right of cross-examination. The Defendant’s counsel sought to discredit this witness and his claims as to how the agreement was signed. He questioned where the agreement was signed, the nature of work of the guarantor as well as the content of the agreement. I find that the witness was however not discredited as he did not give a single response that was contradictory to his own claims of how Exhibit A came into being. The law is long settled that where documentary evidence conflicts with oral evidence, the former should prevail. The Court of Appeal in the case of Mouganie v Yemoh [1977] 1 GLR 163 – 173 on the point held on the headnotes as follows: “the rule that oral evidence could not be accepted to contradict a written document was usually stated in connection with contracts but it was equally applicable to documents such as judicial records, transactions required by law to be in writing or other documents constituting a valid and effective transaction between parties. In the instant case, it was not claimed by the defendant that the deed of gift, relied upon by the plaintiff as evidence of his title to the disputed land, was not exercised by the Page | 5 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 5 proper grantor. Neither was it claimed that the deed was void for mistake or illegality nor voidable on grounds of fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation. In the circumstances, it was not open to the trial judge to receive, much less to accept, oral evidence that the land given to the plaintiff in that transaction was different from what the deed itself said. The land delineated in that deed was the land which had to be accepted as disposed of in that transaction. Dictum of Lord Morris in Bank of Australasia v. Palmer [1897] A. C. 540 at p. 545, P. C. cited.” Similarly, in the case of Yorkwa v Duah [1993-94] 1 GBR 255 -273 at holding 4 of the headnotes delivered itself on the point thus: “(4) Whenever there was in existence a written document and oral evidence over a transaction, the practice in the court was to lean favourably towards the documentary evidence, especially if it was authentic and the oral evidence conflicting. As between the conflicting and inconsistent oral evidence and the authentic exhibit 1 on the pledge, the court would lean favourably towards exhibit 1 that supports the case of the appellant that the transaction was a sale and not a pledge. Hayford v Egyir [1984- 86] 1 GLR 682 cited.” In assessing the weight to attach to Exhibit A, I inclined to determine if Exhibit A was properly executed as well as if it bears the intention of both parties. Black law dictionary 11th Edition defines as agreement as “a consent of two or more persons concurring the one is party with, the other in receiving, some property right or benefit. The Exhibit A was duly executed by the parties and their witnesses. I find that Exhibit A clearly states the parties’ intention with no ambiguity. In a bid to prove his entitlement to the amount claimed, the Plaintiff further tendered in evidence Exhibit “B” which is a six-paged judgment given by this Court differently constituted on the 18th December, 2022. This Exhibit “B” emanates from criminal Page | 6 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 6 proceedings which the police through Plaintiff’s complaint commenced against the Defendant after his cheques were not honoured. Although Exhibit “B” is of a criminal trial, the judgment affirms that the Defendant and his wife signed that existing agreement. The defendant sought to deny liability and claimed that the agreement was brought to him by his wife who had received explanation from the plaintiff. The defendant also claimed that he and his wife were illiterates. Admittedly, the law generally is that where an illiterate executes a document, there is no general presumption that the illiterate appreciated the contents of the document and such a document cannot bind the illiterate. This general proposition is however not sacrosanct and without exceptions. The High Court commenting on the exceptions to the general rule on illiteracy on executed documents held on the headnotes in the case of Kotokoli and Another v Sarbah [1981] GLR 496 – 504 in the following hallowed and authoritative words: “the general rule of evidence was that where an illiterate executed a document, any other party to the document who relied upon it should prove that it was read over and if necessary interpreted to the illiterate. That was a rule based mainly on common sense. Evidence should be preserved of the fact that illiterate natives who were parties to conveyances had the contents of such conveyances clearly interpreted to them in their own native language and that they fully appeared to comprehend the nature and effect of the transactions evidenced by the document. However, where the document did not bear a jurat on the face of it but the party who executed it did not object either to it or the transaction which it sought to evidence, that general rule should not be allowed to defeat the document on the mere technical ground of lack of a jurat. In the Page | 7 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 7 instant case, the receipt which counsel sought to avoid was issued by one illiterate to another and it bore no jurat but it could be inferred from the evidence that the appellant understood and fully appreciated its meaning and effects and he was therefore bound by its contents. Waya v. Byrouthy (1958) 3 W. A. L. R. 413; Dadzie and Boateng v. Kokofu [1961] G. L. R. 90 and Youhana v. Abboud [1973] 1 G. L. R. 258 cited.” In the case of Zabrama v Segbedzi [1991] 2 GLR 221 – 247, the Court of Appeal held at holding 2 of the headnotes in the following terms: “(2) The principle