REPUBLIC VRS TIGBANBE (NR/DC/KPA/B4/10/2024) [2024] GHADC 442 (27 June 2024)

27th June, 2024 IN THE DISTRICT COURT KPANDAI- N/R CASE NO: NR/DC/KPA/B4/10/2024 THE REPUBLIC VRS BIYAGMA TIGBANBE _____________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT _____________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION The accused person in the instant case has been charged with the offences of causing unlawful damage, threat of death and assault on public officer contrary to sections 172(1), 75 and 205(a) of the Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). The Accused person pleaded not guilty on his arraignment before the court and the burden therefore lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. FACTS AND CASE OF THE PROSECUTION The facts as attached to the charged sheet which forms the case of the prosecution are that on 4/12/2022 at about 9:00am, the complainant, Kwabena Waja visited his farmland at Kachilende village and detected that the accused who he shares farm boundary with has burnt his two acre cassava farm. The complainant reported the matter to the Kpandai police and led the police to the farm to ascertain first-hand information. On arrival, the accused person was met raising yam mounds at the place and was told to avail himself at the Kpandai Police Station to assist investigation. According to the prosecution, the accused became infuriated and threatened complainant and police with words to wit, “this should be your first and last because I will kill you people the next time you visit this land again”. Accused then begun advancing towards the unarmed policemen and complainant at the scene while wielding a cutlass amidst shouting that he is under attack. That act attracted the attentions of other farmers numbering about fifteen some of whom were with short guns and they joined hands with the accused to chase the policemen and complainant away from the scene. Moments after the police and complainant have been chased away from the scene, accused and his cohorts vented their anger on one Ntawei Mabrado who was at his farm just because he is related to complainant. That in the course of that, an aged man at the scene also from the side of the accused advised accused and his cohorts not to harm Ntawei Mabrado because he is not the one they are looking for. Accused thereafter relocated from their village to evade police arrest but was arrested on 3/11/23 for the offence. EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECTION To proof its case the prosecution called five witnesses to testify in support of its case. PW1 Waja Kwabena testified and stated that he had a case with the accused person pending at the Wulensi district court, for which the accused person was granted bail but he jumped bail. That on 04/12/2023, at about 9:00am he visited his cassava and yam farm at Kachilende village and detected that the accused person set fire into his 2 acre cassava farm, burning the entire farm land. PW2, Ntawei Mabrado in his evidence in chief stated that on 05/12/2023 at about 7:00am, he was on his farm with his two children when a mop led by the accused person and Obanyala wielding cutlasses and locally manufactured guns came to his farm in an aggressive mood. That the accused person stated that they were looking for PW1 and the policemen to kill but since he is related to PW1, they should kill him but they were told by one old man present at the scene to stop. He further stated that the accused person told him to inform Waja Kwabena that if he met him on the farm again, it is either he (PW1) kills him or he will kill and bury him (PW1) in the farm. Prosecution also called PW3, Ntawei Nabado who also testified that on 05/12/2023 at about 8:00am he was on the farm with his father when a certain man he can identify came to their farm with some others wielding cutlasses and short guns. That the man told the group to kill his father because he is related to PW1 but an old man advised them to stop but the man further threatened his father to inform PW1 not to step his foot on the land again or else he will bury PW1 or PW1 will bury him. In further support of its case the prosecution called PW4, NO. 56068 G/Const. Azaglo- Tay Bernard to testify. In his evidence in chief, PW4 stated that 4th December, 2022 at about 2:15am a case of unlawful damage was referred to him for investigation. PW1 then led him and PW5 to the cassava farm at Kachilende where they took photographs of the burnt cassava farm and also met the accused person raising yam mounds nearby and informed him to avail himself at the station to assist with investigation. Accused became infuriated upon hearing his invitation to the police station and threatened them to step foot on the land again or he will kill them. That accused person started advancing towards them with a cutlass he was holding amidst shouting in their local dialect that he is under attack. That the said act attracted other farmers wielding cutlasses and short guns who run after them but they managed to escape the scene unhurt. PW5, No. 58434 G/Const. Galley Johnson testified and stated that on 05/12/22 at about 6:15am, he and PW4 with complainant visited the complainant’s farm to ascertain