AGBETOR VRS KUDJORDZIE [2023] GHADC 705 (21 August 2023)

CORAM: HER WORSHIP AMA ADOMAKO-KWAKYE (MS.), MAGISTRATE, DISTRICT COURT ‘2’ KANESHIE, SITTING AT THE FORMER STOOL LANDS BOUNDARIES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OFFICES NEAR WORKERS’ COLLEGE, ACCRA ON 21ST AUGUST, 2023. SUIT NO. A9/361/20 AMEWU AKU AGBETOR (SUING AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF VIVIAN KUSE ADDAE) UNNUMBERED HOUSE, SOWUTOUM VRA ROAD, ACCRA. :: PLAINTIFF VRS. RICHARD KWASHIE KUDJORDZIE NO. B/43, LAPAZ, ACCRA :: DEFENDANT JUDGMENT Introduction/Background The Plaintiff, suing as the Administrator of the Estate of the late Vivian Kuse Addae, instituted this action against the Defendant on 20th July 2020 praying for the following reliefs: Page | 1 i. That the Honourable Court order the Defendant herein and his assigns to vacate the said House No. B/43, Lapaz, Accra forthwith. ii. An order directed at the Defendant herein to pay an amount of Six Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢6000) to Plaintiff being rent arrears due and owing the estate of Vivian Kuse Addae (late) with interest. iii. Cost inclusive of legal cost. iv. Any other order this Honourable Court deems fit. The summary of the claim as per the accompanying claim to the Writ of Summons is that the Defendant is alleged to be indebted to the estate of his late landlady, as epitomized by the Plaintiff, who avers that she is the Administrator, and the Plaintiff wants the Defendant to vacate the premises for the property to be vested in the beneficiaries and for him to pay up his rent arrears. No written statements/pleadings were ordered pursuant to Order 18 Rule 1(1) of the District Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 (C. I. 59). The Defendant pleaded Not Liable to the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff and accordingly, trial had to be conducted. Issues From the claim before the Court and the proceedings, the main issues which cropped up for resolution by this Court are: a. Whether or not the Plaintiff has capacity to mount this action. b. Whether or not the Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum claimed as rent arrears. c. Whether or not any sums of money were expended by the Defendant which ought to be commuted to rent. d. Whether or not the Defendant is a part owner of the property. Page | 2 Evaluation of Evidence and Legal Analysis It is the duty of a Plaintiff to prove his case for a determination to be made in his/her favour. A party who raises issues essential to the success of his/her case assumes the onus of proof and as such a person who alleges, whether a plaintiff or a defendant, assumes the initial burden of producing evidence. It is only when such a person has been successful in producing evidence that the other party will be required to lead rebuttal evidence, if need be. In the case of T. Chandiram v. Tetteh [2018] 120 GMJ 112 @ 147 C. A, Her Ladyship Agnes M. A. Dordzie, J. A (as she then was) noted on the standard of proof in civil cases as follows: “[T]he standard of proof in a civil suit is placed on the ‘balance of probabilities. Section 12 (2) of the Evidence Act defines it as follows: “Preponderance of the probabilities” means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence.” Again, in the case of Agbosu v Kotey; In Re Ashalley Botwe Lands [2003-2004] SCGLR 420, His Lordship Brobbey, JSC (Rtd.) noted: “The effect of sections 11(1) and 14 and similar sections in the Evidence Decree 1975 may be described as follows: A litigant who is a Defendant in a civil case does not need to prove anything. The Plaintiff who took the Defendant to court has to prove what he claims he is entitled to from the defendant... At the same time if the court has to make a determination of a fact or of an issue, and that determination depends on the evaluation of facts and evidence the defendant must realize that the determination cannot be made on nothing. If the defendant desires a determination to be made in his favour, then he has a duty to help his own cause or case by adducing before the Page | 3 court such facts or evidence that will induce the determination to be made in his favour…” The Plaintiff therefore has the responsibility of adducing evidence which is sufficient enough to avoid a ruling against him on the issues before the Court. See also the following cases: Takoradi Flour Mills vs. Samir Faris [2005-2006] SCGLR 882 @ 900 GIHOC Refrigeration & Household vs. Jean Hanna Assi (2005-2006) SCGLR 458 Tagoe v. Accra Brewery [2016] 93 GMJ 103 S. C Deliman Oil v. HFC Bank [2016] 92 GMJ 1 C. A. Baker-Woode v Nana Fitz [2007-2008] SCGLR 879 Ababio v Akwesi III [1994-95] GBR 774 Air Namibia v. Micon Travel [2015] 91 GMJ 173 @ 191 C. A In a case where a Counterclaim is put up by a Defendant, the Defendant assumes the position of a Plaintiff as regards his or her Counterclaim and would therefore have to prove the counterclaim. The Supreme Court speaking in the burden of proof on a Defendant who has a Counterclaim held in the case of Nortey (No. 2) v African Institute of Journalism and Communication & Others (No. 2) [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 703 as follows: “Without any doubt, a defendant who files a counterclaim assumes the same burden as a plaintiff in the substantive action if he/she is to succeed. This is because a counterclaim is a distinct and separate action on its own which must also be proved according to the same standard of proof prescribed by sections 11 and 14 of NRCD 323 the Evidence Act (1975).” The Court of Appeal also noted as follows on the same topic in the case Alex Etoh Kwaku v Bridgette Ofosu Asabea [2014] 72 GMJ 68: Page | 4 “It is trite learning that in civil suits when the defendant counterclaims, for the purposes of the relief, that party becomes the plaintiff and bears the same burden of establishing that relief. The yardstick being the same as the plaintiff, on the preponderance of probabilities.” Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant herein therefore had the duty in the course of the suit to produce sufficient evidence in respect of their respective claims on a balance of probabilities for a determination to be made in their favour. See also the case of In Re Krah (Decd.); Yankyeraah v Osei-Tutu & Another [1989] DLSC 601. The Plaintiff’s evidence was that she was introduced to the Defendant by her late auntie, Madam Vivian Kuse Addae as the caretaker of her house in Nii Boi Town. From her evidence, the Defendant has rented a three-bedroom apartment in the house at a monthly rent of GH¢500. She testified that the Defendant made part payment of his rent for 2015 to Madam Kuse Addae (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) in her presence and the balance for that year was used to defray expenses he had incurred in purchasing blocks for an extension of a bathroom to his room. She said that the Defendant paid rent for 2016 and 2017 with some of the payments in cash and others through mobile money. She tendered in evidence some receipts of payments and her mobile money account statement. She further stated that in 2018, the Defendant paid his rent with an overpayment of GH¢100, which she enquired from him through whatsapp (Exhibit ‘C’) if she should transfer same to him but the Defendant did not reply and she subsequently used same to pay Defendant’s share of payments in respect of septic tanker. According to the Plaintiff, the deceased asked the Defendant to vacate the property for her personal use through two letters but the Defendant failed to move out and the deceased therefore took the matter to the Rent Control Department. She testified that, having been donated a Power of Attorney by the deceased, and upon directions by Rent Control, she wrote a letter of eviction directed to the Defendant. She stated that after the Page | 5 deceased passed on, she applied for and was granted Letters of Administration in respect of her estate with the authority of the family. She said she subsequently wrote letters, with her lawyer’s assistance to the tenants including Defendant for them to pay their rent arrears, and the Defendant replied, asking for some time to settle his arrears. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant paid GH¢3,000.00 out of the GH¢8,500.00 he owed as at May 2020 to her lawyer on 1st July 2020 and he was issued with a receipt. The Plaintiff stated that the deceased’s funeral had been organized and the family is in need of the property since the deceased has siblings who wish to take over the property. She said that she wanted the Defendant to pay his rent arrears and vacate the property. The Plaintiff called Gloria Fio as her witness (PW1). Her evidence was that Defendant got to stay in the house through her since she was then the caretaker and rented the house to him, and later introduced him to the deceased. She said that she rented it to him on 6 February 2014 and he was issued with a receipt which he even signed. The said document was admitted in evidence as Exhibit ‘N’. The Defendant testified