MUSTAPHA PLUS LIMITED & ANOTHER VRS BOADU & 4 OTHERS (E1/16/2021) [2023] GHAHC 569 (13 October 2023)
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE HELD AT CAPE COAST IN THE CENTRAL REGION ON FRIDAY THE 13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2023 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE BERNARD BENTIL - HIGH COURT JUDGE SUIT NO: E1/16/2021 1. MUSTAPHA PLUS LIMITED 2. EBUSUAPANYIN KOBINA BUDU - PLAINTIFFS VRS 1. EBUSUAPANYIN...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2023] GHAHC 569
- Court
- High Court
- Jurisdiction
- Ghana
- Case Number
- E1/16/2021
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
No structured case brief is available yet for this judgment.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE HELD AT CAPE COAST IN THE CENTRAL REGION ON FRIDAY THE 13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2023 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE BERNARD BENTIL - HIGH COURT JUDGE SUIT NO: E1/16/2021 1. MUSTAPHA PLUS LIMITED 2. EBUSUAPANYIN KOBINA BUDU - PLAINTIFFS VRS 1. EBUSUAPANYIN KOBINA BOADU 2. KWESI SARKWAH 3. MARGARET DADZIE 4. PETER ESSEL NKRUMAH 5. JAGLAD CONSTRUCTION & SUPPLIES LIMITED - DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT The Plaintiffs have instituted this action against the Defendants claiming against them jointly and severally the following reliefs: a. Declaration of title concerning the parcels of lands described in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Statement of claim. b. Recovery of possession. c. Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, grantees, assigns, privies, servants, workmen or anybody whatsoever claiming through the Defendants from having anything to do with the quiet enjoyment of the 1st Plaintiff’s land. d. General damages for trespass. e. Costs including lawyer’s fees. Events leading up to the institution of this present action are simple. The 1st Plaintiff, a limited liability company registered under the laws of Ghana and a real estate developer, entered into a leasehold agreement with the 2nd Plaintiff who is the head of the Royal Aboradze family of Gomoa Akotsi in the Central Region of the Republic of Ghana. The Plaintiffs’ case, as gleaned from the amended Statement of Claim filed on 29th November, 2021 is that, the 2nd Plaintiff’s family owns a large tract of land situate at Gomoa Akotsi in the Central Region of the Republic of Ghana and this piece of land shares a common boundary with the family land of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants. According to the Plaintiffs, the 2nd Plaintiff’s family executed a leasehold agreement concerning a portion of its land in favour of the 1st Plaintiff Company on or after 27th July, 2020. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the amended Statement of Claim provide a description of the said land which is the subject matter of this suit. In order to take effective possession of the 43.44 acres of land leased to him (the disputed land), the 1st Plaintiff exercised various acts of possession including registering the entire land in the name of the 1st Plaintiff Company at the Lands Commission, Cape Coast. The Plaintiffs aver that the 1st Defendant (being the acting head of the Agona family of Gomoa Ojobi) together with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants who are principal members of the Agona family of Gomoa Ojobi have allegedly granted the disputed land to the 4th and 5th Defendants as well as other unsuspecting developers who have unlawfully trespassed on the land in dispute and are developing same without the consent and/or permission of the Plaintiffs thus changing the nature and form of the land. The Plaintiffs further aver that the Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that they will not stop their unlawful acts of trespass unless compelled by this Honourable Court. The Defendants, in their defence, denied the claims of the Plaintiffs to the land in dispute. In the Statement of Defence filed on 15th October, 2020, the Defendants state that the 1st Defendant owns about Two Hundred and Twenty-four (224) acres of land situate at “Owuassaw” and shares boundary with the properties of Ojobi Kona family in the East, Ojobi Asona family in the South, Ojobi Yeko family in the West and Akotsi Aboradze family in the North; with Obirikwa footpaths which passes through the land of the 1st Defendant in the northern sector. The Defendants then proceeded to narrate how the ancestors of the 1st Defendant came by the aforementioned land. According to the 1st Defendants, the above described land was acquired by three (3) of their ancestors namely, Nana Kobina Obonko, Kobina Ewudzi and Kwesi Yedu who were living at Gomoa Dawurampong. They moved from Dawurampong to settle in the then thick forest popularly known as “Owuassaw” to hunt and farm since there was severe