first- hand information about the complaint of causing damage made by PW1. On arrival they took photographs of the cassava farm which was burnt and also informed accused person who was raising yam mounds nearby to avail himself at the station to assist with investigations. Accused person became infuriated and threatened them not to step foot on the land or else he will kill them. That PW4 quickly took a video of the demeanor of the accused after which he started advancing towards them with a cutlass he was holding amidst shouting in their local dialect that he is under attack which act attracted other farmers wielding cutlasses and short guns who run after them but they managed to escape the scene unhurt. EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENCE After the close of the prosecution’s case, a prima facie case was found to be made by the prosecution against the accused person whereupon he was called upon to open his defence. The accused person testified for himself and called one other witness to also testify in support of his case. In his evidence in chief, the accused person stated that he and PW1 shares a common farming boundary. That on 17/11/2023 he burnt a portion of land for raising yam mounds. That unknowingly the fire entered the complainant farm and burnt a portion of it. That he knows he has burnt PW1’s farm but that it was not his intention to do that. DW1 Nmondom Tiwome testified that he was not present when the fight took place. However, that on the day of the event he was on his farm when he heard some noise. On his arrival at the scene, he met only the accused person but did not meet the other persons. While he was talking with the accused person one uncle of theirs told him that the land on which accused person was spraying is the subject matter of the arguments. He then advised his said uncle that both of them should meet with the elders for amicable resolution. BURDEN OF PROOF The law is now settled that in criminal proceedings, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. By the provisions of article 19(2)(c) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, a person who is charged with a criminal offence is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty or he pleads guilty. The law was rehashed by the Supreme Court speaking through Dotse JSC in GLIGAH AND ANOR. v THE REPUBLIC [2010] SCGLR 297 that: “ … [I]t is important for this Court to bear in mind that the Constitution 1992 article 19 (2) (c) presumes everyone innocent until the contrary is proved. In other words, whenever an accused person is arraigned before any court in any criminal trial it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the essential ingredients of the offence charged against the accused person beyond any reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is therefore on the Prosecution and it is only after a prima facie case has been established by the Prosecution that the accused person is called upon to give his side of the story.” The accused in the instant case has been charged with the offences of causing unlawful damage, threat of death and assault on public officer. The burden is thus on the prosecution to prove the essential elements of each of these offences with which the accused person is charged. Section 11 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) provides that “[i]n a criminal action, the burden of producing evidence, when it is on the prosecution as to a fact which is essential to guilt, requires the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that on the totality of the evidence a reasonable mind could find the existence of the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, the prosecution is required to lead evidence in prove of all the essential elements of the offences charged in order to secure a conviction, short of which the accused person is entitled to acquittal. It has been held that proof beyond reasonable doubt is actually proof of the essential ingredients of the offence charged. Please see the case of ABDULAI FUSEINI v THE REPUBLIC [2018] 122 GMJ 12 SC where the court stated that ‘in criminal trials, the burden of proof against an accused person is on the prosecution. The standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt actually means “proof of the essential ingredients of the offence charged and not mathematical proof.”’ I shall now proceed to examine each of the charges and the evidence led by the prosecution in proof of same. CAUSING UNLAWFUL DAMAGE The first charge with which the accused person is standing trial is causing unlawful damage. Section 172 (1)(b) of the Criminal and Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) provides: Section 172—Causing Unlawful Damage. (1) Whoever intentionally and unlawfully causes damage to any property by any means whatsoever— (b) to a value exceeding ¢1 million, shall be guilty of second degree felony. From the reading of the section, the essential ingredients to be proved by the prosecution are: that damage has been caused to property which value exceeds ¢1 million, that is (GH¢100.); and that the damage was caused intentionally and unlawfully, that is, without any justification whatsoever. This is