Republic Vrs Sasraku and 3 Others Ex-parte Okpe V [2023] GHAHC 161 (27 January 2023)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, COMMERCIAL DIVISION HELD IN ACCRA ON THE 27H DAY OF JANUARY, 2023 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE JUSTIN KOFI DORGU CR/0447/2022 THE REPUBLIC VRS NII AYINSAH SASRAKU NII AKWEI BONSU } } 1ST RESPONDENT 2ND RESPONDENT NII KOJO ASHAMFLO @ BISHOP NII AFLAH SACKEY} 3RD RESPONDENT NII APPIAH } 4TH RESPONDENT EX-PARTE NII OKPE V } APPLICANT PARTIES: RESPONDENTS PRESENT APPLICANT PRESENT JUDGMENT On the 14th April, 2022, the applicant herein Nii Okpe V, describing himself as the Dzasetse of Ngleshie Alata Stool James Town, filed the instant application under 1 Order 50 rule 1 of the C.I 47 praying for an order to commit the Respondents into prison for their ‘contumacious conduct by reason of obstructing the roadways and highways of public justice by usurping the powers of the Court’. The applicant supported his application with a 13 paragraph affidavit in support with Exhibits and annexures. To put the application into perspective, I hereby reproduce some salient paragraphs of the affidavit in support for their full effects. They are paragraphs 4, 7 to 9 as follows: “4. That I have been told by my Counsel and I believe same to be true that per the ruling in the case of THE REPUBLIC VRS JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL EXPARTE; NII KOJO ABABIO V, SUIT NUMBER MISC/28/85, His Lordship A.K.B Ampiah J.A indicated that it is only persons from the Okpe Family of James Town Ngleshie Alata can be Dzase or kingmakers who can enstool the paramount chief of Ngleshie Alata. Attached is a copy of the said judgment marked as Exhibit ‘A’. 7. That on the 21st day of March 2022, respectively the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents posted on the internet a press conference they organized in Accra and stated that plans are far advanced to outdoor a new Dzasetse for Ngleshie Alata in the name of NII KOJO ASHAMFLO III known in real life as Bishop Dr. Nii Aflah Sackey, the 4th Respondent herein. Attached is a copy of the said video of the press conference and it is marked as Exhibit ‘B’. 8. That on the 1st day of February 2022, the 4th Respondent in confirming the statements made in the press conference mentioned supra, wrote a letter in which he claimed to be the Ngleshie Alata Dzasetse though he hails from the Adanse We which is different from the Okpe Family who are entitled to this position of Dzasetse of Ngleshie Alata Stool. Attached is a copy of the letter written by the 4th Respondent calling himself Dzasetse of Ngleshie Alata contrary to the judgment of the court and this is marked as Exhibit ‘C’ 2 9. The 4th Respondent in wilful disrespect to the judgment of a competent Court or jurisdiction has always attempted to widen the Dzase to include others and or strangers who are not members of the Dzase and not kingmakers and although he does not hail from the Okpe family has been describing himself as a member of an accredited and legitimate Kingmakers of Ngleshie Alata Stool and he has written letters to various Government institutions and the National House of Chiefs in that capacity. Attached are copies of such letters written and signed by the 4th Respondent calling himself Paramount Stool Father and Kingmaker on behalf of the said legitimate and accredited kingmakers of the Ngleshie Alata Stool and these are marked as Exhibit ‘D’ series”. The Respondents also upon service filed individual affidavits in opposition and further supplementary affidavit in opposition. I must observe from the onset that the depositions in the affidavits in opposition for the 1st to 3rd Respondents were couched in similar language and phraseology. They are paragraphs 6 to 13 and 15 of the Affidavit in Opposition by the 1st Respondent;- “6. That the applicant has not gone through any formal procedure to have his name entered into the National Registrar of Chiefs for the purpose of holding himself out in the capacity of the Dzasetse of Ngleshie Alata. In short he has not been gazzetted. 7. That I am advised by counsel and verily believe that in the light of the aforementioned he has no capacity to institute this action in the said capacity. 8. Further to the above, any determination by this Honourable Court on the said matter of capacity is likely to lead to a determination of a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, which jurisdiction this Honourable Court lacks. 9. Paragraph 4 of the Affidavit in Support which highlights on a High Court Ruling is most flawed and misleading, since the said ruling reared its 3 head in the 1991 decision of Yacubu Armah J in the case of The Republic V. Judicial Committee of The Ga Traditional Council, Ex-Parte Nii Anto Nyame II Weija Mantse, Suit No. MISC/742/90, a copy which is attached and marked as Exhibit ‘1’. The basis of the then application was founded on Ampiah J’s ruling of 1985. However, the High Court presided over by Yacubu Armah J dismissed the said application and ordered the said Judicial Committee to proceed. The judgment is dated 14th October, 1991. 