that he knew the Plaintiff as a relative of her landlady, Vivian Kuse Addae who is deceased and that he previously did not know of the demise of Vivian Kuse Addae until Plaintiff’s lawyer wrote to him on 27th May 2020. According to him, he became a tenant in the deceased’s house on 6th February 2014 through her caretaker, Gloria Fio and at the time, he did not meet deceased because he was informed she was living outside the country. He stated that the rent for the year was GH¢4,800. According to Defendant, he first met the deceased in early September 2015 and they had discussions in respect of constructing toilet and bath in the two apartments and on electricity and water issues. He stated that they agreed for him to create an enclosed toilet and bath in the new building and thereafter for him to relocate into the new building so that the enclosed toilet and bath would also be done in the apartment he stays in. He Page | 6 further stated that they agreed for him to bear the expenses for same to be reimbursed to him by way of offsetting with his rent. The Defendant testified that few days after this discussion, the deceased visited him and as part of their discussions, she mentioned her desire to sell the house, of which he expressed his interest to purchase same. He stated that they agreed on GH¢220,000 as the purchase price and for him to continue his rent payment until he had paid 50% of the purchase price. He said the deceased subsequently engaged her surveyor to prepare the site plan and on 25th September 2015, he paid GH¢75,000 as part payment and a sale and purchase agreement executed between him and the deceased with her two witnesses and his fiancée at the time, as a witness. He testified that his second witness, his brother, was not around so the deceased left the agreement with him and after his brother came later to sign, he and his then fiancée sent the document to the deceased at her residence at Sakumono after she had given them directions to her house. He stated that the next day, the deceased gave him a letter notifying him of an increase in rent effective January 2016. It was Defendant’s testimony that he worked on the toilet and bath on the new building as agreed, but he did not move into that after its completion because the rent for that premises was twice his rent. He listed his expenditure as follows: Cost of enclosement of the toilet and bath of master bedroom of the new building: GH¢6,610 and T&T of GH¢1,640 Water installation: GH¢580 Commissioner for oaths: GH¢50 Return valve installation: GH¢120 Labour: GH¢470 Supervision cost: GH¢2,500 Electricity restructuring (pole and cable): GH¢1,370 Page | 7 Surveyor’s work/site plan: GH¢1,500 Water metre: GH¢780 Rent through momo: GH¢3,600 – not receipted The Defendant stated that he had spent a total of GH¢15,040 on the house that has not been traded off in rent payment. He stated that when he received the letter from Plaintiff’s Counsel, he replied, indicating that there was the necessity to meet to address some issues which were unknown to Plaintiff and the family. He said he was advised by his lawyer to pay the rent so that when he was able to meet the family, they settle on the outstanding issues, so he paid GH¢3000 on 1st July 2020. He testified that thereafter, Plaintiff’s Counsel refused to pick his calls and upon the advice of his Counsel, he sent Plaintiff’s Counsel a whatsapp message on 5th August 2020, which he tendered in evidence. He added that after his numerous attempts at reaching Plaintiff’s Counsel failed, the next thing he received was the Writ of Summons. In respect of the Rent Control matters, the Defendant testified that he went to the Rent Control with his Company lawyer and when he called the deceased, she indicated that she had not sent the Plaintiff there concerning him but in respect of the other tenants in the new building. He concluded his evidence-in-chief by stating that he is a part owner of the property and is ready to conclude the purchase. Issue a: Whether or not the Plaintiff has capacity to mount this action From the evidence before the Court, it is a finding of fact that the Defendant rented a three-bedroom apartment, the property of the late Madam Vivian Kuse Addae through Gloria Fio (PW 1) who was then the caretaker on 6th February 2014 for a year. He paid his rent of GH¢4,800 and this was acknowledged as evidenced by Exhibit N and Exhibit 1 (it is apparent from the evidence before the Court, even from the Defendant’s evidence, Page | 8 that the rent was GH¢4,800 and therefore