the position held by the court in the case of HOMENYA v THE REPUBLIC [1992] 2 GLR 305. The court, emphasising the essential ingredients required to be proved by the prosecution in a charge of causing unlawful damage stated as follows: Section 172(1) of Act 29 which creates the offence of unlawful damage requires that for a person to be liable under the said section, the accused must have caused the damage intentionally and unlawfully. The section reads: “whoever intentionally and unlawfully causes damage to any property by any means . . .” Each of the two words emphasised above is important and must be established before one can be called upon to open his defence in respect of this offence. For if the damage was intentionally but not unlawfully caused, the offence is not committed. Likewise if the damage was unlawfully but not intentionally caused, then it is not one of unlawful damage. In the instant case therefore, for the prosecution to secure conviction on this charge, it is incumbent on it to prove that the damage was intentionally and unlawfully caused by the accused person. It is the case of the prosecution that on 4/12/2022 at about 9:00am, the complainant visited his farm which shares common boundary with the farmland of the accused and detected that the accused burnt the two acre cassava farm belonging to the complainant. On the charge sheet the value placed on the said farm is GH¢4,000. It must be stated that no further evidence was however led in proof of the said amount. In the case of ASANTE v THE REPUBLIC [1972] 2 GLR 177-197, the court stated that it is the value of the damage caused and not the value of the property that is of essence, unless the damage was such that it rendered the property irreparable. Under section 172, a distinction is made between damage to a value below 1 million cedis (GH¢100) which is classified as a misdemeanor, and damage to a value exceeding 1 million cedis (GH¢100) which is a second degree felony. In my opinion, since the value of the damage caused is an essential ingredient of the offence charged, prosecution ought to have led evidence in prove of same. Merely stating the value on the charge sheet without more is not sufficient. In any case, the accused person does not dispute that he caused the burning of the complainant’s cassava farm. The accused person in his caution statement which was tendered in evidence by the prosecution stated that “It is true that I have burn some bushes at my farm and the flames of the fire entered into one Kwabena Waja’s cassava and yam farm and destroyed his crops”. After the close of the prosecution’s case, the accused was ordered to open his defence whereupon he filed his witness statement on 5/2/24 and maintained that he burnt his farm and the fire crept unto the complainant’s farm, burning his cassava farm. There is therefore no issue that the complainant’s farm was burnt and that it was the accused person that caused the fire. The essential issue remaining however is, whether the accused intentionally burnt down the cassava farm belonging to the complainant, thereby causing damage to same. In proof of its case the prosecution called PW1, the complainant to testify. He stated that he had a case with the accused person at the Wulensi district court where the accused was granted bail but he jumped bail. That he later visited his cassava farm and detected that the accused person set fire onto his 2 care cassava farm, burning the entire farm. PW2 and PW3 gave no evidence on the charge of causing unlawful damage. PW4 and PW5 are police officers who testified that after the complaint was lodged at the police station by PW1, they were both led by PW1 onto the farm to assess the damage where PW4 took photographs of the burnt cassava farm. Does the evidence led by the prosecution prove that the accused person intentionally burnt the cassava farm belonging to the complainant? In ASANTE v THE REPUBLIC (supra), the court noted that the“[p]rosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the damage was caused intentionally within the meaning of section 11 (2) of Act 29, and also without justifiable cause or excuse”. Section 11 (2) of Act 29 relating to provisions on intent provides as follows: (2) If a person does an act voluntarily, believing that it will probably cause or contribute to cause an event, he intends to cause that event, within the meaning of this Code, although he does not do the act for the purpose of causing or of contributing to cause the event. Situating the facts of the instant case within the meaning of section 11 (2) of Act 29, it must be proved that the accused person, when he voluntarily set the fire on his land, must believe that it will probably cause or contribute to the burning of the complainant’s cassava farm. There is undisputed evidence on the record that the accused person and PW1 are adjoining land owners. None of the prosecution witnesses saw the accused setting the fire on his farm. The evidence of PW1 is not sufficient proof that the accused intentionally burnt the cassava farm belonging to the complainant. According to PW1, he caused the arrest of the accused person who was arraigned before the Wulensi District Court but he was granted bail. Then