REPUBLIC VRS MANNAH (CC 10/6/23) [2023] GHADC 872 (3 October 2023)

CORAM: IN THE AMASAMAN DISTRICT COURT “B” HELD ON 3rd OCTOBER, 2023 BEFORE HER WORSHIP ANNETTE SOPHIA ESSEL (MRS.) SITTING AS MAGISTRATE CC 10/6/23 REPUBLIC VRS PHILOMINA MANNAH JUDGEMENT The accused person is a twenty-five-year-old trader. She was charged with one count of the offence of Offensive Conduct Conducive to the Breach of the Peace; contrary to Section 207(1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). It reads as follows: She pleaded not guilty to the charge after the Charge Sheet and Brief Facts had been read to her in English and translated in Twi language to her. This case went through full Hearing. Prosecution called four witnesses and the accused person called none in support of their respective cases. Now to recount the facts leading to the instant prosecution, Complainants in this matter are Ofori Benson and Naomi Asamoah who are a married couple resident at Dome. They lodged a formal complaint at the Achimota Mile Seven Police Station that for a continuous period, it had been a usual practise of the accused person to rain unwarranted insults on Naomi Asamoah. For this reason, Ofori Benon sought the assistance of a neighbour to inquire front the accused person her reason for the unwarranted insults she kept spewing on his wife. On 26th December, 2022 in the absence of the complainants from their home, the accused person stood at the frontage of their home and to the hearing spewed insults such as “dirty woman, stupid woman, you are just like stuff in a fridge.” The children of the complainants stepped out of their home and informed the accused person that their mother was not at home, to which she responded that upon the return of Naomi Asamoah, they should pass a message on to her that she had been t her home to insult her. Upon her return, she was duly informed. Naomi Asamoah followed up to the accused person where she was insulted to her face together with her husband for seeking the assistance of a neighbour in resolving her insulting conduct. They consequently lodged a complaint with the police. Following the arrest of the accused person and investigations conducted, she was charged with the offence herein. From the above the question for the court to determine is whether or prosecution has proved its case in respect of the charge levelled against the accused person. Sections 10(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) provides that: “For the purposes of this Act, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish the requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.” Section 11(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) states that in a criminal action the burden on the prosecution of facts essential to guilt requires Prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that the court can find the guilt of the accused person proved beyond reasonable doubt. Section 11(2) of the Evidence Act,1975 (NRCD 323) stipulates that: “In a criminal action, the burden of producing evidence, when it is on the prosecution as to a fact which is essential to guilt, requires the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that on the totality of the evidence a reasonable mind could find the existence of the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” In the case of Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 ALL at 372, 373 Denning J (as the then was) stated that: “It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice… If the evidence is, so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’ the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt …” It is trite that there is no burden at all on the accused person except to raise reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution. For this reason, Section 11(3) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) provides that: “In a criminal action, the burden of producing evidence, when it is on the accused as to a fact the converse of which is essential to guilt, requires the accused to produce sufficient evidence so that on the totality of the evidence a reasonable mind could have a reasonable doubt as to guilt.” EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PROSECUTION: In support of their case, prosecution called four witnesses; Naomi Asamoah, a business woman (PW 1) testified that she together with her family and the accused person were residents of Dome Heavy Do and neighbours. She stated that the accused person was in the habit of raining unwarranted insults on her frequently which same was not comfortable for her and her husband. For this reason, they sought the assistance of a neighbour to enquire from her if they had offended her in any way in order to put a stop to this unpleasant conduct of the accused person. Thus, whilst awaiting feedback on 26th December, 2022 in their absence from home but in the presence of their children and neighbouring residents, the accused person alias Maame Ama visited her premises and insulted her to their hearing to wit “the dirty woman, where is she? The woman with smelling vagina, the woman that her body is like stuff in the fridge, the woman who has been bleaching her kids.” She further invited PW 1 to visit her upon her return. Upon her return home she was duly informed by her son of what transpired in her absence. PW 1 followed up with a visit to the accused person’s home clearly upset. She narrated that this visit only resulted in more unpleasant words hurled at her from the accused person which same she recorded and played to the hearing of her husband and their subsequent report to the police. During trial the accused person waived cross-examination of the accused person. Benson Ofori (PW 2) a mechanic and spouse of PW1 corroborated the testimony of PW1 and added that when PW1 confronted the accused person in her house she further added that it was him she had a bone to pick with so that he would be so much infuriated that he might beat her up so that she could hand him over for prosecution. PW 2 concluded that with this tip-off from PW 1 and being fed up with the unwarranted coupled with unpleasant conduct of the accused person, he consequently lodged a complaint with the police. A child of the complainant called Gabriel Obour (PW 3) testified that he was home when the accused person came unto their premises, hurled insults at PW 1 and left with an extension of an invitation to her. He narrated that even after she informed the accused person of the absence of the complainants, she was not deterred