the GH¢48,000 on the exhibits appear to be a typographical mistake). The Defendant has stayed there since then. At a point, Gloria Fio (PW 1) was relieved of her duty as the caretaker and the Plaintiff, a niece to Madam Vivian Kuse Addae, assumed that role. A Power of Attorney was donated to her by the deceased on 7th October 2015 authorizing her to represent the deceased in all rent matters in respect of House Number B. 43 Nii Boi Town as evidenced by Exhibit D. It is also a finding of fact from the evidence that the rent was initially GH¢400 and was increased to GH¢450 from January 2016. There is nothing on record to show that there was any subsequent change in the rent and it therefore means that the rent has been GH¢450 since January 2016. Upon the death of Madam Vivian Kuse Addae, the Plaintiff was granted Letters of Administration by the High Court, Tema. Exhibits H and J which are statutory documents have a presumption of regularity until rebutted and in the absence of such rebuttal, it is a fact per the evidence that the Plaintiff is the Administratrix of the estate of the late Madam Vivian Kuse Addae, having been granted Letters of Administration on 11th May 2020. The Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of her authority or capacity to mount the suit and was able to show Counsel for Defendant some documents he requested for under cross examination: Q: I deduce from the records that you are the maternal niece of the deceased, Vivian Kuse Addae, is that so? A: Yes please. Q: You have before the Court Exhibit H and J both from the High Court, Tema. I suppose these exhibits form the basis of your being in Court to pursue the matter. Is that so? Page | 9 A: Yes, my Lady. Q: What documents did you submit for the issuance of Exhibits H and J? A: The authorities in Switzerland wrote to me when my auntie died and using that letter and the Power of Attorney she had given me at that time, we went to Tema to acquire the Letters of Administration together with some relatives and a death certificate. Q: Do you have copies of the letter and death certificate? A: I know I have the death certificate here but for the letter I do not think I have a copy here. Q: Can we see the death certificate? A: Yes please. I have seen the death certificate and the translated version and the letter they wrote to me to say my auntie has passed away (documents handed over to Counsel for Defendant). Q: I suppose there was a family meeting before you went for the LA and it was chaired by someone. A: Yes, it was chaired by the family head, George Tsao Addae. Q: On the 11th of May 2020 you became clothed with capacity as the Sole Administratrix of the estate of the late Vivian Kuse Addae. A: That is true. Section 1(1) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63) provides that the movable and immovable property of a deceased person devolves on his personal Page | 10 representatives with effect from his death. Section 108(1) of the same Act interprets personal representative to mean the executor, original or by representation, or administrator for the time being of a deceased person. The property at the core of the suit is admittedly property which was owned by the late Madam Kuse Addae who died intestate sometime 19th August 2019. The law is settled that before vesting assent is executed in favour of a beneficiary, the estate devolves on the Executor (Executrix) who has obtained probate as the personal representative or the Administrator (Administratrix) who has obtained letters of administration. See the case of Charlotte Anum & Ors v The High Court Registrar & Ors [2019] 137 G. M. J. 75 @ 89. Section 67 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63) provides that where administration has been granted in respect of any estate of a deceased person, no person shall have power to bring any action or otherwise act as executor of the deceased person in respect of the estate comprised in or affected by the grant until the grant has been recalled or revoked. In the present case, the Plaintiff is the one who has been granted Letters of Administration and as the personal representative of the deceased, she is the rightful person with the capacity to sue in respect of the deceased’s estate. Issue b: Whether or not the Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum claimed as rent arrears. The Plaintiff’s evidence was that the Defendant paid GH¢2,000 in her presence to the deceased in 2015 as part payment of his rent and the expenses he had incurred in purchasing blocks was