RIGGLET & 6 OTHERS VRS THE TRUSTEES OF G.P.R.T.U OF T.U.C & ANOTHER (E12/56/18) [2023] GHAHC 428 (30 October 2023)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, WESTERN REGION, SEKONDI HELD IN SEKONDI ON MONDAY THE 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2023 CORAM: G. K. GYAN-KONTOH ‘J’ JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT BETWEEN: SUIT NO. E12/56/18 PLAINTIFFS 1. JULES JOSEPH RIGGLET 2. EKOW KOBINA 3. ANTHONY MENSAH 4. EBENEZER KRAMPAH 5. KOBINA KORANKYE 6. STEPHEN BOTWE 7. OTUMFO EGYAH ALL MEMBERS OF TAKORADI-SEKONDI TROTOR BRANCH OF G. P. R. T. U OF T. U. C TAKORADI. ::: vs 1. THE TRUSTEES OF G. P. R. T. U OF T. U. C TAKORADI-SEKONDI TROTORO BRANCH TAKORADI. ::: DEFENDANTS 2. THE TRUSTEES OF G. P. R. T. U OF T. U. C WESTERN REGIONAL BRANCH SECRETARIAT TAKORADI. JUDGMENT: BY a writ of summons issued out of the Registry of the court on 26/3/2018, the Plaintiffs claimed against the Defendants for the following: 1. An order of this honourable court to compel the 2nd Defendant to demand that the 1st Defendant release their books for auditing as recommended by GPRTU Sekondi-Takoradi Trotro branch Investigation Committee Report also known F. K. Quaicoe’s Report; 2. And order that the said auditing should be done by supervising authority, that is 2nd Defendant as also recommended by F. K. Quaicoe’s Report; 3. An order to compel 1st Defendant to reinstate members who were dismissed as recommended by the said F. K. Quaicoe’s Report; 4. And order of this honourable court compelling 2nd Defendant to appoint I. M. C to manage the affairs of the 1st Defendant until the final determination of the case; 5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the executives of the 1st Defendant from having anything to do with the management of the affairs of the 1st Defendant; 6. An order restraining the 2nd Defendant from organizing election for the 1st Defendant Branch until the final determination of the matter; 7. Any other orders the court may deem fit. BACKGROUND: The Plaintiffs, until this dispute arose, and the Defendants all belonged to GPRTU of Ghana with the Plaintiffs then being members of the Takoradi-Sekondi Trotro Branch and the Defendants being the Trustees of GPRTU of TUC Takoradi-Sekondi Trotro Branch, Takoradi and the Trustees of GPRTU of TUC of Western Regional Secretariat, Takoradi respectively. Accusing the 1st Defendant of gross dictatorship and embezzlement, the Plaintiffs petitioned the 2nd Defendant about the 1st Defendant which eventually led to the setting up of an Investigative Inquiry being the Quaicoe Committee by the 2nd Defendant which brought out some investigations. It is the result/outcome of this Committee that the instant action has been commenced to enforce the recommendation made therein whilst the 1st Defendant is challenging the very recommendation in the said Report. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CASE: The Plaintiffs state that they are members of the Takoradi Sekondi Trotro Branch of GPRTU of TUC, Takoradi and that their affairs are governed by the constitution of GPRTU of TUC, 2015. They stated that in January, 2016, they petitioned the 2nd Defendant (Regional Branch) accusing the executives of the 1st Defendant of embezzlement of funds, refusing to accept payment of dues from some members, oppression and dictatorship eventually, the 2nd Defendant exercising its supervisory role to set up a three member committee on the petition and after its work presented its Report (F. K. Quaicoe Report) to all stakeholders. The Plaintiffs claim that the committee recommended an audit to be conducted on the affairs of the 1st Defendant and which the 2nd Defendant took steps to effect the audit as per Article 17 of its constitution. In spite of correspondence by the 2nd Defendant on the 1st Defendant to submit its books for audit, the 1st Defendant refused even though as at the institution of the writ of summons, the 1st Defendant had been in office for over 6 years without accounting to its members and had also exceeded their tenure of office as its tenure ended on 23/3/2018. The Plaintiffs stated that the 1st Defendant refused to reinstate all the members they unilaterally dismissed as recommended by the Report and affirmed by the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiffs stated that the 1st Defendant instituted an action against the 2nd Defendant at the High Court, Sekondi when they later sought to implement the recommendations of the Report. The Plaintiffs did not call any witness but relied on Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and F to support their case against the Defendants. THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S CASE: The 1st Defendant’s case is that he, representing the 1st Defendant’s Branch Union as the Chairman maintain that the Plaintiffs are NOT members of the branch union as they ceased to be members of the branch union for 4 years prior to the commencement of the writ. According to the 1st Defendant, membership of the union is determined by the GPRTU constitution of 2015, Article 3 (specifically Articles 3(m) and (s)). The 1st Defendant’s case is that in 2012 and before this action commenced, the 3rd Plaintiff (Anthony Mensah) instituted an action against the Branch union (1st Defendant herein) and during such period all members stopped paying dues and this resulted in chaos in the work of the Branch union and at the time that the current executives were not in office. The 1st Defendant stated further that in 2013 when the court case ended, the current executives were elected into office on 23/3/2014 and at a general meeting all members were given 3 months to resume paying their dues. Some of those not present including the former Branch chairman started paying their dues but the Plaintiffs did not. Paa Kow Ackon who was one of the petitioners and was not present at the meeting resumed payment of his dues upon hearing of the news of the resumption of payment of dues. But the Plaintiffs refused to pay their dues for over two (2) years in addition to the deadline. The Plaintiffs also refused to attend meetings of the Branch union contrary to Article 3 (m) & (s) resulting in the automatic loss of membership. To the 1st Defendant, members of the union have cards in which they record dues payments. The Plaintiffs do not have cards and so they ceased to be members of the union. According to the 1st Defendant, as far as the Plaintiffs ceased to pay dues and refused to attend meetings, they ceased to be members of the union. The 5th Plaintiff however plies his car at the station as a non-member of the union as permissible under the constitution. According to the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiffs with Paa Kow Ackon and Nana Benyin petitioned the 2nd Defendant on embezzlement and dictatorship against the 1st Defendant, but this was denied and a Committee was set up after their initial response to investigate the petition of embezzlement and dictatorship. According to the 1st Defendant, they made it clear to the Committee of the capacity of the Plaintiff as they were not members and that the committee was to deal with matters arising between members. Also, the 1st Defendant stated that at the onset of the work of the committee, they took an objection to the composition of the committee but the committee ignored all of the protest of the 1st Defendant and proceeded to determine the matter before it. 1st Defendant also stated that they were also not happy with the Chairman (2nd Defendant) for sponsoring the litigation as he wanted to get the Executives of the 1st Defendant out of office. The 1st Defendant stated that they were not happy with the findings of the Committee. The 2nd Defendant again set up a three (3) man committee to look into the Report of the F. K Quaicoe Report and the committee came out with a Report (Exhibit F) which was tampered with as even the Secretary did not sign same as the new Report differed much from the original Report which had been read to all. So, according to the 1st Defendant, they lodged an appeal at the National Secretariat of the Defendants (See Exhibit 1) which was received and now pending. According to the 1st Defendant, the District Branch intervened in the matter between the parties and the 1st Defendant insisted that the Plaintiffs must withdraw the charges against the executive before considering the admission of the Plaintiffs into the union. According to the 1st Defendant, the membership of the Plaintiffs was not determined when this suit commenced and so the Plaintiffs are not members of the 1st Defendant’s union and so lack the capacity to mount this action. The 1st Defendant stated that before the institution of this action, their books were audited as per the constitution of the union (Exhibit 2). And the Plaintiffs always had information and documents not meant for them but rather the 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant admitted that elections are due but same cannot be effected due to the instant action, particularly as all the issues in controversy have to be dealt with before any meaningful elections could be conducted. The 1st Defendant maintained that since the Plaintiffs are not members, they cannot call for elections as per their constitution, it is only paid up members who can call for elections as per the constitution. 1st Defendants stated that they render accounts every 3 months and the Plaintiffs are not aware as they are not members of the union. On the appointment of the IMC, the 1st Defendant stated that all had to wait for the outcome of the appeal but the 2nd Defendant sought for an IMC to unlawfully overreach the law and the constitution by the appointment of the IMC and this resulted in a court action against the 2nd Defendant (See Exhibit 3). This case was pending when the instant action also commenced. But the Plaintiffs did not trim that action but brought the instant one. According to the 1st Defendant, their action was bona fide – to challenge the Committee’s Report among others. The 1st Defendant maintains that the present action is premature as the appeal is still pending (Exhibit 4, 5, 6). The 1st Defendant called a witness (DW1) to support the case of the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant relied copiously on the Plaintiffs’ exhibits and also tendered in evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 with series where necessary. THE 2ND DEFENDANT’S CASE: The 2nd Defendant generally admitted the case of the Plaintiffs that they are members of the 1st Defendant union and set up a committee upon the petition by the Plaintiffs to it and accepted the Report and recommendations of the F. K Quaicoe Committee and sought to implement same. The 2nd Defendant confirmed that the continuous demands of the 1st Defendant’s books for audit resulted in the 1st Defendant suing the 2nd Defendant at the High court, Sekondi in Suit No. E12/1/18 entitled: The Trustees of GPRTU of TUC, Takoradi – Sekondi Trotro Branch v. The Trustees of GPRTU of TUC, Western Region, Regional Secretariat, Takoradi. The 2nd Defendant stated that for one to qualify to contest for a position as per Exhibit ‘A’ (the constitution) that person must have to be a member of good standing of the union. The 2nd Defendant stated that the Branch embarking upon the dismissal of any of its