was firmly established by a stream of decided cases that where an illiterate executed a document which compromised his interest and that document was being cited against him by a party to it or his privy, there was no presumption in favour of the proponent of the document, and against the illiterate person, that the latter appreciated and had an intelligent knowledge of the contents of the document. The party seeking to rely on the document must lead evidence in proof that the document was actually read and interpreted to the illiterate who understood it before signing same. Being a question of fact, the presence or otherwise of an interpretation clause on a document was one of the factors a court should take into account in determining whether the document in question was fully understood by the illiterate. The presence of an interpretation clause in a document was not conclusive of that fact, neither was it a sine qua non. It was still possible for an illiterate to lead evidence outside the document to show that despite the said interpretation clause, he was not made fully aware of the contents of the document to which he made his mark. If a court, after assessing all the available evidence was satisfied, upon the preponderance of the evidence, that the document was read and interpreted to the illiterate person, then the burden of proof would have been discharged by the person relying on the document. That was because just as it was bad to hold an illiterate to a bargain he would otherwise not have entered into if he fully appreciated it, so also Page | 8 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 8 was it equally bad to permit a person to avoid a bargain properly and voluntarily entered into by him under the guise of illiteracy. In the instant case, although there was no interpretation clause on exhibit A, there was sufficient evidence on record to justify a finding of fact that the document was read over and dutifully interpreted to the plaintiff before he made his mark. “State v. Boahene [1963] G. L. R. 554 applied. Kwamin v. Kufuor (1914) P. C. '74-'28, 28 explained.” As these claims are emanating from the defendant, section 14 of the Evidence Act, NRCD 323 demands that he satisfies the Court as to the existence or non-existence of the claim or defence he is asserting. The Supreme Court in the case of In Re Will of Bremansu Akonu-Baffoe & Ors. VRs. Buaku Vrs. Vandyke (substituted by) Bremansu stated in holding 3 that, “the Illiterates Protection Act, 1912 Cap 262 did not give a definition of who is an illiterate. However, whether a person was to be considered as literate or illiterate in that context, must be related to the language in which the document has been prepared, i.e. the ability to read and write the said language”. Defendant’s counsel has argued that the defendant was disserted as he is illiterate and as such he did not understand the content and the absence of the jurat should cause the court to hold the agreement a void. In the Defendant’s evidence before the Court he said in paragraph 6 of his witness statement that, he was seriously sick and could not have validly entered into any agreement, then in paragraph 8 he said his wife brought the agreement that Plaintiff had explained same as capturing his entire debt. The court finds that if the defendant was seriously sick then it would have made no sense for his wife to send the agreement to him. Again, he asserts the document was read to his wife as including all debt owed meaning as at the time the defendant Page | 9 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 9 acknowledges that he owed the plaintiff. To further support his claims, the defendant claimed he only owed the plaintiff GH₵40,000.00 with accrued interest of GH₵44,000.00. On the face of Exhibit “A” an amount of GH₵1,325,400 is stated in figures and not wards. With defendant having agreed per his own evidence to owing the plaintiff at least the absence of the amount he claims to have owed should and a new figured in its place should have been a red flag if indeed he did not understand the agreement he signed. During cross-examination of the defendant the following transpired: Q. Was it such time that you signed an agreement with plaintiff? A. It is not so I know nothing of that agreement. Q. But you can identify your own signature not so? A. Yes I can. Q. Have a look at Exhibit A? A. It is my signature but I do not know what is inside. Q. On Exhibit A, your wife also signed? A. I know nothing of same. Q. You signed the document but you do not know the content? A. I know nothing of same. Q. Did your wife also sign the document? A. I know nothing of same. I find from the Defendant’s responses as a bare face try-on determination to deny knowledge of Exhibit A. In the face of the above cogent and crucial evidence against the Defendant, I do not see why the Defendant should be permitted to feign ignorance of his own deed that he executed. To hold that Exhibit “A” – the agreement duly executed by the Defendant and guaranteed by his wife will amount to judicial aid to the Defendant to overreach the Plaintiff and unjustly enrich himself to the detriment of the Plaintiff. Page | 10 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 10 On the issue of jurat, I find that that the document in contention is an agreement and not a will therefore establishing that one understand its content or not is a question of facts. His Lordship Justice Dennis Adjei at page 66 of his book on Modern Approach to the law of interpretation in Ghana 2nd Edition wrote that, “The present decisions of the Supreme Court are to the effect that failure to provide jurat has been moved from a fatality to a presumption”. Defendant’s counsel relied on holdings in Zabrama