used to offset the balance. Rents for the years 2016 and 2017 were also duly paid by the Defendant. Exhibit A for instance shows that an amount of GH¢5400 was paid by Defendant for January 2016 to December 2016. Exhibit A1 is also an official receipt dated 26/3/17 for GH¢2000 as part payment of 2017 rent made by the Defendant as part payment of 2017 rent and Exhibit A2 also evidences the payment of GH¢1000 by Defendant also as part payment of 2017 rent, with the balance of GH¢2400 to be made. Page | 11 The Plaintiff acknowledged that the rents for 2017 and 2018 were fully paid and the Defendant did not dispute this. The Plaintiff’s evidence is to the effect that rent had remained unpaid by the Defendant since the year 2019 and as such, her lawyer wrote to Defendant to demand unpaid rent of GH¢8500 for seventeen months. This is borne out by Exhibit K which is dated 27th May 2020. Subsequent to this, the Defendant replied as per Exhibit L stating that he needed until the end of June 2020 to settle his arrears and resolve all other issues and on 1st July 2020, he paid GH¢3000 as part payment of rent arrears and was issued with Exhibit M. It was almost three weeks thereafter that this suit was instituted. Exhibits K, L and M are not documents which are in dispute and the Defendant himself even tendered those same documents in evidence as Exhibits 5, 5A and 6. From Exhibit 7, which is a whatsapp chat between Defendant and Plaintiff’s Counsel, it is evident that the Defendant wanted to make some payments of his rent arrears to Plaintiff’s Counsel and this is more than evident that he acknowledged he was in rent arrears. I find that the Defendant indeed owes rent from the year 2019 less the GH¢3000 he paid on 1st July 2020. He did not rebut this assertion by providing any evidence of payment for the said period such as a mobile money statement if he paid through that mode or a receipt or any form of evidence. He had indicated that he had paid rent of GH¢3,600 through momo which was not receipted. Since he was the one alleging payment, he had the onus was on him to at least provide a mobile money statement to that effect. The law is very clear about this. In Deliman Oil v. HFC Bank [2016] 92 GMJ 1 Her Ladyship Barbara Ackah-Yensu, JA noted at pages 19-20 as follows: “The very well-known rule of evidence is that proof lies upon him who affirms or alleges, not upon him who denies since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof.” Page | 12 As stated elsewhere in this judgment, there was no evidence that the rent had been increased from GH¢450.00 at any point in time and as such, the rent owed by Defendant as at the commencement of the suit, being rent for eighteen months was GH¢5, 100 (GH¢8,100 less GH¢3,000). Section 17(1)(a) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) provides as follows: Section 17—Recovery of Possession and Ejectment. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 25 and of section 28, no order against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of, or for the ejectment from, any premises shall be made or given by the appropriate Rent Magistrate, or any other Judge of a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force, except in any of the following circumstances:— (a) where any rent lawfully due from the tenant has not been paid or tendered within one month after the date on which it became lawfully due; It is a fact that the Defendant as at the date of institution of this suit was in arrears of rent and once at least one month’s rent has not been tendered by a tenant, Section 17(1)(a) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) permits an order to be made against a tenant for recovery of possession or ejectment except in the circumstances specified under the said section. The Defendant has failed to perform his rent obligations as a tenant and has therefore breached this covenant. The Plaintiff’s right under Section 17(1)(a) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) has accrued and as such, the Plaintiff’s reason for praying for an order for recovery of possession is supported by law and the Defendant accordingly ought to vacate from the premises. More importantly as well is the fact that the property is needed by the Plaintiff in carrying out her responsibility as an Administratrix of the deceased’s estate to ensure the winding up of the estate. Page | 13 Issue c: Whether or not any sums of money were expended by the Defendant which ought to be commuted to rent. It was the Defendant’s evidence that