members is required to give a copy of the letter to the Regional Secretariat, as Exhibit ‘A’ provides the clear procedure in the removal or dismissing of anybody from the membership of the union, and in the case of Branches of GPRTU, when they need to dismiss any of their members for any reason, the Trustee of the branch are enjoined to first and foremost to give a month’s notice to the member to be affected and give that member a hearing. The 2nd Defendant stated as at the present, it has not received any letter copied to her by the 1st Defendant as embarking upon any procedure to dismiss the Plaintiffs from their membership. The 2nd Defendant stated that the Plaintiffs who are members of the same 1st Defendant Branch petitioned the 2nd Defendant on the allegations of embezzlement of the funds of the Branch by the Trustees. The 2nd Defendant, upon the petition and the response from the 1st Defendant, set up a committee (F. K Quaicoe committee) which went into the matter and provided a Report (Exhibit F). Upon the Report (Exhibit F), the 2nd Defendant called the 1st Defendant for audit so as to ward off any animosity between the parties, but the 1st Defendant did not comply but rather instituted an action against the 2nd Defendant at the High Court, Sekondi entitled the Trustees of GPRTU of TUC, Takoradi, TUC (Suit No. E12/1/18) to restrain the Regional Secretariat from carrying into effect the auditing of the books. The 2nd Defendant stated that prior to the Suit (E12/11/18), the 1st Defendant had appealed the F. K Quaicoe Report (Exhibit 4). According to the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Defendant could not prosecute the appeal and so the National Secretariat wrote to the 1st Defendant to withdraw the suit (E12/1/18) (See Exhibit 7). According to the 2nd Defendant, the Plaintiffs are within their legal rights to seek the relief before the court. The 2nd Defendant did not call any witness but relied heavily on Exhibit ‘F’ and also tendered in evidence Exhibit ‘7’ in support of its case. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION At the close of the pleadings, the following issues were set down for trial: a) Whether or not the 1st Defendant breached auditing rules of GPRTU and TUC constitution by failing to release books of Sekondi Takoradi Trotro branch of the union for auditing. b) Whether or not the executive of the 1st Defendant were the subject matter of a petition of embezzlement and dictatorship investigation by a committee known as the F. K Quaicoe committee. c) Whether or not the 1st Defendant has failed or refused to implement the re-commendation as contained in the White Paper of the F. K Quaicoe Report. d) Whether or not the 2nd Defendant has failed or refused to compel the 1st Defendant implement the recommendation of the F. K Quaicoe Report. e) Whether or not the Plaintiffs are entitled to their reliefs. f) Any other issues arising from the pleadings and evidence. ADDITIONAL ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Plaintiffs are members of the 1st Defendant’s union. 2. Whether or not an appeal is pending at the National Secretariat of the parties union. 3. Whether or not the action is premature. 4. Whether or not the 2nd Defendant in the light of issues 1-3 herein had the right to make recommendations for the admission of the Plaintiffs. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: Counsel submitted that the Plaintiffs have capacity to mount the instant action against the Defendants. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiffs are still members of the 1st Defendant’s union as the 1st Plaintiff is the founding Secretary of the said union, and this was supported by the 2nd Defendant in addition to the F. K Quaicoe Report. Counsel submitted that the style of the work of the 1st Defendant Executive resulted in the Plaintiffs losing their cards and payment of dues. Counsel submitted that the letter allegedly wrote by the 1st Defendant of the Plaintiffs dismissal never got to the Plaintiffs as same was not addressed to the intended recipients but rather served on the Notice Board of the union. Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant did not comply also with Article 3 of the GPRTU constitution (Exhibit ‘A’) which imposes a duty on the executives to officially write to notify the defaulting members of their offence 30 days before sanctions could be applied. Counsel submitted that the Report of F. K Quaicoe committee and this recommendations ought to be applied and complied with. Counsel also on the audit of the 1st Defendant union that the recommendations of F. K Quaicoe have to be complied with and as particularly per Article 17 of Exhibit ‘A’. On elections, Counsel submitted that Article 13 of the constitution has to be complied with. On Interim Management Committee (IMC), Counsel per Article 23(a) of Exhibit ‘A’ prayed for the appointment of an IMC in the face of the 1st Defendant’s executives having exceeded their mandate. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST DEFENDANT: Counsel raised a preliminary issue on capacity relating to the capacity of the Plaintiffs to institute the instant action against the Defendants at all. Counsel dealt extensively on this issue and cited decided cases to buttress his point, which included; 1. Sarkodie v. Boateng II [1982-83] GLR 715, holding 2. 2. Sam Jonah v. Duodu Kumi [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 50. 3. Amissah – Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] GLR 110, And various paragraphs of the 1st Defendant’s pleadings and his witness statement and portions of the GPRTU constitution (Exhibit ‘A’) and in cross-examination of the parties particularly the Plaintiff touched on the capacity of the Plaintiffs. Summing up on the issue of capacity, Counsel submitted that since the Plaintiff s were in default and also the fact that the 1st Defendant communicated to them on various portions of the constitution, the Plaintiffs were clearly in breach of Exhibit “A” and by the said constitution, the Plaintiffs cannot be considered as members of the 1st Defendant Branch union and so are not members and cannot therefore maintain an action against them and thus invited the court so to do. On the issue of auditing of the 1st Defendant branch union, Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant did not breach Art 11(b) and (c) of Exhibit “A”, and particularly so as it is not, per Exhibit “A” the duty of the region to call for the books for audit. On the issue of embezzlement and dictatorship of the 1st Defendant which was the subject matter of a petition, resulting in the constitution of the F. K Quaicoe Committee, Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff failed to convince the court on the issues as the Plaintiff’s case on the issue were doubtful, frivolous and unwarranted and supported the position with the case of Doegba v. Akyea-Djamson [1984 – 86] 1 GLR 697. Counsel submitted that the F. K Quaicoe Report was a subject of appeal as its work and Report were fraught with irregularities and so urged to court to ignore or not to put any weight on same. On the issues of whether or not the 1st Defendant has failed to implement the recommendations as contained in the F. K Quaicoe Report and also the 2nd Defendant refusing to compel the 1st Defendant to implement the said Report, Counsel submitted since the matter of the Report was a subject of appeal, elections could not be conducted. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances, there was nothing untoward or illegal about elections not being conducted by the 1st Defendant branch claim. Counsel submitted finally that the Plaintiff failed to comply with grievance procedures before initiating the instant action. Counsel submitted that as the Plaintiffs did not exhaust all grievance procedures as per Exhibit ‘A’ the action of the Plaintiff must fail. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT: Counsel submitted that both the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendants come under the supervisory jurisdiction of the 2nd Defendant and both of the parties were ad idem on the role of the 2nd Defendant in that circumstances. As such, Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant had maintained that per Article 3 of the Exhibit ‘A’, the Plaintiffs are still members of the 1st Defendants Branch Union. Counsel therefore urged the court to consider the membership of the Plaintiffs as it is a central point in the case. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES: In the address of the Counsel for the 1st Defendant, a preliminary Issue of Capacity was raised even though same was not originally part of the Issues set down for determination by the court. Counsel referred to paragraphs 2, 5, 6, 11, 25 and 26 of the 1st Defendant’s Statement of Defence on the capacity of the Plaintiff to mount the instant action. It is settled that capacity is so fundamental that it goes to the Root of the matter as it forms the fulcrum upon which a party, usually the Plaintiff (in action) can mount an action and succeed thereof. See; 1. SARKODIE v. BOATENG II [1982-1983] GLR 715 2. AMISSAH-ABADIOO v. ABADOO [1974] GLR 110 It has indeed been held that once the issue of capacity is raised by an applicant it has to be determined as it is so fundamental to justice and it cannot be sacrificed on the altar of expediency or for the sake of avoiding multiplicity of suits – See; BANDA v. AYISI [2015] 82 GMJ 8. In that case, therefore, whenever the issue of capacity is raised, a court of law is duty bound to entertain and decide on same even before delving into the merits of the case. See; 1. R. v. HIGH COURT, EXP. HANNI @ ALI OWUSU & OWUSU INERESTED PARTIES [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1169. 2. R. v. DSP ASARE (THE COMMANDER), EXP. IBRAHIM JAJA (CIVIL APPEAL NO. H1/216/2019 Reported on www. dennislaw.com. Capacity is a question of law, and it can be raised at any time of the proceedings. See: BIMPONG BUTU v. GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL, [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 1200. In has also been held that capacity can even be raised by the court suo motu. See; … Equally, it is the law that the issue of capacity can be raised for the first time on appeal. See: SAM JONAH V. DOUDU KUMI [2003-2004] 1. Even though the issue of capacity was not set out as an issue for determination by the court, Counsel for the 1st Defendant raised it as a preliminary legal point in his submission filed on 26/7/2023 in this case. Cleverly also, Counsel conveniently, in his submissions decided to subsume, quite ideally this preliminary issue under the omnibus clause of ANY OTHER ISSUE ARISING OUT OF THE PLEADINGS. Supporting his argument with the Supreme Court Cases of SARKODIE v. BOATENG (supra) holding 2 thereof, SAM JONAH v. DOUDU KUMI (supra) and others, Counsel submited very forcefully that the Plaintiffs are not members of the 1st Defendant union and so lacked the requisite capacity, particularly as per their 2015 GPRTU of TUC Constitution. It is settled that capacity can also be a question of law, it can be a question of fact and it can also be a question of BOTH MIXED LAW AND FACT. (See the case of FRIMPOMG v. ROMEO [2013] 58GMJ 131, CA.) Counsel did not end and just raising the above issue. Indeed, there was no duty on the part of the 1st Defendant to have provided details via pleadings and evidence to support the above issue. In such situations therefore, the burden was on the Plaintiff to prove that indeed he has the capacity to mount the instant successfully. See: Nii Kpobi Tetteh Tsuru III & ors v. Agricultural Cattle & ors (unreported) (civil Appeal No. J4/15/2019, dated 18th May, 2020, SC) Counsel supported the above by referring to paragraph 2, 5, 6, 11, 25 and 26 of the Statement of Defence of the 1st Defendant which, according to Counsel, raised the issue of capacity of the plaintiffs to commence the instant action. And for ease of reference, I hereby reproduce all the affected paragraphs thus; “2. Paragraph 1 is denied and Plaintiffs will be put to strict proof of that averment and in denial, the 1st Defendants will aver that the Plaintiffs are NOT members of the 1st Defendant Union ceasing to be members for 4 years now and the 1st Defendant will thus contend that the Plaintiffs do not have capacity to bring this action. 