COBBINAH VRS PARKER (E6/24/22) [2023] GHAHC 432 (8 November 2023)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, HELD IN SEKONDI ON WEDNESDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2023 CORAM: G. K GYAN-KONTOH ‘J’ JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT BETWEEN: SUIT NO. E6/24/22 TONY BEN COBBINAH ::: PETITIONER vs MERCY AMA PARKER ::: RESPONDENT JUDGMENT: ON 31/05/2022, the Petitioner filed a petition at the Divorce Registry of the court for the only relief thus: 1. Ordinance marriage between the parties celebrated on 31st August, 2012 be dissolved. By a 13 paragraphed petition, the Petitioner averred that the parties married under customary law. Later, they converted same to the Ordinance marriage on 31/08/2012 at the District Court, Sekondi. The Respondent, upon service of the petition on her also entered an appearance on 06/06/2022 and on 14/06/2022 filed her answer to the petition which was a 13 paragraph answer with a cross-petition for the following: a. An order declaring the matrimonial home as a jointly acquired property of the parties; b. A further order for the Petitioner to assign Respondent’s interest in the property of the Respondent Petitioner; c. An order directed at the Respondent to “SEND-OFF” the Respondent with an amount of Gh¢200,000.00; d. Costs, including legal fees. In a reply by way of answer to the cross-petition, the Petitioner maintained that the Respondent’s family drove away the Petitioner’s family from meeting to dissolve the marriage. Also, the Petitioner in further response maintained that the Respondent was striped naked on the streets of Sekondi upon being caught in sexual intercourse with another married man to the disgrace and embarrassment of the Petitioner as a husband. Also, the Petitioner maintained that the matrimonial home is a joint property of the Petitioner and his twin brother; And that the Respondent just left the matrimonial home and refused to return to same and used her mother as an excuse. After the cause had been set down for trial on 05/04/2023, parties, quite unconventional of the court and at the special request from Counsel and the parties, prayed the court to allow them to file their respective witness statements which they eventually did and complied with the orders of the court and filed same in addition to their respective pretrial check lists. On 27/07/2023, the trial commenced. PETITIONER’S CASE: The Petitioner testified through his attorney, Philip Cobbinah. (See Exhibit “A”). The Petitioner is ordinarily resident in New Jersey, U. S. A and both parties are Ghanaians and were married under customary law on 15/4/2005 and later converted same to ordinance marriage on 31/8/2012 at the District Court, Sekondi. (See Exhibit B) tendered in evidence without objection. The Petitioner testified that he is a Merchant Marine Able Seaman whereas the Respondent is a hairdresser and both have only one (1) issue in the marriage, Anthony Cobbinah aged 30 years. The Respondent testified that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation over 19 years ago culminating in the dissolution of customary marriage on 10/07/2023 at Sekondi. (See Exhibits “C” and “D”). The Petitioner testified that the Respondent engaged in acts of infidelity to the embarrassment of the “Petitioner, one example of which is that the Respondent was caught in bed with another man”. Also, the Petitioner testified that the Respondent rarely lived/stayed in the matrimonial home and thus has vacated the matrimonial home for nearly 8 years prior to the filing of the instant Petition to the extent that the Respondent once told the Petitioner to rent the matrimonial home as she was not ready to live in same. The Petitioner thus stated that both parties had lived their separate lives and thus have not lived as man and wife for the past 8 years prior to the filing of the petition. The Petitioner testified that the Respondent left the matrimonial home before her mother fell sick as a result of which both parties agreed to lock the matrimonial home when the Respondent refused to live in the matrimonial home and the home, according to the Petitioner has since been locked. The Petitioner testified that the matrimonial home is the property of himself and his twin brother (See Exhibit “F”). The Petitioner testified that the Respondent is not entitled to the reliefs sought and thus prays for the marriage to be dissolved. The Petitioner tendered in evidence Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and F in support of his claim and did not call any witness. In cross-examination though, the Petitioner’s attorney admitted that the principal only heard of the alleged adultery of the Respondent resulting in her being stripped naked on the street of Sekondi; and also admitted the role of the Respondent on the matrimonial home and also the admission that he had interest in the matrimonial home. The Petitioner insisted that the Respondent is not entitled to her cross-petition. THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENT: The Respondent as a hairdresser testified that the parties married at custom in August 1990 and married under the ordinance on 31/08/2012 at Sekondi Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly. The Respondent stated that there