Centre for Democratic Empowerment v Electricity Company of Ghana and Others (GJ/0011/2024) [2023] GHAHC 693 (19 December 2023)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE GENERAL JURISDICTION DIVISION “2” HELD IN ACCRA ON MONDAY THE 19TH DAY OF DEECEMBER, 2023 BEFORE HER LORDSHIP JUSTICE FORSON AGYAPONG BAAH, JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT SUIT NO: GJ/0011/2024 CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC EMPOWERMENT … PLAINTIFF VRS. 1. 2. 3. ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF GHANA … DEFENDANTS SAMUEL DUBIK MAHAMA KWAME AGYEMAN BUDU ========================================================================= JUDGMENT By its Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim filed on the 4th of October, 2023, the Plaintiff/Respondent herein (hereinafter interchangeably called the “Plaintiff” or Respondent) sued the Defendants for the reliefs endorsed on the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim as follows: (i) A declaration that the procurement practices used by the 1st Defendant for the years 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 are unsanctioned, illegal and a breach of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. Page 1 of 20 (ii) A declaration that the current and former managing directors of ECG for the years in question have contravened the provisions of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. (iii) A declaration that the procurement practices used by the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants constitute offence under the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended and they are therefore liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 2,500 penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or both. (iv) An order directing the Public Procurement Authority and Attorney General to investigate the matter and prosecute offending officers of the 1st Defendant company including the current and past managing directors. (v) An order directing the 2nd Defendant to step down to facilitate investigations by the Public Procurement Authority and Attorney General. (vi) Punitive damages. (vii) Costs including legal fees. Upon service of the Plaintiff’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim on the Defendant, the 1st and 2nd Defendants through their lawyers, entered appearance on the 16th of October, 2023 and on the same date filed the present application seeking an order of this court to strike out pleadings contained in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim particularly paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and a further order to dismiss the Page 2 of 20 action on grounds of not disclosing a reasonable cause of action and abuse of judicial process pursuant to Order 11 rule 18(a) and (d) of C. I. 47. When the case came up for hearing on 23rd October, 2023, the Court ordered counsel for the parties to simultaneously file written submission on the motion filed by the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants. I must state that by the date of this judgment, both counsel have complied with the order of the court. I must once again commend the learned counsel for their industry in their written submissions to the court. The Applicants filed their written submission on 7th November, 2023 and that of the Plaintiff filed on 15th November, 2023 Per the counsel for the Plaintiff’s written submission, he questioned the propriety of the said motion since the said motion was not supported by any affidavit contrary to Order 19 rule 4 of C. I. 47, which provides as follows: Rule 4 – Affidavit in Support of Motion provides: “Every application shall be supported by affidavit deposed to by the applicant or some person duly authorised by the applicant and stating the facts on which the applicant relies, unless any of these provides that an affidavit shall not be used (emphasis is the court’s) or unless the application is grounded entirely on matters of law or procedure which shall be stated in the motion paper” As stated in the said rule 4 supra, where any of these rules provides that an affidavit shall not be used, so shall it be. Order 11 rule 18(1)(a) and (d) of C. I. 47, one of the grounds, the other ground being an inherent jurisdiction of the Court, under which the Applicants have mounted their motion provides thus: Page 3 of 20 Rule 18 – Striking out Pleadings on the other hand provides: “(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order any pleading or anything in any pleading to be struck out on grounds that: (a) (d) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; or it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.” Rule 18(2) also provides that: “no evidence whatsoever shall be admissible on an application under subrule (1)(a).” By virtue of the caveat of Order 19 rule 4 and Order 11 rule 18(2), the Applicants’ motion need not be supported by any affidavit as such an affidavit will offend rules 18(1)(a) and 18(2) of C. I. 47. Thus in the case of Okofo Estates