5. 1st Defendant will show that when the matter was finally resolved, all the members were given 3 months to begin paying their dues but the Plaintiffs did not pay and 1st Defendant will contend that they ceased to be members of the branch union for non-payment of dues for more than 3 months and had not made any attempt then for more than 4 years to do so. “6. 1st Defendant in further denial will show that none of the Plaintiff apart from the 5th Plaintiff plies his car at the 1st Defendant union’s lorry station and neither do they attend meetings. 11. Save that the 2nd Defendant intended to set up a committee and save also that the 1st Defendant caused their Lawyer to write challenging the basis of the setting up of the committee on the grounds that the Plaintiffs were not members of the 1st Defendant Union, paragraph 5 to that extent is admitted. 25. Save that elections are due and the 1st Defendants are willing and ready for election and save also that same has not been done because of this dispute and save also that the Plaintiffs cannot call for election because, they are not members of the 1st Defendant Union, paragraph 22 to that extent is admitted. 26. Paragraph 23 is denied and in denial the 1st Defendant aver that they render account to the union every 3 months but the Plaintiffs are not aware because they are not members and again do not attend meetings. Indeed, according to Counsel, the 1st Defendant stoutly at the trial maintained this position as specifically stated in paragraph 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the witness statement of the 1st Defendant (found in page 5 of the written submission of Counsel). Further to the above, Counsel referred to Exhibit “A”, the constitution of GPRTU, Article 3 thereof and promulgated in 2015 and specifically sub clause (b) thus: “(b). Members in the union shall constitute acceptance by each member to be bound by the provisions of this Constitution, policies and directives of the National Union”. Counsel founded his position on Article 3 (m) and (s) of Exhibit “A” which provides as follows: “(m). Any member who fails to pay his/her monthly dues for three (3) consecutive months WITHOUT ANY TANGIBLE REASON SHALL FORFEIT his/her membership but upon application shall be RE- ADMITTED as a new entrant. (s). Any member who absent himself/herself from three (3) consecutive meetings WITHOUT ANY TANGIBLE REASON or PERMISSION, SHALL FORFEIT his/her membership. Further to the above, Counsel’s submission went thus; “Curiously, the language of the constitutional provision mandatory is – SHALL. Adopting either the simple of purpose approach of interpretation we will not come to any conclusion save that a member losses his/her membership dues of the union if he/she fails to pay the monthly dues for 3 months consecutively or absent himself/herself from 3 consecutive meetings. IN BOTH CASES WITHOUT TANGIBLE REASONS. In the light of the evidence which unfolded before the court, the Plaintiffs were not the ONLY defaulting members. THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNION HAD CEASED PAYING DUES AND ATTENDING MEETINGS BECAUSE OF A PROTRACTED LITIGATION AT THE HIGH COURT, SEKONDI DIFFERENTLY CONSTITUTED AND COMMENCED BY THE 3RD PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE 1ST DEFENDANT. As soon that litigation was completed, the 1st Defendant at a general meeting gave all the members 3 months to pay their dues or commence doing so. The Plaintiffs did not avail themselves for this relief. They maintained a defiant posture and chose to ignore this feigning that they did not have notice of that direction.” Counsel went further to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs had notice but just decided to ignore the directive. Counsel buttressed the above position on Paa Kow Ackon who was a member of the original team that made the original complaint of embezzlement and dictatorship against the 1st Defendant’s Trustee who was not at the meeting but upon hearing of the directive resumed payment of his dues. This was the case also for the former Branch chairman. Further, Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant met the constitutional provision, as captured in Article 3 (n) by notifying defaulting members in writing when they had the directives boldly written on the union’s Notice Board to all the members and at the time including the Plaintiffs thus: “n. It SHALL be the duty of the Local/Branch or the level of the union concerned to notify the defaulting member in writing of his indebtedness, at least 30 days prior to any sanctions to be applied to such a member.” Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant had the power under the constitution (Exhibit 5) to DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS from the union. And further, Counsel submitted that the writing on the Notice board calling on the membership to resume paying dues within 3 months was notice to ALL the members of the union and this MET the requirement of the constitutional provision which did not say that it should be written and handed over to the defaulting members end on the above, Counsel submitted that the Plaintiffs are not members of the 1st Defendant’s union and cannot maintain an action against them and so invites the court to so hold. Counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted that the Plaintiffs are members of the 1st Defendant’s union and supported the position with the evidence in pages 10 and 11 of the record of proceedings (during the cross-examination of the 1st Plaintiff by Counsel for the 1st Defendant), the cross-examination of the 1st Defendant by Counsel for the Plaintiffs at page 30 - 31), and the cross-examination of the 2nd Defendant at page 55 of the proceedings. Counsel referred to Exhibit “B” the F. K Quaicoe Report recommending the reinstatement of the Plaintiff as according to Counsel for the Plaintiffs, the 1st Defendant did not comply with the constitution of GPRTU (Exhibit ‘A’). Counsel also submitted that aside the constitutional provisions being breached by the 1st Defendant on the membership status of the Plaintiffs, there is nowhere in the evidence where the Plaintiffs expressly informed the 1st Defendant of their intention not to be members of the 1st Defendant’s union. Counsel submitted also on the above that, the alleged writing and posting to inform the Plaintiffs of their dismissal by the 1st Defendant from the union was neither addressed to the intended recipients (the Plaintiffs) nor was it served on them; but rather the 1st Defendant posted a copy of the letter on the Union’s notice board – thus not complying with the important process towards imposing sanctions on a member. Counsel referred to Article 3 (n) as stated supra of Exhibit “A” imposing a duty on the executive to write to notify the defaulting members of the offence(s) 30 days before sanctions could the applied and which the 1st Defendant’s executives failed to do. Counsel submitted on the above that the pieces of evidence before the court are some of the machinations of the 1st Defendant’s executives particularly the Chairman to stifle dissenting view of its members. On the part of the 2nd Defendant, and as stated earlier in this judgment and also as per the submission of Counsel for the 1st Defendant, the 2nd Defendant through his Counsel, in page 3 of Counsel’s submission stated thus: “My Lord, the evidence of the Plaintiffs can be summed up that, when they thought that they were wrongfully dismissed from the membership of the 1st Defendant Branch of GPRTU they as a result, petitioned the 2nd Defendant who in turn constituted 9 - 3 member committee which later came to be known to all the parties as “F. K Quaicoe Committee”. “Whilst the Plaintiffs have instated that they are still members of the union, the 1st Defendant thinks otherwise.” Counsel for the 2nd Defendant, as part of his submissions stated as follows: “In specific terms, the said Article 3 by clauses (m), (n) and (g) provide as below; “(m). Any member who fails to pay his/her monthly dues for 3 consecutive months WITHOUT ANY TANGIBLE REASON SHALL FORFEIT his/her membership but UPON APPLICATION SHALL BE RE-ADMITTED AS A NEW MEMBER.” “(n). It shall be that the duty of the/branch or the level of the claim concerned to NOTIFY the defaulting member IN WRITING of his indebtedness at least 30days prior to any sanctions to be applied to such a member.” (g). Any member who absent himself/herself for 3 consecutive meeting without any tangible reason or permission shall forfeit his/her membership.” Article 4(e) also provides that: “Any member who fails to contribute towards the union….30 days’ written notice. The member and the Regional/National Secretariat SHALL be informed accordingly. Counsel submitted finally that the 2nd Defendant has not received any such notice of dismissal from the 1st Defendant’s union as the 1st Defendant is enjoined by the constitution to do. I have taken time to delve very deep into every submission by all Counsel in the matter on this very thorny issue of capacity as central as to whether or not the Plaintiffs are members of the 1st Defendant’s union (on capacity) as the MOST CENTRAL of all of the issues before the court and its resolution will certainly affect the other issues. This is the quote from Counsel: “It is respectively submitted on behalf of the 2nd Defendant that the additional issue filed by the 1st Defendant as to whether the Plaintiffs are members of the 1st Defendant branch is most central and its resolution will certainly impart the other issues.” I do sincerely appreciate the concerns raised in the case through the pleadings, evidence and the exhibits presented to support the entrenched positions held by the parties. And I do sincerely agree also with Counsel for the 2nd Defendant’s submission on the above matter of the membership or otherwise of the Plaintiff in the 1st Defendant’s union as the MOST CENTRAL ISSUE in the case. In the first place, the parties are ad idem on the fact that the parties, as a union are governed by a constitution, tendered in court and now for ease of reference called Exhibit “A” for all purposes of this judgement and reference to the constitution of the parties (GPRTU of TUC, 2015). The Plaintiffs made reference to Article 17 of the GPRTU constitution 2015 in paragraph 