is only one issue and also testified that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation all because of the attitude of the Petitioner but it is never true that the marriage broke down over ten (10) years ago. The witness testified that it was the Petitioner who actually told her to procure a divorce certificate for his documentation in U. S. A which was procured with the younger brother Kwesi Baidoo Cobbinah to sign as the Petitioner and same presented to the Petitioner in the U. S. A and the said dissolution was not recorded in the books of the authorities as same was fake. On the matrimonial home, the Respondent testified that she still had her belongings in same and used to visit there and used to stay there with the Petitioner’s niece who is currently in Dubai. The Respondent testified that on adultery, it is rather the Petitioner who has been so involved as he has a child with one Agnes Otoo Bimpong whose husband died as a result of the shock of the adultery of the Petitioner with his wife. On the matrimonial home, the Petitioner chased her out by changing the keys to the home when the Petitioner admitted that he instructed her mother to change the locks to the property. The Respondent testified that she implored the Petitioner to put up the home for them to live in same to which he agreed and that she supervised the construction of same with the Petitioner’s brother with lots of the purchases being done by the Respondent with funds from the Petitioner. The Respondent states that the Petitioner has lived in the U. S. A for 11 years and for the first three (3) years, he provided maintenance but for the ensuing 7 years, the Petitioner has refused to provide for her. Both Counsel in the case agreed and prayed with the court to continue with the trial of the case during the legal vacation. The matter was therefore continued and the case closed on 5/09/2023. Upon the above, Counsel were directed to file their respective written addresses by deadlines set for each Counsel and the matter fixed for 16/10/2023 for mentioning and to ascertain if both Counsel had complied with the orders of the court. On the 16/10/2023, both Counsel had not complied with the court’s order and so the suit was adjourned to 8/11/2023 for judgment, which falls today. ANALYSIS: Per S. 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, (1971), Act 367, the sole ground for the dissolution of a marriage contracted under the Act is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. And in proving that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, the section requires that the Petitioner proves one or more of the facts provided in S.2(1). These included the following: a. The Respondent has committed adultery and by reason of that adultery the Petitioner finds it in intolerable to live with the Respondent. b. The Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent. c. That the Respondent has deserted the Petitioner for a continuous period of at least two (2) years preceding the presentation of the petition d. That the parties have not lived as husband and wife for a continuous period of at least 2 years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and the Respondent consents to the grant of a decree of divorce e. That the parties to the marriage have not lived as husband and wife for a continuous period of five (5) years immediately preceding the presentation of the portioner; or f. That the parties to the marriage have after diligent efforts been unable to reconcile their differences. In this case, the Petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the marriage contracted between the parties simpliciter. The Respondent in her answer cross-petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage and for other ancillary reliefs therein contained and as particularly reproduced in this judgment. The Petitioner’s main ground of this divorce stems from the fact that the Respondent has engaged in acts of infidelity, undressed naked and paraded in the streets of Sekondi. The Petitioner who testified through an attorney, could not substantiate the above allegation. Upon being quizzed to prove same, the following is what ensued. Cross-examination of the Petitioner’s attorney by Counsel for the Respondent: Q: In your evidence, in paragraph 11 thereof, you indicated that the Respondent was engaged in some acts of infidelity with some man in bed, who caught her in bed with another man? A: My brother heard that his wife had gone to sleep with a certain man and has been caught. Q: Was the person who was found in bed’s name mentioned as sleeping with the Respondent? A: No. No name was mentioned. Q: I put it to you that the Respondent never engaged in any act of infidelity? A: My brother used to hear comments about the Respondent’s behaviour and infidelity and so when he heard about this, he believed it. The court finds the above evidence is not relevant to the case as it actually sins against the rules of evidence and to be precise the hearsay evidence rule. In that regard, this court will not use the above evidence for any purpose in the circumstances. In that case therefore, under the circumstances, per the evidence, the Petitioner’s case ought to fail as the prayer does not fall within the category of requirement