vrs. Modern Signs Ltd. & Ors. [1996/97] SCGLR 224 @ 225, holding (3), the Supreme Court held that: “The purpose of Order 25, r 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), was to prevent against claims which on the face of the pleadings disclosed no cause of action or which was shown to be frivolous or vexatious. In such an application, only the pleadings might be considered by the court. However, under the application for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the purpose was to empower the court to use summary means to prevent the abuse of its process by taking into account affidavits and extrinsic evidence. Since in the instant case, the words used in the application were “to dismiss suit for non-disclosure of cause of action” that constituted an application made under Order 25, rule 4. Dictum of Smith LJ in Attorney General of the Duchy of Lancaster vrs. London & North Western Rly [1892] 174 at 278 cited”. Page 4 of 20 The Supreme further held that the per holding (4) that the trial High Court judge had committed error of law on the face of record by taking into account extrinsic evidence. See also the case of Adam vrs. Nuamah [2017-2020] SCGLR 36 @ 37, holding (1) where the Supreme Court held that: “(1) under the rules of court, a party who applied to dismiss an action on the ground that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action was deemed to admit the truth of the averments contained in the statement of claim and such a party could not engage in a traverse and admission … Order 11, r 18(1)(a) of CI 47 precludes controverting factual averments contained in an offending pleading on which an objection is based … “ In the Adam case supra, Gbadegbe JSC, at page 42 of the report, stated as follows: “… A party who seeks an action to be dismissed for disclosing no reasonable cause of action cannot be engaged in a traverse or an admission. We think that such a course of procedure is clearly unwarranted as was determined in the case of Wenlock v Maloney [1965] 2 All ER 871, in which it was held that where the application basically is made under Order 11, rule 18(1)(a) but grounds are added under subrules of Order 11, rule 18(1), namely (b), (c) and (d), evidence should not be admitted, the purpose of the rule being to prevent a trial on affidavits in order to determine whether there is a cause of action. We think that the effect of the approbation of the truth of the averments contained in the statement of claim by the defendant was to sow deeds of destruction of his own case that left the learned trial judge with no option that to dismiss the application …”. Page 5 of 20 In the circumstance, the applicants’ motion is proper before the Court and accordingly dismisses the objection taken by the Respondents on the propriety of the Applicant’s motion. Before I proceed to determine with the substantive issues of whether or not the Plaintiff’s action (writ of summons and statement of claim) discloses a reasonable cause of action and also constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court, I intend to first deal with the issue of whether or not the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are proper persons to this suit. It is the case of the Applicants that the 1st Defendant is a limited liability company by virtue of its conversion from a corporation to a company by the Statutory Corporations (Conversion to Companies) Act, 1993 (Act 461), Schedule No. 7. See also Yeboah vrs. Electricity Company of Ghana and Ors. Writ No. J1/7/2016, dated 28th July, 2016 @ page 10; GHASC 42, where the Supreme Court per Dotse JSC stated that status of the 1st Applicant Company in that case as follows: “… The law made it quite clear that the 1st Defendant has become a limited liability company under the Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179), reference section 1 of Act 461. Section 2 thereof of Act 461 vests all assets, properties, rights, liabilities and obligations of the former statutory corporation in the new “successor company” and that is the 1st Defendant …” In his judgment in the case of Nathan Adongo & Ors v Chy Century Heng Yue Group Ltd, Suit No. GJ/0160/2021, 6th November, 2023, (Unreported) His Lordship, Justice Kwasi Adjenim-Boateng sitting at the General Jurisdiction Division One of the High Court, stated thus: Page 6 of 20 “… It is a cardinal principle of company law as established in the English case of Salomon vrs. Salomon (1895-1899) All ER 33; [1897] AC 22, HL, that the legal personality of a company is distinct from its shareholders and directors. In Salomon’s case supra, Lord Macnaghten stated the principle thus: “the company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act.” His Lordship, in the said Nathan Adongo case further stated that: “The legal personality doctrine of a company as has been espoused in the above case law has been given statutory support. See section 18 of the Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992) titled “Powers of Companies” which provides thus: “(1) Subject to this Act and to