10. That I am further advised by Counsel and verily believe that the contempt that the applicant complains of must relate to an enforceable order. 11. That I am further advised by Counsel and verily believe that since in the instant case the contempt complained of by the Applicant refers to a declaratory relief of 1985, no contempt can be established by the Applicant 12. That in this particular instance, it is noteworthy to point out that I have no knowledge of this Judgment, and I was never a party to same for it to be enforced against me, where it can be adduced that I have willfully disobeyed an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. 13. That I am further advised by Counsel and verily believe that the invocation of this Honourable court’s jurisdiction under Order 50 Rule 1 of C.I 47 is deeply flawed and the applicant should have invoked the Court’s jurisdiction under Order 43 rules 5 and 7, by taking steps to ensure that the declaratory relief of 1985 was enforced to be able to cite the Parties herein for contempt. 15. That I deny flatly paragraph 10 of the Affidavit in Support of the motion and I am advised by Counsel and verily believe that the said 1985 Judgment cannot be described as an enforceable Judgment which has been violated or disrespected”. 4 Subsequent to this, the respondents (1st Respondent particularly) filed two supplementary Affidavits in which he challenged the capacity of the Applicant as a chief within Ngleshie Alata Paramount Stool and the National House of Chiefs as evidenced in Exhibits 3 and 4 of the 1st Respondent’s supplementary and further supplementary Affidavit in Opposition. I must say that the Applicant also filed a supplementary Affidavit in answer to the Supplementary Affidavit in Opposition in which he attached Exhibit A1 series which are pictorial evidence of his enstoolment and swearing in ceremonies as well as Exhibit A2 which is also a Search from the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council signed by the Registrar which confirmed that the Applicant herein Nii Okpe was installed on 19th November, 2021. I will also refer to the following paragraphs in the Affidavit of the 4th Respondent in opposition to the application. They are paragraphs 6 through 11 which I reproduce hereunder for their full benefits;- “6. My Lawyer has advised me and I verily believe same to be true that the Applicant’s present application is incompetent as the Applicants has mounted his application in breach of procedural rules as provided by the rules of Court procedure, C.I 47 7. My Lawyer has further advised me and I verily believe same to be true that the Applicant has brought his application under Order 50 of the C.I 47 which deals with contempt of Court in general even though the Applicants seek to commit me for contempt following an alleged breach of a specified order. 8. I am informed by my Lawyer and I verily believe same to be true that it is Order 43 of the C.I 47 which should govern this application as it deals specifically with the enforcement of a judgment or order of the Court to do a certain act or abstain from doing an act as opposed to the Order 50 of C.I 47, and the Applicant having chosen the enforcement of the judgment of the High Court presided over by 5 His Lordship, Mr. Justice A.K.B Ampiah JA (as he then was) under Order 50 instead of Order 43 makes this application before this Court incompetent. 9. I am further informed by my Lawyer and I verily believe same to be true that, assuming for a moment the application was brought under Order 43 Rules 5 and 7 of C.I 47 for the enforcement of the judgment of His Lordship, Mr. Justice A.K.B Ampiah of the 6th of August, 1985, though that is not the case, the said Order 43 Rules 5 and 7 read together were not complied with as the order upon which the application for committal has been mounted to be enforced ought to have been entered and served on me and the judgment endorsed with a penal notice; the absence of which makes the application incompetent. 10. Paragraph 2 of the Applicant’s Affidavit in Support is vehemently denied. In further denial of the said paragraph2, I shall say that the status and office/position the Applicant claims is incorrect. 