YALLEY VRS DAH-HUSS & ANOTHER (E12/50/21) [2023] GHAHC 425 (17 October 2023)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, WESTERN REGION, SEKONDI HELD IN SEKONDI ON TUESDAY THE 17TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2023 CORAM: G. K. GYAN-KONTOH ‘J’ JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT SUIT NO. E12/50/21 BETWEEN: GORDON ANSAH YALLEY (SUING PER HIS LAWFUL ATTORNEY ALBERT ADOWA) OF H/NO. M9 – EFFIAKUMA, TAKORADI. ::: PLAINTIFF vs 1. MARCUS DAH-HUSS ::: DEFENDANTS ANAJI ESTATE DAVIS STREET H/NO. 13, TAKORADI. 2. MY HOME PROPERTIES H/NO. 88D/6, A. T NARTEY ESSIKAFOAMBANTEM (NO.2) TAKORADI. =============================================================== JUDGMENT: INTRODUCTION: The parties, being the owner of the subject matter of this dispute, property/plot number 86, a three storey building on Plot No. 86, situate at West Tanokrom, Takoradi and businessmen respectively entered into an agreement for the completion of work on the subject matter in dispute upon some agreed terms. As at the time of entering into such agreement the subject matter was, upon completion of the project by the Defendants, the proceeds, by way of rental, will for a period of 10 (ten) years be distributed by 70% to the Defendants and 30% for the Plaintiff. The fact is that the agreement was executed and in the course of it, there have been some breaches of same leading to the Plaintiff accusing the Defendant for breach of contract, among others, resulting in the instant suit. The Plaintiff therefore instituted the instant action for the following reliefs: i. That the Defendants render account of all receipt of proceeds amounting to GH¢3,600.00 from the said building to the Plaintiff; ii. That the Defendants be ordered to cease collecting rent on the building; iii. Recovery of possession; iv. Damage for breach of contract; v. Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, officers, assigns, etc., from further interfering with the Plaintiff’s property; vi. Mesne profits; vii. Legal costs. Upon the service of the process on the Defendants albeit by substituted service granted on 21/7/2021, the Defendants, initially failed to enter appearance as a result of which a motion on notice for judgment in default of appearance was filed on 03/9/2021. Subsequently, on 09/9/2021, the Defendants entered appearance to the writ of summons and later on 14/10/2021, filed their defence. It must be noted though that the Defendants did not counterclaim against the Plaintiff. THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE: The Plaintiff’s case is that, he on 12/11/2019, entered into an agreement with the Defendants for the Defendants to complete the Plaintiff’s uncompleted 3 storey building situate on Plot No. 86 at West Tanokrom, Takoradi (hereafter called the facility/premises/property) which was near completion then, and then was about 70 - 80% complete. And according to the Plaintiff, upon completion by the Defendants at the Defendants’ expense, the Defendants shall then rent the premises out to tenants for 10 years and the profit of same shared in a proportion of 70% to the Defendants and 30% to the Plaintiff according to the agreement (hereafter called Exhibit ‘C’, [Exhibit 1). According to the Plaintiff and per Exhibit “A”, the bill of quantities or estimated costs of the project to completion as at the time of the agreement was GH¢406,409.00 and upon giving the Defendants vacant possession to complete the project between 11/11/2019 – 30/4/2020, the Defendant would then rent the facility out to tenants on 01/5/2020. But according to the Plaintiff, the Defendants breached the agreement and failed to complete the project as agreed but commenced renting the facility out to tenants and collecting rents which, as at the institution of the action had yielded GH¢93,600.00 but had failed to render account to the Plaintiff and sharing the proceeds too. The Plaintiff called witnesses to support his case against the Defendants. THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE: The Defendants generally admitted the Plaintiff’s claim particularly as to the content of the execution of Exhibit “A” (Exhibit ‘1’) as also tendered by them, the date for the giving of vacant possession of the facility, its completion and its start of renting the facility out to tenants being 01/5/2020 and the sharing of the rent from 70% to the Defendants – 30% to the Plaintiff for 10 years subject to renewal and also the cost of the completion being GH¢406,409.00 as per Exhibit ‘1’. But according to the Defendants, there was delay in giving possession of the facility to the Defendants which affected the completion of the project, lack of permit from the authorities and outside work which all affected the work to be on schedule as agreed in Exhibit ‘1’. The Defendants’ case was that the factors as stated above affected his finances and so had to secure loans for the project and also rent the facility out to enable him repay the loans contracted. The Defendants agreed renting the facility out and also admitted to the need for sharing the proceeds as per the agreement in Exhibit ‘1’. The Defendants aside admitting to the need to sharing the rent also stated that he had invited the Plaintiff to render account to the Plaintiff all to no avail. According to the Defendants, as far as Exhibit ‘1’ was concerned, they had not breached any provisions therein and thus stated that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the reliefs sought. The Defendants did not call any witness but tendered in Exhibit 1, 2, 3 series, 4, 5 and 6 in support of their case. AT the close of pleadings, the following issues were set down for the trial of the case thus: a) Whether or not the Defendants were given vacant possession of the disputed property at the time of the agreement; b) Whether or not the Defendants have breached the contract agreement; c) Whether or not the Defendants have been receiving rents on the building contrary to the agreement and refused to account for same; d) Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to his claim; e) Any other issues as this court may deem fit. No additional issues were filed by the Defendants. And the parties were ordered on 25/11/2022 to file their respective witness statements which were duly complied with. WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Supporting his submission with decided cases and statutes including the following: 1. S.12 and 14 of Act 323 2. Abbey & ors v. Antwi [2011] 26GMJ 151 3. Obeng v. Bempomaa [1992 -1993] GBR 1027@1028 4. Dufie v. Fosua [2006] 4 MLRG 143 @ 147 5. Agbosu & ors v. Kotey & ors [2003 - 2005] SCGLR 420 6. Kwashie Gbo v. Kwabena Antie & ors [2016] JELR 68385 (S. C) 7. Delmas Agencies (Gh.) Ltd. v. Food Distribution Int. Ltd [2008] 14 MLRG 8. Boston & anor v. Khemland Bros & ors [1964] GLR 277-284 9. Hanna Assi (No.2) v. Gihoc Refrigeration [2007 - 2008] SCGLR 16 10. Appiah v. Takyi [1982 - 1983] GR1-10 C. A 11. Praah & ors v. Ananne [1964] GLR 458 @ 462 12. Avadzinu v. Njona [2010] MLRG C. A 105 @108, Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff has successfully proven his case on the preponderance of probabilities to the effect that the Defendants have breached various provisions of Exhibit “C”, did not complete the project as agreed, collected rent but failed to share as