16 of the statement of claim thus: “16. The Plaintiffs aver that as a result of the said committee Report it came to light that for some time the books of the executives have not been audited contrary to Article 17 of the GPRTU constitution 2015. On the part of the 1st Defendant, he made copious references to the constitution in paragraphs 3, 7 and 21 of their statement of defence of 10/4/2018 thus: “3. That assuming but not admitting that the Plaintiffs were members, the writ is premature because the Plaintiffs have not availed themselves of the grievance procedure in the GPRTU constitution for addressing their grievances before coming to court.” “7. The non-payment of dues and non-attendance at meetings for 4 years effectively removed the Plaintiffs as members of eh 1st Defendant’s union, the 5th Plaintiff plying his car as a non-union member which is permissible by the union constitution but it will not allow him the privileges of the unionized members.” “21. The 1st Defendant contend that under the GPRTU constitution that is not the 2nd Defendant who must audit their account.” On the part of the 2nd Defendant, they admitted in their pleadings and indeed evidence that the parties are governed by Exhibit “A” – see paragraph 3 of the statement of defence of the 2nd Defendant filed on 30/04/18 and paragraphs 5, 6, 8 all in Exhibit “A” and its provisions and application. The 1st Defendant’s trump card was all hinged on the copious provisions of Exhibit “A” and so made copious references to same in his witness statement/evidence in paragraphs 3, 5 & 6 thereof. For this court also, the endorsement to the writ provides some information or at least some hints of the constitution of the parties. I find that all the parties are making their respective cases all based on the provisions of Exhibit “A”, the fulcrum of all of the affairs of the parties. In their respective cross-examination Counsel made several references to various provisions of the Exhibit “A”. And these included the following Articles: 3. (c) A qualified applicant shall not be denied admission by a branch or local. (f) Each member shall be issued with a membership/dues card and a copy of the constitution by the National Secretariat on a written application by the Regional Secretariat concerned. The membership shall remain the property of the union. (j) The member then shall surrender any Union property in his custody including his membership card to the Union. (m) Any member who fails to pay his/her monthly dues for three (3) consecutive months without any tangible reason shall forfeit his/her membership but upon application shall be re-admitted as a new entrant. (n) It shall be the duty of the Local/Branch or the level of the Union concerned, to notify the defaulting member in writing of his indebtedness, at least 30days prior to any sanctions to be applied to such a member. (s) Any member who absents himself/herself from three (3) consecutive meetings without any tangible reason or permission, shall forfeit his/her membership. 4. (e) Any member who fails to contribute towards the Union dues for three consecutive months shall lose his/her membership after having been given 30 days written notice. The member and the Regional/National Secretariat shall be informed accordingly. 5. (b) In the period between the Quadrennial Delegates Conference the National Executive Council can expel, suspend, dismiss take legal action against any member on proven misconduct and Report same to the next Delegates Conference. 13.(o) All Locals, Branches, Regional and National elections shall be held in every four (4) years. (p) Local, Branch, Regional and National elections shall be conducted by Electoral Commission Officers or Labour Officers. (r) After a mandatory four (4) year period, if elections are prevented by circumstance beyond the control of the Union, the elected officers shall continue in office until the obstacle is removed for the election to be held. However, proven improprieties can call for an Interim Management Committee (IMC). 17. (b) The accounts of the branch and local shall be audited at the end of every year by a qualified auditor. In case of any Reported suspicion of the inability of the officers to account to their membership the supervising authority shall call for audit. (c) The audit Report of a branch shall be discussed under the supervision of the Regional Secretariat and that of the local under the supervision of the branch. 20. (e) The branch shall hold general meetings to review its activities at least once in every three months. (f) The branch shall carry out activities as directed by the Regional Secretariat acting on behalf of the Union in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the Union constitution. (g) The branch shall submit to the Regional Secretariat quarterly Reports in respect of its activities and data on membership. (i) Every branch shall be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the locals and shall enliven and sustain the interest of members by organising educational, social and recreational activities. 22. (b) A branch shall operate under the jurisdiction and supervision of a Regional Secretariat. (c) A Regional Secretariat shall operate under the jurisdiction and supervision of the National Secretariat. (d) The National Secretariat shall operate under the jurisdiction and supervision of the National Executive Council. (e) The National Executive Council shall operate under the jurisdiction of the Delegates Conference. 23. (a) Formation of an Interim Management Committee (IMC) shall be inevitable in the case of abrupt resignation, suspension, interdiction, or dismissal of elected officers. (c) Suspension of officers should not be carried out on mere allegations. Preliminary investigations must be conducted into the allegations for prima facie (preliminary information to support a case) to be established before the accused officers are suspended for further detailed investigation to be conducted. Then an IMC of three (3) shall appointed. (e) The membership of an IMC should not exceed three (3) and shall not be formed on mere accusations. In all cases thorough investigation shall be carried out before the formation of the IMC by the next higher authority and it the incumbent is exonerated after investigation, he/she or they should be reinstated. (g) Formation of IMC at all levels shall be Reported to the National Secretariat. 29. Procedure for seeking redress. 31 (a) The provisions of the constitution, rules and Standing Orders excerpt otherwise stated, shall apply levels of the union. 40. Sanctions. For the court and for the purposes of this judgment and in a fair attempt at resolving the instant matter which commenced at the Registry of this court on 26/3/2018 and passing through the hands of several Judges, I shall refer to Article 2 of Exhibit “A” also, in the interest of delivering substantial justice and under Order 1 r 1(2) of C. I 47. The main issue to be discussed under the contention of capacity on membership of the Plaintiffs is that whereas the 1st Defendant maintains very forcefully is that the Plaintiffs are not members of the 1st Defendant for their default of payment of dues, and non- attendance of meeting as per Exhibit “A”, the Plaintiffs think otherwise and thus maintain that they are members albeit they do not presently have membership cards from the National office, and neither do they pay dues as the 1st Defendant has refused to entertain them by the reasons as found and stated in the evidence, and so it has not been their fault. The 2nd Defendant sharing the position of the Plaintiffs insists that in so far as the 1st Defendant who used the Exhibit “A” to deal with the Plaintiffs on their membership did not completely exhaust the processes therein contained in Exhibit “A”, the Plaintiffs are still members of the 1st Defendant’s union. Furthermore, the 1st Defendant disagrees with the 2nd Defendant to the effect the 1st Defendant did not exhaust the provisions of Exhibit “A” in seeking to dismember the Plaintiffs. The affected articles from Exhibit “A” have been reproduced hereunder: 3 (c) A qualified applicant shall not be denied admission by a branch or local. (f) Each member shall be issued with a membership/dues card and a copy of the constitution by the National Secretariat on a written application by the Regional Secretariat concerned. The membership shall remain the property of the union. 5. (b) In the period between the Quadrennial Delegates Conference the National Executive Council can expel, suspend, dismiss take legal action against any member on proven misconduct and Report same to the next Delegates Conference. 13.(o) All Locals, Branches, Regionals and National elections shall be held in every four (4) years. (p) Local, Branch, Regional and National elections shall be conducted by Electoral Commission Officers or Labour Officers. (r) After a mandatory four (4) year period, if elections are prevented by circumstance beyond the control of the Union, the elected officers shall continue in office until the obstacle is removed for the election to be held. However, proven improprieties can call for an Interim Management Committee (IMC). 17. (b) The accounts of the branch and local shall be audited at the end of every year by a qualified auditor. In case of any Reported suspicion of the inability of the officers to account to their membership the supervising authority shall call for audit. 20. (a) A branch shall be formed with not less than four (4) locals or one hundred (100) members, on written application to the Regional Secretariat nearest branch. No branch shall have more than ten (100) locals. However, a viable local with less than 100 members can be ungraded to a branch status. (d) The branch shall have the right to draw its own bye-laws subject to the approval by the Regional Secretariat with copy to the National Secretariat. (e) The branch shall hold general meetings to review its activities at least once in every three months. (f) The branch shall carry out activities as directed by the Regional Secretariat acting on behalf of the Union in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the Union constitution. (g) The branch shall submit to the Regional Secretariat quarterly Reports in respect of its activities and data on membership. (i) Every branch shall be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the locals and shall enliven and sustain the interest of members by organising educational, social and recreational activities. 22. (b) A branch shall operate under the jurisdiction and supervision of a Regional Secretariat. (c) A Regional Secretariat shall operate under the jurisdiction and supervision of the National Secretariat. (d) The National Secretariat shall operate under the jurisdiction and supervision of the National Executive Council. (e) The National Executive Council shall operate under the jurisdiction of the Delegates Conference. 