11. In response to paragraph 4 of the Applicant’s Affidavit in Support, my Counsel has advised me and I verily believe same to be true that Exhibit ‘A’ attached to the Applicant’s Affidavit is support cannot be a basis for contempt of Court against me.” Now, Counsel on both sides were offered the opportunity to argue the motion in Court in addition to whatever processes were filed. In course of the arguments and submissions, two issues cropped up which are of preliminary nature which ought to be determined first before going into the merits of the application. This is so because they touch on the issues of procedural appropriateness of the originating process and the capacity of the Applicant. This is so because once they are raised they ought to be determined before going to the merits. Thus in the case of GRIFFTH SOWAH OSEKPE & REGMA V. ABDUL LATIF KAROUN & ERIC OSEI KWAKU [2020] CA H1/65/2015 (UNREPORTED), C. Honunyegah JA (as he then was);- 6 “Capacity goes to the root and is fundamental in every action. A person who has an iron cast case would not be heard on the merits of the case where he is unable to satisfy the Court that he has capacity to maintain the action.” Also FOSUA & ADU POKU V. ADU POKU MENSAH [2009] SCGLR 310 (Holding 6) Also REPUBLIC V. HIGH COURT ACCRA, EX-PARTE ARYEETEY (ANKRAH INTERESTED PARTY) [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 398 HOLDING 2 “Any challenge to the capacity therefore puts the validity of the suit in issue. It is a preposition familiar to all Lawyers that the question of capacity, like the pleas of limitations is not concerned with the merits so that if the case fails, then a Defendant who is lucky enough to have the advantage of the unimpeachable defence of lack of capacity in his opponent is entitled to insist upon his rights.” On the first issue, the Learned Lawyer for the Respondents argued that the application having been premised on Order 50 rule 1 of the C.I 47 is inappropriate to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court when the complaint is about the disobedience of a Court Order. Learned Counsel submitted that the Applicant should rather have come under Order 43 of the C.I 47. It is the submission for the Respondents that since the Rules of Court make provision of a particular mode of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court in contempt applications such as this, coming under the wrong Rule and procedure is fatal to the case of the Applicants and so prayed that the application be so dismissed as incompetent. In view of the different positions held by the Parties, I will set down the provisions of Order 43 rules (1) and (5) of the C.I 47 and also Order 50 rule 1 for their full effects to be appreciated. Order 43 has the heading ‘Enforcement of Judgments and Orders’ Rule 1(1) states;- 7 “Subject to these Rules, a judgment or Order for the payment of money, not being a Judgment or Order for the payment of money into Court may be enforced by one or more of the following means…. ‘e’ In a case in which Rule 5 applies, an Order of Committal or a Writ of sequestration” Rules 5(1) (a) further provides;- “WHERE ‘a person disobeys a Judgment or Order requiring that person to abstain from doing an act, the Judgment or Order may subject to these Rules be enforced by one or more of the following means;- “c’ an Order of Committal against that person or, where that person is a body corporate, against any directors or other officers” Having set down the provisions of Order 43 as they apply to enforcement of Judgment or Orders, what then does Order 50 provides for especially as the instant application was grounded on it. Order 50 of the C.I 47 has the heading “Committal” ‘Rule 1 – Committal for contempt (1). The power of a court to punish for contempt of Court may be exercised by an Order of Committal. (2). Committal proceedings shall be commenced by an application to the Court (3). The application shall be supported by an affidavit stating inter alia the grounds of the application 8 (4). Subject to sub rule (5), the notice of motion together with a copy of the affidavit in support of the application shall be served personally on all the persons sought to be committed. (5). Without prejudice to its power under Order 7 rule 6, the Court may dispense with service of the notice of motion if it thinks it just to do so” It is the case of the Respondents that in as much as the basis for which the Applicant is seeking the committal is the disobedience of a Judgment or Order of Court, he ought to have come under Order 43 rule 5 (cc) which is the specific legislation for disobedience and not come under the general provisions of Order 50 rule 1 under the principle of “Verba generalia specilibus…” To me however, both Rules have their object as punishing a contemnor for a disobedience of a Court Order or Judgment. In determining the most appropriate procedure to adopt, the Court ought to be guided by the basis of the application. This of course is equally to be determined by recourse to the definition of Contempt of Court. per the decision in the case of REPUBLIC V. BOATENG-ODURO EX-PARTE AGYENIM BOATENG [2009] SCGLR 154 @161 (SC) “ “A person commits contempt and may be committed to prison for wilfully disobeying an Order for a court requiring to do any act other than the payment of money or to abstain from doing some act, and the Order sought to be enforced should be unambiguous and must be clearly understood by the Parties concerned. The reason is that a Court will only punish as contempt a willful breach of a clear Order requiring obedience to its performance therefore disobedience which is found not wilful cannot be punished”. But