he visited his farm and found out that the accused burnt his cassava farm. In my opinion, the evidence of PW1 is a mere suspicion and does not aid the court in the determination of the issue at hand. It is not sufficient to say that because he has a case with the accused, the accused intentionally caused the damage to his cassava farm. In any case, no evidence was led on any pending case against the accused person in the said court by the prosecution. Even if evidence was led on the pendency of the said matter before the Wulensi District Court, that fact alone, without more, is insufficient to prove the motive or intent required in this case. It is said that not even the devil knows the mind of a person. However, intent could be inferred from the manner in which an act was carried out, and the conduct of the accused person prior to or subsequent to the act. Did the accused purposely set the fire on the boundary or close to the boundary he shares with the complainant so as to cause the fire to creep onto the complainant’s farm? What precautionary measures were taken by the accused person prior to setting the fire? And after realizing that the fire crept onto the complainant’s farm, did the accused person take steps to quench same so as to mitigate the damage? In my opinion, these are facts which if proved by the prosecution, could assist the court to make a determination on the intent of the accused person. The accused in his defence maintained that although he set the fire on his farm, it crept onto the complainant’s farm. This evidence was not controverted in any way under cross examination. There was no contrary evidence introduced to prove that the accused did not unintentionally burn the complainant’s cassava farm. As stated earlier, prosecution could have led further evidence to prove that the accused took no precautionary measures in setting the fire on his farm, or that he took no steps to quench the fire after he realised that the fire crept from his farm onto the farm of the complainant, or that he started the fire very closely to the farm of PW1 so as to cause it to creep onto PW1’s farm. Lacking these pieces of evidence, there is doubt whether the accused person’s act of setting the fire was intentional or an act of negligence. The latter however cannot secure a conviction under section 172 of Act 29. The doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused person. Please see the case of RICHARD BANOUSIN v THE REPUBLIC [2015] DLSC 3046 which held that: The rule beyond a reasonable doubt, can thus be formulated thus:- “An accused person in a criminal trial or action, is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.”’ I therefore hold that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person intentionally caused the fire and burnt the complainant’s farm. Having failed to prove that the damage was caused intentionally by the accused person, the charge of causing unlawful damage fails and I hereby acquit and discharge the accused person on count one. THREAT OF DEATH The next offence with which the accused person is charged is threat of death. The particulars of the offence are that the accused person on 5/12/22 threatened the complainant with words to wit “I will kill you if you step your foot on this land again”. Section 75 of Act 29 provides as follows: Section 75—Threat of Death. Whoever threatens any other person with death, with intent to put that person in fear of death, is guilty of a second degree felony. The essential ingredients which require proof by the prosecution are that there was in fact a threat of death; and that the threat was made with intent to put the victim in fear of death. In BEHOME v. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 112-128, the court laid the actus reus and mens rea required for the offence in the following words: “In the offence of threat of death the actus reus will consist in the expectation of death which the offender creates in the mind of the person he threatens whilst the mens rea will also consist in the realisation by the offender that his threats will produce that expectation. It matters not, therefore, whether the threats were related to the present or to the future”. It is the case of the prosecution that while on the farm of the complainant, and after informing the accused person to avail himself at the police station to assist in investigations, the accused person became angry and threatened the complainant and the police with words to wit “this should be your first and last because I will kill you people the next time you visit this land again”. According to the evidence of PW2, he was on his farm with his children when the accused person and Obanyala came, wielding cutlasses and locally manufactured guns. That accused person stated that they were looking for the complainant and the policemen to kill but since he is related to the complainant, he should be killed but they were told by one old man to stop. That the accused person told him to inform the complainant that if he (accused person) meets him on his farm again, it’s either he kills accused person, or accused person will kill him. The evidence of PW3 is essentially the same as that of his father, PW2. PW4 