23. (a) Formation of an Interim Management Committee (IMC) shall be inevitable in the case of abrupt resignation, suspension, interdiction, or dismissal of elected officers. (c) Suspension of officers should not be carried out on mere allegations. Preliminary investigations must be conducted into the allegations for prima facie (preliminary information to support a case) to be established before the accused officers are suspended for further detailed investigation to be conducted. Then an IMC of three (3) shall appointed. (e) The membership of an IMC should not exceed three (3) and shall not be formed on mere accusations. In all cases thorough investigation shall be carried out before the formation of the IMC by the next higher authority and it the incumbent is exonerated after investigation, he/she or they should be reinstated. (g) Formation of IMC at all levels shall be Reported to the National Secretariat. 29. (a) A dispute in the union at a local level shall in the first instance, be settled by the Supervising branch. (b) If the aggrieved party or parties are not satisfied with the decision, either of the aggrieved party or parties shall refer the matter to the Supervising region. (c) If the party or parties are still not satisfied with the decision, the aggrieved party or parties shall appeal to the National Secretariat. (d) If the aggrieved party or parties are still not satisfied shall appeal to the National Executive Council. 31 (a) The provisions of the constitution, rules and Standing Orders excerpt otherwise stated, shall apply levels of the union. 40 (a) The union can caution, withhold loading rights, fine, suspend, dismiss or expel an officer, a member or group of members or officers who subvert any portion or portions of this constitution, of found guilty of a misconduct. Such members’ membership cards shall be withdrawn. Having reproduced the relevant provisions of Exhibit “A” as above, I now wish to deal with the grounds/provisions on which the 1st Defendant hinged his submissions/defence. These were Article 3 (b), c (m) (n) and (s) respectively. 3 (b). Members in the union shall constitute acceptance by each member to be bound by the provisions of this Constitution, policies and directives of the National Union”. (m) Any member who fails to pay his/her monthly dues for three (3) consecutive months without any tangible reason shall forfeit his/her membership but upon application shall be re-admitted as a new entrant. (n) It shall be the duty of the Local/Branch or the level of the Union concerned, to notify the defaulting member in writing of his indebtedness, at least 30days prior to any sanctions to be applied to such a member. (s) Any member who absents himself/herself from three (3) consecutive meetings without any tangible reason or permission, shall forfeit his/her membership. I am not ever ready to do any interpretation of any provisions of the 2015 constitution (Exhibit “A”) as canvassed by Counsel for the 1st Defendant. I am here in this judgment seeking to appreciate ONLY the understanding of the provisions stated. After all, both the 1st Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, and even the 2nd Defendant whose document it is, have been reading and explaining same to our understanding. So, I do not think I should attempt any interpretation of Exhibit “A” but only appreciating same by way equally seeking to understand same so as to guide us in the delivery of this judgment. I think the meaning is for us to understand so there is no need therefore to seek to explain much. The position of Counsel for the 1st Defendant on the membership and for that matter the capacity of the Plaintiffs, on the fact that the Plaintiffs are not members of the union is not made in a vacuum is founded as Articles 3 (m) (n) and (s) respectively. It must be of interest when Counsel for the 1st Defendant highlighted the word SHALL in the stated articles from Exhibit “A”. Further, it must be of interest when Counsel stated that in both provisions of sub clauses “m”, “n” and “s”, it contained the expression “WITHOUT TANGIBLE REASONS.” And I am keen to include the word ‘FORFEIT’ in sub clauses “m” and “s” which is the trump card of the 1st Defendant’s argument. I shall revert to continue in due cause the above discussion. But for now, I wish to refer by way of digressing a little to the submissions of Counsel for the 1st Defendant and the evidence itself. At page 5 of Counsel’s submission, he made references to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the witness statement of the 1st Defendant to the effect that due to an earlier suit by one of the Plaintiffs against the 1st Defendant at the High Court, Sekondi and which dragged on for years, “all the entire membership of the Branch union stooped paying dues. It was an unsettled period and there was absolute chaos in the administration of the Branch union. At that time, we were not in office but some of the Plaintiffs were elected officers and in office.” My understanding of the above prompts a neutral person to question thus: 1. Did it mean all the entire membership forfeited their membership then as the matter, from the evidence dragged on for over two years? 2. And if they forfeited their membership on what basis did the entire membership become members. 3. How did they all come back to renew the union or re-organise themselves? 4. Were there situations where the entire membership had to re-apply and if so by what process? 5. And by the above evidence what and how did some of the Plaintiffs herein by the evidence of the 1st Defendant, handle the situation to bring back or calm the ‘chaos’ resulting in elections? Maybe, by the end of this judgment, answers maybe found. From the evidence, it is not in doubt at all that there is complete DISUNITY between the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant executive. This I will hasten to call “RIVALRY/FACTIONS” at the 1st Defendant’s branch which has degenerated to the present state of affairs – which is this suit. To call a spade a spade, and being noted for my frankness, I think the Plaintiffs led by the 1st Plaintiff have not been very sincere with the court at all. Maybe, his attitude, posture, behaviour and style of handling issues for himself and on behalf of his colleagues has resulted into this sorry state of affairs in the affairs of the 1st Defendant’s branch. The demeanour of the Plaintiff, his contradictions and insincerity in answering questions to this court was not the best for unity of purpose for the union work. To list just a few of the examples on the above are the following some of which are quite evasive; Cross-examination of the Plaintiff by Counsel for the 1st Defendant: Q: You recall that when this action was instituted, you brought a motion for Interlocutory Injunction? A: I do not recollect that. Q: I put it to you that on 27/3/10, you filed a motion for Interlocutory Injunction to restrain the 1st Defendant’s Executive from operating the branch and same was refused and dismissed by this court? A: I cannot recollect. The truth and indeed the record is that on 27/3/2018 the then Counsel for the Plaintiffs Achempnong Opoku Harry filed a motion on notice to restrain the Executives of the Takoradi – Sekondi Trotro Branch of GPRTU of TUC from operating and managing the office of the branch as the its officers with a return date of 10/4/2018. Interestingly, the affidavit in support of the application was duly signed by JULES JOSEPH RIGGLET of Takoradi. The Plaintiff is literate. He also testified in English. He made several references to the constitution (Exhibit “A”) and read various provision therefrom under cross- examination. Q: When was the last time you attended a meeting of the union? A: It has been a long time but I can explain. When we went to pay our dues, they refused it and so we deemed they had expelled us. Q: You have not been paying dues or attending meetings for the past 3 months or 1 year? A: That is not correct. Q: I suggest to you that the 3rd Plaintiff brought an action against the 1st Defendant union? A: I am not part and parcel of that case. So, I do not know anything about it. Q: In that case, the court decided that election should be held for the 1st Defendant union? A: Still I am not aware of that. Q: I suggest to you that it was that election conducted by the Electoral Commission that brought into office the Executive of the 1st Defendant’s union? A: I was not in town. So, when the election was being held, I did not know of it until after the election. Q: You are not being truthful to this court. At that time, you were the Secretary of the 1st Defendant’s union branch? A: My Lord, in 2012 the people (the new executive) came to lock my office. So, I was pushed out of the office. So, I did not come to the office again. Moreover, I was not well. I was sick. So, I did not know of anything about it. I speak the truth. Q: Do you know when the executives of the 1st Defendant union were elected into office? A: I cannot tell the date. Q: I want to believe that on your return, you got to hear that there was a general meeting called by the 1st Defendant? A: I did not hear of it. Q: But at least, just as you were not at that meeting; equally some members were also not at the meeting? A: I cannot speak of other people. Q: Did you get to know the decision taken at that general meeting? A: No, my Lord. Q: Did you ever hear that all the members of the 1st Defendant’s union were given a three-month moratorium within which to pay their dues? A: No, my Lord. Q: You were a member of the previous executive before the current one took over? A: Not correct. Q: Was there another executive after you had left office as an executive member prior to the current one? A: There was not any executive before they came. That is before this current executive came. Q: The IMC (Interim Management Committee) you alleged in your answer that was appointed after you left office were not executive members of the branch union (1st Defendant) unit? A: That is not correct. I now say it is correct. The above and many more from the evidence support my view that the Plaintiff has not been very fair not only to the 1st Defendant and this court but also to his colleagues who he represents in this case. The Plaintiff representing his six (6) other colleagues cannot just say in cross-examination that he cannot speak for others when he knows, by his position as a representative of the Plaintiff that he speaks for himself and on behalf of the others that he cannot speak whether the 3rd Plaintiff instituted an action against the 1st Defendant or not. The witness sought to provide evasive answers which did not go very well as he sometimes sought to be quite economical with the truth on probing questions during the cross-examination. This attitude only stretches the court into delving deeper to unravel by the evidence the real problems pertaining to the 1st Defendant’s Branch resulting in litigation upon litigation one of which is presently before this court. Back to the issue on the ‘dismembering’ of the Plaintiffs by the 1st Defendant triggering the stated provisions of Exhibit “A”, much as I appreciate the effort of the 1st Defendant defending his decision based on Exhibit “A”, Articles 3 (m), (n) and (s) respectively and which I sincerely applaud not only Counsel for the 1st Defendant, but also the witness himself and who happens to be the chairman of the union for their bold, courageous and consistent efforts. In my humble view, in the sub clauses (m) and (s) of Article 3, the expression WITHOUT TANGIBLE REASON, denotes and requires the affected member the right to be heard. This brings in the doctrine/principle of audi alteram partem rule. My understanding is that in the first place, before any action is taken