the question is whether that is the only ground for citing a person for contempt, the obvious answer is no. Oswald’s book on contempt of Court (3rd Edition) at page 6;- 9 “To speak generally, contempt may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrepute or to disregard or to interfere with to prejudice Parties, Litigants or their Witnesses during litigation.” This general definition of contempt which was captured in the case of IN RE EFFIDUASE STOOL AFFAIRS (NO 2); REPUBLIC V. NUMAPAU, PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHEIFS & ORS; EX-PARTE AMEYAW (NO.2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639 and cited with approval by the same Supreme Court in the case of REPUBLIC V. BANK OF GHANA & 5 ORS; EX-PARTE BENJAMIN DUFFOUR [2018], CIVIL APPEAL NO J/4/34/2018 (Unreported) delivered on 6th June, 2018 per Acquah JSC with Sophia Akuffo concurring thus;- “Contempt of Court was constituted by any act or conduct that tended to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants or their witnesses in respect of pending proceedings” Now, a critical look at the application by the applicants will show that they did not mount their action on any specific Order of a court demanding of them to do an act or refrain from doing an act but on the basis that there is a Judgment in rem declaring a status of which family constitute the Dzase of James Town of Ngleshie Alata and that the Respondents aware of such a Judgment are doing acts contrary to that declaration. The basis for the application as I understand it therefore is the disrespect or disregard of a lawful judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction. This to me does not warrant the application being brought under Order 43 rule 5 but under the general provisions of “Contempt of Court”. To me, the requirements necessary under the Order 50 rule 1 of the C.I 47 were complied with making the application competent. The legal objection as to the propriety of the procedure adopted is thus without merit and so overruled. 10 Now, the second objection to me concerns the capacity of the Applicants. It is the case of the Respondent that the Applicant has never been enstooled as Nii Okpe as endorsed on his processes. On this point, the Respondents tendered various Searches from the Stool House of Ngleshie Alata Paramount Stool Council and recently the Registry of the National House of Chiefs. All these Searches revealed that there is no chief or person with the title of the Applicant in any of the Chieftaincy Registers. The Respondents further contend that since determining whether or not the Applicant is a chief under the title Nii Okpe V will call for evidence as to his nomination, selection, appointment and enstoolment, the exercise will constitute the instant action into a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. On that basis of capacity, the Respondent again prayed the Court to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction - capacity on the basis that the Applicant is not Nii Okpe, a chief and since the determination of whether or not he is a chief will lead into a matter affecting chieftaincy by which the Court’s jurisdiction will be ousted. It is my considered opinion that these two issues could be determined without necessarily delving into a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. This is so because on the face of the processes, this is a simple application for contempt on the grounds that the Respondents have disregarded or disrespected a Judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction. As explained somewhere else in this Judgment, it is simply a question of whether or not the Respondents are members of the Nii Okpe Family. This does not call for a determination as to who is Nii Okpe V especially as none of the Respondents is claiming that title to himself. One may describe himself as the Dzasetse for which the temptation may arise as to who is the lawful Dzase of Ngleshie Alata and for that matter James Town. This issue is also a non-starter moot since it had long been established that it is only of persons of the Nii Okpe Family that constitute the Dzase of Jamestown and for that matter the Kingmakers. This is perfectly and unambiguously pronounced upon by the decision in Exhibit A. it is trite that it is not every case or matter in which a chief is mentioned that will constitute a cause or matter 11 affecting chieftaincy for which at the slightest hint a Court of Competent jurisdiction ought to decline jurisdiction. See the case of REPUBLIC V. CODUAH; EX-PARTE AABA SUBSTITUTED BY ASMAH [2013-2014] SCGLR 1032 per Akamba JSC. On that point also, I hold that this is not a chieftaincy dispute or any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy and so the Court is competent to hear and determine same. On the issue of capacity again, the Applicant has been able to prove to my satisfaction that he is Nii Okpe V, having been enstooled or installed and outdoored as such. The Applicant has through