any other enactment, a company shall have: (a) full capacity to carry on or undertake business or activity , do any act, or enter into any transaction; (b) full rights, powers and privileges for the purpose of paragraph (a)” Section 147“(1) of Act 992 on acts of the company, provides that: “An act of the members in general meeting, of the board of directors, of the managing director while carrying on in the usual way the business of the Page 7 of 20 company, shall be treated as the acts of the company itself; and accordingly the company shall be criminally and civilly liable for that act to the same extent as if it were a natural person”. It is also respectfully stated in the Supreme Court case of Ago Sai & Ors. vrs. Kpobi Tetteh Tsuru III [2010] SCGLR 762 @ 799, the Supreme Court per RC Owusu JSC, stated thus: “…It is trite law that a company has its own distinct legal identity. It can sue and be sued and is different from its members. This Court (per Sophia Akuffo JSC) in the case of Morkor vrs. Kuma [1998-99] SCGLR 620 held that: “since the appellant had been jointly sued with the first defendant, a limited liability company, for the only reason that she was the chief executive, main shareholder and a director of the company, she would be a proper party to the suit only if specific personal liability were established against her …” See also The Supreme Court in the Morkor vrs. Kuma [1998-99] SCGLR 620; per Akuffo JSC (as she then was) affirmed this principle of distinct personality of a company and liabilities of for acts of its agents. “Save as otherwise restricted by its Regulations, a company, after its registration, has all the powers of a natural person of full capacity to pursue its authorised business. In this capacity, a company is a corporate being, which within the bounds of the Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179) and the Regulations of the company may do everything that a natural person might do. In its own name, it can sue and be sued and it can owe and be owed legal liabilities. A company is, thus a legal entity with a capacity separate, independent and distinct from the persons constituting it or employed by it. From the time the House of Lords Page 8 of 20 clarified the cardinal principle more than a century ago in the celebrated case of Salomon v Salomon & Co., it has, subject to certain exceptions, remained the same in all common law countries and is the foundation on which our Companies Act, 1963 is grounded”. Save the averments that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are current and former managing directors of the 1st Defendant Company, there are no averments in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim suggesting that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants acted beyond their official capacities. The authorities stated above, both statutes and case laws, have all demonstrated that a company is separate and distinct from its officers, directors and shareholders. Accordingly, I hold that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not necessary persons and therefore have improperly been made parties to this suit. In consequence, I accept the argument by the learned counsel for the applicants that whatever liabilities there are both civil and criminal are the liabilities of the 1st Defendant solely and strike out the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as parties to this suit. Now, I proceed to discuss the substance of the Applicants’ application and in so doing, the question that is begging to be answered is “what about the paragraphs contained in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, namely, paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, that the Applicants are seeking the order to this court to have them struck out? In order to be able to discuss the impugned paragraphs, same will be reproduced hereunder as follows: Page 9 of 20 7. That the Plaintiff conducted a detailed audit and research into the procurement practices of the 1st Defendant public institution and found it contrary to the governing statute that is the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. 8. The Plaintiff institution found that the methods used in procurement as per the Corporate Procurement Plan provided by the 1st Defendant Company were unsanctioned and in flagrant disregard of the Act and are illegal and contrary to law. 9. The Plaintiff’s research also showed that these procurement methods and thresholds used by the 1st Defendant Company were used without the required statutory clearance and constitutes a violation and misuse of the taxpayer’s money. 10. That the amounts involved in the procurement were staggering amounts of USD409,685,911.86, USD566,790,524.96 and USD237,032,194.25 for the years of 2020, 2021 and 2022 respectively and cannot be overlooked. 11. That the Plaintiff accordingly wrote to the 1st Defendant Company, informing them of their breaches and demanding for the resignation of the current managing director, i.e. the 2nd Defendant of the 1st Defendant Company and an investigation and subsequent prosecution of all officers including the former ECG managing directors who oversaw statutory breaches of such a magnitude. 