as stated in S. 2(1) of Act 367. However, the Petitioner’s case was saved by the bell. The Respondent in her cross-petition, also prayed for the dissolution of the marriage even though the Respondent did not explicitly pray for same. I say so because the Respondent did not specifically demand the dissolution of the marriage as did the Petitioner. Rather, she seems to be contending that (if) the Petitioner is demanding the dissolution of the marriage, then she is entitled to other ancillary reliefs as properly captured in her cross-petition. To me, I seem to appreciate the Respondent’s position to mean that if the Petitioner has brought it on, then she consents to the divorce decree being issued in the circumstances. With the above position from the Respondent, then the petition could be upheld as both parties seem then to come under S.2(1) (d) which provides by way of reproducing same thus: “d. That the parties have not lived as husband and wife for a continuous period of at least two (2) years preceding the presentation of the petition and the Respondent consents to the grant of the decree of divorce”. Supporting the above, the Petitioner’s Attorney in cross-examination on the number of times that the Petitioner has for the past 20 years come to Ghana, had the following to say: Q: For how long has he been outside the country ever since he went overseas? A: Over 20 years. Q: In that 20 years or more, how many times has he come to Ghana? A: Four (4) times. (See page 29 of the record of proceedings). Q: Your evidence that the marriage broke down over ten (10) years ago leading to the dissolution of the marriage is false? A: It is true that it broke down 10 years ago. Q: You are aware that on 13/8/2012, the parties got married under the Ordinance in STMA? A: Yes, I am aware. Equally, the Respondent had the following to say in cross-examination thus: Q: When was the last time you had sex with your husband? A: 31/8/2012. Q: Even though the last time you had sex with your husband was August, 2012, your husband has been coming to Ghana and going back to the USA? A: Not correct. Since he left in 2012, he never returned until December, 2022. Q: You remember that he sacked you on this issue of you having been caught sleeping with another man and caught you naked. This was only the reason on which he sacked you? A: Not correct. In 2012 when he left for the USA, he never returned. And I heard that he had had a child with somebody. And I called him about it. This resulted in a conflict with him telling me that he will never call me again. The woman, with him had had a child also had her husband, who heard of this affair between my husband and that lady, also died out of shock. So, when I asked my husband about it and the death of the lady’s husband, my husband told me that there was a lot to it. At that time, the news of the death of the lady’s husband was trending in Sekondi. And he told me that I should never call him. And he would also never call me again. Since then I never heard from him until 2022 when he came back to Ghana and then commenced this divorce matter. The above evidence supports S.2(1) (d). To this court, the above evidence meets the requirement of S.2(a), (b), (c), (e). In the case of Mensah v. Mensah [1972] 2 GLR 19, the court held amongst others as follows: “In considering whether a husband has behaved in such a way as to make it unreasonable to expect a wife to live with him, the court must consider all the circumstances constituting such behaviour including the history of the marriage. It is always a question of fact. The conduct complained of must be grave and weighty and mere trivialities, will not suffice”. Further to the above, in the case of Mensah v. Mensah (supra) Justice Hayfron Benjamin stated thus: “Our legislation seems to state that proof of one of the facts show that, the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, and yet the court can decline to grant the decree because it is not satisfied that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. The Act seems to draw a distinction between appearance and reality. The Petitioner after proving one of the enunciated facts would be held to have shown that, the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. The court is then to find out whether in truth it has done so. Here, the court is directed to conduct an inquiry as far as reasonable into the facts relied on by the parties. The court is then to consider all the evidence that is, including what it has found on its inquiry, and if satisfied that the marriage really has broken down beyond reconciliation, decree a divorce”. See also on the above the cases of: 1. KNUDSEN v. KNUDSEN [1976] 1 GLR 204, C. A 2. DARKO v. DARKO [2011] 29 GMJ 121 The test in S.2 of Act 367 is an objective one and a question of fact that does not admit any trivialities. This means that the difference between the parties ought to be grave and beyond human endurance. I find that the difference between the parties are so great beyond human endurance. Thus, even though the Respondent never triggered for the dissolution of the marriage, she is only consenting to the demands of the Petitioner, I find her situation as so grave and beyond human endurance. On the pleadings; the facts and the evidence adduced, I