Exhibits A series shown pictures of his installation or enstoolment and outdooring, there is no challenge to that from any quarters. In addition the Applicant produced Exhibit A2, a Search from the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Counsel to support his assertion. In fact I am of the opinion that the issue of who a chief is is more of a fact than of law even though the law gives it governmental recognition. To me, the proof offered by the Applicant is more authentic than the challenge put up by the Respondents. In the first place, the Respondents’ Exhibit 3 cannot be anything than a self-serving document. It is a supposed Search conducted in the Registry of the Ngleshie Alata Paramount Stool, James Town Accra. It is a Search signed by a supposed secretary of the Ngleshie Alata Paramount Stool. I dare say that there is doubt as to the legal status of such an entity within the Chieftaincy hierarchy even if it is exists at all. In respect of Exhibit 4, the Registrar of the National House of Chiefs did not sign or append any seal to the supposed Search. Its relevance is therefore negligible. This is so because, by practice and procedure. Gazette documentation start at the Traditional Council level and progresses through the Regional House of chiefs before ending at the National House of Chiefs. The mere fact that a Search Result returns a negative finding from National House of Chiefs does not necessarily mean the Applicant is not a chief once he is registered at the Traditional Council level, it could only mean that the process has not reached the National House of Chiefs. The challenge to the capacity therefore fails. And as indicated earlier on, whether a person is a chief or not is more of a fact than law. This 12 progressive view was expresses by Amegatcher JSC in the case of REPUBLIC V. NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS KUMASI, WESTERN REGION HOUSE OF CHIEFS, SEKONDI AND COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY; EX-PARTE AHANTA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL (OSAHENE KATAKYI BUSUMAKURA III (INTERESTED PARTY) 2019 DLSC 6209 at page 15 where the Law Lord opined thus;- “The Appellant seems to have lost sight of the fact that the institution of chieftaincy in the country has been going through dynamic changes. Under the current laws regulating the institution, governmental recognition and gazzetting is no longer the requirement for the recognition and certification of chiefs in the country…the change from political interference in who should or should not be a chief is clearly captured in Article 270 (1) and (2) of the Constitution” I must say that I am most obliged to follow this position which in any case I do not have an option. The issues of procedural impropriety capacity and jurisdiction are thus overruled and so I will proceed to deal with the application on its merit. It is trite that contempt being a quasi-criminal process has its burden of proof akin to that of criminal standard and that is to say beyond reasonable doubt. This is so because a person convicted or found liable in contempt could at worst be imprisoned. Thus in the case of COMET PRODUCTS V. HAWKEX PLASTICS LTD [1971] 1 ALL ER 1141 at page 1143-1144 C.A, the Court held;- “Although this is a civil contempt, it partakes of the nature of a criminal charge. The Defendant is liable to be punished for it. He may be sent to prison. The rules as to criminal charges have always been applied to such proceedings. It must be proved with the same degree of satisfaction as in a criminal charge” Similarly, in the case of AKELE V. COFFIE & ANOR and AKELE V. OKINE & ANOR (Consolidated) [1979] GLR 84-90, it was held that “in order to establish contempt of Court even when it was not criminal contempt but civil, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt that a contempt had indeed been committed” 13 Also, the point was reiterated in the Supreme court case of REPUBLIC V. BOATENG & ODURO; EX-PARTE AGYENIM BOATENG [2007] SCGLR 151@162 per Dotse JSC thus:- “It is therefore clear that just as in criminal cases, an alleged contemnor is presumed innocent until proven guilty, so it is with civil contempt application. An Applicant must therefore adduce sufficient evidence, documentary or oral to establish the essential elements of the offence of contempt. An applicant who fails to meet the required Standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt must fail in his quest to have a contemnor convicted of contempt”. See also the RE EFFIDUASE STOOL AFFAIRS (NO.2); REPUBLIC V. NUMAPAU, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS; EXPARTE AMEYWA II (N0.2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639 @ 647 What then are the ingredients necessary to be proved in order to gain conviction on a charge of contempt. The judicial jurisprudence on the subject of contempt have established that for any person to succeed, he or she must prove that there is or was a subsisting Order or Judgment requiring