famine. Their hunting expedition then led them to discover a rocky well which contained about ten barrels of rain water polluted with rotten leaves and some faggots. According to the 1st Defendant, Nana Obonko organised his men and other followers to clean the tank and finally settled One Hundred (100) meters beside it. The 1st Defendant further states that it has a Royal Cemetery in the south-western side of the land which is a thick forest serving as a centre of rainfall attraction which made their farming activities ever fruitful in those days. The 1st Defendant further states that, his ancestors’ second settlement was located at the centre of the disputed land known as “amanfo” and they subsequently built mud-houses and big corn barns, grew maize on large scales and became highly wealthy. The 1st Defendant states that his ancestors were later attacked by thieves and this made them leave the area to settle at Ojobi in a joint community with their relatives of Osomfo-ano village, now called Gomoa Ojobi. The 1st Defendant states that his ancestors have, for over so many centuries, exercised control, possession and ownership over the land and have passed same to current generation who have also exercised ownership and possession over the land. The 1st Defendant states that sometime in January, 2012 one Ebusuapanyin Yaw Minsu transferred One Hundred (100) acres of land belong to his family to the 4th Defendant. The 1st Defendant was notified of the trespass of the 4th Defendant on the land and the latter had to settle same with the 1st Defendant’s family. In paragraph 16 of the Statement of Defence, the 4th Defendant avers that he informed Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII (of Akotsu Aboradze) of the trespass who admitted same and the boundary was properly demarcated between the Aboradze family and the 1st Defendant family. The 4th Defendant states that, as an estate developer, he also transferred his interest in the land so acquired to one Alhaji Tijani and his land was on the boundary between the Aboradze family and the 1st Defendant. According to the 4th Defendant, the said Alhaji Tijani has been operating since 2012 up to date without boundary dispute between the Aboradze family and the 1st Defendant. The 4th Defendant further states that the Aboraze family headed by Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII denied him and thus had to acquire the same land from the 1st Defendant which the 2nd Plaintiff is aware. The 4th Defendant and his brother acquired the land in dispute from the 1st Defendant sometime in 2020 after due diligence had been conducted and a search at the Lands Commission, Cape Coast, indicated that the land is not encumbered by any transaction. According to the 4th Defendant, one Nana Panyin, brother to Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII brought a client of his to acquire land from the 1st Defendant and a portion of the very land the Plaintiffs are claiming to be owners of was sold to his client who has started developing same. Thus, it comes as a surprise to the 4th Defendant that the Plaintiffs are claiming that same land. It is the case of the 1st Defendant that the land in dispute belongs to the 1st Defendant family and not the property of the 2nd Plaintiff herein for same to be conveyed to the 1st Plaintiff. According to the 1st Defendant, he has transferred parcels of its land which was part of the disputed land to other individuals who have put up houses on portions of the land allocated to them and have been living there since time immemorial. The 1st Defendant pleaded estoppel, the particulars of which I reproduce below: a. The Defendant has exercised total ownership over the land for four (4) centuries. b. The Defendant has transferred its interest to other developers who have developed the land which the 1st Plaintiff is aware. It is also the case of the 1st Defendant that the Plaintiffs are caught by section 10 of the Statute of Limitation. The 1st Defendant also challenged the capacity of the 2nd Plaintiff to commence this action. Moreover, the 1st Defendant states that sometime in 2020, Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII trespassed onto his land and same was reported to the Property Fraud Unit of the Ghana Police Service. Both parties were instructed to have a valid and licenced Surveyor demarcate their boundaries which the 1st Defendant, together with the 4th Defendant, paid the sum of Eight Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵ 8,000) for the exercise to be done but Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII failed to do so. This notwithstanding, the 1st and 4th Defendants paid for the demarcation to be done and the Survey Report indicated that Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII had trespassed on the land of the 1st Defendant. According to the 1st Defendant, whilst