12. That all efforts to get the Defendants to correct their statutory breaches have proven futile, that instead they wrote back to the Plaintiff justifying said breaches. Page 10 of 20 13. That according to the Public Procurement Authority the 1st Defendant Company is not exempt from the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended while the 1st Defendant Company insists that their written opinion to the Ministry of Energy about their contrary procurement practices is somehow exempts them from adhering to the Public Procurement Act passed by Parliament. 14. That in the interest of the public that the veil of incorporation is lifted and the perpetrators of the said acts be brought to book. 15. The purpose of the Public Procurement Act is to protect the public purse from exploitation and for the past three years ECG through their managing directors have breached their fiduciary duty to the people of Ghana. The Plaintiff stated the alleged particulars o breach as follows: PARTICULARS OF BREACH i. That the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants failed to work within the method thresholds specified in the 5th Schedule by using selective tendering and sole sourcing without approval from the Board (the governing body of the Public Procurement Authority) and have failed to work within the approval limits of GH₵15,000,000 specified in the 2nd and 5th Schedules in the conduct of its duties contrary to S.20(4) of the Public Procurement Act , 2003 (Act 663) Page 11 of 20 ii. That the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants failed to ensure that the entity tender committee of the company followed procedures and threshold limits prescribed by the Public Procurement Act at each stage of procurement contrary to S.20A (1)(a)-(b) of the Public Procurement Act , 2003 (Act 663) as amended. iii. That the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants failed to ensure that procurement above the entity committee’s threshold are reviewed and referred to the central tender committee for concurrent approval contrary to S20A(1)(d) of the Public Procurement Act , 2003 (Act 663) as amended. iv. That the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants failed to ensure that the necessary concurrent approval is obtained from the appropriate tender review committee where applicable contrary to S20A(1)(d) & S20B (2) (c) & (d) of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. v. That the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants failed to use procurement methods subject to and in accordance with S34A(2) of the Public Procurement Act , 2003 (Act 663) as amended. vi. That the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants engaged in single sourcing procurement without the approval of the Board contrary to S40(1) & (2) of the Public Procurement Act , 2003 (Act 663) as amended. Page 12 of 20 vii. That the 2nd and 3rd Defendants acted in contravention of their duty to ensure that the provisions of the Procurement Act are complied with contrary S18(1) & (2) of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. viii. That the 1st Defendant under the supervision of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants failed to comply with the threshold stated in the 2nd and 5th Schedule o the Act but rather developed their own procurement policy in their company manual contrary to the 2nd and 5th Schedule of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. By the provisions of the Order 11 rule 18(1)(a) and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, this Court has the power at any stage of proceedings, order any pleading or anything in any pleading to be struck out on grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or abuse of the process of the Court, etc or may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly. In exercising the jurisdiction of the court under the said rule 18, the Court is minded of the admonition by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction to strike out pleadings should be exercised sparingly and be limited to obvious cases where there is no point in going through full trial. See the case of Gbenartey & Gblie v Netas Properties & Investments & Ors. [2015-2016] 605 @ 608 holding (2), where the Supreme Court, per curiam, held that: “… The jurisdiction to strike out pleadings should be sparingly exercised with extreme care and circumspection in plain and obvious cases …”. Page 13 of 20 At page 619 of the report, Anin Yeboah JSC (as he then was) stated thus” “… It therefore follows that the procedure of terminating proceedings by summary process should be applied only in cases where the action is clearly unsustainable, plain and obvious that it is beyond that the case is unarguably frivolous and vexatious; and even legitimate amendments could not cure the defect …” In Jonah v Kulendi & Kulendi [2013-2014], 1 SCGLR 