of the would be contemnor to do or abstain from doing something, that the person is aware of the said Order or Judgment and yet still goes ahead to do what precisely the Order or Judgment says, he must or must not do. Quite apart from that there must be shown the clear intention on the part of Contemnor to flout or disregard the Order or Judgment. this is the element of willfulness. Thus in the case of REPUBLIC V. SITO I;EX-PARTE FORDJOUR [2001- 2002] SCGLR 322, the Supreme Court laid down the ingredients as;- “i. There must be a Judgment or Order requiring the contemnor to do or abstain from doing something; ii. or must be shown that the contemnor knows what precisely he is expected to do or abstain from doing and iii. it must be shown that he failed to comply with the terms of the Judgment or Order and that the disobedience is wilful” 14 In the earlier case of REPUBLIC V. HIGH COURT ACCRA;EX-PARTE LARYEA MENSAH (1998-99) SCGLR 360, the Court speaking through Bamford-Addo JSC rendered the principle thus;- “By definition, a person commits contempt and may be committed to prison for wilfully disobeying an Order of Court requiring him to do any act other than the payment of money or to abstain from doing some act, and the Order sought to be enforced should be unambiguous and must be clearly understood by the Parties concerned. The reason is that a Court will only punish for contempt, a wilful breach of a clear Court Order requiring obedience to its performance. Therefore disobedience which is found not to be wilful cannot be punished.” Now, in as much as these positions hold true in especially cases where specific injunctive orders are given or made, contempt could be committed by persons who though are not Parties in the true legal sense but are privies who come to the knowledge of such pronouncements even if they are declaratory in nature. On this I am consoled by the observation of Hayfron-Benjamin JSC in the case of REPUBLIC V. NUMAPAU cited supra at page 296 when he opined as follows;- “It is not correct in law that a Contempt of Court must necessarily relate to any proceedings pending in the Court, neither does it complain of a specific prohibitory or mandatory injunction in this Court” The question then arises whether or not the Applicants have been able to prove the ingredients constituting the offence or charge of contempt and whether that has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Now that the technicalities have been cleared as above, the question is whether or not the Respondents have been able to exonerate themselves from the charge of contempt levelled against them. To me, this can only be done if the Respondents have been able to prove that they are the Dzasetse or belong to the Dzase and to further prove that being members of the Dzase, they equally hail from the Nii Okpe’s Family of James Town. This is the crux of the matter and the application. It is trite to remind all that a 15 Judgment must be read as a whole to put into the right perspective the ratio on all issues. In this regard, I will quote copiously portions of the Exhibit A, the Judgment of A.K.B Ampiah J.A (as he then was) of 1985 and on which the application is premised – the case of In THE REPUBLIC V. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX-PARTE NII KOJO ABABIO V. It is instructive to point out at the onset that this is not a simple application for certiorari and prohibition under now broad phrase of Judicial Review but it is a whole review of cases on the structure of the Kingmakers of the James Town Mantse from the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council to the Greater Accra Region and to the National House of Chiefs. This was what the Judge said at page 10 on the issue starting from page 9’- “There is evidence also that Nii Adja Kwao II had been enstooled by the Respondents and the section who claim to be the only family. In the Nii Adja Kwao case, Nii Sampah Kojo was the spokesman and indeed a spokesman also in the 1968 proceedings. The decision of the State Council contained in Exhibit N4 has never been gazzetted. In fact it was on those proceedings that the District commissioner within his powers recognized the appointment of Quaye in the Exhibit NS4 proceedings as the properly enstooled James town Mantse. By that decision, the Government recognized Nii Okpe’s family as the only family entitled to enstool a James town Mantse. It appears that the troubles which has arisen since that date has revolved round the attempt to widen the Dzase to include others who are not members of the Dzase and not kingmakers. The National House of Chiefs decision was therefore a confirmation of the customary position. At no time has the Dzase group been extended to include the Respondents. The Respondents have never belong to the Dzase and can therefore never claim to be entitled to take part in the enstoolment of a James Town Mantse. The Judgment of the National House of Chiefs was a Judgment which touched on the capacity of the litigants. The Judgment is therefore a judgment in rem and is binding not only on the parties and their privies but also on strangers. 