agreed from Exhibit “C”, and thus there is the need to account and further for the Defendants to render account on the collected rent of GH¢93,000.00 with the Plaintiff’s per share of 30% being GH¢28,080.00. Further, Counsel submitted that for breaching the agreement, the Plaintiff ought to be entitled to the reliefs sought including the order for payment of GH¢28,000.00 being the 30% share of the GH¢993,000.00 on which the Defendants admitted on the Plaintiff’s share of 30% per Exhibit “C”. Counsel also submitted that the Defendant did not act bona fide and that his case has been riddled with contradictions, inconsistencies and refusal to produce documents and information when requested to do so in cross-examination on some of the Defendants’ Exhibits – Exhibits “4”. WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS: The summary of Counsel’s submission is that since the court seeks to do justice and pieces of evidence before the court show how much the Defendants have spent so far on the rent, his suggestions was the necessary pluses and minutes should be done by the court so that the dictates of the agreement are allowed to work accordingly so that the Defendants are not deprived of the huge resources they have spent on the facility otherwise it will be unconscionable, with the greatest of respect. The above being the concluding paragraph of Counsel’s submission, had been preceded by Counsel’s answer that the Defendants’ did not breach any provisions of Exhibit ‘1’ and that the Plaintiff misconstrued actions by the Defendants in the execution of Exhibit ‘1’ as breaches of the agreement particularly on the delay in giving vacant possession of the facility, the issue of permit, renting the facility out as being misconstrued as a breach of the provision of Exhibit ‘1’. Counsel had submitted that the Defendants had to rent the premises out to take rent to settle financiers so as to avoid being blacklisted. Relying on S.11 of Act 323, Counsel submitted that indeed the Defendants have produced enough and sufficient evidence to counter the many untruths manufactured by the Plaintiff with one aim – to deprive the Defendants of the amount of money spent on the facility. ANALYSIS: I must say at the onset that this matter commenced before other judges and I am possibly the fourth judge to sit on this. Also, the issues were set out by the court differently constituted. I therefore request to discuss the issues that will best be presented in the manner that I think will help in the delivery of this judgment effectively. To start with, and in doing so, I wish to state also and as well espoused by Counsel for the Plaintiff in his submissions on the issue: “WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HIS CLAIM”, it seems to me that courts and lawyers are now getting used to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of DALEX FINANCE & LEASING COMPANY v. EBENEZER DENZEL AMANOR & ORS [2021] DLSL 10163, when Pwamang JSC admonished lawyers to DESIST from singularly setting the above issue down for determination as a product of lazy work. I am therefore quite enthused that Counsel for the Plaintiff took such a bold initiative of referring to the said decision in abandoning the said issue. Also, it needs to be restated the principle of law that in matters like the instant one before this court, the burden of persuasion which is often also called onus of proof is always on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. See: JOHN DRAMANI MAHAMA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ANOR (unreported) J1/05/2020 dated 4th March, 2021, through Anin Yeboah C. J, who stated as follows: “The burden of persuasion rests with the person who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue on the pleadings and this is the principle that has been unremittingly followed by our courts for decades.” The above position from the Apex Court in the above cited case stems from the S.12 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act of 1975 (Act 323). Also, in the Supreme Court case of AKUFFO ADDO V. CATHERINE [1992] 2 GLR 377, the court held thus: “It is almost pedantic to say that in a civil case the Plaintiff has the duty to prove his case.” And in POKU v. POKU [2008] MLRG 1 @ 30, Wood, C. J stated of the Burden of Proof in these words: “Generally, the burden of proof is on the person asserting the fact in issue with the evidential burden shifting as the justice of the case requests.” In this case, the matter before the court is a dispute arising out of an agreement between the parties which in this case is exhibited in the evidence as Exhibit “C” by the Plaintiff and Exhibit “1” being the Defendants. For ease of reference and for any avoidance of doubt, the reference to Exhibit “C” or Exhibit “1” interchangeably ought not be construed as a mistake, as the two Exhibits actually refer to the same document in this case and in this judgment. Now, this agreement which is a form of a contract has to meet certain conditions including the intention of the parties, the certainty of the contract, timing of the contract, freedom of contract and also the doctrine of sanctity of contract all ought to prevail in same. In R. v. HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST, EXP. GHANA COCOA BOARD, APOTUI III – INTERESTED PARTY [2009] SCGLR 603, it was held that contracts must be CERTAIN. In the words of Atuguba JSC @ 619, this is what the learned jurist stated. “BUT if such terms of settlement are to be effective, they must in my opinion be CERTAIN enough so as to bind the parties for that is their intent or purpose.” The learned jurist went further to state as follows: “It is trite law that for a contract to be enforceable, it must be CERTAIN at least to its essential terms. In modern times, however, the courts have taken the stand that especially as here, there has been part performance, the agreement should survive as a contract.” (See also: Koglex Ltd v. Field [2009 – 2010] 2 GLR 437, SC). The law is also settled that parties to a contract would not be permitted to avoid the contract unless there are valid lawful reason to do so. It is not the duty of the court to make contract for parties. Therefore, where the terms of the contract have been reduced into writing, the court would interpret them to give effect to the intention of the parties. See: (1) Poku v. Ghana Commercial Bank [1989 – 1990] 2 GLR 37, C. A. (2) Mireku & Tetteh (Dec’d), In re Mireku v. Tetteh [2011] 1 SCGLR 520. Indeed, it is settled that a person of full age and sound mind would be bound by the contents of a documents he has signed, whether he read it or not. (See: Twum v. SGB Ltd [011] 30 GMJ 92, C. A. It ought also to be noted that to be a good contract there must a concluded bargain, and a concluded contract is one which settles everything that is necessary to be settled and leaves nothing to be settled by agreement between the parties – See Madina Shopping Mall Association v. Rosehill (Gh) Ltd [2012] 39 MLRG 81, S. C. It is the duty of the courts to ensure that the doctrine of sanctity of contracts is always maintained. It has also been held that TIME is of essence in contracts. It has even been held that in the absence of stipulation of time in a contract, REASONABLE TIME applies as has been held in the case of Koglex Ltd v. Katefield [1998 – 1999] SCGLR 451. (See also: Atta & anor v. Adu [1987 – 88] 1 GLR 233. To the case under consideration, Exhibit “A” even though so terse, generally met all the requirements in all the above cited cases regarding the freedom of contract, time, certainty and sanctity thereof. My position is that even though Exhibit “C” is so terse a document, it is pregnant with all the salient ingredients of a contract with the intention to create legal relations and enforceable at law. In POKU v. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [1989-90] 2 GLR 37, C. A, it was stated thus: “Parties to a contract would not be permitted to avoid the contract unless there were valid or lawful reasons to do so. It was not the duty of the courts to make contracts for the parties. And where the terms of the contract had been reduced into writing, the court would interpret them to give effort to the intention of the parties.” I now come to the issues. ON WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANTS WERE GIVEN VACANT POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF THE AGREEMENT: The arrangement between the parties in respect of the facility/property is per Exhibit “C”. Paragraph 5 thereof provides as follows: “5. That the 1st party shall be given vacant possession from the property to enable him start the completion from 11th November, 2019 - 30th April, 2020. Exhibit “C” itself was executed on 12th November, 2020. Exhibit “C” from the oath of proof was witnessed by David Awotwee Otoo of Takoradi who, from the evidence turned out to be the person who prepared Exhibit “C” for the parties. My understanding of Exhibit “C” in relation to the giving of vacant possession of the property is that the Defendant had vacant possession actually before the execution of Exhibit “C” having regard to the date of the execution of Exhibit “C” on 12/11/2019 and the effective date of having to be given possession as per paragraph 5 of Exhibit “C” as being 11/11/2019. And the Plaintiff’s position as per the evidence is that the Defendants had vacant possession in the 2nd week of December, 2019. And the Defendants’ position was that it was not until March 2020 that the Defendants had vacant possession and it took them six (6) months to get the premises ready to rent out (as per the evidence). See page 9 of the record of proceedings thus: Q: Are you aware that the Defendants were not given vacant possession of the property until March, 2020? A: I am aware that he was given possession of the property in the 2nd week of December, 2019. Meantime, the evidence is that the Defendant started renting the premises out in/around May, 2020. If the court should go by the above position of the Defendants, then it means the Defendants had vacant possession of the property before January, 2020. There, therefore seems to be conflict between Exhibit “C” (a document) and the oral version/position of the parties albeit differently stated. It is settled that where there is a conflict between documentary evidence and oral Evidence, the courts lean toward the documentary evidence. (See; FOSUA & ADU POKU v. MENSAH [2009] SCGLR 310, per Atuguba, JSC which held thus: “This is equally so because as laid down in ATADI v. LADZEKPO [1981] GLR 218, C. A and also R. v. NANA AKUAMOAH BOATENG II, EXP. DANSOAH [1982 - 83] 2 GLR 913 (S. C), documentary evidence should prevail over oral evidence. Moreover, whichever date that the Defendants had vacant possession, the facility was ready to rent out by/around May 2020. And for the court, since Exhibit “C” was prepared by a lawyer and it was the same lawyer who represented the Defendant in this case, this court will adopt the content of Exhibit “C” irrespective of the difference of the parties. This is particularly so as the time of giving vacant possession was as stated in Exhibit “C” as same was reduced into writing; and also same was prepared not only by a lawyer, but also a lawyer for the Defendants and most importantly an experienced lawyer who captured two (2) dates in the 1st paragraph and the 5th paragraphs of Exhibit “C” same being 12/11/2019 and 11/11/2019 respectively. Considering the totality of the premises, the date for the giving of the vacant possession is not so much material in the circumstances of this issue and also to the resolution of the matter before the court. In my view therefore, whether or not the Defendants had vacant possession of the facility on 11/11/2019; 2nd of December, 2019 or March 2020, even though the facts and evidence clearly point to same being in 2019, the evidence is that the Defendants managed to commence the renting of the facility out to tenants to implement an aspect of Exhibit “C” in May/June 2020 wherein the Defendants commenced taking rent. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE BREACHED THE CONTRACT AGREEMENT: There is no doubt that the parties were bound by the provisions as found in Exhibit “C”. For purposes of any breach of any of the provisions of Exhibit “C” by any of the parties, consideration will be given to paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7 thereof. The affected paragraphs are as follows: “3. That the rent that will accrue shall be shared as follows: 30% to the second party and 70% to the party on a yearly basis. “5. That the 1st party shall be given vacant possession from the property to enable him start the completion from 11th November, 2019 – 30th April, 2020. “6. That the cost of the completion shall be borne by the 1st party and the estimated cost of the completion shall be GH¢406,405.00 “7. That the 10 years will start counting after the completion of the building on 1st May, 2020. The Plaintiff pleaded in paragraphs 10, 11, and 13 of the statement of claim about the breaches of the Defendants in so far as Exhibit “C” is concerned. The Defendants denied the above in paragraph 13 and 14 of the statement of defence. The Plaintiff indeed led evidence to the breaches by the Defendants in paragraphs 9 and 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 17 of the witness statement the Defendants in their evidence in paragraph 12 and 13 of the witness statement denied breaching Exhibit “C”. However, in cross-examination, the following is what was revealed: Cross-examination of the Plaintiff by Counsel for the Defendants: Q: I am putting it to you that whatever you are saying about the tenants was solicited by you because you wanted to come to court? A: This cannot be true. He breached the contract and that is why they are here. Q: What aspect of the contract did he breach for which you have brought them to court? A: A lot of clauses he breached but the one I can remember now is when the property is complete and we put in tenants a percentage of the rents will come to me and the rest to him but that never happened. Q: Before you came to court, the Defendant had fixed fans, light was running and plastering works had been done, painting had been done internally, windows had been fixed with bungler proofs and in short, the place had been made habitable? A: He did some work alright. The plumbing work done was a bad job; and the tenants had to rush in with water oozing from the wall, waste water from the home disturbing neighbours as the water was running to neighbours’ homes. And I had to rush in, upon being called to do the plumbing work to handle the waste water disturbing