from misbehaving on their premises. The Investigator of this case; D/PW/Inspr. Amoah Josephine Owusua (PW 4) testified under oath and corroborated the testimony of all witnesses. She further added that there was a longstanding misunderstanding between the accused person and complainants which same the accused person relied on to insult them regularly which culminated on the above-mentioned incident. In support of her testimony, she tendered exhibits without objection during trial. The accused person waived cross-examination of this witness too. The accused person admitted the offence. In her investigation cautioned statement. She clearly demonstrated that she had an unresolved grudge with the complainants which same she demonstrated by hurling insults at them at will. During trail she stated that indeed she hurled obscene insults at the complaints in her home because she had been earlier provoked by the complainants. In respect of this charge, which is offensive conduct conducive to the breach of the peace, Section 207(1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) provides that: “A person is guilty of a misdemeanour who, in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned.” For this offence the prosecution is required to establish that the offence can be committed only in a public place or at a public meeting, the accused must have used the threatening or abusive or insulting words or behaviour at such public place or meeting, the accused must have used such words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or in the alternative, the words or behaviour must be such as to be likely to conduce to a breach of the peace. As per the learned jurist P. K Twumasi in his book Criminal Law in Ghana page 465, a public place by definition includes “any public way and any building or conveyance to which for the time being the public are entitled or permitted to have for the time being the public are entitled or permitted to have access, meeting or assembly, or as an open court” without any condition or upon condition of making any payment, and any building or place which is for the time being used for any public or religious event. Applying the law to the facts, the accused person engaged in offensive conduct because he insulted PW1 within the neighbourhood to the hearing of PW3 and other adjoining neighbours and persons. This court prefers and believes the version of the case presented by the prosecution witnesses because there is sufficient corroboration of PW1’s evidence by the testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW4. In her statements to the police and during trial, the accused person gave no details of their long-standing quarrel. All events cited by the accused person which same was done by the complainants were not sufficient reason for the accused person to misconduct herself so much. Mills Odoi JSC. In the case of Ofosu v The State [1963] 2 GLR 417 – 423 stated that: “But the defence of provocation must be considered in relation with the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and in relation to the particular person setting up that defence, bearing in mind that the burden of proving absence of provocation remains throughout on the prosecution.” Also, in the case of R. v. Semini (1949) 33 Cr. App. R. 51 at p. 57, C. C. A where the issue turned on whether there had been provocation enough to reduce the crime to manslaughter, Lord Goddard C. J. made this authoritative statement of principle: " … It is abundantly clear, therefore, that threatening gestures or other circumstances of insults do not by themselves constitute sufficient evidence of provocation unless they are accompanied by "an unlawful assault and battery committed upon the accused person by the other person, either in an unlawful fight or otherwise, which is of such a kind ... as to be likely to deprive a person, being of ordinary character, and being in the circumstances in which the accused was, of the power of self-control." Although Section 7(3) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) stipulates that generally corroboration is not necessary unless required by statute, there is a danger in accepting uncorroborated evidence over corroborated evidence. In the case of Republic v Nana Akuamoah Boateng II; Ex Parte Dansoa and Another [1982-83] GLR 913, Apaloo CJ held that: Again, both the defence of the accused person amounted to an admission and no more. The evidence against this accused person was made up mainly of her own confessions contained in a number of written statements she made to the police after her arrest. These statements were duly put in evidence by the prosecution as exhibits A, Al, and also during trial when she was called upon to open her defence. Phipson on Evidence (9th ed.) at page 266 stated that: "A confession duly made and satisfactorily proved is, in general, sufficient to warrant a conviction without corroboration.…” In the case of State v. Otchere & Others [1963] 2 GLR 463-531 the apex court stated that: “A confession made by an accused person in respect of the crime for which he is tried is admissible against him provided it is affirmatively shown on the part of the prosecution that it was free and voluntary and that it was made without the accused person's being induced to make it by any promise or favour, or by menaces, or undue terror.” From the foregoing I find as a fact and hold that the Accused person did conduct herself in an offensive manner conducive to the breach of the peace; contrary to Section 207 (1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). I therefore hold that the Prosecution led credible and cogent evidence to support all the ingredients of the offence charged beyond all reasonable doubt and I reject the defence of the Accused person as not being reasonably probable. I therefore find the Accused person guilty of the offence of Offensive Conduct Conducive to the Breach of the Peace; contrary to Section 207(1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) and I convict her accordingly. In sentencing the accused person, the court has considered the age of the accused person and also that she has had no brush with the law. Throughout trial the accused person showed no remorse and was blatantly disrespectful to prosecution and court staff. The accused person is to pay a fine of forty (40) penalty units, additionally the court hereby bonds the accused person to be of good behaviour for six (6) months and in default will serve a term of one year imprisonment. H/W ANNETE SOPHIA ESSEL (MRS.) MAGISTRATE