the first time he met the deceased was sometime in early September 2015 and they had a conversation relating to the construction of a toilet and bath in the deceased’s two apartments as well as discussions on issues of electricity and water. He testified that as part of the agreement between him and deceased, he had to bear the expenses involved in the renovations for him to be reimbursed by way of an offsetting to be done against his rent. He stated that he worked on the toilet and bath on the new building as agreed. It was his evidence that he had spent a total of GH¢15,040 on the house that has not been traded off in rent payment. It was therefore incumbent on the Defendant to adduce sufficient evidence to show that he spent this amount and also more importantly, that there was an agreement between him and the deceased for him to carry out the extent of works he alleged to have done and also that they agreed that the expenses would be catered for by way of rent. The Defendant tendered in evidence Exhibit 4 series which he had described as receipts for materials used in various works carried out on the house to be reimbursed, to support his case. I find it necessary to set out what is contained in Exhibit 4 series: Exhibit 4: Official receipt dated 8/10/16 for GH¢1,210 received as full payment of 550 sandcrete blocks. Exhibit 4A: Cash sales/Invoice dated 15/10/16 for iron rods, workmanship: GH¢350 Exhibit 4B: Receipt from Fofo A. Komlavi dated 15/10/2016 of GH¢1,000 for workmanship. Page | 14 Exhibit 4C: Receipt from Fofo A. Komlavi dated 31/10/2016 acknowledging payment of the balance of GH¢1100 for the construction of new toilet and bath in the master bedroom Exhibit 4D: Receipt from D. Mensan dated 23/11/2016 acknowledging payment of GH¢1500 being part payment for construction of toilet and bath in the master bedroom of second building Exhibit 4E: Invoice dated 25/11/2016 from Saddam Ventures for sets of doors, wood door frame, window frame, door battens, door locks, door hinges, T&T, Workmanship… GH¢1,450. Exhibit 4F: Cash sales invoice dated 22/2/17 from Premo electricals for electric pole, aluminium 2-in-one cable, metre board, fuse, copper wire, workmanship in the sum of GH¢1,370 with paid stamp. Exhibit 4G: Official receipt dated 5/1/18 in the sum of GH¢1,500 as full payment for survey works on House No. AB 310, Nii Boi Town. Exhibit 4H: GWCL bill for V. K. Addae, House No. AB 310, Nii Boi Town for June 2018. Exhibit 4J: GWCL Bill for September 2018 Exhibit 4K: GWCL receipt for GH¢200 from V. K. Addae dated 18/7/18 for metre installation. Exhibit 4L: Summary of total monies spent on the house: part payment for house of GH¢75,000, materials, workmanship, charges and T&T of GH¢15,040, rent to Plaintiff via momo in late 2018 towards 2019 without receipts of GH¢3,600, rent to lawyer of GH¢3,000. Total of GH¢96,640. From Defendant’s evidence, it was the toilet and bath of the new building that he worked on. The Court does not therefore see the relevance of Exhibits 4G to 4K to the work he alleged he did on the enclosure of the toilet and bath and no weight would therefore be Page | 15 given to those. Exhibit 4L is also a self-serving document and the Defendant’s own list he has made in respect of what he claims to have spent. I find as a fact that the Defendant caused to be carried out some block works on the property at a point in time. The Plaintiff admitted to this under cross examination: Q: You said it in your evidence that I have done some concrete/block works which proceeds were used to defray rent. A: Yes, I was informed he did some concrete works on one of the apartments for the landlady which she used to defray part of his rent and not on the apartment he is staying in. Q: So the block works were done on the apartment I am not living in, if I am clear with what you said. A: That is correct. Q: Did you ask why I did the renovation on the apartment I am not living in? A: No I did not. It was not a renovation of the apartment but extension of a toilet and bath facility and in that regard, he bought the block and not that he did the work. It was Plaintiff’s assertion that the expenses incurred by the Defendant were taken care of by way of commuting same to rent such that he did not have to pay his full rent for 2015 and that the expenditure of GH¢15,040 which Defendant alleges was news to her. The following ensued under cross examination of the Plaintiff: Q: You told the Court that Defendant paid his rent fully to your auntie in 2015. Is that correct? Page | 16 A: In 