and PW5, policemen who went to assess the damage at the scene testified that while on the farm with the complainant on 5/12/22, the accused person became infuriated after he was told to avail himself at the Police station to assist in investigations. Accused then threatened them and the complainant that if they step foot on land again, he will kill them and started advancing towards them with a cutlass amidst shouting that he was under attack. By the particulars of the offence, the accused person is charged with threat of death of Kwabena Waja, the complainant and none other. It is therefore incumbent on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the said Kwabena Waja was threatened with death by the accused person with intent to put PW1 in fear of death. It is surprising to note that in all the evidence of the prosecution, no where did the complainant himself stated that he was threatened with death by the accused person. The evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 seems to be corroborating nothing! In my understanding, there can be no corroboration of a fact when the previous evidence made no mention of that fact. In FRANCIS ARTHUR v THE REPUBLIC, Criminal Appeal No: J3/02/2020 delivered on 8th December, 2021, the Supreme Court per Amegatcher JSC had this to say on corroboration. He stated that: “Section 7(1) of NRCD 323 defines corroboration to consist of evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn which confirms in some material particular the evidence to be corroborated and connects the relevant person with the crime, claim or defence. In essence, the corroborating evidence strengthens the initial evidence, which standing alone is insufficient to determine the commission of a crime. Retired Supreme Court Judge and legal text writer Stephen Alan Brobbey writes in ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, First Ed. 2014 at page 85 that this definition connotes three concepts; firstly, for the evidence to amount to corroboration, it must have some connection or relationship with the previous evidence. Secondly, that connection should amount to affirmation or denial of some relevant part of the previous evidence. Thirdly, the connection and affirmation should directly be referable or attributable to the person or fact in so far as the crime, claim or defence is concerned. If these three concepts exist, the court may conclude that the second evidence confirms, supports or “corroborates” the first evidence.” There is no doubt that in a charge such as this, the evidence of PW1, the person alleged to have been threated, is principal to the case of the prosecution. Nowhere in PW1’s evidence did he mention that he was threatened by the accused person with those words as stated in the facts narrated by the prosecution. The evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 cannot therefore be said to corroborate the fact of threat of death of PW1 as there was no fact of threat of death stated in the testimony of PW1. Referencing the essential ingredients of the offence of threat of death, it is not sufficient to prove that the threat was made or spoken. In my opinion, the evidence must further show that the victim was in fact put in a state of fear of death by the words or threats spoken to him by the accused person. There is no better evidence of that fact than the evidence of the victim himself. There is no evidence by PW1 to prove that he heard the threats by the accused person to bury him through PW2 and PW3 and that he was put in a state of fear of death after hearing those words. PW4 and PW5 also testified that while at the scene with PW1, the accused person got infuriated after they informed him to avail himself at the police station and stated that he will kill them and PW1 if they step foot on the land again. In his own evidence in chief, PW1 never mentioned that the accused person said those words to him in the presence of PW4 and PW5, let alone prove that he was put in a state of fear of death by the said words. The law is well settled that a party who bears the burden of proof in an action does not discharge the burden by the multiplicity of witnesses he calls, but by the quality of witnesses called by him. Please see the case of GLIGAH AND ANOR. v THE REPUBLIC (supra) where the Supreme noted that “ …[I]n establishing the standard of proof required in a civil or criminal trial, it is not the quantity of witnesses that a party upon whom the burden of proof rests calls to testify that is important, but the quality of the witnesses called and whether at the end of the day the witnesses called by the party have succeeded in proving the ingredients required in a particular case.” In the instant case, I hold the opinion that there being no iota of evidence in the testimony of PW1 that the accused person uttered those words of threat to him is fatal to the case of the prosecution. If those threatening words were indeed said to PW1 by the accused, what prevented him from saying so, he being of full age and of sound mind? Lacking such evidence, I find that there is doubt as to whether those threatening words were said to PW1 by the accused person with intent to put him in fear of death. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused person threatened PW1, Kwabena Waja with death with intent to put him in fear of death. I therefore acquit and discharge the accused person on count two. ASSAULT ON PUBLIC OFFICER I now turn to the count of assault on public officer. The particulars of the offence are that the accused person on 5/12/22 obstructed PW4 and PW5 in the execution of their lawful duty while visiting a crime scene by chasing them away. The facts relied on by the prosecution are that upon a complaint of causing unlawful damage reported by PW1 to the police, PW4 and PW5, accompanied by PW1 visited the scene to ascertain first-hand information. That on arrival PW4 took pictures of the burnt cassava farm belonging to PW1 and further informed the accused person who was raising yam mounds nearby to avail himself at the police station to assist in investigations. That the accused person became infuriated and threatened the police and PW1 and begun advancing towards them wielding a cutlass amidst shouting that he was under attack. The act of the accused person attracted the attention of other farmers numbering about fifteen and wielding short guns and joined the accused to chase PW4 and PW5 and the complainant away. Section 205 of Act 29 provides as follows: Section 205—Assault, etc., on Public Officer. Whoever— (a) assaults, obstructs, molests, or resists, or aids or incites any other person to assault, obstruct, molest, or resist any public or peace officer, or any person employed by a public or peace officer, acting or proceeding to act in the execution of any public office or duty or in the execution of any warrant or legal process; or (b) uses any threatening, abusive, or insulting language, or sends any threatening or insulting message, or letter, to any peace officer in respect of his duties, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour. From section 205, the essential ingredients to be proved by the prosecution are that; 1. The accused person assaulted, obstructed, molested, or resisted a public or peace officer or his employee; or 2. The accused person aided or incited another person to assault, obstruct, molest, or resist a public or peace officer or his employee; 3. The accused person used threatening or abusive language against a public/peace officer; 4. That the public officer at the time was acting or proceeding to act in his public duty or in execution of a warrant or legal process. The case of ASANTE v THE REPUBLIC (supra) set out the requisite ingredients to be proved by the prosecution in a charge of assault on a public officer. The Court held in the following words: “Where, as in this case, a person is charged with this offence, it is essential for the prosecution to prove (1) that the victim of the alleged assault is a police officer as stated in the indictment; (2) that he was in the due execution of his duty at the material time; and (3) the conduct of the accused as allegedly constituting the assault”. The court further held that it is not necessary to prove that the accused person knew at the time that the victim was a public officer if in fact he was; or that he was acting or proceeding to act in his public duty or in execution of a warrant or legal process. The prosecution called PW4, No. 56068 G/Const. Azaglo-Tay Bernard and PW5, No. 58434 G/Const. Galley Johnson to testify in support of its case. They both stated that they are police officers stationed at the Kpandai Police Station. That upon the complaint of causing unlawful damage made by PW1 they proceeded to the scene with PW1 to ascertain first-hand information. That they informed accused who was raising yam mounds nearby to avail himself at the police station to assist in investigations. Accused thereupon became infuriated and started advancing towards them amidst shouting that he was under attack which act attracted other farmers who emerged on the scene wielding short guns and cutlasses and joined the accused person to chase away the prosecution. From the evidence led I find that it is not disputed that the accused person on meeting PW4 and PW5 started shouting and raised an alarm which drew the nearby farmers to the scene. I also find that the accused started the shouting and raising the alarm after he was informed to avail himself at the police station. According to him, he did not know that PW4 was a policeman that is why he ran away shouting. This is what transpired during the cross examination of the accused by the prosecution: Q. You became angry and furious upon hearing your invitation to the police station. A: Yes Q: You then advance towards the unarmed police officers wielding a cutlass. A: I run away with the cutlass and the hoe. Q: While advancing towards the policemen, you began raising false alarm that you were under attack in your local dialect. A: Because I did not know them, that was why I was shouting and running away. Not because I wanted to do anything to them. Q: You will agree with me that, you did raise a false alarm A: Yes, because I did not know them, that was why I was running and shouting. Q: I put it to you that, you did that with the aim of scaring the police officers away. A: Because I did not know them, that was why