conclude that the marriage contracted between the parties on 31/08/2012 at Sekondi has broken down beyond reconciliation. And I hereby dissolve same FORTHWITH. ANCILLARY: A LUMP SUM/COMPENSATION: The Petitioner did not include any other reliefs by way of ancillary. However, the Respondent did. S.2(1) of Act 367 provides as follows: “S. 2(1) The court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party sum of money or to convey to the other party such movable and immovable property a settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of financial provisions, as the court think just and equitable. (2) Payment and conveyance under this section may be ordered to be made in gross or by instalment”. In the case in point the parties have only one issue, Anthony Cobbinah aged about 30 years. The parties first married under customary law and later in 2012 solemnised same under the ordinance at Sekondi. In this peculiar situation, for the past 20 years since the marriage was contracted, the Petitioner has visited Ghana only four (4) times as he is ordinarily resident in U. S. A as a Marine Seaman whilst the Respondent is a hairdresser. Both have had some discomfort particularly the Respondent. For the man, the evidence is that he has some comfort as he has a mistress with whom he has a child. The Respondent has been denied sex – maximum four (4) times in 20 years. Alimony or compensation is a lump sum payment to a spouse (especially woman) for her maintenance after the dissolution of the marriage. Also, the evidence is that ever since the Respondent “confronted” the Respondent about his affair with a married woman and has had a child with her, the Respondent stopped maintaining her. When the Respondent made this statement, it was not denied in any way. This in law amount to admission. For the position is that silence may amount to an admission when it is natural to expect a reply. (See Bessaka v. Stern [1877] 37 L. I 88, C. A). Also, in Aryeetey v. Brown [2006] 5 MLRC 16, C. A, the court held thus: “Where an opponent in an action failed to challenge the other party on an issue of fact alleged, then the court would take the failure to challenge as an admission of the truth of the fact as presented by the person who asserted it” The Respondent has been denied children (not a child) as she pointed her hand to her abdomen when she was testifying that due to the behaviour of the Petitioner not frequenting home, she has not been able to get pregnant and so all her children are in her abdomen due to the treatment and behaviour of the Petitioner. In awarding a lump sum payment, the court ought to look at all the circumstances. The court must also look at the standard of living of the parties, and also the condition and the welfare of the children (if any) as there are no children considerations in this particular case. The court must also take into account the duration of the marriage, the earning capacities of the parties, their properties and financial resources, for the future. Their obligations and other considerations. All that the court heard about the Petitioner is that he is a Ghanaian who has been a Marine Seaman and ordinarily resident in U. S. A. The Respondent has ever since the marriage been a hair dresser and still continues to be so. Honestly, the Respondent is quite aged. But since the Petitioner filed the Petition and conducted the matter through his Attorney, not much can be said of him. The justice of the situation demands that some compensation or alimony be made to the Respondent as financial settlement. This is particularly so when the evidence is clear that almost all of the siblings of the Respondent are in overseas. And the evidence is that the Respondent’s mother assisted the Petitioner to travel to the U. S. A with $3,000.00 with the aim that the Petitioner will in turn come to pick the Respondent to the U. S. A. This never happened. The Petitioner’s attorney admitted the above thus: Q: In fact, when your brother came to Ghana, he had issues returning overseas and it was on documentations? A: True. Q: It was the Respondent’s mother who gave $3,000.00 USD to the Respondent before he could go? A: I know she helped but I do not know the quantum of the amount. Q: If you do not know the amount then I put it to you that she gave him $3,000.00 USD? A: I do not know the quantum. As the Respondent is not in the country, it is difficult to assess his current income but there is no doubt that as a Marine Seaman he is earning a substantial income and is likely to continue to earn that much. In the case of Aikins v. Aikins [1975] GLR 223, the court held thus: “In considering the amount payable as lump sum the court should not take into account the conduct of either the husband or the wife but it must look at the realities and take into account the standard of living which the wife was accustomed during the marriage.” Now considering the property acquired and put up by the Petitioner and how bringing forth no baby, I have no doubt but the Petitioner is likely to work harder. And so taking the interest of the Petitioner into account together with the factors stated above, I would order the Petitioner to make a lump sum payment of Gh¢100,000.00 to the Petitioner as alimony. Candidly in my view, I think a lot