Vrs. Segbedzi and Akowuah & Anor. Vrs. Amoo & Anor. And stated that under cross-examination, Plaintiff admitted that the agreement was not read over to the Defendant. Defendant’s counsel mentioned page 8 and 9 of the records. However, I find that is a misrepresentation of what transpired even per the question and response that he quoted himself. BURDEN OF PROOF The evidentiary rules on proof are as contained in sections10, 11, 12, 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323) and expounded by case law in our Courts. I set out the relevant statutory provisions in extenso for their full effects. They are as follow: Section 10(1): “For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court. (2) The burden of persuasion may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or non-existence of a fact or that he establishes the existence or non-existence of a fact by a preponderance of the probabilities or by proof beyond reasonable doubt.” Page | 11 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 11 Section 11 (1) “For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue. (4) In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.” Section 12 (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities. (2) “Preponderance of the probabilities” means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non- existence. Section 14: Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non- existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting. Section 17: (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof. Page | 12 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 12 (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact. It is elementary and settled rule of evidence that the burden of proof is on he who alleges the existence or non-existence of a fact. In other words, he who alleges must proof his allegation. In the instant case, the Plaintiff alleged that a loan agreement – Exhibit “A” with the Defendant, on the understanding that he would be repaid his capital with accrued interest. Contrary to that said understanding, the Defendant failed or refused to repay the said loan plus accrued interest despite persistent demands. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant pleaded for extension time within which to repay the loan and the Plaintiff indulged him, but the Defendant still failed to pay the Plaintiff without any justifiable reasons. In proof of his case, the Plaintiff mounted the witness box, tendered his Witness Statement and relied on same with its accompanied exhibits. The Defendant in his Statement of Defence, generally denied the Plaintiff’s claim but failed to lead cogent, convincing and credible evidence to displace the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff. It is respectfully view of this Court that by the combine effect of sections 10, 11,12, 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323) and the authorities cited supra, the irresistible and inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that, the Plaintiff discharged his evidential burden of proof of her claims and the onus probandi then shifted to the Defendant to prove his case, an obligation, he woefully failed to discharge. It has been held that proof in law is the establishment of the establishment of a fact or its non-existence by proper legal means. The authorities have it that whenever an allegation is made and it is denied by the opponent and it is capable of proof, the one Page | 13 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 13 asserting must lead sufficient evidence to prove same. A few of authorities on the point will suffice. The Supreme Court held in the case of Ackah v Pergah Transport Limited & Others [2010] SCGLR 728 thus: “…It is trite law that matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more reasonable than its non- existence. This is the requirement of the law on evidence under sections 10(1) and (2) and 11(1) and (4) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323).” Also, in the case of Zabrama v Segbedzi [1991] 2 GLR 221, the Court of Appeal delivered itself on proof in the following terms: “a person who makes an averment or assertion which is denied by his opponent, has the burden to establish that his averment or assertion is true. And, he does not discharge this burden unless he leads admissible and credible evidence from which the fact or facts he asserts can properly and safely be inferred. The nature of each averment or assertion determines the degree and nature of that burden.” The Court in the oft-cited case of Majolagbe v Larbi [1959] GLR 190 cited the case of Khoury and Another v Richter (1958) and stated the law on proof as follows: “Proof in law is the establishment of facts by proper legal means. Where a party makes an averment capable of proof in some positive way, e.g., by producing documents, description of things, reference to other facts, instances, or circumstances, and his averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the witness-box and repeating the averment on oath, or having it repeated on oath by his witness. He proves it by producing other evidence of Page | 14 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 14 facts and circumstances, from which the Court can be satisfied that what he avers is true.” The Defendant having admitted and confirmed by EXHIBITS ‘A’, and ‘B’, that the balances stood to the credit of the Plaintiff as at the institution of the instant action and his conviction by this Court differently constituted for issuing dude cheques to repay the Plaintiff respectively, it was incumbent on the Defendant to lead evidence to convince the Court that it really repaid the monies to the Plaintiff or it does not owe the Plaintiff and