the matter was still pending before the Property Fraud Unit, Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII surreptiously transferred the land in dispute to the 1st Plaintiff when at all material times he knew the disputed land does not belong to the 2nd Plaintiff. Again, the 1st Defendant state that sometime in 2019, the 5th Defendant needed land to engage in real estate business and the 1st Defendant granted portions of the land in dispute to the 5th Defendant. According to the 5th Defendant, during negotiation for the purchase of the land, the 1st Plaintiff, acting through its Managing Director, acted as an intermediary between the 1st and 5th Defendants and afterwards, his commission was paid to him. After the transaction, an issue arose between the 1st and 5th Defendants which became the subject matter of a dispute between the parties at the High Court, Agona Swedru. The 5th Defendant avers that the 1st Plaintiff’s Managing Director sometimes represented the 5th Defendant during the pendency of the suit. The 1st Defendant states that it is a bona fide owner of the disputed land. On this account, the 1st Defendant counterclaims against the Plaintiffs as follows: a. Declaration of title and recovery of possession of all that parcel of land situate at “wowua-woosaw” and share boundary with the properties of Ojobi Asona family, Ojobi Yeno family, Ojobi Kona family and Akotsi family land as the property of the 1st Defendant family. b. General damages for trespass c. Perpetual injunction d. Cost of suit. The Plaintiff filed a Reply on 1st December 2020 wherein they join issues with the Defendants on their defence. The Plaintiffs denied the averments contained in the Statement of Defence. The 1st Plaintiff, among others, denied the averment contained in paragraph 33 and 34 of the Statement of Defence which were to the effect that the Managing Director of the 1st Plaintiff represented the 5th Defendant in the High Court, Agona Swedru in respect of a dispute between the 1st and 5th Defendants. In response to this, the 1st Plaintiff states in paragraph 8 of the Plaintiffs’ Reply that this act was that of Mustapha Mohammed and not the 1st Plaintiff Company’s. In their defence to the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim, the Plaintiffs state that the 1st Defendant is not entitled to its counterclaim. At the close of pleading, the issues set out in the application for direction by the Defendants as well as the additional issues by the Plaintiffs were adopted as issues for trial. The issues are reproduced below: a. Whether or not the 2nd Plaintiff has capacity to issue the instant action against the Defendants? b. Whether or not the 2nd Plaintiff can transfer the disputed property to the 1st Plaintiff when the disputed property does not belong to the 2nd Plaintiff as expressed in Latin Maxim Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet? c. Whether or not the Plaintiffs are caught by section 10 of the Statute of Limitation NRCD 54? d. Whether or not the Plaintiffs are caught with laches, acquiescence and Estoppel by conduct and Deed? e. Whether or not the Defendants are entitled to their Counterclaim? The additional issues are as follows: a. Whether or not 2nd Plaintiff’s family is the owner of the subject matter land. b. Whether or not 2nd Plaintiff leased the subject matter land to the 1st Plaintiff. c. Whether or not 1st Plaintiff registered the subject matter land and exercised various acts of possession thereon. d. Whether or not the 4th and 5th Defendants have trespassed on the 1st Plaintiff’s land. e. Any other issues arising out of the pleadings. It is worth noting that the issue of capacity was determined by this Court (differently constituted) as a preliminary issue and same was held in favour of the 2nd Plaintiff. Thus, there is no need to belabour the issue of want of capacity on the part of the 2nd Plaintiff. It is also noteworthy that Counsel for the Defendants, in his written address, has challenged the legal status of the 1st Plaintiff as a company. He states at pages 12-13 of the said address as follows: “Throughout the trial, even though the Defendants denied the legal personality status of the 1st Plaintiff, it never brought before this Court and document evidencing that it is indeed a company that has been registered under the laws of the Republic of Ghana and has been issued with relevant documents such as Certificate of Incorporation and Certificate to Commence Business. To the extent that; the 1st Plaintiff failed to bring before this Court that it has been registered as it alleged in its Statement of Claim; it still remains an allegation which the 1st Plaintiff could not prove. To that extent, the 1st Plaintiff could not produce any document to prove the said allegation, it is bereft with capacity to have initiated the action and for the matter the suit be dismissed.” I