of disservice and injustice will be occasioned if this court, being a court of justice and equity closes its eye and make a provision lower than the above figure considering the above in totality. a) PROPERTY RIGHTS: Now in considering property rights of the parties, the parties are ad idem that the matrimonial home was put up by the Petitioner with some support from the Respondent. The following cross-examination of the Petitioner’s attorney will help resolve this property right issue thus: Q: In 1991, your brother brought money through the Respondent for the purchase of the plot on which the matrimonial home is situate? A: My brother did not send the money to the Respondent to give to my father to purchase the plot on which the matrimonial home is situate but rather, the Petitioner sent the money directly to my father to buy same for him. The evidence on this is part of the Petitioner’s case and admitted as Exhibit “E” the indenture. Q: I put it to you that when the matrimonial home was acquired, it was solely through the money sent by the Petitioner through the Respondent and your other brother? A: That is true – was through the two of them. Also, the following cross-examination of the Respondent may help on this property rights thus: Q: You said that it was the Petitioner who was sending money for the construction of the house that you claim is a matrimonial home? A: True. Q: At the time that these monies were being sent to you, it was at the block laying stage. It was not habitable? A: Not correct. I started from the beginning and completed it with tiles. Q: You do not know the person who owns the land? A: It is for my husband. This court find that the parties are ad idem to the fact that the property was fully procured and financed in the circumstance by the Petitioner solely, with the help of the Respondent; at least from the evidence on record in view of the said admission, the Respondent need not lead any further evidence to prove her case. See: In the Ashaley Botwe Land, Adjetey Agbosu & ors v. Kotey & ors [2003 – 2004] SCGLR 420 @ 444. Also see the following cases on admission: (a) Fori v. Ayirebi & or [1966] GLR 627, SC (b) Appiah v. Anane [2019 – 2020] 2 SCGLR 820. Further to the above, the evidence is that it was only the Petitioner who alone financed the construction of the matrimonial home. There is no shred of evidence to the effect that there is a twin brother who contributed to the contribution of the matrimonial home. From the evidence, all finances came from the Petitioner. Also, it was only the Petitioner’s wife who used the whole premises as a matrimonial home as same is not in dispute. Again, there is no evidence on record to show that any other person contributed or lived in the matrimonial home. From the evidence, even when the Respondent left the matrimonial home to attend to her sick mother, the house was initially left in the care of the niece of the Petitioner and later on when she left the matrimonial home, the Petitioner locked the whole premises. Also, there is evidence that the Petitioner changed all the locks in the matrimonial home so as to prevent the Respondent from returning to the matrimonial home. All the above support the court’s decision that indeed, the property used as a matrimonial home by the parties was singlehandedly acquire by the Petitioner and solely put up with his finances by himself with support from no other person but the Respondent. I therefore hold that the matrimonial home was single handedly acquired by the Petitioner, even though the Respondent sought in vain to provide documents to support his contention that it was for him and his twin brother and thus same is a jointly acquired property of the parties. On this issue of property right, I take notice and have serious regards to Article 22(2) and (3) of the 1992 Constitution; S. 20(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act (1971) Act 367, Mensah v. Mensah [1972] SGLR, Boafo v. Boafo [2005 – 2006] SCGLR 709 and Mensah v. Mensah [2012] SCGLR 301 which all deal one way of the other with properties acquired during the subsistence of the marriage. In spite of the futile effort of denying the Respondent her fair share of the matrimonial home, the Respondent was able to convincingly prove that she did in the acquisition of the property on which the matrimonial home is presently situate, her cooking for the workers, her finances without further purchase of items and many other contributions to the extent that she lived in same and still has her belongings there. I would therefore not be wrong at all, if this court grants the Respondent a half share of the matrimonial home now situate at Plot No. 172, situate at West Anaji Planning Scheme, Sector A, Shama Ahanta East Division. As the court holds that the said property is the bonafide property of the Petitioner, he having singularly acquired same, developed same singularly, managed same exclusively and with the support of the Respondent as a wife. Now, the evidence is that the Petitioner has stopped maintaining the Respondent for some years now. This was admitted by the Attorney thus: Cross-examination of Petitioner’s Attorney Q: A: In all those years, he was not maintaining the Respondent? True. This is because, after he had told the Respondent to go