2015 he paid GH¢2000 to my auntie but the balance of GH¢2400 was used to defray the cost of blocks. In 2016 and 2017 he paid fully to me. In 2018 he paid part to me, part to my auntie. Q: I suggest to you that the total expenditure of the extension work for the first house and subsequently, Defendant’s apartment came up to GH¢15,040 and your late auntie was aware of this. A: I am not aware. Q: I put it to you that the GH¢15,040 has not been defrayed by way of rent payment in favour of the Defendant. A: I am not aware of any GH¢15,040. This is the first time I am hearing this. It is necessary for the Court to avert its mind to the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), specifically Section 21 of the said Act which provides as follows: Section 21—Compensation for Improvements. Where a tenant who has made improvements to his premises, with the approval of the landlord of the premises is requested to vacate his premises before the prescribed period, the landlord of such premises shall pay such compensation for the improvements as may be ordered by the appropriate Rent Officer within such period as may be specified by him. Section 21 is clear on the payment of compensation for improvements made to premises let. For there to be any payment of compensation for improvements made to any premises let to a tenant, such improvements must be made or must have been made with the approval of the landlord or landlady of the premises. It therefore follows that where a tenant carries out any improvements or renovations on a premises let to him without the Page | 17 approval of the landlord or landlady of the premises, there can be no compensation for the tenant in law. In the first place, a summation of the amounts on the receipts tendered by Defendant gives a total of GH¢9,680 and not the GH¢15,040 he claims. Moreover, the Defendant did not deny at any point in his evidence that he did not pay the full rent for the year 2015 because the expenses he had incurred were used to offset his rent. Considering the dates on the exhibits tendered by the Defendant, whatever works he allegedly carried out which he is now demanding for an offset to be made were done from October 2016. The Defendant’s evidence was unable to convince the Court that he indeed carried out the alleged improvement after the 2015 one, with the approval of the landlady. Having failed to show same, the Plaintiff is therefore not mandated to pay the Defendant any compensation for the renovations made nor is Plaintiff required to use the expenses incurred to offset the rent since the alleged renovation, if any, was made without the consent and concurrence of the Plaintiff. Additionally, the Defendant was unable to adduce cogent, reliable and satisfactory evidence to show that whatever alleged expenses on renovations were to be commuted to rent. I am baffled that he still paid rent for the years 2017 and 2018 in full if indeed the alleged expenses were to be offset with rent payment. At which point therefore was the purported cost of renovations to be factored in his rent payment? This story from him therefore sounds highly incredulous to the Court, and the Court accordingly rejects same. Issue d: Whether or not the Defendant is a part owner of the property. At the close of trial, Counsel for the Defendant filed his Address in respect of the suit on 15th August 2023 urging this Court to hold that the Defendant is a part owner of the Page | 18 property and for the Court to order a transfer of title to Defendant upon full payment. Counsel for the Plaintiff on the other hand, in his Written Address filed on 18 th August 2023 held a contrary view. The Defendant’s evidence was that in September 2015, he and his now deceased landlady agreed on the sale and purchase of the house at a price of GH¢220,000, with an agreement that he would still pay his rent until he had paid 50% of the purchase price. He testified that he made a part payment of GH¢75,000 on 25th September 2015 and a sale and purchase agreement was executed between him and the deceased and their witnesses, and as such he is a part owner of the property. The Defendant tendered in evidence Exhibits 2 and 2A in respect of his assertion of part ownership. The law is settled that a contract for the sale of an interest in land ought to be in writing and duly executed for same to be enforceable. See Section 34 of the Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036) (equivalent of Section 2 of the Conveyancing Act, 1973 which was then the applicable law), Adiza Mohamadu