am unable to agree with Counsel for the Defendants on this point. The legal status of the 1st Plaintiff as a Company has already been admitted by the Defendants in their Statement of Defence. The Defendants aver in paragraphs 31, 33 and 34 of the Statement of Defence as follows: 31. The 5th Defendant states that during the negotiation for the purchase of the land, the 1st Plaintiff acting through its Managing Director acted as an intermediary between the 1st and 5th Defendants and afterwards his commission was paid to him. 33. The 5th Defendant again states that during Court proceedings before the High Court, Agona Swedru the 1st Plaintiff’s Managing Director sometimes represented the 5th Defendant when the matter was pending before the Court. 34. The 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants filed Terms of Settlement which the High Court, Agona Swedru adopted as Consent Judgment which the Managing Director of the 1st Plaintiff leased between the parties and one NANA AMPONSAH to settle the matter out of Court. It is without doubt that the import of the above reproduced paragraphs of the Defendants’ own Statement of Defence amounts to an admission of the legal status of the 1st Plaintiff. It is trite learning that where a matter is admitted, proof is dispensed with. See SAMUEL OKUDZETO ABLAKWA & ANOR V JAKE OBETSEBI LAMPTEY & ANOR [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 16. Thus, the 1st Plaintiff is not obligated to prove its capacity as a Company when this fact has already been admitted by the Defendants. With this said, capacity is not issue to be determined in this present action. It is trite that issues set down for trial are determined by the pleadings of the parties to the dispute. Upon a careful reading of the pleadings I am of the view that the following issues are germane to the determination of this instant case: 1. Whether or not the disputed land belongs to the 2nd Plaintiff’s family or forms part of lands belong to the 1st Defendant’s family. 2. Whether or not the 1st Defendant owns all that piece of land described in paragraph 4 of the Defendants’ Statement of Defence. 3. Whether or not the 2nd Plaintiff can validly transfer the land in dispute to the 1st Plaintiff. The law is that the onus lies on a party who makes assertions to adduce sufficient evidence to prove his assertions. This is more so where the assertions he makes are denied by the other party failing which, his claims also fails. See ZABRAMA V SEGBEDZI [1991] 2 GLR 221 at 224. In civil cases, the standard of proof is proof on the preponderance of probabilities which is the degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the court by which it is convinced that the existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence. See section 12 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (N. R. C. D. 323); ACKAH V PERGAH TRANSPORT LTD (2010) SCGLR 728. Moreover, in cases where a defendant has a counterclaim against a plaintiff, the policy of the law is that such defendant bears the onus to establish his case for a counterclaimant is as good as a plaintiff and thus, assumes the same standard of proof as the plaintiff. In the light of the above, I am of the considered view that the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant, in this case, bear the onus to establish their respective claims by the adduction of sufficient evidence failing which their claims fails and judgment would be entered against the party who fails to satisfy the standard of proof. Suffice to say that, each party succeeds on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the case of his opponent. It is settled law that a person seeking for a declaration of title to land or recovery of possession must prove his root of title, mode of acquisition and various acts of possession exercised over the land. It is also worth noting a party relying on a derivative title must prove the title of his grantor. See YEHANS INTERNATIONAL LTD V MARTEY TSURU FAMILY AND ANOTHER (J4/34/2018) DATED 24TH OCTOBER, 2018 (DELIVERED BY THE SUPREME COURT) and AWUKU V TETTEH [2011] 1 SCGLR 366. It is only where the party has succeeded in establishing these facts on the balance of probabilities that the party would be entitled to the claim. This was emphasised by the Supreme Court in the case of MONDIAL VENEER (GH) LTD V AMUAH GYEBI XV [2011] 1 SCGLR 466 AT PAGE 476. The law also requires such a party to adduce sufficient evidence to prove or establish the identity and the limits of the land in respect of which he seeks a declaration of title. See ANANE V DONKOR and KWARTENG V DONKOR (CONSOLIDATED) [1965] GLR 188 at 192. However, this rule is only applicable in cases where the identity of the land is in dispute (just as it is in this instant case). In cases where the parties are ad idem as to the identity of the land, proof is dispensed with. This