16 Until that judgment is set aside, it is binding on the Respondents- Judicial Committee”. Now, what this finding means is that it is the Nii Okpe’s family which is clothed with capacity to install a James Town Mantse. Anything to the contrary is against the Judgment and what ought to be the status quo and for that matter a disregard or disrespect of the authority of the Court. If for any reason one is dissatisfied with the said Judgment, the avenue opened to that person is to appeal or have the decision quashed. There is no evidence in the proceedings showing that that case was ever appealed against or set aside. And since it is a Judgment in rem, it is binding on all, in the ordinary parlance, it holds against the whole world, both parties and their privies as well as strangers. The reference of 1st Respondent in his Affidavit in Opposition filed on 6th June, 2022 to the alleged Judgment of YAKUBU ARMAH J IN THE REPUBLI V. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL;EX-PARTE NII ANTO NYAME II, WEIJA MANTSE, SUIT NO. 742/90, is to me of no relevance to the status declared in the Exhibit A. Quite apart from it being a Judgment of a court of Co-ordinate jurisdiction, it was not a case for the setting aside of the Judgment nor was it an appeal. It is therefore not binding upon this Court. In all the Affidavits filed in opposition none of the Respondents averred to the fact that they also belong to the Nii Okpe’s family. The 1st Respondent described himself as Dzasetse of the Plernor division and head of the Nii Arde Nkpa We of James Town. The 2nd Respondent described himself as the Stool secretary of Ngleshie Alata. The 3rd Respondent states in paragraph 2 of his Affidavit in Opposition that he is also the legitimate Dzasetse of Ngleshie Alata hailing from Adanse and the 4th Respondent only described himself as stool father ‘of Ngleshie Alata Stool and kingmaker. It is only when any of the Respondents had asserted as also coming from the Nii Okpe family that the issue of capacity would have cropped up. As at now, by their own depositions, the Respondents do not hail from the Nii Okpe family. At best, they are arrogating to themselves the position of Kingmakers for Ngleshie Alata which the 17 Court as well as the National House of Chiefs held is the preserve of the Dzase or Dzasetse. And even within the Dzase, it was only the Nii Okpe family that have that mandate. Anything to the contrary is going against the tenents of the Judgment. It is tantamount to disrespecting the Judgment of the Court. And yet still, it is only when there are rival claims to the Nii Okpe family representatives that there would be the need to go into trial of who is the lawful Nii Okpe and for which inquest the Court would be faced with the temptation to go into matters affecting chieftaincy, ousting the jurisdiction of the Court. In the meantime, the Court in Exhibit A had distinguished the Dzase from the title of kingmaker. There is also a tacit admission of the mischief complained of by all the Respondents. Instead of addressing the issue of whether or not the Respondents are aware of the existence of the Judgment as contained in Exhibit A, they rather sought to explain their disobedience to it through various interpretations given by them to the Judgment. For example, the 1st Respondent deposed to in paragraphs 5 and 9 as follows;- “5. That I am advised by Counsel and verily believe that there has been no Dzasetse in Ngleshie Alata since 1979 after the death of one Nii Okpe IV and that the issue of Dzasetse has been rotational between the Nii Okpe and Nii Kojo Ashamflo of Adanse and it is now the turn of the Nii Kojo Ashamflo” then “9. Paragraph 4 of the Affidavit in support which highlights on a high Court ruling is most flawed and misleading since the said ruling reared its head in the 1991 decision…..” It is instructive to note that these same paragraphs were repeated mutatis mutandis by all the four Respondents. Again, on all the three (3) Affidavits in Opposition, these paragraphs were equally emphasized and repeated. They are:- 18 “12. That I am further advised by Counsel and verily believe that since in the instant case the contempt complained of by the Applicant refers to a declaratory relief of 1985, no contempt can be established by the Applicant. 