v Ali Adamu & Another (2014) JELR 63944 (CA), Anthony Wiafe v Dora Borkai Bortey & Another (2016) JELR 68795 (SC). On the face of Exhibit 2, the agreement was duly signed and stamped by the deceased, Vivian Kuse Addae and signed by her two witnesses; Evans Kobla Kwao and Filicia on 25 th September 2015. The Defendant and his witnesses’ signatures are also evident on same. Exhibit 2A is also an official receipt dated 25th September 2015 with V. K. Addae’s stamp and signature stating that GH¢75,000 had been paid with an outstanding balance of GH¢145,000. No issue was raised to challenge that it was the deceased who executed Exhibits 2 and 2A. Exhibit 2 titled Sale and Purchase Agreement which in essence is a contract for sale and purchase was prepared by Livingstone A. Dey, Esq. of Addae-Aboagye & Associates (Nokware Chambers), whom Counsel for Plaintiff initially sought to subpoena but later Page | 19 abandoned that course. The agreement is dated 25th September 2015 between Vivian Kuse Addae and Defendant in respect of House No. B 43, Nii Boi Town at cost of GH¢220,000. The agreement acknowledged a part payment of GH¢75,000 made by the Defendant paid. As part of the terms of the agreement as stated in Exhibit 2, the payment of rent was to come to an end when the purchaser (Defendant herein) pays over 50% of the purchase price to the vendor, and the purchaser shall have immediate vacant possession of the property after that payment. The balance was to be paid in instalment. Further, the change in name was to be done only upon full payment by the purchaser and the documents of the property received after the full payment. This Court is satisfied from the evidence on record that there was indeed an agreement between the deceased and the Defendant in respect of the sale of her property, House No. B 43, Nii Boi Town for which the Defendant has made part payment, making him have interest in the property. I must state clearly that the sale agreement did not in any way put a hold on the obligation of the Defendant to pay his rent as a tenant and therefore notwithstanding the fact that he advanced some monies in respect of the sale of the property, he had to comply with all the duties of a tenant. It is also worthy of mention that the amount paid by the Defendant being the GH¢75,000.00 constitute only 34% of the full sale price and as such, 66% has been outstanding as far back as September 2015. No payment at all was made by the Defendant towards settling the full price since 25th September 2015. I do not think that payment of the outstanding balance was to be done in perpetuity, having regard to the fact that the value of landed property appreciates, and it is only fair to suggest that the payment had to be done within a reasonable time. In the absence of any payment having been made since the initial payment, it would be proper for the Defendant’s money to be refunded to him since there seems to be no commitment on his part to pay up the balance, even during the lifetime of the deceased. I acknowledge that the GH¢75,000.00 paid in Page | 20 2015 would have lost its value in 2023 and as such the amount is to be refunded by the estate with interest. Conclusion Having regard to the evidence adduced by the parties herein and PW1 and the evaluation of same made by this Court supra, the Court makes the following final orders: a. The Defendant is to vacate the premises being House No. B 43, Niiboi Town, Lapaz, Accra on or before 31st October 2023. b. The Defendant is to pay to Plaintiff rent arrears of GH¢5, 100 being the arrears as at the commencement of the suit together with interest thereon at the prevailing commercial bank rate from May 2020 to date of payment. c. The Defendant is to pay mesne profit of GH¢17,100 (calculated as rent from July 2020 to August 2023). d. The Defendant during occupation of the premises in September and October 2023 as granted by the Court would be expected to pay his rent for those months if he occupies same. e. The Estate of the late Vivian Kuse Addae is to refund to the Defendant the amount of GHȼ75,000.00 paid by him towards the purchase of the house. f. The sum in e. supra is to be paid with interest thereon at the prevailing commercial bank rate from October 2015 to date of payment. g. Cost of GHȼ8,000.00 is awarded for the Plaintiff against the Defendant. Page | 21 [SGD] AMA ADOMAKO-KWAKYE (MS.) (MAGISTRATE) Counsel Ivan Yao Akrobotu, Esq. for the Plaintiff. Chris A-Ackummey, Esq. holding brief of Atsu Tom Paine Akaba, Esq. for the Defendant. Page | 22