is because, as stated supra, facts which are admitted by a party need not be proved by the other party. See DR ERIC GRAHAM & ANOTHER V VIVIAN AKU BROWN-DANQUAH & 3 ORS (CIVIL APPEAL NO. H1/93/2017) DATED 31ST JANUARY, 2019 (DELIVERED BY THE HIGH COURT); BENJAMIN QUARCOPOME SACKEY V ISSAKA A. MUSA (CIVIL APPEAL NO. H1/93/2010) DATED 20TH MAY 2010 (DELIVERED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL). This said, I now proceed to evaluate the evidence adduced by the parties in the light of the above discussed law. From the Witness Statement of the 2nd Plaintiff, it is stated that he is the Chief and a principal member of the Royal Aboraze family of Gomoa Akotsi in the Central Region of the Republic of Ghana. The 2nd Plaintiff derives his title from a Statutory Declaration by Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII and Ebusuapanyin Yaw Minsu both of Gomoa Akotsi executed in favour of his family (EXHIBIT ‘E’ Series). Generally, a statutory declaration per se, is a self-serving document and thus of no probative value where the facts contained therein are challenged or disputed. Therefore, it is incumbent on a party relying on a statutory declaration for an action for title to land to lead credible and admissible evidence to prove the acts of ownership and possession referred to in the declaration. See IN RE ASHALLEY BOTWE LANDS; ADJETEY AGBOSU AND OTHERS V KOTEY AND OTHERS (2003-2004) SCGLR 420. In this instant case, however, there is no such challenge or dispute concerning the facts contained in the Statutory Declaration. I find no challenge on the part of the Defendants in respect of the contents of the Statutory Declaration. Moreover, the Plaintiffs were not cross-examined on same. The law is that, where a party gives evidence of a material fact and is not cross-examined on same, he needs not call further evidence to corroborate that fact. This is because such failure is deemed to be an admission of those matters. See KUSI AND KUSI V BONSU 2010 SCGLR at 60. The 2nd Plaintiff further gave evidence to the fact that, on 27 July, 2020 his family executed a Lease in respect of a portion of its land in favour of the 1st Plaintiff Company. He stated that by virtue of this lease the 1st Plaintiff Company is the bona fide owner of the land in dispute. In respect of the 1st Plaintiff, it clear that it traces its root of title to the 2nd Plaintiff who in turn derives his title from the said Statutory Declaration which is attached to the 1st Plaintiff’s Witness Statement and marked (EXHIBIT A). The 1st Plaintiff also attached a copy of the Lease executed on 27th July, 2020 as EXHIBIT B and C. By this indenture, the 2nd Plaintiff granted the 1st Plaintiff a portion of the land of the former. The 1st Plaintiff further states that in order to take effective possession of the 43.44 acres of land granted to it, the 1st Plaintiff Company has exercised various acts of possession including registering the entire land in its name at the Lands Commission, Cape Coast. EXHIBIT D, which is a search report, was annexed to prove that indeed the land is in the name of the 1st Plaintiff. On the other hand, in the Witness Statement of Ebenezer Arko Tawiah, a member of the 1st Defendant family, he attached a copy of the Site Plan for his family as EXHIBIT 1. Exhibit 1 clearly shows the boundaries of the land described in paragraph 3 of the Witness Statement. He further states that the 1st Defendant family has been exercising total control of the lands without any interference from any individual including the Plaintiffs. As evidence of this, he attached a copy of a Lease Agreement between the 1st Defendant’s family and Sarcon Quarry Limited (EXHIBIT 2). According to Ebenezer Arko Tawiah, sometime in 2020, Nana Osafo Ninsin XVIII trespassed onto the land of the 1st Defendant’s family and the matter was reported to the Police. He attached EXHIBIT 4 which, according to him, states that the land trespassed on belongs to the 1st Defendant’s family. I have perused Exhibit 4, which is a police report, and I am satisfied that the report did not come to the said conclusion. I therefore attach less weight to Exhibit 4. This notwithstanding, it is clear that both the 2nd Plaintiff family and the 1st Defendant family own lands. The issue therefore lies in the identity or limits of their respective lands and whether or not the disputed land belongs to the 2nd Plaintiff’s family or forms part of lands belong to the 1st Defendant’s family. In resolving this issue, the composite plan comes in handy. Although it is trite that expert evidence, like any other evidence, is not binding on the court and same ought to be evaluated like any other evidence, it is also trite learning that a judge must reach conclusions based on based on evidence on record. A composite plan is just as relevant or useful as a judge’s physical presence on a disputed land. I therefore lean favourably towards the Composite plan by the Survey Department. The composite plan was drawn by the Survey Department using the survey instructions filed by the parties. According to the Surveyor’s report, the land on the ground as shown by the Plaintiffs is edged Green; land on the ground as shown by the Defendants is edged Red; the Site Plan of the Plaintiffs is edged Cyan; the Site Plan of the Defendants is edged Yellow. The composite plan clearly indicates that the 1st Plaintiff’s site plan substantially corresponds to the land on the ground. The same can be said of the Defendants’ site plan. The site plan corresponds to the land on the ground. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1st Plaintiff’s site plan substantially corresponds to the land on the ground, the Composite Plan reveals that a greater portion of the land in dispute falls within the lands of the 1st Defendant. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I find this issue as settled. The logical inference that can be drawn from this is that the 2nd Plaintiff has substantially encroached upon the lands of the 1st Defendant by purporting to transfer the disputed land to the 1st Plaintiff. In view of this, the 2nd Plaintiff lacks capacity to alienate all that piece of land falling within the land of the 1st Defendant as shown in the composite plan. In respect of the issue of whether or not the 1st Defendant owns all that piece of land described in paragraph 4 of the Defendants’ Statement of Defence, Ebenezer Arko Tawiah, in his Witness Statement, gave the historical antecedents of the acquisition of the land. This historical account was not controverted by the Plaintiffs. The following ensued during cross-examination of Ebenezer Arko Tawiah. Q: How did your ancestor acquire the judgment of the dispute? A: they were hunters and famers. We live at a place called “Owuassaw”. There was no water at the land. They got the land because of their hunting and farming. Q: Where did your ancestors acquire the subject matter of this court? A: About 500 years. Q: You told the court you are about 42 years, how then do you know that your ancestors acquired the land some 500 years ago? A: Is a norm that has been passed unto us. Moreover, Ebenezer Arko Tawiah gave evidence of recent acts of ownership exercised by the 1st Defendant family (See Exhibit 2 supra). On the totality of the evidence, I am satisfied that the 1st Defendant has successfully proven its case on the preponderance of probabilities. The 1st Defendant has satisfied this court of its root of title, mode of acquisition and has also exhibited some acts of ownership in respect of the land it claims. Moreover, the boundaries/limits of the said land claimed by the 1st Defendant are sufficiently set out in Exhibit 1. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs’ action fails. The Plaintiffs failed to establish that the land in dispute falls within the lands of the 2nd Plaintiff family. Although the 1st Plaintiff successfully traced his root of title to the 2nd Plaintiff, the evidence before this Court clearly indicates that a greater portion of the land alienated to the 1st Plaintiff by the 2nd Plaintiff does not belong to the latter. In other words, the 2nd Plaintiff lacked the requisite capacity to alienate the land of another family and this action constitutes trespass. In effect, the Plaintiffs have no interest in the disputed land. In respect of the registration of the land in dispute by the 1st Plaintiff which it considers an act of possession, I wish to state that, same is inconsequential and the opinion expressed above still holds. It is trite law that the registration of a deed of conveyance does not confer title on a purchaser. See LAMPTEY V HAMMOND [1987-88] 1 GLR 327. More importantly, in the case of BOTCHWAY V OKINE [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 C. A. the court held, inter alia, as follows: “It ought to be emphasised that registration does not prevent the court from ascertaining who has a valid title to a piece of land; and it must also be borne in mind that registration will not confer a legal right or title on any party who took his grant from a person who had no title to convey.” For all the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to their reliefs and same are hereby dismissed. Accordingly, judgment is entered in favour of the 1st Defendant in respect of their reliefs. The Plaintiffs, their agents, grantees, assigns, privies, servants, workmen or anybody whatsoever claiming through them are hereby perpetually restrained from interfering with the quiet possession and enjoyment of the disputed land by the 1st Defendant. Cost of GH¢ 10,000.00 awarded in favour of the 1st Defendant. (SGD) BERNARD BENTIL, J. [HIGH COURT JUDGE] COUNSEL FAUSTINUS K. KORANTENG ESQ. FOR PLAINTIFFS. ROBERT TWENE ESQ. FOR DEFENDANTS. 16