272 @ 274, holding (1), it was held that: “where (as in the instant case), the second and third Defendants had applied to the trial High Court, invoking the court’s jurisdiction to strike out the Plaintiff’s pleadings as not disclosing any reasonable cause of action and to dismiss the suit under Order 11, r(18)(a) of … C.. I. 47, the trial court must assume that the offending pleadings are true. … the relevant question to consider was whether the allegations of facts pleaded by the Plaintiff, could disclose a reasonable cause of action or was not frivolous and vexatious so as to avoid the penalty of the court striking out the pleadings or to resort to its summary process as was done at the High Court in the instant case. The trial judge was enjoined to look at the pleadings without other extrinsic evidence outside pleadings, and therefore, ought to assume the pleadings sought to be struck out were not only true but on the face of it was obviously unsustainable, clear beyond doubt and unarguable. The Court ought to be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action raised by the pleadings and that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious …”. See Ghana Muslims Representative Council and Others vrs. Salifu and Others [1975] 2 GLR 256 @ 248 holding (4), Azu Crabbe C. J. stated thus: Page 14 of 20 “(4) It was a matter within the judicial discretion of a judge whether or not to strike out pleadings or stay proceedings on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action or defence or that the action had no reasonable chance of success. The jurisdiction of the court must, however, be exercised with extreme caution. A pleading would only be struck out where it was apparent that even if the facts were proved the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief he sought. In any case affidavit evidence was inadmissible on an application to strike out pleadings on the ground that the action had no reasonable chance of success.” As stated above, the Applicants’ grounds of the application are two-folds, firstly the Plaintiff’s pleading, viz. Statement of Claim does not disclose any reasonable cause of action and secondly, that the Plaintiff’s case is an abuse of the process of the Court. “Cause of Action” was defined in the English case of Letang v Cooper [1965] 1Q. B. 232, CA by Diplock L. J, thus: “a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person o obtain from the court a remedy against the other”. In the Ghanaian case of Harriet Morrision & Anor. v Registered Trustees Victory Bible Church (2012) 49 GMJ 80 @ 120, Ayebi J. A. (as he then was) citing the case of Drummond Jackson vs. British Medical Association (1974) 1 WLR 688 with approval stated that: Page 15 of 20 “… a cause of action connotes the existence of a state of facts which entitles a party to maintain an action in a court of law. Therefore, an action which clearly has no chance of success will naturally be void of a reasonable cause of action …”. See also the case of Spokesman (Publications) Ltd. v Attorney General [1974] 1GLR 88, obiter thus: “A party had a cause of action when he was able to allege all the facts or combination of facts necessary to establish his right to sue.” Looking at the nature of the reliefs being sought in this case and the reading of the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff’s claim, is in the nature of criminal law which ought to be determined in accordance with the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) with Amendments: Act 633 and 714 and therefore beyond the scope of civil action by way of writ of summons under High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C. I. 47). Another ground of the Applicants’ application is that the Plaintiff’s action is an abuse of the process of the Court. Ssee the judgment of the High Court (General Jurisdiction Division One) presided over by His Lordship, Justice Kwasi Adjenim-Boateng in Suit No. GJ/0236/2023 intituled “Madam Grace Amfobea Akonnor vrs. The Republic Bank & Anor.” dated 14th June, 2023. “The question to ask then is, what in law constitutes an abuse of Court process? For an answer, see Dotse JSC in Naos Holding Inc. vrs. Ghana Commercial Bank Ltd. (2011) 1 SCGLR 492 as follows: Page 16 of 20 “… There is said to be an abuse of court process when an adversary through the malicious and unfounded use of some regular legal proceedings obtains some advantage over his opponent …”. His Lordship further stated at page 500 of the judgment as follows: “… The principle of abuse of process that is discernible has been postulated on the fact that the matters in controversy have been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction between the same parties and basically on the same subject matter and that it would have therefore be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a suitor to have an open ended opportunity to be litigating and re-litigating over and over again in respect of the same issue which has over the period and in previous decisions been decided against him. See