neighbours. And on the water oozing from the walls of the work of the plumbing work, was also fixed by me upon being called by one of the tenants. All in all, he did some work but it was a bad job. Q: I put it to you that the Defendants have worked according to the dictates of the contract between you and them? A: No. He breached the contract. That is why we are here. He did not complete the work. There are indeed other breaches as evidenced in pages 23 of the record of proceedings on the manhole and also page 25 of the same when the Defendant practically abandoned the workplace and rented it out and no one could even reach the Defendants. (See page 25 of the record of proceedings). PW1, Ato Fynn testified as one of the tenants and brought out some of the breaches of the Defendants in respect of the premises. These included lack of electricity, defects on the tiles in his room and bathroom, grouting of kitchen and many others. In effect, PW1’s testimony is a corroboration of the plaintiff’s case against the Defendants on the many breaches occasioned by the Defendants. (See: BOATENG v. BOATENG (2009) 5 GMJ 58 @ 64, Court of Appeal held: “Where the evidence of the only independent witness, on a vital issue corroborates the evidence of one party or the other, a court is bound to accept the case of the party so corroborated by independent witness, unless there are good reasons for discrediting the independent witness, in which case, the reasons must be clearly stated in the judgment.” The evidence clearly shows that there were several breaches occasioned by the Defendants. The Defendants sought in vain though to provide excuses albeit baseless that there was an issue of permit, agents of former contractor delayed the vacant possession of the facility, he had to solicit for loan which took some time which all influenced negatively the work in general. Further, the Defendant sought to be shifting goal posts to the extent of blaming not only the Plaintiff himself for not only cooperating with the Defendant on the completion and accounts of the project but also electrical cables, and the Plaintiff’s Attorney for influencing tenants and many other excuses completely unrelated to the matter at hand and the breaches of various provision of Exhibit “C”. One interesting attitude of the Defendants is that Exhibit “C” was prepared by him and a lawyer who happened to be his Counsel in this case. As part of Exhibit “C” was a Bill of qualities prepared NOT BY THE PLAINTIFF but the Defendants and his lawyer, which totalled GH¢406,068.00 and accepted by the Plaintiff as the total cost of the project up to its completion. This was admitted by the Defendant in the Pleadings and evidence (witness statements). (See on admission the case of KUSI & KUSI v. BONSU [2010] SCGLR 60, where it was held thus: “It is an elementary principle of law that in civil litigation, where no issue was joined as between parties on a specific question, issue or fact, no duty was cast on the party asserting it to lead evidence in proof of that fact or issue. Indeed, most of the delays associated with civil trial would be avoided, in this simple elementary evidentiary rule were strictly adhered to.” And yet in cross-examination, the Defendant turned 360° and told the court that aside what had been quoted in Exhibit “C” as GH¢406,068.00, he additionally spent extra GH¢606,000.00 being loans from financiers who he could not provide in court to support his claim in spite of the prompts by not only the court but also Counsel for the Plaintiff. This aspect of evidence by the Defendant even though never pleaded, seems to be quite material. And so, the Defendant, even though he could not support same with any receipt or document could have brought such material witness to corroborate his case on this GH¢606,000.00. And on the authority of OWUSU v. TABIRI [1987] 1 GLR 287, for failing to produce such material witness, it is fatal to the Defendants’ case, and so I find in the circumstances the figure completely was unconscionable looking at the facility, the fact that it was not even completed before being rented out. In civil suits generally, the burden of proof is placed on the party asserting the existence of a fact in issue, or any relevant fact. Depending on the admissions made by a party, the party on whom the burden of proof lies is enjoined by the provisions of S.11 and 12 of NRCD 323 to lead cogent evidence such that on the totality of the evidence on record, the court will find that party’s version in relation to the rival accounts to be more probable than its non-existence. The above provisions have been applied and restated in a plethora of cases on proof, burden of proof and burden of persuasion including the following cases: a) ENEKWA & ORS v. KNUST [2009] SCGLR 242; b) ABBEY & ORS v. ANTWI [2010] SCGLR 17. And on the authority of the above, I find the Plaintiff’s version more probable and therefore I find from the evidence that the Defendants breached the contract entered between the parties. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING RENTS ON THE BUILDING CONTRARY TO THE AGREEMENT AND REFUSED TO ACCOUNT FOR SAME: Indeed, the parties are ad idem on the receipt of rent on the building. In that regard no further evidence is needed to prove same as the issues are not joined in such instance. However, the issues are joined on the refusal of the Defendants to account for the rent received. Whereas the Plaintiff insists that the Defendant has not accounted, the Defendants think otherwise. Indeed, it is not an issue that under the agreement there is a need to account in respect of the premises. Exhibit “C” presented by the Plaintiff, and Exhibit ‘1’ as presented by the Defendants between the parties in paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, there is an information on accounts. The provisions state thus: “2: That after the completion the first party shall rent it for ten (10) years, subject to renewal by both parties. “3: That the rent that will accrue shall be shared as follows; 30% to the second party and 70% to the first party on a yearly basis. Pursuant to Exhibit “C”, at a point in the implementation of Exhibit “C”, some rooms in the facility/premises (for purposes of this judgment) were rented out to tenants. In paragraph of the statement of claim filed on 25/5/2021, the Plaintiff in paragraphs 5 and 6 thereof stated as follows: “5: The Plaintiff contends that the said agreement provided among others that the Defendants upon completion of the three (3) storey building referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph shall rent same for ten (10) years subject to renewal. “6. The Plaintiff avers that the said agreement also provided that the RENT shall accrue from the property during the ten (10) year rent period shall be distributed as follows: - 70% to the Defendants and; - 30% to the Plaintiff. The Defendants, in paragraphs 4 & 5 of the statement of Defence filed on 14/10/2021 ADMITTED SAME thus: “4. The Defendants ADMIT paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff’s statement of claim that after the completion of the said 3-storey building it should be rented out for ten years subject to renewal. “5. The Defendants ADMIT paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff’s statement of claim that the rent which could accrue therefrom should be shared with 70% going to the Defendants and 30% to the Plaintiff. The evidence of the Plaintiff captured the above pleaded facts in paragraph 5 of the witness statement filed on 10/01/2022. Similarly, the Defendants’ admission as pleaded was evidenced in their witness statement filed on 02/6/2022 in paragraphs 3 and 4 thus: “3. It is TRUE that the Plaintiff and I agreed that after the completion of the refurbishment of the said 3-storey building it should be RENTED OUT FOR TEN (10) YEARS subject to renewal. Attached is a copy of the agreement marked as Exhibit ‘1’. “4. It was also agreed between me and the Plaintiff that when the property was completed and given out for rent, what would accrue therefrom should be shared with 70% coming to me and 30% going to the Plaintiff. ADMISSION has been defined as a VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF FACTS relevant to an adversary’s case. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition by Bryan A Garnes, has this to say about admission at page 58 thus: “A statement in which someone admits that something is true, or that he or she has done some wrong; especially any statement or assertion made by a party to a case and offered against that party; an acknowledgement that the facts are true.” Simply put, admission simply implies that the fact or issue has been conceded and is NO longer in contention. The importance of admission lies in the fact that the court can act on them without proof of the facts constituting the admission. This is a formal admission, in my humble view, and are therefore binding on the party by whom or on whose behalf they were made and cannot be contradicted by the person who made them. It has also been held that although admission are ordinarily made in pleadings by notice, conduct which is not expressly stated may amount to admission where the circumstances warrant or influence of guilt or weakness of the case of the party against whom the admission is held. See also the cases of: 1. KUSI & KUSI v. BONSU [2010] SCGLR 60; 2. FYNN v. FYNN [2013-2014] SCGLR 727. In RE ASERE STOOL; NIKOI OLAI AMONTIA IV ETC. v. AKONTIA OWASHIKA III, ETC. [2005-2006] SCGLR 637@656. It was held thus: “Where the adversary of a party has admitted a fact advantageous to the case of that party, what better evidence does the party need to establish that fact than by relying on the admission of his opponent. This is estoppel by conduct. It is a rule whereby a party is precluded from denying the existence of some state of facts which he had formerly asserted.” It is part of the case of the Plaintiff that the Defendants refused to account. But the Defendants could not take a positive stand as to the accounts. There have been contradictions as in fact, they admit that they have to account; and at times too they contend that they have already accounted to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff pleaded in paragraph 11 of the statement of claim thus: “11. The Plaintiff further avers that even though the Defendants have been receiving rents from several tenants on the Plaintiff’s building contrary to the 12/11/2019 agreement, the Defendants have failed and/or refused to render accounts on same.” In response to the above, the Defendants in paragraph 11 of their defence stated thus: “11. The Defendants deny paragraph 11 of the Plaintiff’s statement of claim and say that the Plaintiff had been invited several times for the accounts to be rendered but all to no avail. Again, the Defendants contend that against their advice the Plaintiff decided to bring electric cables from abroad and these have increased the cost of completing the project.” I see that by the above pleadings alone, the Defendant s did deny the Plaintiff’s paragraph 11, they actually admitted that indeed there has not been any accounts as the Plaintiff has not be available for same to be rendered. In my view, the totality of the Defendants’ response to paragraph 11 of the Plaintiff’s statement of claim is an admission – to the effect that no accounts have been rendered in respect of the property. In my view, the above pleading from the Defendants amounts to an implied admission. Further, as part of the evidence of the Plaintiff, he repeated the fact that the Defendants have failed/refused to render accounts of same (see paragraph 10 of the witness statement). In an answer by way of admission, in my candid view, the Defendants’ evidence in paragraph 10 thereof (see the witness statement), this is what the Defendants had to say in their evidence: “10. The truth in what the Plaintiff has stated in his paragraph 11 of his claim is that I invited him several times for accounts to be rendered to him, but to no avail. I also contend that against my advice, the Plaintiff decided to bring some electric cables from abroad which have increased the cost of completing the project. Attached are the receipts marked as Exhibit ‘2’.” The following cross-examination of the Defendants may help on the issue of accounts in the case thus: Q: Your statement in paragraph 10 of your witness statement of your invitation to the Plaintiff for accounts but all to no avail is not correct? A: It is correct. We demanded for accounts to be rendered because we got the tenants together, that is, upon the recommendation of the Plaintiff. And whilst this matter is pending, the Plaintiff went to the facility to do some work on the facility. Q: You are aware that per Exhibit ‘1A’, the Plaintiff is entitled to 30% of rent that would accrue on a partly basis? A: Yes, per Exhibit ‘1A’. Based on this several letters were written to the Plaintiff for accounts but he was not ready because he knows he has not performed his part of the contract as the letters were dated 20/5/2020 and 20/6/2020. Even though Counsel for the Plaintiff challenged the Defendant on the last portion of the immediate preceding answer from the Defendants, the fact still remains that there has not been any account rendered. I find that indeed and as per the agreement, receipt of rent was captured in Exhibit “A”. I also find that Exhibit “A” provided the rent to be shared on 70% - 30% basis. However, I do not find that the receipt of the rent was not contrary to Exhibit “A”. Per Exhibit “A” which was admitted in evidence and used in this case as the basis upon which the whole case revolves, and as also exhibited by the Defendants as Exhibit ‘1’, there was per paragraph 3 thereof, the need to share the rent accruable from the facility on 70% - 30% basis. Upon the above, the accounts have not as yet been rendered. And per Exhibit “A”, the rental of the premises even though not provided in detail, the date of commencement of rental has been stated in paragraph 7 thereof thus: “7. That the ten (10) years will start counting after the completion of the building on 1st May, 2020.” Even though the above date of 01/5/2020 was expressly stated in Exhibit “C”, the parties differed on the dates. According to the evidence, the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant took actual possession of the facility in the 2nd week of December and was to complete the project by 30/4/2020. The action of taking possession of the facility delayed a little which occurred in the 2nd week of December, 2019 as there were occupants in the property. The differences in the taking of possession of