16. That I deny flatly paragraphs 10 of the Affidavit in Support of the motion and I am advised by counsel and verily believe that the said 1985 Judgment cannot be described as an enforceable Judgment which has been violated or disrespected” On the part of the 4th Respondent, he deposed to in paragraph 11 of his Affidavit in Opposition thus;- “11. In response to paragraph 4 of the Applicant’s Affidavit in Support, my Counsel has advised and I verily believe same to be true that Exhibit ‘A’ attached to the Applicant’s Affidavit in Support cannot be a basis for contempt of Court against me” Now, what all these depositions mean to me is that, all the Respondents are aware of the existence of Exhibit A which categorically declared that any person outside the Nii Okpe family of the Dzase will be wrong in arrogating the powers to install the James Town Mantse. In spite of this knowledge of the Judgment the Respondents still go ahead, parading themselves as Kingmakers of the Ngleshie Alata Stool (James Town Mantse) and doing other acts as exhibited in Exhibits B, C, and D. If that cannot be a disobedience and disrespect to the Judgment as contained in Exhibit A, then I do not know what else could be. This is so because if a Court declares a thing in a particular way, any other person who does the opposite will be at fault as it will amount to mocking the decision of the Court and thus bringing it into disrepute or ridicule. In fact, I have observed that the Respondents herein have been prodded on by their Lawyers and have not shown any remorse for doing what they were expected not to do. These acts of counsel must not be encouraged as they rather perpetuate the cyclical and almost unending chieftaincy disputes in the country even on issues that had 19 already been determined. Such disingenuous acts must not be encouraged and ought to stop. On the whole I find as proved by the Applicants that on the 21st day of March, 2022, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents posted on the internet a press conference they organized in Accra in which they announced the outdooring ceremony of the 4th Respondent herein Dr. Nii Ashamflo as evidenced in Exhibit B. I also find as proved that on the 1st of February, 2022, the 3rd Respondent confirmed the above statements by writing a letter with the title Ngleshie Alata Dzasetse as evidenced in Exhibit C. It is also been proved that the 4th Respondent also carried out himself as the Paramount Stool father and Kingmaker of the Ngleshie Alata Stool when he does not come from the Nii Okpe family of Dzase. Even in Court, the 2nd Respondent continued to exhibit this contemptuous acts by signing official Searches from an unrecognized ‘office of the Kingmakers of the Ngleshie Alata Paramount Stool, an entity not known to the Traditional Council set up in the Chieftaincy Act. I must emphasize here and now that all these proofs are beyond reasonable doubt as required in a contempt proceedings. In conclusion, I find all the four (4) Respondents guilty of acts designed to encourage the disobedience to lawful decisions of the Courts, usurping the Court’s interpretative powers, obstructing the course of justice and bringing the dignity and authority of the Courts of competent jurisdiction into public ridicule and contempt. I find them guilty of the contempt charges against them and convict them accordingly. Each Respondent is sentenced to a fine of 200 penalty units or in default serve a term of 14 days imprisonment. (SGD) JUSTICE JUSTIN KOFI DORGU (JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT) 20 LEGAL REPRESENTATION BENJAMIN SEVOR WITH NAOMI ONUMAH FOR THE APPLICANT GEORGE HEWARD-MILLS WITH ABIANA MENSAH YAWSON FOR THE 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS KWASI ADJENIM-BOATENG FOR THE 4TH RESPONDENT CITED CASES GRIFFTH SOWAH OSEKPE & REGMA V. ABDUL LATIF KAROUN & ERIC OSEI KWAKU [2020] CA H1/65/2015 (UNREPORTED), FOSUA & ADU POKU V. ADU POKU MENSAH [2009] SCGLR 310 REPUBLIC V. HIGH COURT ACCRA, EX-PARTE ARYEETEY (ANKRAH INTERESTED PARTY) [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 398 HOLDING 2 REPUBLIC V. BOATENG-ODURO EX-PARTE AGYENIM BOATENG [2009] SCGLR 154 @161 (SC) IN RE EFFIDUASE STOOL AFFAIRS (NO 2); REPUBLIC V. NUMAPAU, PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHEIFS & ORS; EX-PARTE AMEYAW (NO.2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639 REPUBLIC V. BANK OF GHANA & 5 ORS; EX-PARTE BENJAMIN DUFFOUR [2018], CIVIL APPEAL NO J/4/34/2018 (Unreported) REPUBLIC V. CODUAH; EX-PARTE AABA SUBSTITUTED BY ASMAH [2013-2014] SCGLR 1032 per Akamba JSC. REPUBLIC V. NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS KUMASI, WESTERN REGION HOUSE OF CHIEFS, SEKONDI AND COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY; EX-PARTE AHANTA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL (OSAHENE KATAKYI BUSUMAKURA III (INTERESTED PARTY) 2019 DLSC 6209 21 COMET PRODUCTS V. HAWKEX PLASTICS LTD [1971] 1 ALL ER 1141 at page 1143- 1144 C.A, AKELE V. COFFIE & ANOR and AKELE V. OKINE & ANOR (Consolidated) [1979] GLR 84-90 RE EFFIDUASE STOOL AFFAIRS (NO.2); REPUBLIC V. NUMAPAU, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS; EXPARTE AMEYWA II (N0.2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639 @ 647 REPUBLIC V. HIGH COURT ACCRA; EX-PARTE LARYEA MENSAH (1998-99) SCGLR 360 In THE REPUBLIC V. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX-PARTE NII KOJO ABABIO V. YAKUBU ARMAH J IN THE REPUBLI V. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL;EX-PARTE NII ANTO NYAME II, WEIJA MANTSE, SUIT NO. 742/90 22