on any such member, the affected member ought to be heard – that is, the other side has to hear the offending party – hence the QUEST/DEMAND for the TANGIBLE REASON. Also, the framers of Exhibit “A” did not just state WITHOUT ANY REASON BUT RATHER without ANY TANGIBLE reason. I understand TANGIBLE which emanates from the latin verb “TAN GERE” – meaning to “TOUCH”, meaning that one ought to demand “TOUCHY” or some explanations that is very hard/serious before a decision is made on any such affected person. And the question is, did this happen to the affected members (the Plaintiffs) in this case? So far both on the payment of dues (Article 3 (m)) and on absence from meetings (Article 3 (s)), the expression WITHOUT ANY TANGIBLE REASON occurs. Throughout the evidence I have not come across the 1st Defendant and indeed the Defendants giving the Plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard on their refusal/failure to pay monthly dues for three (3) consecutive months; and also being heard on why they had absented themselves from three (3) consecutive meetings. I think by the above stated/provisions on which the 1st Defendant acted in “dismembering” the 1st Defendant ought to have heard the side of the Plaintiffs no matter how flimsy, how defiant, how dismissive and how arguing they would have been. The best that the 1st Defendant came to giving the Plaintiffs the opportunity, is that notice on the 1st Defendant’s notice board which the 1st Defendant claims to have been the writing to the affected members. (See pages 6 and 7 of the submission of Counsel) and also the following: Cross-examination of the 1st Defendant by Counsel for the Plaintiff thus: Q: You are aware that the constitution gives processes for either sacking, suspending, punishing any member in any other form has been stated in the constitution? A: Yes, all in the constitution. Q: In the case of this case, what are some of the processes one has to follow to make somebody suspended or lose his membership from the association? A: If the dues are not paid, the constitution provides for same for the branch or executive to notify the person for thirty (30) days and if he does not pay same within the 30 days, then he ceases to be a member, also if he absents himself from meeting for three (3) consecutive times without tangible reasons, he ceases to be a member. Q: Does your constitution prescribe that such a person should be written to officially to notify him of the fact of his arrears of dues, or has been absenting himself from meetings for three (3) consecutive times? A: Yes, my Lord. Q: In the case of the Plaintiff, did you write to them of their indebtedness to the union or inform them that they have been absenting themselves from meetings? A: Yes. We wrote to them. Q: Do you have any documents notifying them of the meetings or were in arrears of dues? A: The union has a notice board. So, it was written on the notice board of the meeting and so the Plaintiffs were summoned for a meeting. It was a general meeting. So, the answer is yes. Q: Can you provide any evidence of such notice? A: No. We wrote everything on the notice board of the union. I was quite disturbed about the answers provided by the 1st Defendant to the effect of the NOTIFICATION of any affected party through the notice board of the union. One question that a prudent by stander may ask is: Does this notice to the affected member through the notice board of the union qualify or satisfy enough notice to the Plaintiff as envisaged or stated in Exhibit “A”? That is, did Exhibit “A” demand that the notice or writing to any affected member include writing on the union’s notice board? Article 3 (n) which has been stated earlier in this judgment is hereof reproduced for the sake of analysis thus: “3 (n) It shall be the duty of the Local/Branch or the level of the Union concerned, to NOTIFY the defaulting member IN WRITING of his indebtedness, at least 30 days prior to any sanctions to be applied to such a member. By the above cross-examination of the 1st Defendant, the union did notify the Plaintiffs through writing on the union’s notice board. Now, on “writing” as stated in Article 3 (n), sub clause (f) of Article 3 on jurisdiction and membership provides thus: “3 (f) Each member shall be issued with a membership/dues card and a copy of the constitution by the National Secretariat ON A WRITTEN APPLICATION by the Regional Secretariat concerned. The membership shall remain the property of the union. The “writing” appears twice under this Article and on membership. So, what was meant or in what circumstance ought the writing in Article 3(f) be? Surely, it cannot be the notice board of the National Secretariat, the Regional or branch. But it has to be on something else. Now, on Article 3 (n) of Exhibit “A” below is what went on during the cross-examination of the 1st Defendant by the Plaintiffs’ Counsel thus: Q: Have a look at Exhibit ‘A’. Go to Art 3(n) and read to the hearing of the court? A: Witness reads. Q: In respect of the Plaintiffs, did you do as Art 3(n) stipulates? A: No. But I have an explanation. When I resumed work, the three (3) months period had lapsed already so I called for a meeting by writing on our notice board for the meeting. We met over it. So, when we met everything was in arrears for over a year and so we all agreed to settle it by a deadline. Some people did not attend the meeting but they eventually paid up and those then absent but paid included Paapa Ackon. Interestingly also, when Counsel for the 1st Defendant was cross-examining the 2nd Defendant, the factor of correspondence through WRITING came to the fore thus: Q: If the National Secretariat will call on the 1st Defendant to do something or to produce any document, they would put it into writing? A: True, but they did write. Q: Can you tell the court if that writing (allegedly) got to the 1st Defendant or not? A: The National Secretariat wrote to the 1st Defendant Branch to produce a white paper which suggests that the Regional Secretariat was about to set up an IMC (Interim Management Committee) at the 1st Defendant’s Branch. The 1st Defendant’s Branch failed to produce that white paper to substantiate their claim. Interestingly, Counsel for the 1st Defendant ended the cross-examination on that tangent without denying the answer just above stated by the 2nd Defendant. On the authority of BESSAKA v. STERN [1877] 37 C. I 87, C. A, “It was held that silence may amount to an admission when it is natural to expect a reply.” Also, in the case of ARYEETEY v. BROWN [2006] 5 MLRG 16A, C. A, it was held that: “Where an opponent in an action failed to challenge the other party on an issue of fact alleged, then the court would take the failure to challenge as an admission of the truth of the fact as presented by the person who asserted it.” The above supports the inclination that even though the 1st Defendant commenced the forfeiture of the Plaintiffs status as members boldly and legally, they indeed could not complete the process. There were instances when the 1st Defendant through his Counsel described the Plaintiffs as dismissed members. See the cross-examination of the 2nd Defendant by Counsel for the 1st Defendant thus: Q: And the whole issue for this suit before the court is a result of the dismissal of the Plaintiffs by the 1st Defendant? A: True, my Lord. Is it not amazing that the single issue of refusal to pay dues and absence from the meetings turns into dismissal? And if the Plaintiffs were dismissed, as alleged, did the 1st Defendant have the mandate so to do under the Exhibit “A”? From the evidence, the 1st Defendant maintains that it has. But the 2nd Defendant consistently maintains that even it being the supervising authority over the 1st Defendant did not have such a mandate. See the following cross-examination. Cross-examination of the Plaintiff by the 1st Defendant’s Counsel: Q: And you know that the 1st instance for making the complaint is the supervising branch. That is where the complaint is lodged? A: Yes, my Lord. When the issue cropped up, we went to inform the supervising authority which is the Regional Branch/Secretariat. And the Regional Chairman told them that he, as the Regional Chairman had no capacity to expel any person from the union. But they did not agree to what he said. In the cross-examination of the 1st Defendant by Counsel for the Plaintiffs the following ensued: Q: In your alleged ‘dismembering’ of the Plaintiffs, you never followed the laid down procedure as stipulated in your constitution? A: We followed the constitution and procedure? Further in the cross-examination of the 1st Defendant by Counsel for the 2nd Defendant, below is what ensued: Q: You will agree with me that Art 3 clause ‘n’ of Exhibit ‘A’ states that a defaulting member of any branch of the union could be sanctioned for non- payment of dues only after 30 days of written notice to the defaulting member? A: True. But the constitution also states that by Art 3(s), absence from meeting means and results in a member leaving the union. Q: It is also true as per Exhibit ‘A’ that any such notice to be given to a defaulting member has to be COPIED TO THE REGIONAL SECRETARIAT? A: True. But the constitution did not provide the time frame within which the Regional Secretariat’s copy should be sent. Q: As you testify before this court today, the 1st Defendant that you represent has not given the 2nd Defendant any notice of any sanctions by your branch to the 2nd Defendant concerning the sanction? A: True. But because the Plaintiffs themselves know of their sacking and the sanctions given them that is why they have sued us here. But in the interim the main matter is on appeal at the National. Now, Article 40 of Exhibit ‘A’ deals with sanctions. Throughout Exhibit “A” it is only under Article 40 that the word “DISMISS” is found. Incidentally, the provision does not talk of the procedure for dismissing or sacking a member. ‘DISMISSAL’ in an organization is such a strong word that its use is made with serious care as it is punitive. In my view, in organizations, such as the GPRTU of TUC, one cannot just “dismiss” a member without giving the affected person a fair hearing. There is nowhere in the evidence that the 1st Defendant gave the affected persons fair hearing before their “dismissal/sacking” as used by Counsel for the 1st Defendant and the witness himself in this case. The Audi Alteram Partem Rule ought to be strictly completed with or else everything done is void, and so has it been held. IN the case of AWUKU – SAO v. GHANA SUPPLY LIMITED [2009] SCGLR 711@ 719-722, per Adinyira JSC, it was held thus: “…. It is worthy to note that even in purely administrative actions some administrative justice is required by way of fairness and reasonableness. It is a constitutional requirement under Article 23 of the 1992 constitution.” In ABOAGYE v. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK LTD [2001-2002] 2 SCGLR 797@806, Bamford Addo JSC stated thus: “…. Article 23 says that administrative bodies and officials shall act fairly. And acting fairly implies the application of the Rules of the Natural Justice, which have been elevated to constituting rights and are binding on all adjudicating and administrative bodies as well as courts and tribunals.” The court held that the bank failed to apply the rules of Natural Justice in the Aboagye case (supra). Also, in the case of AWUNI v. WAEC [2003-2004] SCGLR 471, the phrase “TO ACT FAIRLY AND REASONABLY” was explained by Kpegah JSC thus: “The phrase ‘TO ACT FAIRLY AND REASONABLY’ in my opinion necessarily imports a duty to observe the common law maximum of Audi Alteram Partem and other principles of Natural Justice which is very much part of one jurisprudence and one implicit in the constitutional provisions in Article 23. Because I cannot contemplate how a person could be said to have acted fairly and reasonably if he did not give notice or hearing to another who was entitled to such notice or hearing before taking a decision which adversely affects his rights, neither can I contemplate a situation where a person could be said to have acted fairly as a judge in his own cause or give a biased and perverse decision”. On her part, Sophia Akuffo JSC explained further the requirement of acting fairly and reasonably thus: “I will not venture to give a comprehensive definition of what is fair and reasonable, since these qualities are dictated by the circumstances in which the administrative function is performed. At the very least, however, it includes probity, transparency, objectivity, opportunity to be heard, legal competence and absence of bias, caprice or ill-will.” In the case of LAGUDAH v. GCB [2005-2006] SCGLR 388 @ 394, Akuffo JSC stated that the Audi Alteram Partem rule requires no formal procedure. In the light of the above, I find that indeed the 1st Defendant boldly commenced the process of ‘dismissing’ the Plaintiffs under Exhibit “A”, the 1st Defendant did not complete the processes under the Exhibit “A”. Aside the provisions of Exhibit “A” not being fully complied with, there are other instances on the subject of the membership/capacity of the Plaintiffs. The evidence is that the Plaintiffs have made several efforts of being part of the affairs of the 1st Defendant’s union be it to disturb, confuse, disgrace or sabotage the 1st Defendant’s executive. The evidence is that Plaintiffs genuinely have interest in being part of the affairs of the union. The following cross-examination of the Plaintiff may help in this regard, thus: Q: When was the last time you attended a meeting of the union? A: It has been a long time but I can explain. When we went to pay our dues, they refused it and so we deemed they had expelled us. Q: So, I assume that from 2011 to date you have not paid dues? A: That is true. From that time, the station was being operated by an IMC so every member was not paying dues. Q: You see, before the elected Executive of 1st Defendant was elected into office, all the members of the union were not paying dues? A: That is correct. Q: Can you tell the court leading up to that event why all the members of the Branch Union were not paying dues? A: I was in office one day and when I came back my office had been locked so we made a complaint to the Supervising Authority, being the Regional GPRTU Secretariat. They refused to open my office for me so the case was sent to court. The court gave an order for them to allow me back into the office but they refused and from that 2011 to date I am still at home and not in the office. Q: And you know that the 1st instance for making the complaint is the supervising branch. That is where the complaint is lodged? A: Yes, my Lord. When the issue cropped up, we went to inform the supervising authority which is the Regional Branch/Secretariat. And the Regional Chairman told them that he, as the Regional Chairman had no capacity to expel any person from the union. But they did not agree to what he said. Q: And because of that you refused attending the meetings of the Union and paying the dues which is mandatory under the constitution? A: My Lord, that is not true. This is because when I was in office, we had an appropriate place where we had our meetings, that is the Regional Secretariat where we hold our meetings. And we went and told the Regional Chairman that when we go to the Branch Chairman’s house where they had decided to hold their meetings, we did not know what would happen to us. So, from there some of us, about 20 of us did not go to the Branch Chairman’s residence again for the meeting. This is captured in the Investigation Committee that the Regional Secretariat formed to investigate the matter (Refer to Exhibit “F”) Q: Indeed, is it not the case that you and the rest of the Plaintiffs have deliberately refused to pay your dues up till today? A: That is not correct. And when we heard that they have had election, we went there to pay. But they were not collecting our dues. So, we went to the Regional Secretariat and informed the Regional chairman. And the Regional chairman in turn invited the executives for a round table meeting on the subject matter of the dues. And at the meeting, he told them that he as the Regional chairman has no mandate to expel anybody from the union and so we should go and pay. And when we went, they refused to collect the money. This same issue went to the National Secretariat. And the National Secretariat set up a Committee to come and investigate the matter. And when they came, they resolved that we should go and pay. And when we went, they refused to collect our dues/money for the payment of the dues. The secretary representing the five (5) executives told us that until the court settles the matter, they were not going to accept our dues. Cross-examination of the 1st Defendant: Q: You were ordered to recall the Plaintiffs and others back into the union for illegally dismissing them from the union and you refused this one too? A: True. There were changes in the report in Exhibit ‘F’. It was manipulated. Q: I put it to you finally that the Plaintiffs are right in asking this court to direct you to implement all the recommendations as contained in the Quaicoe Committee (Exhibit ‘F’)? A: They can come to court for the reliefs claimed but, the Plaintiffs did not follow the requirements in the constitution (Exhibit ‘A’). Cross-examination by Counsel for the 2nd Defendant: Q: I put it to you that the 2nd Defendant still has the records of the Plaintiffs as members of GPRTU as at today? A: Not correct, for the branch, the Plaintiffs ceased to be members. Q: I suggest to you that the Plaintiffs are and still members of the branch of the union whose executives you are the chair? A: Not correct. They do not pay dues, they do not attend meetings and they do not have membership cards. Cross-examination of the 2nd Defendant by Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Q: Has it ever come to your notice that it is the case of the 1st Defendant union that the Plaintiffs are not members of the 1st Defendant union? A: Yes, my Lord. Q: And what will you say to such a statement? A: When the matter arose at the time, I invited the parties to the Regional Secretariat. I made them to know that the procedure they were pursuing was not the right procedure. Q: So, in effect are they members or not members of the 1st Defendant union? A: They are members. Cross-examination of 2nd Defendant by Counsel for the 1st Defendant: Q: Do you know the Plaintiffs? A: Yes, my Lord. Q: How do you know them? A: I know them to be members of the Takoradi-Sekondi Trotro branch. The above, rather copious cross-examination of all the parties bring out the efforts made by the Plaintiffs to have their dues paid over the period and further to attend meetings, not at the residence of the 1st Defendant’s Chairman’s residence but rather the Regional Secretariat’s all to no avail. From the evidence not only was there an intervention from the Regional Secretariat but also the National intervention all of which turned into death ears of the 1st Defendant as from the evidence, which was not denied in anyway, the Secretary to the 1st Defendant always refused to collect the dues of the Plaintiffs when offered for payment. And as tacitly stated by the DW1, the only witness for the 1st Defendant, in cross- examination, he admitted and told the court that there are two factions at the 1st Defendant’s union thus: Q: Who are the factions? A: They were the 1st Defendant and the 1st Plaintiff. Indeed, there is evidence that there was a petition by the Plaintiffs to the Regional Secretariat/branch. Part of the petition was on the wrongful dismissal from the membership of the 1st Defendant’s union. My finding then is that upon being treated as has been the evidence, the failure to collect dues, inability to attend meetings at the Defendant’s Chairman’s house, the dismissal by the 1st Defendant union, the petition and instant action, the Plaintiffs have made serious efforts to assert their right. They did not sit idle and by. They have taken action to assert their right as members of the union. I therefore hold that indeed upon all the above the 1st Defendant did not exhaust the process of dismissing the Plaintiffs under Exhibit “A” to effect that the Plaintiffs are still members of the 1st Defendant’s union. They also breached Exhibit “A” in that regard. In spite of the above, even if the dismissal was complete as claimed by the 1st Defendant, it breached the audi alteram partem rule for which reason such wrongful process ought to be set aside as above found. Moreover, the 1st Defendant continuous refusal to collect the dues of the Plaintiffs is contra to Article 3(c) & 3 (n). I also find and hold that indeed the Plaintiff not having been sincere and frank and also quite economical with the truth made bold and serious effects to asserts their right by challenging the wrongful action of the 1st Defendant union, per the evidence. The ‘writing’ under Article 3 on membership, in my opinion is not via notice board, but rather a writing addressed to the person/body. (See Article 3(f) of Exhibit ‘A’). ON WHETHER OR NOT THE 1ST DEFENDANT BREACHED AUDITING RULES OF GPRTU OF TUC CONSTITUTION BY FAILING TO RELEASE BOOKS OF SEKONDI-TAKORADI BRANCH OF THE UNION FOR AUDITION, I have stated elsewhere in this judgment that in so far as the Exhibit “F’ is concerned, I do not intend to make any finding on the basis of such Exhibit “F” (Report). Aside, from the cross- examination of the Plaintiff and at page 27 of the record of proceedings, there is clear evidence that up to 2018, the 1st Defendant’s accounts/books had been audited by a Charted Accountant. This I find is in consonance with Article 17 of Exhibit ‘A’ and to be precise, Article 17 (b). This may be understandable at least up till now as the 1st Defendant union is at logger heads with its immediate supervising authority. This does not take away the constitutional requirement to be supervised by the 2nd Defendant in such matters. The right thing has to be done in the circumstances. And I direct that the 1st Defendant from now, as it seems to be quite law abiding, have its books audited as per the tenets of the 2015 constitution on Article 17. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXECUTIVE OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT WERE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF A PETITION OF EMBEZZLEMENT AND DICTATORSHIP INVESTIGATION, BY A COMMITTEE KNOWN AS THE F. K QUAICOE COMMITTEE: IN the cross-examination of the Plaintiffs, the following is what went on between the Plaintiffs and Counsel for the 1st Defendant thus: Q: Look at Exhibit ‘2a’ on 2016. It is the annual statement and report for the union for 2016? A: True. After the submission of the report, the Regional Secretariat ordered them to bring their accounts and books to be audited because for so long, they had failed to do so; and Art. 17 Clause (g) of the constitution support and empowers the Regional Secretariat to order them to bring their books for auditing. Q: Exhibit 2A was prepared by Chartered Accountants? A: Yes. According to the audit before me, it was prepared without our consent. I have been there for so many years and I know what goes into it. Q: Look at Exhibit ‘2D’. That one takes care of the period ending at 31/3/2018? A: Yes. But an audit is prepared, by Art 17(c), the content is reported to the branch members in the presence of Regional executive by the supervisor of the regional executive. Q: In paragraph 7 of Exhibit ‘B’, your first charge an allegation was that the executive members failed to account? A: Correct. Q: Do you still maintain your evidence that they sold five (5) out of six (6) cars? A: No, my Lord. And I explain that when the investigation was conducted it revealed that they sold five (5) cars instead of the six (6) that we left behind. Q: So, you will not know that a meeting was held and a decision taken for those vehicles to be sold? A: Correct. Q: You will also not know that indeed those four (4) vehicle were replaced with four (4) brand new ones that are still operating at the 1st Defendant’s station? A: Correct. But the cars were not new but rather used cars. I have decided to put up the above cross-examination of the Plaintiffs by the 1st Defendant’s Counsel in respect of Exhibit “B” which is the petition by the Plaintiffs against the 1st Defendant’s alleged embezzlement and dictatorship. Indeed, I have carefully studied the evidence and also Exhibit “F” which is the Report of F. K Quaicoe. And candidly, I do not intend to place much value on Exhibit F – same being incomplete and not very reliable particularly so as it was not endorsed by all the committee members. With the evidence on record on Exhibit “B”, one clearly finds that the allegations are purely frivolous and not worthy for any proper evaluation by this court for any proper findings. This is particularly so when the Plaintiff admitted in cross-examination that the basis of his complaint to the 2nd Defendant was based on falsehoods thus: Q: You will agree with me from your answers that the basis of your complaint to the 2nd Defendant were based on falsehoods? A: Yes, my Lord. WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR RELIEFS: On the basis of the authority of DALEX FINANCE & LEASING COMPANY LTD v. EBENEZER DENZEL AMANOR [2021] 73 GMJ 173, this issue has now become moot, as according to Pwamang JSC singling this issue out as an issue for the trial amounts to lazy work as it is the resolution of that very issue why the parties are in court and so same needs not to be set out as a district issue. WHETHER OR NOT AN APPEAL IS PENDING AT THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTIES UNION: There is no doubt that an appeal was lodged by the 1st Defendant in respect of the F. K Quaicoe Report. Indeed, the records support the above position. The 2nd Defendant also admits the above only that the 2nd Defendant goes further to state that the appeal has been abandoned as the 1st Defendant failed to corporate with the National Secretariat when the 1st Defendant was written to, to provide the white paper in respect of the Report (Exhibit F), the 1st Defendant then abandoned the appeal and resorted to a court action against the 2nd Defendant. This might have influenced the 1st Defendant to argue that the instant suit by the Plaintiffs is premature as the Plaintiffs, having embarked on the above as per Exhibit ‘A’, ought to have continued with the grievance procedure as captured in Article 29 of Exhibit ‘A’ on the procedure for seeking redress. To this court, this issue is not so much relevant to the effectual and eventual resolution of the issue before the court. My understanding is that a resort to Article 29 of Exhibit ‘A’ does not take away the jurisdiction of this court to entertain and decide on this matter as it is doing now. Moreover, the 1st Defendant who set as issue down as additional issue short himself in the foot when he himself after lodging the appeal against the decision of the F. K Quaicoe Report at the National Secretariat later abandoned or suspended same at least from the record before me and resorted to a civil action against the 2nd Defendant. That, in some way is what the Plaintiffs too have resorted to in this case. For this court therefore, there is nothing wrong in procedural with the process. Also, during the cross-examination of the Plaintiff, Counsel for the 1st Defendant stated thus: Q: I put it to you that you failed to follow these grievance procedures for seeking redress? A: Not correct. I hold that the Plaintiffs’ action before this court is not premature. WHETHER OR NOT THE 2ND DEFENDANT IN THE LIGHT OF ISSUES 1 - 3 HEREIN HAD THE RIGHT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE PLAINTIFFS: It must state that I am the fourth Judge to sit on this case now bringing same to its conclusion, hopefully. I have had problems determining this singular issue as set out for determination. I am baffled by the way the issue has been couched when one considers Article 3 of Exhibit ‘A’. I am of the firm opinion that this issue has been dealt with or at least subsumed in the preliminary issue of capacity/membership of the Plaintiffs in the circumstances. Further to my earlier finding and holding on the issue of capacity of the Plaintiffs and their membership in the 1st Defendant’s union, a clear look and consideration of Article 3 (c) and (f) provides some relevance and role of the 2nd Defendant on membership of a person into the GPRTU of TUC. Article 3 (c) provides thus: 3 (c): A qualified applicant shall not be denied admission by a branch or local. (f): Each member shall be issued with a membership/dues card and a copy of the constitution by the National Secretariat on a written application by the Regional Secretariat concerned. The membership shall remain the property of the union. In my view therefore, I find that in all the processes involving a member’s admission into the union, the Regional Secretariat has a role to play in consideration of the totality of Article 3 of Exhibit ‘A’ and specifically 3 (f). Now, on the required standard of proof in matters like this, there is a plethora of cases in relation to the provisions of the Evidence Act (Act 375 NLRCD) Sections 1 (4) and 12 (1) & (2) thereof. Cases that easily come to mind on the above are: 1. Sagoe & ors v. SSNIT [2012] 2 SCGLR 1093; 2. Yorkwa v. Duah [1992-1993] GBR 278, C. A; 3. POKU v. POKU [2008] MLRG 1, per Wood C. J. In Poku v. Poku (supra), the Apex court held thus: “Generally, the burden of proof is on the person asserting the fact in issue with the evidential burden shifting as the justice of the case requires.” In support of the above, the Yorkwa v. Duah (supra) had held that a civil case has a standard of proof as a preponderance of the probabilities as per S. 11 (4) & 12 (1) of NRCD 327. I honestly find that the Plaintiffs’ representative in the person of 1st Plaintiff has generally been inconsistent and his evasive answers, contradictions and his general demeanor and answers to questions in diverse ways did not help much. This although did not take away the spirit of expression and firmness in the face of the bullets and arsenals and missiles of Counsel for the 1st Defendants. The 1st Defendant, on the legal front, I find, also sought to outwit his opponents being the Plaintiffs with his expertise on legalities and through the provisions of Exhibit “A”. Sadly, though the 1st Defendant could not effectively use and exhaust all the legal points to expel the Plaintiffs without considering particular Article 3 (c) and 3(m) of Exhibit “A” aside other provisions of Exhibit “A” and the principle of Natural justice of being head by dismissing the Plaintiffs. I also find that the 2nd Defendant seeking to bring harmony was a little one sided thus weakening his position as a neutral supervisor. I, for obvious reasons as stated above could not rely on Exhibit “F” to make any findings as it was not worth relying on same to do so in the face of the evidence before the court. I also find from the evidence that the 1st Defendant has been rendering accounts periodically, a process the Plaintiffs did not know and so baselessly used same as one of the grounds to the petition in Exhibit “B”. The same applies to the audit by the 1st Defendant. The evidence clearly showed that the 1st Defendant had had his book audited up to 2018 only that the 1st Defendant once again did not comply fully with Article 17 and specifically 17 (c) and the supervisory role of the 2nd Defendant. I equally find from the evidence from all the parties including even DW1 (the witness from the 1st Defendant) that for 9 years since the 1st Defendant’s executive came into office, no election has been held. And I find that indeed from the evidence the Plaintiffs are still members of the 1st Defendant’s union and I so hold as such. Now, on the basis of the standard of proof as set out earlier in this judgment and as per the decided cases cited supra, I hold that the Plaintiffs’ relief 1 fails for not being able to prove same on the basis of the authorities sited supra. There is clear evidence that that the 1st Defendant has had his books audited up to 2018 only that the 1st Defendant did not completely comply with the provisions of Article 17 of Exhibit “A”. I therefore direct the 1st Defendant to as a matter of urgency FULLY comply with the provisions of Exhibit “A” for the purposes of audit. Again, I have held that the Plaintiffs are members of the 1st Defendant’s union. In that regard, I direct that immediately the Defendants are to ensure that all their dues are paid and received with receipts issued to that effect and their respective membership cards issued to them. Upon the full payment of the dues payable as all other members have done after the re- start of payment by members. I hold that the Plaintiffs’ reliefs 4 & 5 fails as the evidence did not support the above. There is clear evidence that, indeed, the parties are ad idem that for 9 years no elections have been held since the present executives were ushered into office. I hereby direct that within six (6) calendar months from the date of this judgment, elections in respect of the 1st Defendant’s union are held without any extension of time and that is as required by the Exhibit ‘A’ (Article 13 thereof). I have had to make the above orders, in the best interest of the parties, having regard to some provisions of their own constitution particularly Article 2 thereof and specifically sub (g), Article 3(c) and 3(m) respectively. Without acting bona fide, no court of law can settle differences like the instant one. IN CONCLUSION therefore, the Plaintiffs reliefs 1, 4, 5 and 6 fail and are hereby dismissed. Reliefs 2 and 3 succeed. There is no order as to costs. G. K GYAN-KONTOH ‘J’ JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT SGD COUNSEL: (1) G. ESSIFUL ANSAH FOR THE PLAINTIFFS. (2) E. K. N. ARTHUR FOR THE 1ST DEFENDANT. (3) S. K. AGBOTTAH FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT. 62