the property generated arguments and counter arguments resulting in same becoming a contentious issue in the case. In the first place, Exhibit “C” had had a provision stating the date and timing of the commencement and ending of the refurbishment process. I must also state that Exhibit “A” is a document executed in a terse expression and yet very pregnant with the essentials of a valid contract. In R. v. HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST, EXP. GHANA COCOA BOARD, APOTUI III – INTERESTED PARTY [2009] SCGLR 603, it was held that contracts must be certain. In the words of Atuguba JSC @ 619, this is what the Learned Jurist stated: “BUT if such terms of settlement are to be effective, they must in my opinion be CERTAIN enough so as to bind the parties for that is their intent or purpose.” The Learned Jurist went further to state as follows: “It is trite law that for a contract to be enforceable, it must be CERTAIN at least to its essential terms. In modern times, however, the courts have taken the stand that especially as here, there has been part performance the agreement should survive as a contract.” (See also: KOGLEX LTD v. FIELD [2009-2010] 2 GLR 437, S. C) The law is also settled that parties to a contract would not be permitted to avoid the contract unless there are valid lawful reason to do so. It is not the duty of the court to make contract for parties. Therefore where the terms of the contract have been reduced into writing, the court would interpret them to give effect to the intention of the parties. See: 1. POKU v. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [1989-1990] 2 GLR, 37 C. A; 2. Mireku & Tetteh (Dec’d), In re Mireku v. Tetteh [2011] 1 SCGLR 520. Indeed, it is settled that a person of full age and sound mind would be bound by the contents of a document he has signed, whether he read it or not. (See; Twum v. SGS Ltd. [2011] 30 GMJ 62, C. A.) It ought also to be noted that to be a good contract there must be a concluded bargain, and a concluded contract it is one which settles everything that is necessary to be settled and leaves nothing to be settled by agreement between the parties – See; MADINA SHOPPING MALL ASSOCIATION v. ROSEHILL (GH) 39 MLRG 81, S. C. It is the duty of the courts to ensure that the doctrine of sanctity of contracts is always maintained. It has also been held that TIME is of essence in contracts. It has even been held that in the absence of stipulation of time in a contract, REASONABLE TIME applies as has been held in the case of KOLEX LTD v. KATE FIELD [1998-1999] SCGLR 451. (See also: ATTA & ANOR v. ADU [1987-88] 1 GLR 233). To the case under consideration, Exhibit “C” even though so terse, generally met all the requirements in all the above cited cases regarding the freedom of contract, time, certainty and sanctity thereof. Therefore this court will not be bogged down with the shifting of blame, excuses and defences regarding when vacant possession was granted and when occupants moved out. Whereas the Plaintiff maintained that the Defendant had vacant possession in the 2nd week of December, 2019 the Defendants insisted albeit at different times that it was in March, 2020 and sometimes too in May, 2020. Cross-examination of the Plaintiff by Defence Counsel: Q: And eventually after you had managed to get them out for the refurbishment to start time had ran out? A: The Defendant moved in the middle of December 2019. Q: Can you tell the court when the workers moved out of the place? A: In December 2019 in the second week. When he took delivery of the electrical guards/cables from abroad. Q: I put it to you that what you are telling the court is not true. The workers moved out of the facility in March 2020? A: That cannot be true …” The Defendant in cross-examination admitted thus on the start and completion of the facility: Q: As part of the agreement in Exhibit 1, you were to start the work on 11/11/2019 and complete on 30/04/2020? A: Yes, without any hindrance. In spite of the above, the evidence is that the Defendant commenced renting the premises out to tenants in May, 2020. One particular instance is the rent from Regina Appiah thus: Q: On 29/5/2020, Regina Appiah paid Gh¢7,000.00 as part payment of a bedroom & a hall? A: Yes. I know she made payment but I am not too sure of the date. Similarly, there are lots of tenants who rented the facility around the same time, according to the evidence before the court. Having rented the facility out, according to the Plaintiff, the Defendants have refused to account to the Plaintiff. This has been admitted by the Defendants both in their pleadings, the evidence. But very sadly in cross-examination of the Defendant, he testified that he has already accounted to the Plaintiff thus: Q: And since 23/3/2020, when you began to take rent, you have not accounted to the Plaintiff of his 30% share as per Exhibit “1A”? A: False, we have accounted to the Plaintiff via telephone. I will come to this issue of contradiction and inconsistence on part of the Defendants. Yet, when the question was finally put to the Defendant on the share of the Plaintiff’s 30% being Gh¢28,080.00 below is what transpired thus: Cross-examination of the Defendants by Counsel for the Plaintiff Q: I suggest to you that the Plaintiff is entitled to Gh¢28,080.00 as his share of 30% per Exhibit “A” (1A) in respect of the facility for the Gh¢93,600.00 which you have so far collected as rent? A: True. He is entitled to a share but we invited him which he did not honour based on his own negligence at the facility. To the court, the last cross-examination above seals all arguments between the parties as accounts and the Plaintiff’s fair share of 30% as per Exhibit “A” due him. In effect therefore, as a result of all of the above pieces of evidence regarding the contradictions, inconsistencies, departure from the pleaded facts, evasiveness of the Defendant in answering questions in cross-examination and above all the Defendants’ refusal/failure to produce documents from Ben Ventures and Essien loans or producing them as material witnesses to support his case, this court is in the circumstances obliged from the evidence to prefer the assertion of the Plaintiffs as against the Defendants. Also, on proof, the law is settled by the authorities thus: “It is a well-known principle of law of evidence that where a party makes some assertions/averments in his pleadings and same are denied it behoves on him NOT to simply mount the witness box and repeat these assertions without more, he must give further and better particulars.” See - 1. Majogbe v. Larbi [1959] GLR 16; 2. Zabrama v. Segbedzi [1991] 2 GLR 221. The Defendants were found wanting in so far as the above are concerned relative to the evidence adduced before the court in this case. The common law position on interpretation of documents is that PAROLE EVIDENCE will generally not be permitted to defeat the intention of the parties as contained in their written agreement. See on the above principle, the case of JACOBS v. BATAVIA & GENERAL PLANTATIONS TRUST LTD [1924] 1 CH. 287 where the court held as follows; “It is firmly established as a rule of law that parole evidence cannot be admitted to add to vary or contradict a deed or other written instrument.” Similarly, in the Ghanaian case of Akim Akoroso stool & ors v. Asona building co. ltd [1989-1990] 2 GLR 100, it was held thus: “What the words in a document meant could ONLY be denied from the documents itself. The intention of the parties had to be gathered from the written instrument. The function of the court was to ascertain what the parties meant by the words which they had used. The court was to declare the meaning of what was written in the instrument and NOT what was intended to have been written so as to give effect to the intentions expressed; for it was NOT permissible to guess at the intention of the parties and to substitute the promised intention for the actual intention.” I must say that indeed the Defendants’ case was riddled with contradictions, inconsistencies, departure form pleadings and also his demeanour and evasive ways of answering questions in cross-examinations which all impacted negatively the totality of the Defendant. See the following cross-examination of the Plaintiff by Counsel for the Defendants thus: Q: Are you aware that before the contract was signed there was a bill of quantities? A: That one was not disclosed to me. It was the Defendant’s deed. Q: At the time of the signing of the contract, were you not there? A: I signed the contract. Q: And there was a bill of quantities. Can you deny it? A: If it is the estimates, then I agree with you. Q: Can you tell the court how much the bill of quantity was? A: Off head, I will not be able to tell. But if I get the contract, I can tell. It is about GH¢400.00 plus. In spite of the above, the Defendant in cross-examination told the court that aside this Gh¢406,409.00, he additionally secured a facility of Gh¢606,000.00 to support the project. This piece of evidence is material. And to this court, it amounts to a departure from pleadings and this is not proper. ON departure from pleadings, by the rules on pleadings, parties are bound by the facts contained in their respective pleadings. The only way a party can change his or her pleadings is by amendment. The pleadings circumscribed the parameters within which the evidence should be given. Pleadings form the factual basis upon which a party’s case is built and place fetters on their evidence – 1. ADEHYEMAN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX v. OFOSU MENSAH [2010-2012] 2 GLR 32; 2. HAMMOND v. ODOI & ANR [1982-83] 2 GLR 1215, S. C; 3. KLAH v. PHOENIX INS. CO. LTD [2012] 2 SCGLR 1139. In ADOM v. MARFOR [2012] 38 MLRG 58, the Supreme Court held per Gbadgbe JSC thus: “This change in the version of the Appellant’s case between the statement of claim and the evidence is fundamental in nature as not to be seen as a variation but a conflict in his case that has the effect of disentitling him to relief on the ground that he had departed substantially from his case and accordingly, his case should NOT have been given a favourable consideration by the Learned Trial Judge.” The law therefore, from the above authority is that, if a party’s evidence contradicts or departs from his pleadings, then the evidence should NOT be given a favourable consideration. Thus, by Adom v. Marfor (Supra), the law is that an allegation of fact NOT pleaded but adduced in evidence, which is inconsistent with, and is a departure from the averment made by a party in his pleadings is NOT entitled to favourable consideration. Thus, a party is therefore bound by his pleadings and CANNOT at the trial set up a different case – MARFOR & ORS v. ADUSEI [1963] 1 GLR 225, S. C. On the Defendants’ financiers, below is what transpired during the cross-examination of the Defendants on the loan facility of Gh¢606,000.00 from Essien loans but which the Defendant could not produce any document to support same thus: Q: It is your case that you went to financiers for loans to do the work? A: Yes, my Lord. Q: Who were your financiers? A: My investors who I work with. Q: Who are they? A: They are a loan company. Q: What is the company’s name? A: Essien Loans. Q: How much loan were you given by Essien loan? A: Close to GH¢600,000.00 Q: When did you apply for the loan? A: After the signing of the contract. Q: When PRECISELY was it contracted? A: After the date of signing the contract and I will have to verify from my personal records. Q: When was the loan amount released to you? A: Released in phases as the work progresses. Q: How much was the first tranche released to you? A: After the date of signing the contract. The above cross-examination convinces any neutral person that the witness was just being evasive with the answers even though such piece of evidence looked quite material to not only the Defendant’s case but the interest of the court in the administration of justice. The above actually brought in the question of the credibility of the Defendant in this action. To another question on the loan, below is what transpired thus: Q: Where are the documentations indicating the alleged loan facility that you took? A: They are available with me. Q: They are not part of the documents in evidence in this case? A: True. Not part of this case. Q: So, when given the opportunity, you can produce these documentations per Essien loans? A: Yes, my Lord. In spite of the assurance by the witness, and aside the prompts from the Plaintiff’s Counsel on subsequent court days as the witness was still under cross-examination, the Defendant woefully failed to produce same. See the cross-examination that followed on the next court dates: Q: At the last adjourned date, you indicated to the court that you had the documents pertaining to the loans secured from Essien loans. Could you bring the documents to court today? A: No. I am sorry. Next time I would bring it. In the cross-examination of the Defendant and in the evidence, the Defendant shifted positions on when he started renting rooms in the premises to tenants. At some points, he agreed that the rentals started in May, 2020. And at other times too, he insisted it was June, 2020 (see pages 50 & 51 of the record of proceedings). Further on the credibility factor of the Defendants, he contradicted himself also and continued with his evasive answers when Counsel for the Plaintiff sought to know from him when the rent was to commence from Exhibit “C”. Below is the surprising answer provided by the Defendant thus: Q: Have a look at your Exhibit ‘1’ (Exhibit “C”) (The agreement with the Plaintiff), the completion date was 30/4/2020? A: FALSE. It has been held that inconsistencies and contradicted have negative impact on a party’s case. And so, for the case in point, the above contradictions, inconsistencies, departure from pleadings, evasive answers and economy of truth all together and in addition to the production of documents or witnesses to support the “Essien loans” all fatally affected the defence of the Defendants. “Inconsistencies, though individually colourless, may cumulatively discredit the claim of the proponent of the evidence. The conflicts in the evidence of the Plaintiff and his witnesses weakened the merit of his case and proved fatal to his claim.” – See: OBENG v. BEMPOMAA [1992-1993] GBR 1027@1028, C. A; per Lamptey J. A, holding l. On the figure of Gh¢606,000.00 which was not pleaded by the Defendant, which was not supported by any document and which the Defendant could not support same with any document upon being given the opportunity on two occasions, this court cannot rely on same as same amounts