contradict his alleged conviction and sentence. This, burden, the Defendant woefully failed to discharge. On the totality of the evidence led, the Defendants failed to discharge the evidential burden cast on them. It is the view and holding of this Court, that this is a proper case in which it is clearly plain and obvious that it is beyond doubt that the case of the Defendant is unarguably unsustainable, frivolous and discloses no reasonable defence to the Plaintiff’s action, warranting the exercise of this Court’s power to enter judgment for the Plaintiff. Accordingly, issues (i) and (ii) are resolved favour of the Plaintiff since the two issues are inextricably linked together – the questions of whether the defendant owes the Plaintiff to the sum of One Million, Two Hundred and Eighty-One Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵1,281,000.00) and if defendant signed the agreement hand in hand. On the totality of evidence, I find that the Plaintiff’s claim of Defendant owing him is more probable than not. I also find that the agreement clearly states the amount owed in figures and the existence of Exhibit B confirms that by virtue of the debt the defendant gave the Plaintiff a cheque which was dishonoured. On the part of the defendant, I find that his claim of not owing the plaintiff is unsubstantiated and does not find favour with this Court and same is accordingly rejected. Page | 15 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 15 Indeed, if he only owed the plaintiff GH₵44,000.00 then as at the time Plaintiff presented the cheque to the bank he did not owe him. If the defendant did not owe Plaintiff, then he should have appealed against his conviction and sentence for the charge would have been against the wrong person. Thus the Court differently constituted finding would have reflected same had he even raised this defence during the criminal trial. In the case of Kia Vrs. Kissiedu [2010 – 2012] 2 GLR 57 @ 75, Kanple J. A. stated that, “A party with the burden of producing evidence is entitled to rely on all the evidence in the case and need not rest entirely on evidence adduced by him. The party with the burden of producing evidence on the issue may point to evidence introduced by another party which meets or helps meet the test of sufficiency. It is for this reason that the phrase on all the evidence included in each of the tests of sufficiency”. Although defendant relied on documents tendered in by the plaintiff he failed to satisfy the Court that he did not know the amount the agreement covered or the content of the agreement. Again, he failed to prove that he was not in the right phase of mind to have signed the contract. On the question of where the agreement was signed whether it was in Plaintiff’s adduced evidence on same but the relevant issue for the Court was determining the parties’ intent. Based on the agreement, I am satisfied Defendant understood what he signed and the Plaintiff is entitled to recover One Million Two Hundred and Eighty- One Thousand Ghana Cedis being outstanding debt owed. The third issue was whether the defendant paid all monies he owed the plaintiff. As it was the defendant’s claim of not owing Plaintiff, he carried the duty to adduce Page | 16 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 16 cogent evidence to satisfy the court of this claim. However, short of giving evidence in his witness statement that he did not owe plaintiff no evidence on record supported this claim. I find that defendant failed woefully to execute his legal burden. The final issue to be determined was whether plaintiff submitted cheque with face value of GH₵1,281,000.00 to the bank without defendant’s knowledge. This is a claim the Defendant is making and the court expected cogent evidence to establish same. The Defendant however only made this claim by mounting the box and stating same on oath. He claimed the Judge in the criminal trial sympathised with him and admonished him for issuing blank signed cheques to the Plaintiff. Reading Exhibit B I can boldly state that although the court admonished Defendant for issuing out signed cheques to the Plaintiff but was silent on if Defendant knew Plaintiff was going to present same. The Defendant, during the trial has maintained that he was used to be issuing out cheques to Plaintiff and authorising him to go to the bank when there were funds in the account. As this Defendant claims he had paid Plaintiff money as at the time of the criminal trial, the Plaintiff had no business presenting his cheque to the bank. The story should have turned against the complainant then during the police investigation or even the court. As this was not the case I find that a reasonable person can infer that Plaintiff wrote the face value amount on the Defendant’s cheque and presented it and that the Defendant knew the plaintiff would be making the said withdrawal. That it is a stand process that if a cheque is dishonoured against once account the bank would notify the person since same has legal implication. Judgment is entered for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff prayed for cost on legal fees but did not tender any invoice to that effect. I hereby order that Plaintiff is to recover the amount Page | 17 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 17 of One Million, Two Hundred and Eighty-One Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵1,281,000.00) from the Defendant with interest to be calculated at prevailing bank rate from December 2020 to July 2023. Cost of GH₵5,000.00 is awarded against Defendant as cost incidental to trial. (SGD.) H/H. HATHIA AMA MANU, ESQ. (CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE) Page | 18 Stephen Dankwa – Smith v Samuel Ansah - Judgment 18