I was scared. Q: Most of your colleague’s farmers came to your defence whiles wielding offensive weapons. A: They were there because they wanted to find out what was happening. Q: I put it to you that they came to assist you to chase the police officers and the complainant away from the scene from performing their lawful duty. A: I did not know they were police officers. If I had known, I would not have run away. I hold that the prosecution has been able to discharge the burden on them to prove the essential ingredients of the offence of assault on public officer with which the accused person has been charged. Evidence has been led to prove in fact that PW4 and PW5 are police officers and no contrary evidence has been led to prove otherwise. Having proved that PW4 and PW5 are police officers, it was irrelevant to the charge whether or not the accused knew at the time PW4 and PW5 came to his farm that they were police officers. The evidence further reveals that the accused person upon being informed to avail himself at the police station got angry and started running and shouting. I find that this act of the accused was done by him on purpose so as to obstruct PW4 and PW5 who were at the scene to conduct investigations into the complaint of unlawful damage and to assess the extent of the damage. PW4 and PW5 were at the scene for no other purpose but to perform their official duties as police officers. The accused person shouting and running and drawing the nearby farmers to the scene prevented PW4 and PW5 from performing their lawful duties. The accused person did not deny the prosecution’s assertion that the nearby farmers came wielding short guns and cutlasses and chased the police officers, PW4 and PW5 away. DW1 who testified for the accused person did not help his case in anyway as he stated that he came to the scene after the incident and he did not meet any other person but the accused at the scene. He therefore could not testify as to what actually happened at the scene. Under section 205 of Act 29, a person is liable for the offence if he committed the acts of assault by himself or aided or incited another person to commit the act of assault. I find that the accused person running and shouting upon being informed to come to the station amounts to an assault on PW4 and PW5 as he did it purposely to scare the policemen and to obstruct them from performing their lawful duties. I also find that the accused person shouting that he was under attack to draw the nearby farmers to the scene who joined the accused wielding short guns and cutlasses amounts to the accused inciting the nearby farmers to assault the policemen by causing fear and chasing them away, thereby preventing them from undertaking their lawful duty. I therefore find the accused person guilty of the offence of assault on public officer and I hereby convict the accused person on count three. CONCLUSION The prosecution failed to prove that the accused person caused the damage to PW1’s cassava farm intentionally and unlawfully. The said charge could not hold even though there was evidence that the accused set fire on his farm and the said fire crept onto the farm belonging to PW1 which shares a common boundary with that of the accused person. Having therefore failed to prove that the accused intentionally caused the damage to PW1’s farm, I acquit and discharge the accused person on count one. On count 2, of essence is the evidence of PW1 to the charge of threat of death against him. In his whole evidence, PW1 stated nowhere that the accused said those words to him which put him in a state of fear. The evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 in that regard were therefore premised on nothing. In his evidence in chief, PW1 did not say whether he heard the words spoken by the accused in his absence through PW2 and PW3 which put him in fear of death, or that at the scene the accused said those words to him in the presence of PW4 and PW5 which put him in a state of fear of death. I therefore hold that the prosecution failed to prove the charge of threat of death of PW1 by the accused. I therefore acquit and discharge the accused person on count 2. The prosecution has however been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person committed assault on PW4 and PW5 who are policemen who visited the scene to investigate the complaint lodged by PW1. I find that the acts of shouting and raising alarm which drew the natives to the scene wielding weapons obstructed PW4 and PW5 by preventing them from undertaking their lawful duties at the scene. I therefore convict and pronounce the accused person guilty of count three. SENTENCE I have considered the plea of mitigation by the accused and also that the accused person is a first time offender. I hereby sentence the accused person to a fine of one hundred (100) penalty units to be paid forthwith or in default, one month’s imprisonment. This is to serve as a deterrent to the accused, his cohorts and the general public and to decry the conduct of civilians attacking and assaulting public officers. Such uncivilized acts do not augur well for our democracy which we need to guard with all our strength and might. SGD H/W GODSON ETSE KUMADO