a reproduction by learned author, Kwamina Mensah in his book “The Annotated High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C. I. 47), page 85. In the Supreme Court unreported case of Isaac Antwi vrs. Obiri Yeboah Appiahene in Civil Appeal No. J4/10/2023 dated 18th May, 2023, SC (Unreported), a copy of which Counsel for Plaintiff graciously furnished the Court, the Supreme Court speaking through Asiedu JSC in defining the term abuse of court process quoted the Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edition) page 11 thereof to mean: “The improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process’s scope”. Page 17 of 20 Their Lordship a page 17 of the Isaac Antwi vrs Obiri Yeboah Appiahene supra quoted the leaned of the Supreme Court Practice, 1995 (also known as the White Book Volume 1, published by Sweet and Maxwell at page 344 paragraph 18/19/33 as follows: “The term connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent the improper use of its machinery, and will, in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexatious and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances and for this purpose considerations of public policy and interests of justice may be material.” I am in full agreement with His Lordship in his analysis of the law and hereby adopt same as quoted above and hold that the Plaintiff’s suit constitutes an abuse of the Court process as the instant suit is clearly outside the civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Section 92 of Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended by section 51 of The Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 914) is offence creating law in matters of public procurement. Any infraction of any provisions of the said Act would be dealt with under Act 30. See the Supreme Court case of The Republic vrs. High Court (Commercial Division), Accra; Ex-Parte Yvonne Amponsah Brobbey, Gladys Nkrumah – Interested Party, Civi Motion No. J5/82/2022, 1st February, 2023, where the Supreme Court, per Kulendi JSC delivered itself as follows: Page 18 of 20 “In a proper sense, section 17 of PNDCL 111 ought to be deemed as the offence creating law in matters of intermeddling. The default procedure for the trial of the offence under section 17 of PNDCL 111 would therefore be the procedure prescribed under section 1(2) of Act 30 which states as follows; “An offence under any other enactment shall, subject to that enactment, be enquired into, tried and dealt with in accordance with this Act.” See also the case of Gregory Afoko vrs Attorney General, Writ No. J1/0/2019 dated 19th June, 2019; GHASC 41, where Marful-Sau JSC stated as follows: “In this judgment, we have already alluded to the fact that the power to enter nolle prosequi vested in the Defendant by section 54 of Act 30, is inherent in the constitutional mandate of the Defendant under 88(3) of the Constitution, to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions in the country. The Attorney-General by Article 88(1) is a Minister of State and the principal Legal Advisor to the Government. The Attorney- General is therefore a member of the Executive arm of Government, for that matter, the initiation and conduct of criminal prosecutions is an executive act vested in the Attorney-General, who is the Defendant in this case. The power to enter nolle prosequi, just like, the power to determine who is to be charged or becomes a prosecution witness, and the power to withdraw a charge, by the Defendant are clearly executive acts, which are exercised legally in accordance with article 88(3) and section 54 of Act 30”. In conclusion, having read the Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Applicant’s motion on notice to strike out pleadings in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim and to dismiss action on grounds of not disclosing any reasonable cause of action and abuse of judicial process pursuant to Order 11 rule 18(1)(a)&(d) filed on 16th October, 2023, the written submissions filed by the learned counsel for the parties and having duly considered the relevant authorities, both statutes and case laws, it is the considered view of the court Page 19 of 20 that the Plaintiff’s suit (Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim) filed on 4th October, 2023 discloses no reasonable cause of action and also constitutes an abuse of court process. In consequence, the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants’ application is granted as prayed. The Plaintiff’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim filed on said 4th October, 2023 are dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and also constitute an abuse of the process of the court. And for costs, I award the 1st and 2nd Defendants the sum of GH₵10,000.00 against the Plaintiff. (SGD.) H/L FORSON AGYAPONG BAAH (MR.) (JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT) LAWYERS: NKRABEAH EFFAH DARTEH ESQ. FOR PLAINTIFF ABSENT. GODWIN KUDZO TAMAKLOE ESQ. FOR DR. DOMINIC AYINE ESQ FOR RESPONDENT PRESENT. Page 20 of 20