and live in the matrimonial home and she had refused to go and stay there, the Petitioner delegated a nephew to go and live in the matrimonial home and she had been taking care of the matrimonial home. This is an admission which does not require the Respondent to lead any further evidence to prove same. See: (1) Fynn v. Fynn [2013 – 2014] SCGLR 727 (2) Danielli Construction Ltd v. Mabey & Johnson [2007 – 2008] 1 SCGLR 60. In the cross-examination of the Respondent, the following is what ensued: Q: Again, your evidence that the Petitioner has refused to provide for you is false? A: It is not false. Since I asked him about his child with the lady about 7 years ago, he has never given me anything. Q: The Petitioner stopped having anything to do with you because the marriage has been dissolved? A: Not correct. It was because of the argument on the lady and the child and this resulted in his refusal to provide for me. From the above cross-examination, if the argument put up by Counsel for the Petitioner is something to go by then why did he file the instant petition after all, if the marriage has been dissolved? Indeed, in so far as this divorce petition is pending and as properly is the case for marriage under the ordinance, it is only a court of law, not individual’s idiosyncrasies which can dissolve an ordinance marriage. Therefore, until being pronounced in this court, the law and fact is that the marriage between the parties had not been dissolved. In that case, the Petitioner was obliged to perform his duties as a husband until a decree ni si is made. Therefore, I find and hold from the above admission by the Petitioner’s attorney on the refusal to provide of maintenance for the Respondent for the past seven years that is contrary to the laws of Ghana, legal, equitable or customary. This is so because inspite of the relationship between the couple, this is the duty of the man to provide for the family, and in this case, the woman. Therefore, the Petitioner, having reneged in his responsibility so to do, he has to be ordered to do so. The Respondent did not claim for arrears of maintenance or maintenance in any form in her cross-petition. Yet there is enough evidence to support such claim. The Petitioner from the above admits that maintenance has been stopped for no apparent reason – just because the Respondent who has had sex just four (4) times in the last 20 years, has opened her mouth to talk about the relationship of the Petitioner with a married woman resulting in a child delivery as a result of the relationship, according to the Respondent. Again, this court is of the fair opinion that great disservice and injustice will be occasioned if this court once again closes its eye on such need and lacuna and make no orders regarding maintenance. This is a court of justice, a court of equity and a court of fair play. Some provision has to be made regarding maintenance. Taking solace from the decision of Gihoc v. Hanna Asi [2005 – 2006] SCGLR 450 @ 492, per Modibo Ocran JSC, in recognition of the flexible approach adopted by the courts stated thus: “At any rate even at the trial level, the High Court rules have maintained sufficient flexibility both in the old and the new rules of procedure to allow courts to make such orders dealing with the proceedings as it considers just or necessary for doing justice to the case”. Also, in the case of Re Gomoa Ajumako Paramount Stool, Acquah v. Apaa & anor [1998 – 1999] SCGLR 312, the court held: “In appropriate circumstances a court of law can grant a relief not sought for by a party. However, any such relief must be supported by the evidence on record and secondly, not inconsistent with the standard of the claim of the party in whose favour the relief is granted”. In the interest of substantial justice, it is important for this court to do justice and put in a claim for the Respondent for small maintenance. In the circumstances therefore, an order that the Petitioner pay maintenance for the Respondent at only Gh¢500.00 per mensem for the three (3) years up to the date of this judgment may not have been a bad one in the circumstances. This order follows the evidence on record which supports this court’s position on maintenance for about 8 years when the Respondent confronted the Petitioner about his adultery with a lady. Therefore, the relief for divorce is therefore granted and the cross-petition also succeeds. In conclusion therefore, this court in deciding on this matrimonial cause orders as follows: 1. I decree that the marriage contracted between the parties is hereby dissolved. 2. The Respondent shall be entitled to an equitable portion of the matrimonial home that is property No. 172, West Anaji, Takoradi which must be the half of the interest of the Petitioner in the said house used as a matrimonial home as same is a jointly acquired property during the subsistence of the marriage. 3. The Respondent is hereby also awarded a lump sum payment of Gh¢100,000.00 which the Petitioner shall pay to the Respondent in the circumstances as a “send off”. 4. There shall be costs of Gh¢20,000.00 to the Respondent. SGD G. K GYAN-KONTOH ‘J’ JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT COUNSEL: 1. CONSTANTINE KUDZEDZI FOR THE PETITIONER. 2. FIFII BUCKMAN FOR THE RESPONDENT. 22