to just speculative as particularly discussed above. On some of the Exhibits tendered by the Defendants in support of his case, this court acknowledges that Exhibit ‘1’ is the same as Exhibit “C” as tendered in evidence and admitted with same being the agreement between the parties. The Defendant claims that he obtained the tiles, POP works, electrical fittings and plumbing and toiletries from a supplier called Ben Ventures. The amount on Exhibit ‘4’ is Gh¢177,230.00. The figure is huge and it must have come from a big supplier who must have had invoices and receipts. Again, the Defendant could not just have procured all the content at a go. Also, there is no date and no signature and no source on Exhibit ‘4’. On the authority of KWASHIE GBO v. KWABENA ANTIE & 1 OTHER [2016] JELR 68 385 (S. C) as aptly cited by Counsel for the Plaintiff, I am unable to rely on Exhibit ‘4’ and the content therein in making my findings. I must say that as part of the submissions of Counsel for the Defendant, the following is what was stated in paragraph 2 of page 6 thereof thus: “On issue (d) which is whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to his claim, I would unhesitatingly say in the affirmative that the Defendants are entitled to be treated fairly and NOT to be thrown away with the salt water.” See: 1. ADWUBENJ v. DOMPREH [1996-1997] SCGLR 660, on the credibility of the witness. 2. DONKOR v. MAYE KOM NA MEHW3 ONYAME ASSOCIATION [2007-2008] SCGLR 179, on the demeanour of the party. Therefore, this court, from the records, does not find the Defendants’ case credible. On the basis of the above therefore, and as I commenced this judgment with the agreement of the parties (Exhibit “C”), I have to conclude with Exhibit “C” and on the above, I find the Plaintiff’s case more probable than it is not. On Relief (a), in spite of the admissions made by the Defendants on the receipt of rent, the Defendants maintained that the total part as at the instant of the action was about Gh¢88,000.00 and not Gh¢93,600.00. From the evidence, the court will lean in favour of the Plaintiff’s version and therefore decide on Relief (a) in favour of the Plaintiff. On Relief (d), this court finds that the Defendants breached various provisions of Exhibit “C” which formed the case of the argument between the parties and the court therefore grants the reliefs accordingly. On the basis of the above, the Defendants are ordered to cease collecting rent on the property FORTHWITH and accordingly the Plaintiff succeeds in Relief (b). Further to the above, it stands to reason that the Plaintiff shall in the circumstance be entitled to recovery of possession. Accordingly, the Plaintiff succeeds on Relief (c). On Relief (f), the Plaintiff could not lead any evidence on same for mesne profits. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff fails on Relief (f). On Relief (e), the court finds same as a matter of course and accordingly, the Defendants, their agents, etc. are hereby restrained from dealing with or interfering with the Plaintiff’s property. Regarding Relief (a), Counsel in his submissions prayed for the refund of 30% of Gh93,600.00 being the rent collected from the tenants in the facility. This amount will total around Gh¢28,000.00 being the 30% share of the Plaintiff as per Exhibit ‘2’. I have a concern here. In the agreement entered into between the parties, I would call it as a business transaction to result in a win-win situation. The Plaintiff provided a consideration of the uncompleted building. And the Defendants, in turn provided cash of about Gh¢406,040.00 and other incidentals to put the facility into shape for renting purposes. From Exhibit “A” both parties are to commence reaping the benefit of Exhibit “A” from 01/5/2020 for at least 10 years subject to renewal at 70% - 30% respectively. Indeed, it is commonsensical that whatever or wherever the Defendants sourced their capital for the due execution of the facility to its completion and renting, the money would have yielded some dividends. For now, as a result of Exhibit “C”, the Plaintiff has a complete facility for renting and so stands to benefit a lot therefrom. The Defendants, as a result of this judgment will NO MORE benefit from the facility again. The intended benefit from the next years have NOW ended. This is a court of justice. And this is also a court of Equity. Ordinarily, per a court of justice, the Plaintiff is entitled to his 30% share as per Exhibit “C” which will stand at Gh¢28,000.00 or so. But the question is: if the above happens will that be fair to the Defendants? A court of equity will surely answer in the negative. The Plaintiff pleaded through the inherent jurisdiction to be granted the amount of Gh¢28,000.00 being the Plaintiff’s 30% share of rent collected as per Exhibit “C”. Also, it is trite that for breach of contract, damages usually follow as a consequential relief be it general or nominal. This, the courts have the inherent power to grant. Counsel, as part of his submission for the Plaintiff referred to the case of Hannah Assi (No. 2) v. Gihoc Refrigeration [2007-2008] SCGLR 16 on substantial justice. Candidly, my conscience does not favour the grant of the said relief to the Plaintiff. Now sitting also as a court of equity, I think it will ONLY be fair if the Defendants is allowed this 30% difference of Gh¢28,000.00 being the Plaintiff’s fair share of GH¢28,000.00 as per Exhibit “C” to park bag and baggage and move out of the facility FORTWITH and with no much regrets. At least the Defendants have invested GH¢406,000.00 to reap GH¢93,000.00 in less than four years. It is not so bad a deal. The bottom line however is that the Defendants ought to always act BONA FIDE in any such transaction. In conclusion therefore and for the avoidance of any doubt, I grant the following Reliefs to the Plaintiff as against the Defendants thus: 1. The Defendants having breached the contract therefore and as held by the court as at the institution of this action, on 25/5/2021, all receipts of proceeds by way of rent from tenants amounting to GH¢93,600.00 from the property/building being Plot No. 86, West Tanokrom, Takoradi by way of accounting thereof shall be kept/held/used by the Defendants as the Defendants investment in Exhibit “C”; 2. The Defendants are directed to pay back to the Plaintiff, by way of account, all receipt of proceeds from tenants from the property from 26/5/2021 up to the date of this judgment FORTHWITH; 3. The Defendants are hereby ordered to cease collecting rent on the building (property) FORTHWITH; 4. The Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of the property FORTHWITH, as I order whoever is in possession of the property at the behest of the Defendants to handover and make vacant possession of the property to the Plaintiff; 5. I grant perpetual injunction against the Defendants, their agents, assigns, etc. from in anyway interfering or dealing with the Plaintiff’s possession and quit enjoyment of the property agreement; 6. There shall not be any award of mesne profit against the Defendants; 7. I award cost of Ten thousand Ghana cedis (GH¢10,000.00) to the Plaintiff as against the Defendants. G. K GYAN-KONTOH ‘J’ JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT SGD COUNSEL: (1) KING DAVID ADDAE FOR THE PLAINTIFF. (2) D. A. OTOO FOR THE DEFENDANTS. 41